Brickley, J.
In these cases we must decide whether trial judges may properly use CJI 7:8:0s,1 [23]*23which explains to the jury the disposition to be made of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, over defendants’ objections.
Defendant Goad was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f). At trial, Goad raised an insanity defense and offered the testimony of a psychiatrist to the effect that he was legally insane at the time of the incident because of acute brain syndrome, a mental illness which results from an interference with the functioning of the brain. The prosecutor rebutted this testimony. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court gave a dispositional instruction conforming with CJI 7:8:08.2 The jury returned verdicts of [24]*24guilty on both counts, and Goad was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment.
On his appeal as of right, Goad claimed the dispositional instruction (CJI 7:8:08) should not have been given. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion per curiam, held that "a trial judge has independent authority” to give the disposition instruction, even over defendant’s objection. People v Goad, 109 Mich App 726, 727; 311 NW2d 457 (1981). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction because it found no instructional error requiring reversal.
Defendant Gillen was charged with one count of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797; and one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Gillen raised an insanity defense at trial, and two psychiatrists testified that he was suffering from a mental illness. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called a psychiatrist who testified that Gillen [25]*25was D.ot suffering from mental illness and was not legally insane. At the close of proofs, the trial judge, over defense counsel’s objection,3 gave the dispositional instruction, CJX 7:8:08. The jury returned a verdict of guilty but mentally ill on both counts.
In appealing his conviction, Gillen claimed the dispositional instruction was improper. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting that the trial court complied with the duty to accurately instruct the jury as to the applicable law.
We granted leave to appeal for both cases and ordered that they be argued and submitted together, limiting the issue in each case to "whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.” 417 Mich 1036; 335 NW2d 468 (1983).
The rule in Michigan has always been that neither the court nor counsel should address themselves to the question of the disposition of a defendant after the verdict. Indeed, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they are not to speculate upon such matters,4 and that they are to [26]*26confine their deliberations to the issue of guilt or innocence. People v Szczytko, 390 Mich 278, 285; 212 NW2d 211 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
In Underwood v People, 32 Mich 1 (1875), the defendant challenged the then existing statutory procedure for trial of persons who raised an insanity defense. The Court, in upholding the trial procedure, noted that "[t]he finding of the jury is confined to the prisoner’s condition at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act.” Id., p 2. The Court also stated that an "information . . . can lawfully embrace, no issue except the prisoner’s guilt as charged.” Any collateral inquiry would be foreign to the issue of the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits. Id.
In People v Williams, 218 Mich 436; 188 NW 403 (1922), the trial court had instructed the jury in part:
"[Y]ou are not concerned in the penalty, that is a matter for the discretion of this court, and if you were informed in any way as to the penalty that might be handed out, you should not be influenced thereby.”
This Court held the instruction was not error. Defense had made allusions to the possible consequences of a guilty verdict and it was therefore proper for the trial court to give the above instruction.
In People v Warner, 289 Mich 516; 286 NW 811 (1939), the jury, after finding itself unable to render a verdict, asked the trial court if a verdict could be accompanied by a recommendation of leniency. The trial court answered in the affirmative, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of leniency after a short time. This Court reversed, holding:_
[27]*27"Defendant was entitled to a fair trial and to a verdict by the jury upon the evidence without consideration of the punishment to be administered.” Id., p 521.
We quoted with approval the following language from a case with almost identical facts:
"The jurors should not have concerned themselves with the punishment, and ought to have been plainly told that they ought not to take that into consideration. Their function ended in deducing the truth from the evidence adduced and expressing it in their verdict. Anything said by the court calculated to draw their attention from the performance thereof, and to induce them to rest their conclusion upon ulterior considerations necessarily was misleading and prejudicial.” State v Kernan, 154 Iowa 672, 677; 135 NW 362; 40 LRA(NS) 239 (1912).
Against this time-proven principle a limited exception has arisen. People v Cole, 382 Mich 695; 172 NW2d 354 (1969). In Cole we noted that instructions as to a defendant’s disposition are extraneous to the basic duty of the jury and should not be given since they would hinder rather than aid the jury in determining the issue of guilt. Id., p 718. The reason for this rule is that jurors might disregard their oath to render a true verdict according to the evidence if concerned with extraneous considerations. Nevertheless, this Court held that the possible miscarriage of justice of imprisoning a defendant who should be hospitalized is a consideration that "far outweigh[s]” the fear that a jury would compromise its integrity and render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence. Id., p 720.
We quoted with approval the following rationale from Lyles v United States, 103 US App DC 22, 25; 254 F2d 725 (1957), cert den 356 US 961 (1958):
[28]*28"This point arises under the doctrine, well established and sound, that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the nature or extent of it, or in probation. But we think that doctrine does not apply in the problem before us. The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning.
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Brickley, J.
In these cases we must decide whether trial judges may properly use CJI 7:8:0s,1 [23]*23which explains to the jury the disposition to be made of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, over defendants’ objections.
Defendant Goad was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f). At trial, Goad raised an insanity defense and offered the testimony of a psychiatrist to the effect that he was legally insane at the time of the incident because of acute brain syndrome, a mental illness which results from an interference with the functioning of the brain. The prosecutor rebutted this testimony. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court gave a dispositional instruction conforming with CJI 7:8:08.2 The jury returned verdicts of [24]*24guilty on both counts, and Goad was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment.
On his appeal as of right, Goad claimed the dispositional instruction (CJI 7:8:08) should not have been given. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion per curiam, held that "a trial judge has independent authority” to give the disposition instruction, even over defendant’s objection. People v Goad, 109 Mich App 726, 727; 311 NW2d 457 (1981). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction because it found no instructional error requiring reversal.
Defendant Gillen was charged with one count of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797; and one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Gillen raised an insanity defense at trial, and two psychiatrists testified that he was suffering from a mental illness. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called a psychiatrist who testified that Gillen [25]*25was D.ot suffering from mental illness and was not legally insane. At the close of proofs, the trial judge, over defense counsel’s objection,3 gave the dispositional instruction, CJX 7:8:08. The jury returned a verdict of guilty but mentally ill on both counts.
In appealing his conviction, Gillen claimed the dispositional instruction was improper. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting that the trial court complied with the duty to accurately instruct the jury as to the applicable law.
We granted leave to appeal for both cases and ordered that they be argued and submitted together, limiting the issue in each case to "whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.” 417 Mich 1036; 335 NW2d 468 (1983).
The rule in Michigan has always been that neither the court nor counsel should address themselves to the question of the disposition of a defendant after the verdict. Indeed, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they are not to speculate upon such matters,4 and that they are to [26]*26confine their deliberations to the issue of guilt or innocence. People v Szczytko, 390 Mich 278, 285; 212 NW2d 211 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
In Underwood v People, 32 Mich 1 (1875), the defendant challenged the then existing statutory procedure for trial of persons who raised an insanity defense. The Court, in upholding the trial procedure, noted that "[t]he finding of the jury is confined to the prisoner’s condition at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act.” Id., p 2. The Court also stated that an "information . . . can lawfully embrace, no issue except the prisoner’s guilt as charged.” Any collateral inquiry would be foreign to the issue of the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits. Id.
In People v Williams, 218 Mich 436; 188 NW 403 (1922), the trial court had instructed the jury in part:
"[Y]ou are not concerned in the penalty, that is a matter for the discretion of this court, and if you were informed in any way as to the penalty that might be handed out, you should not be influenced thereby.”
This Court held the instruction was not error. Defense had made allusions to the possible consequences of a guilty verdict and it was therefore proper for the trial court to give the above instruction.
In People v Warner, 289 Mich 516; 286 NW 811 (1939), the jury, after finding itself unable to render a verdict, asked the trial court if a verdict could be accompanied by a recommendation of leniency. The trial court answered in the affirmative, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of leniency after a short time. This Court reversed, holding:_
[27]*27"Defendant was entitled to a fair trial and to a verdict by the jury upon the evidence without consideration of the punishment to be administered.” Id., p 521.
We quoted with approval the following language from a case with almost identical facts:
"The jurors should not have concerned themselves with the punishment, and ought to have been plainly told that they ought not to take that into consideration. Their function ended in deducing the truth from the evidence adduced and expressing it in their verdict. Anything said by the court calculated to draw their attention from the performance thereof, and to induce them to rest their conclusion upon ulterior considerations necessarily was misleading and prejudicial.” State v Kernan, 154 Iowa 672, 677; 135 NW 362; 40 LRA(NS) 239 (1912).
Against this time-proven principle a limited exception has arisen. People v Cole, 382 Mich 695; 172 NW2d 354 (1969). In Cole we noted that instructions as to a defendant’s disposition are extraneous to the basic duty of the jury and should not be given since they would hinder rather than aid the jury in determining the issue of guilt. Id., p 718. The reason for this rule is that jurors might disregard their oath to render a true verdict according to the evidence if concerned with extraneous considerations. Nevertheless, this Court held that the possible miscarriage of justice of imprisoning a defendant who should be hospitalized is a consideration that "far outweigh[s]” the fear that a jury would compromise its integrity and render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence. Id., p 720.
We quoted with approval the following rationale from Lyles v United States, 103 US App DC 22, 25; 254 F2d 725 (1957), cert den 356 US 961 (1958):
[28]*28"This point arises under the doctrine, well established and sound, that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the nature or extent of it, or in probation. But we think that doctrine does not apply in the problem before us. The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning. As a matter of fact its meaning was not made clear in this jurisdiction until Congress enacted the statute of August 9, 1955 [69 Stat 710; DC Code § 24-301 (1951) (Supp 5)]. It means neither freedom nor punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.” 382 Mich 719-720.
This Court held that in trials "where the defense of insanity is present and that issue is submissible by the proofs, the defendant, upon his own timely request, or upon request of the jury, shall be entitled to an instruction in accord with the rule of Lyles.” Id., pp 720-721.
At the time Cole was decided, the commitment procedure for persons acquitted by reason of insanity provided in part:
"Any person, who is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the court or jury by reason of insanity, shall be committed immediately by order of the court to the [29]*29department of mental health for treatment in an appropriate state hospital, until discharged .... The person shall not be released on convalescent care or final discharge without being evaluated and recommended for release by the center for forensic psychiatry.” MCL 767.27b; MSA 28.966(12).
Effective in 1975, the Legislature passed the Mental Health Code which replaced most of the previous applicable statutes, including the dispositional statute in effect at the time Cole was decided. The statutory provisions for the disposition of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity are much more complex under the Mental Health Code. For example, the general dispositional statute, MCL 330.2050; MSA 14.800(1050), provides:
"(1) The court shall immediately commit any person who is acquitted of a criminal charge by reason of insanity to the custody of the center for forensic psychiatry, for a period not to exceed 60 days. The court shall forward to the center a full report, in the form of a settled record, of the facts concerning the crime which the patient was found to have committed but of which he was acquitted by reason of insanity. The center shall thoroughly examine and evaluate the present mental condition of the person in order to reach an opinion on whether the person meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment or for judicial admission set forth in section 401 or 515.
"(2) Within the 60-day period the center shall file a report with the court, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel. The report shall contain a summary of the crime which the patient committed but of which he was acquitted by reason of insanity and an opinion as to whether the person meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment or for judicial admission as defined by section 401 or 515, and the facts upon which the opinion is based. If the opinion stated is that the person is a person requiring treatment, the report shall be accompanied by certificates from 2 physicians, at least 1 [30]*30of whom shall be a psychiatrist, which conform to the requirements of section 400(j).
"(3) After receipt of the report, the court may direct the prosecuting attorney to file a petition pursuant to section 434 or 516 for an order of hospitalization or an order of admission to a facility with the probate court of the person’s county of residence or of the county in which the criminal trial was held. Any certificates that accompanied the report of the center may be filed with the petition, and shall be sufficient to cause a hearing to be held pursuant to section 451 even if they were not executed within 72 hours of the filing of the petition. The report from the court containing the facts concerning the crime for which he was acquitted by reason of insanity shall be admissible in the hearings.
"(4) If the report states the opinion that the person meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment or for judicial admission, and if a petition is to be filed pursuant to subsection (3), the center may retain the person pending a hearing on the petition. If a petition is not to be filed, the prosecutor shall notify the center in writing. The center, upon receipt of the notification, shall cause the person to be discharged.
"(5) The release provisions of sections 476 to 479 of this act shall apply to a person found to have committed a crime by a court or jury, but who is acquitted by reason of insanity, except that a person shall not be discharged or placed on leave without first being evaluated and recommended for discharge or leave by the department’s program for forensic psychiatry, and authorized leave or absence from the hospital may be extended for a period of 5 years.”
CJI 7:8:08, in its attempt to inform the jury of the disposition of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity, paraphrases and summarizes the portions of the above statute believed to be relevant and necessary to give the jurors an understanding of events should it return the verdict at issue. However, the ratio decidendi of Lyles is that "the jury has the right to know the meaning” of the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. [31]*31103 US App DC 25. (Emphasis added.) There are, however, so many contingencies written into the statutory procedure that neither a jury nor any other person could predict the disposition of the defendant. For example, it cannot be known whether the center for forensic psychiatry will find that the defendant meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment or for judicial admission. Even if such a finding is made, it cannot be known if the court will direct the prosecuting attorney to file a petition for an order of hospitalization or an order of admission. If a petition is filed, there is no way of knowing whether it will be dismissed. There is also no way of knowing, assuming a petition is filed, whether the center will retain the defendant pending a hearing on the petition.
In Garrett v State, 320 A2d 745 (Del, 1974), the Delaware Supreme Court discussed the propriety of a Lyles-type instruction. As in Michigan’s statutory scheme, the Delaware disposition provisions gave officials discretion on whether to take steps to assure the defendant would be confined. The court offered the following analysis:
"The ultimate disposition of the defendant after a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, could not have been explained to the jury with any reasonable degree of certainty. Reading the text of, or paraphrasing [the dispositional statute] would have left the jury uncertain and confused, premised as it is upon (1) the discretion of the Attorney General in moving for commitment; (2) the discretion of the Superior Court in acting upon such motion; and (3) the discretion of the Superior Court in freeing the defendant 'whenever it is satisfied that the public safety will not be thereby endangered.’ Jury uncertainty and confusion as to the ultimate disposition of the defendant in the instant case, [under an instruction in accord with the disposition statute], would have been increased by the opinion testimony of representatives of the Delaware State [32]*32Hospital at the trial that the defendant was not mentally ill at the time of the offense, thus raising the possibility and probability of an early recommendation to the Superior Court that prompt release of the defendant from the Hospital would not endanger public safety.” 320 A2d 749-750.
The court held that no "instruction could have been formulated in this case under [the dispositional statute] with any reasonable degree of clarity and certainty.”* ***5 Id.
We agree with this reasoning and hold that because of the numerous possible contingencies under the statutory scheme, "no instruction could adequately postulate the impact of such a verdict on the appellant’s future tenure in the institution.” State v Wallace, 333 A2d 72, 79 (Me, 1975).
Assuming it is possible to draft an instruction which completely and accurately describes the disposition to be made of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity, we hold that any attempt to do so is unacceptable. The basic dispositional statute refers, in its text, to nine other statutes, without which it cannot be understood.6 Some of [35]*35these referred to statutes in turn refer to other provisions.* *****7 If the jury’s "right to know the meaning” of its verdict is to be fulfilled, the jurors would have to be read many of these provisions.8
For example, the jurors are not given the statutory definitions of "a person requiring treatment,” MCL 330.1401; MSA 14.800(401), or of whom may be a candidate for judicial admission, MCL 330.1515; MSA 14.800(515).9 These are the critical definitions [36]*36upon which the decision to confine or release the defendant will be based. The proponents of the instruction argue that this is largely the jury’s concern when a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is considered, and yet, inexplicably the jury is not given these definitions. They have no way of knowing the standards upon which the decision to commit or discharge the defendant will be based. If the jury were given these definitions, they would then have four more definitions of mental states to consider besides the ones upon which they would already be properly instructed.10 Of course, these four added definitions are irrelevant to the issue they are obliged to decide — whether beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was sane at the time he committed the charged crime.
This illustrates the difficulties that would inevitably occur if we did attempt to explain the detailed statutory scheme to the jury. It also shows that CJI 7:8:08 gives the jury an incomplete understanding of the meaning of its verdict. We hold, therefore, that the alternative of attempting to lead the jury through a labyrinth of complex statutory provisions would be an unwise and unacceptable extension of the exception to the general rule that jurors are not to be concerned with the consequences of their verdict.__
[37]*37Having decided that it was error to give CJI 7:8:08, we nevertheless affirm the Court of Appeals judgment in each case. It is argued that the instruction, and in particular the "60 days” language, led the juries to believe that appellants would be shortly released if they were found not guilty by reason of insanity. On the other hand, it was asserted in Cole that a jury, if it were not told of a defendant’s disposition, would tend to convict because of the fear that he would be released if found not guilty by reason of insanity.11 The assertion, that the giving of CJI 7:8:08 makes a guilty verdict more likely than when no dispositional instruction is given is, without information to the contrary, pure speculation. We find no error which requires reversal.
We hold that in all jury instructions given more than 30 days after the filing of this opinion, the jurors shall not be given any information including, but not limited to, CJI 7:8:07 and 7:8:08 regarding the disposition of the defendant after their verdict.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Levin and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Brickley, J., only in Gillen.