People v. Gibson

2025 IL App (5th) 210428-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 210428-U NOTICE Decision filed 03/06/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-21-0428 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-120 ) TRAVIEL C. GIBSON, ) Honorable ) Jerry E. Crisel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McHaney and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction where the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements, the admittance of character evidence was not an abuse of discretion, and certain remarks within the prosecutor’s closing argument did not result in reversible error.

¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Traviel C. Gibson, was convicted of first degree

murder and robbery. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to consecutive terms of 70 years’

imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) for first degree murder with a 3-

year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and 5 years’ imprisonment for robbery with a

1-year term of MSR.

¶3 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

statements, improperly admitting character evidence, allowing the State to commit prosecutorial

1 misconduct during closing arguments, and that the cumulative effect of these errors was to deny

the defendant a fair trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On May 13, 2020, Sam Gibson, the defendant’s father, was found deceased with multiple

gunshot wounds at his house. The investigation showed the defendant was present at Sam’s house

when Mt. Vernon Police Department (MVPD) officers arrived, and he was subsequently arrested

and interviewed. The defendant was taken into custody and made a statement to Detectives Koontz

and Osborn at the MVPD. Prior to the custodial interview, the defendant initialed a form containing

warnings relating to his constitutional rights outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

titled “Statement of Constitutional Rights and Waiver” (Miranda waiver). The custodial interview

was video recorded.

¶6 On May 15, 2020, the defendant was charged with three counts of first degree murder,

Class M felonies, in connection with Sam’s death. Counts I and II were charged in violation of

section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West

2020)), as intentional first degree murder, and count III was charged in violation of section 9-

1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (id. § 9-1(a)(2)), as first degree murder based on the defendant’s

knowledge that he was creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Each count

alleged that the defendant committed the crime while personally discharging a firearm that

proximately caused a death, resulting in a mandatory firearm enhancement of 25-years to a term

of natural life to be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court. See 730 ILCS

5/5-8-1(d)(iii) (West 2020). The defendant was also charged with one count of robbery, a Class 2

felony, in violation of section 18-1(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2020)),

2 alleging that the defendant knowingly took the property, a cellular telephone (phone), from Rhonda

Wesley, who was Sam’s girlfriend, by the use of force.

¶7 On July 21, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to suppress statements pursuant to section

114-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-11 (West 2020)), requesting

that any statements made by the defendant to law enforcement at the time of and subsequent to his

arrest be suppressed. The motion argued that his statements made during his post-arrest custodial

interview were involuntary and obtained in violation of the fifth, six, and fourteenth amendments

of the United States Constitution, and their counterparts in the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const.,

amends. V, VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, §§ 2, 10. The defendant further argued that the

Miranda waiver was not an effective waiver of his rights, as it was not made voluntarily,

knowingly, or intelligently.

¶8 At the hearing on the motion to suppress statements, the trial court heard testimony from

the detectives present during the defendant’s interview, viewed the audio-video recording of the

interview, and the completed Miranda waiver. The detectives testified that the defendant was

arrested at Sam’s house and transported to the MVPD. Once there, the defendant was taken into a

room where the interview was conducted and recorded. Detective Koontz testified that at the time

of the custodial interview, the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any alcohol or

substances. At the start of the video, Detective Koontz said, “[B]efore we ask you any questions,

since you’re in custody, I got to read you your rights. Okay?” Detective Koontz then told the

defendant that at the time of questioning, he was in custody for obstructing justice and a battery.

The interview proceeded with the following:

“DETECTIVE KOONTZ: But we’re going to find out what’s going on. Okay. You

have the right to remain silent. Okay. Anything you say can be used against you in court

3 or other proceedings. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you

any questions and—and to have him with you—him or her with you during questioning.

If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you free of cost to

you before any questions if you wish. Okay.

Do you understand that?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.

DETECTIVE KOONTZ: Okay.

[THE DEFENDANT]: Okay. You say—say it one more time.

DETECTIVE KOONTZ: I’m sorry?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Say it one more time, please.

DETECTIVE KOONTZ: Read—you want me to read through all of them?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Yeah. Yeah.

DETECTIVE KOONTZ: Yeah. Okay. You have the right to remain silent.

Anything you say can be used against you in a—in court or other proceedings. You have

the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any question, to have him or her

with you here during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to

represent you free of any cost to you. Do you understand that?

[THE DEFENDANT]: So am I supposed to pick one? Do I—

DETECTIVE KOONTZ: No it’s just—I’m just letting you know what those are.”

The defendant then initialed a document titled “Statement of Constitutional Rights and Waiver,”

which in part states, “I understand what my rights are, and I am willing to answer questions.”

During the interview, the defendant stated that his father, Sam, was a “distant family member.”

The morning of the offense, the defendant stated Sam was “worked up” about something, but the

4 defendant could not recall what, and that it did not seem like Sam was okay. The defendant said

Sam asked the defendant questions and lectured him. The defendant said he could not recall the

subsequent events because his thoughts were “boggled up.” He stated that after he saw Sam’s

body, the defendant walked around outside the house for a while before returning, and then he

remained inside until Rhonda arrived at the house.

¶9 The defendant stated that when Rhonda saw what had happened to Sam, she seemed afraid

that the defendant would harm her. The defendant said he tried to calm Rhonda down while she

was trying to make a telephone call but denied taking her phone. The defendant explained that

when he reached out for Rhonda, he did not intend to push or harm her, he only meant to prevent

her from using her phone. The defendant stated that he did not hear any gunshots and was unsure

how Sam ended up on the ground, or what had happened. The defendant suggested that Sam may

have been shot because he was “talking too much” to somebody, but the defendant reiterated that

he did not know what happened to Sam. The defendant then invoked his right to counsel and the

interview concluded.

¶ 10 The trial court found that the video showed the defendant had enough time to read the form,

was read his rights twice, and waived them. Further, about 37 minutes into the interview, the trial

court noted that the defendant invoked his right to an attorney, indicating that the defendant

understood his rights. The motion to suppress was denied.

¶ 11 On April 5, 2021, the State filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence from Officer

Schultze of the MVPD regarding motive. The State proffered that the defendant told Officer

Schultze that he did not get along with Sam. The State argued that this statement, while inclusive

of information revealing prior bad acts, was evidence of motive in the case. The defendant

countered that the statement was vague and not sufficiently relevant to overcome its prejudicial

5 impact. The trial court granted the motion in limine, finding the statement was relevant and not

“very prejudicial.”

¶ 12 The matter proceeded to jury trial on September 15, 2021. Rhonda Wesley, Sam’s

girlfriend, testified that on May 12, 2020, the defendant and his children stayed the night at Sam’s

house. She stated the defendant had been “in and out” of Sam’s house, and Sam wanted the

defendant to find somewhere else to stay. Rhonda testified that on May 13, 2020, she left the house

in Sam’s car to run errands. The defendant and his children were in the house, and Sam was on the

front porch. When Rhonda returned approximately 30 minutes later, she found Sam lying

motionless on the ground with blood near his ear. He was holding a pistol in his right hand. Rhonda

attempted to call the police, but the defendant walked out of the house, took her phone, grabbed

her around her neck, and pulled her backwards. He took cigarettes out of her purse and walked

back into the house. He then told Rhonda he was joking. Rhonda drove to the MVPD and reported

what had happened. On cross-examination, Rhonda testified that in the weeks before Sam’s death,

the defendant had been staying “off and on” with Sam and Rhonda at their house. Rhonda stated

that the defendant and his father would argue occasionally, but for the most part, got along. When

asked if she returned home, Rhonda said she did not drive back to the house until she completed

her errands.

¶ 13 Officer Schultze of the MVPD testified that in April 2020, he responded three times to a

“verbal domestic” between the defendant and his partner. Officer Schultze stated, “There were

three instances. The first time, it was a verbal domestic between the two. They were arguing. ***

There was no physical altercation.” The defendant then left the scene. Officer Schultze further

testified, “About 30 minutes later, I respond again, and during this time, you know, still in effort

to try to get the parties separated, I asked [the defendant’s partner] if there is anywhere else [the

6 defendant] can go.” Officer Schultze then asked the defendant “if he could go to his father’s house,

and he told me him and his dad don’t get along.”

¶ 14 MVPD officers testified that when they arrived at Sam’s house on the day of the murder,

the defendant went into Sam’s house after being on the front porch and locked the door. The

defendant opened the door when officers tried to forcibly enter but then struggled with officers

while being detained. Evidence the MVPD collected from the house showed that Sam had been

shot 13 to 15 times, and that shell casings were discovered near his body. The handgun used was

purchased by the defendant several months prior, and ammunition was discovered in the

defendant’s car parked in front of Sam’s house. A navy-blue jacket belonging to the defendant was

found on a nearby chair after his arrest. A hat with the defendant’s DNA was discovered in an

alley near Sam’s house, and testing of particle samples collected from the defendant’s left hand

showed a small amount of gunshot residue (GSR) was present.

¶ 15 Following his arrest, the defendant was transported to the MVPD and interviewed by

Detective Koontz, while Detective Osborn observed. The video interview was played for the jury

and admitted into evidence. The State presented footage from surveillance cameras located in the

vicinity of Sam’s house at the time of the murder and shortly after. The video footage showed a

black man with dreadlocks in a blue jacket walking around the adjacent streets, yards, and alleys.

MVPD Assistant Chief Brands testified that one of the video exhibits showed a man facing the

camera wearing a jacket that was later recovered from Sam’s home, which Assistant Chief Brands

identified as the defendant’s. Assistant Chief Brands also testified that the video footage showed

Rhonda’s vehicle drive past the house during the time she said she was running errands, despite

her testimony that she remained at the store.

7 ¶ 16 The State called Ronald Minks, a postal worker who was delivering mail in the area at the

time of the murder. He testified to seeing a man walking around the neighborhood with a

semiautomatic pistol in his hand. The man was a black man with dreadlocks and a blue jacket. The

State asked Minks if he recognized the individual in surveillance footage captured after the murder,

to which Minks stated that he did due to the clothing worn. Minks did not identify the man as the

defendant during trial and was not directly asked to do so.

¶ 17 The State then called MPVD Detective Osborn, who testified to the custodial interview

conducted after the defendant’s arrest, which was consistent with his testimony during the motion

to suppress statements hearing. Detective Osborn also stated that during the course of his

investigation, he was made aware of several statements made by the defendant during jail visits

and telephone or video calls. During a video call with his mother, on May 18, 2020, the defendant

stated that he had found Sam on the ground, the defendant did not know if anyone else was at the

house, and he believed it was a set up but did not explain why.

¶ 18 Detective Osborn further testified that during a jail visit between the defendant and his

sister on May 17, 2020, the defendant stated that before the murder occurred, he told his children

to go to the basement because he thought someone was going to kill him. His sister asked if he

remembered anything else, and the defendant stated that he heard something that sounded like a

knocking sound on wood. The defendant reiterated he did not know what happened, but said Sam

told the defendant for the past few days that he needed “to go because of them,” without explaining

who he meant by “them.”

¶ 19 The State called three forensic scientists to testify as experts for the physical evidence in

the case. Susan Kidd was qualified as a forensic biologist, and she identified the procedures used

to establish the defendant’s DNA on the hat found near Sam’s house. Angela Horn was qualified

8 as an expert in firearm identification, and she explained the procedures used to identify the firearm,

bullets, and shell casings evidence provided in this case. Shan Mei Jones was qualified as an expert

in trace chemistry. She identified the procedures used to test GSR samples provided by Rhonda

and the defendant. The samples from Rhonda showed no GSR, and the defendant’s samples

showed GSR present on his left hand. The State then rested its case.

¶ 20 The defense called Damon Owens, who lived down the street from Sam. Owens testified

that, on the day of the murder, he heard a loud noise, similar to a firecracker, and looked outside.

He saw a man in the street who was running, possibly trying to “dodge stuff.” Thirty minutes later,

Owens heard a scream, went to the back door, and saw a heavyset black man reaching over a

blonde woman and then heard the woman say something about a phone. The woman then got into

a car and left. Owens testified that the man he saw in the street running was not the person he saw

reaching over the woman.

¶ 21 On cross-examination, the State asked Owens if he recognized the defendant, and Owens

said he did not. Owens also acknowledged that his recollection of the timing of the events may

have been different from what he told MVPD officers previously. Owens was questioned

concerning the view he had of Sam’s house, including whether he looked out the window or the

door, whether the door was clear or smudged, and whether Sam’s house and the street in front of

it were even visible from Owens’s house. The defense submitted a recording of the MVPD’s

interview with Owens into evidence and rested its case.

¶ 22 During closing arguments, the State said that the defendant “told” what he did through his

actions and words. The State argued that the defendant was the only person with the motive, means,

and opportunity to commit the offense, and even though he consistently claimed that he did not

know what had happened, he conceded that Sam’s death might have been an accident. The State

9 also highlighted physical evidence connecting the defendant to the offense, such as the gunshot

residue on the defendant’s hand and that the defendant was the legal owner of the firearm that was

used to kill Sam. The State further argued that the video surveillance corroborated the defendant’s

statements that he walked around the neighborhood near Sam’s house, and then stated that the

defendant was identified by a postal worker.

¶ 23 The defense stated during closing arguments that Sam did not want the defendant in the

house due to potential danger, the defendant did not know what happened, and that he believed the

offense to be a “setup.” The defense noted that the defendant was in a state of shock during his

interview and never admitted to shooting Sam.

¶ 24 The case was sent to the jury, which found the defendant guilty. The defendant filed a

motion for new trial, which was denied. He was sentenced on December 16, 2021, to 70 years’

imprisonment for first degree murder and 5 years’ imprisonment for robbery, to be served

consecutively. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence, and the

defendant timely appealed.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 On appeal, the defendant’s opening brief lists three issues for this court’s review. Upon

review of the defendant’s arguments under these issues, we find that these issues incorporate

arguments that are more efficiently and appropriately addressed as separate issues. Therefore, we

find that the defendant raises five issues for this court’s consideration.

¶ 27 The defendant abandoned his argument that improper lay identification testimony was

admitted in his rebuttal brief. “[W]hen a party withdraws an issue in a reply brief, he or she

concedes that the other side is correct or that a subsequent decision has resolved the issue.” People

v. Serritella, 2022 IL App (1st) 200072, ¶ 119. As such, we will not address this issue further.

10 ¶ 28 The defendant’s remaining issues are that the trial court erred in (1) denying the

defendant’s motion to suppress statements; (2) allowing improper character evidence; (3) allowing

prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments; and (4) that due to the cumulative effect of these

alleged errors, the defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. We will proceed

with our analysis of the issues in the order listed.

¶ 29 A. Motion to Suppress Statements

¶ 30 On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress statements. The defendant claims that his custodial statements to police were involuntary

where his demeanor indicated that he was confused and in a “charged emotional state,” and where

his Miranda waiver was not made voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently. Specifically, the

defendant argues that his Miranda waiver was ineffective where he (1) was informed he was in

custody for obstructing and battery; (2) was not informed that he would be questioned regarding

his father’s murder; (3) did not indicate that he understood his Miranda warnings; (4) did not

verbally waive his rights; (5) was misinformed about the nature of the form he signed; and (6) was

rushed through the waiver process.

¶ 31 The State responds that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress where

the defendant’s statements were made voluntarily after the defendant made a knowing and

intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. The State

notes that the detective read the defendant his Miranda rights twice, and that the defendant had

time to review the waiver form before signing. The State further argues that the defendant later

invoked his right to counsel, which indicated that he understood his rights.

¶ 32 We review a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a two-part standard of review.

People v. Quevedo, 403 Ill. App. 3d 282, 292 (2010). We first review the trial court’s factual

11 findings under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, while the ultimate question of whether

the defendant’s waiver was voluntary is reviewed de novo. People v. Soto, 2017 IL App (1st)

140893, ¶ 69; People v. Goins, 2013 IL App (1st) 113201, ¶ 47. In this case, the court relied on a

video recording of the defendant’s custodial interview, which this court has also viewed. Any

discrepancies between that video and the officer’s testimony must be resolved in favor of what the

video shows. Id.

¶ 33 Neither party disputes that the defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation. A

custodial statement may be admitted into evidence where the statement was voluntary. People v.

Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 252 (2009). “[T]he test of voluntariness is whether the defendant

made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or

whether the defendant’s will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.” People v. Gilliam,

172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). In making this determination, we consider the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the statement, including the defendant’s age, intelligence, education,

experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of questioning. People

v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 81. In addition, courts consider the legality and duration of the

detention, the duration of the questioning, the provision of Miranda warnings, and any physical or

mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises. Id. Where a defendant

challenges the admissibility of a confession through a motion to suppress, the State bears the

burden of proving the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. 725 ILCS

5/114-11(d) (West 2020); People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003).

¶ 34 The concept of voluntariness includes proof that the defendant made a knowing and

intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. People v.

Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 54 (1990). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that, prior to

12 the start of a custodial interrogation, a person being questioned by law enforcement officers must

first “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used

as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or

appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Miranda warnings are the procedural safeguards that

help protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987).

Any statements obtained in derogation of those rights are inadmissible in a later criminal

prosecution unless those rights were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived. Goins, 2013

IL App (1st) 113201, ¶ 48. A defendant validly waives Miranda when he or she (1) freely and

deliberately (voluntarily) relinquishes the right and (2) is fully aware of both the nature of the right

being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to do so. People v. Crotty, 394 Ill. App. 3d

651, 662 (2009). The State has the burden of proving the validity of a Miranda waiver by a

preponderance of the evidence, and if the State makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

defendant to show that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Id.

¶ 35 The evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress established that after the

defendant was arrested at the victim’s house, he was transported to the MVPD, where he was

interviewed by Detective Koontz, while Detective Osborn observed. The defendant was advised

that he was in custody and was read his rights pursuant to Miranda twice. The defendant initialed

the Miranda form after being given an opportunity to review the same. He was never threatened

or coerced, and the parties were calm as they talked. At the time of the interview, the defendant

was 30 years old, had no health issues, and had attended college for two and a half years. The

defendant was questioned for approximately 40 minutes and did not appear to be under the

influence of alcohol or drugs. The interview was ultimately terminated when the defendant

13 requested an attorney. The defendant’s Miranda waiver form was entered into evidence and

contained the defendant’s initials.

¶ 36 The defendant argues that during his interrogation, he demonstrated a charged emotional

state and confusion, where he indicated that he could not remember what happened and expressed

that his thoughts were “boggled up.” Additionally, the defendant points out that he misstated his

father’s gender and their relationship when asked about his father, and he said, “she’s like a—like

a distant family member.” Thus, the defendant argues his emotional state and demonstrated

confusion rendered his statement and Miranda waiver involuntary.

¶ 37 After the defendant was read his Miranda rights the first time, he indicated that he

understood his rights by stating “[y]es.” While he asked if he should “pick one” after the second

reading, the statement could be interpreted as an inquiry as to how he might select an attorney

should he desire one. Although the defendant may have been emotionally overwhelmed from the

events of the day, he was able to understand questions, communicate, read, write, and most

importantly, invoke his right to an attorney thus ending the interrogation.

¶ 38 The defendant’s questions and demeanor did not render the defendant’s statements to

police involuntary, nor did they render his waiver ineffective. A knowing and intelligent waiver

requires the “ability to understand the very words used in the warnings. It need not mean the ability

to understand far-reaching legal and strategic effects of waiving one’s rights ***.”

People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 363 (1990). While the defendant may have shown some

instances of confusion, that does not mean the defendant could not understand the words used in

the Miranda warnings. The defendant invoked his right to counsel after a relatively short period

of questioning, indicating that he understood his rights. See People v. Thomas, 2020 IL App (1st)

170310, ¶ 34 (defendant’s request for counsel showed some understanding of Miranda rights).

14 ¶ 39 The defendant next argues that where he did not verbally waive his rights, his waiver was

not knowing and intelligent. A defendant is not required to verbally waive his rights where he

signed a Miranda waiver. See People v. Patton, 33 Ill. App. 3d 923, 926 (1975) (waiver form

signed by the defendant was positive evidence that he had been informed of his constitutional

rights and desired to waive those rights). The defendant initialed the form.

¶ 40 The defendant also argues that he was misinformed as to the nature of the form he signed,

and that the detective downplayed the importance of the waiver and rushed him into signing his

Miranda waiver. Detective Koontz read the defendant his Miranda rights twice, handed the

defendant the waiver form to sign, and the defendant had an opportunity to review the form.

Detective Koontz did not direct the defendant to hurry or rush him in any way. Detective Koontz

told the defendant that by signing the form, he was acknowledging that Detective Koontz had read

his rights to him. The defendant was informed of his rights before signing the waiver, and Detective

Koontz answered the defendant’s questions to the best of his ability, which did not downplay the

importance of the waiver. The trial court found that the defendant “had plenty of time to read ‘I

understand what my rights are and I am willing to answer questions,’ ” which was clearly written

in the form.

¶ 41 The defendant next challenges the voluntary nature of his waiver where he was informed

that he was in custody for obstructing justice and battery, but not informed that he would be

questioned regarding his father’s murder. The defendant was arrested at his father’s home, where

his father had been shot and killed. Any reasonable person would believe that questions about what

happened at the home that day would be posed by investigators. A defendant’s awareness,

however, of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to

determining whether he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.

15 Colorado, 479 U.S. at 577. The fact that the defendant was truthfully informed of the crimes for

which he was already arrested at the time of questioning and not informed of the intended line of

questioning related to his father’s death does not render his otherwise knowing and intelligent

waiver invalid, or his statements involuntary.

¶ 42 In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements, the trial court considered all of

the relevant evidence before it when determining whether the defendant’s statements and Miranda

waiver were voluntary and whether the defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent.

The trial court found that the evidence established that the defendant’s statements were made

freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, and that the defendant’s

will was not overcome. The trial court found that the defendant’s statement was voluntary and that

his waiver was made knowingly and intelligently in part because, “If there is any question about

his understanding at some point, at 37 or 38 minutes in he invoked his right to an attorney which

tells me that he certainly understood that part of it.” Based upon our review of the record, the

opposite conclusion to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations are not

evident, nor were the trial court’s findings unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.

Consequently, we find that the trial court’s factual findings, including that the defendant

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, were not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

¶ 43 We further find, based on our de novo review, that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary

and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, where on the facts

of this case, there was no constitutional violation warranting suppression of the evidence.

16 ¶ 44 B. Defendant’s Other Bad Acts

¶ 45 The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine,

filed pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), to admit evidence of the

defendant’s statement to Officer Schultze that he did not get along with his father. The

circumstances surrounding the making of the statement included the fact that approximately a

month prior to the murder, Officer Schultze responded to the defendant’s home three times due to

a verbal domestic dispute. The defendant made the statement to Officer Schultze in response to his

suggestion that the defendant could stay with his father that evening to avoid any further issues.

¶ 46 The State argues that the evidence of the defendant’s statement and the surrounding context

was admissible for the purpose of proving motive. The State further points out that the jury was

instructed to only consider the testimony as to motive and not for any other reason, so any risk of

undue prejudice was minimized.

¶ 47 The defendant argued at the motion hearing that the evidence was irrelevant to motive, and

that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. The defendant argues on appeal that, had the jury not known that the defendant was

involved in multiple “potentially violent” domestic altercations with someone other than his father,

it may have reached a different verdict.

¶ 48 A motion in limine is addressed to the trial court’s inherent power to admit or exclude

evidence. A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion in limine

absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). An abuse of

discretion will be found only where the ruling of the trial court is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable,

or where no reasonable person would take the court’s adopted view. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d

52, 89 (2001).

17 ¶ 49 Generally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character

of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

This evidence, referred to as other-crimes evidence or other-act evidence, is not considered

irrelevant; instead, it is objectionable because such evidence has “too much” probative value.

People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). Rule 404(b) protects the defendant’s right to have

his guilt or innocence evaluated solely on the basis of the charged crime. Id.

¶ 50 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may, however, be admitted for purposes such as

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake

or accident. Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶¶ 11, 14.

Rule 404(b) does not act as a categorical bar to the admission of other-crimes evidence but is

intended to guard against the jury impermissibly relying on the evidence to determine that the

defendant had committed an earlier crime, and therefore, he must have committed this one. Where

the other-crimes evidence has no value beyond that inference, it is excluded. People v. Ross, 2018

IL App (2d) 161079, ¶ 165.

¶ 51 Other-crimes evidence is also subject to other evidentiary rules, such as the requirement

that the evidence be relevant. Evidence is relevant and admissible if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ill. Rs. Evid. 401, 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

Even relevant evidence may be excluded, however, “if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

18 ¶ 52 At trial, Officer Schultze was questioned about the defendant’s statement and the

circumstances surrounding the making of the same. Officer Schultze testified that on April 19,

2020, he responded to an address for a “verbal domestic” between the defendant and his partner.

Officer Schultze responded to the address on three times that day. The first time was for the verbal

domestic, where the two were arguing. There was no physical altercation. Officer Schultze wanted

to separate the two, and the defendant ended up walking away and leaving the scene. At that point,

Officer Schultze believed that the issue was resolved. He testified that 30 minutes later, he was

called back to the residence, at which point he asked the defendant if he could go to his father’s

house. The defendant responded that he and his father did not get along.

¶ 53 The State’s theory of the case was that the evidence that the defendant stated he and his

father did not get along and the police responses to arguments between the defendant and his

partner went to motive. The State further highlighted that the defendant, during his interrogation,

described his father as a distant family member. The State played a portion of the defendant’s

interrogation where he said, in reference to his father: “Every time I talk to him, it’s not right.”

¶ 54 In further support of its theory of motive, the State presented evidence that the defendant

and his children had been staying for a few days with his father. In a phone call while incarcerated,

the defendant told his sister that while staying with his father, Sam had been telling the defendant

to leave the residence for a few days. The State argued that this evidence showed that the two had

a bad relationship and were not connected as a father and son should be.

¶ 55 Based on this combined evidence, the State argued that the defendant had a motive to kill

his father. The defendant and his partner had been arguing in April 2020, which was relevant

because it explained why the defendant and his children were staying at his father’s house and it

described the circumstances under which the defendant’s statement that he and his father did not

19 get along was made. The defendant’s statement that he could not stay at his father’s house because

they did not get along was relevant because it was a statement of the defendant which lent insight

into the nature of their relationship around the time of the murder. The State’s position, with respect

to the defendant’s motive, was that he needed a place to stay with his children, and his father,

whom he did not get along with, was pushing him away.

¶ 56 The State did not argue that the disputes implied that the defendant had a violent nature,

and Officer Schultze stated that the initial dispute was only verbal. The defendant argues that while

Officer Schultze testified that the first response to the defendant and his partner was for a verbal

altercation, the officer did not clarify that the remaining two visits were for verbal altercations.

Upon reviewing the testimony from Officer Schultze, he stated, “I responded to *** a verbal

domestic between [the defendant] and [his partner].” He continued describing the altercation

between the parties and the officers’ attempts to separate them to resolve the issue. Officer Schultze

did not testify that any of the visits that day were in response to violence and classified the

altercation as a “verbal domestic.” Officer Schultze never indicated that the defendant had

committed a crime and, instead of being arrested, he attempted to separate the parties, further

indicating no crime had been committed. At most, the evidence indicated that the defendant had

ongoing verbal arguments with his partner on the particular day.

¶ 57 In light of the evidence that the defendant had been in a verbal dispute with his partner

approximately a month prior to staying with his father for a few days, that he needed a place to

stay, and that he did not get along with his father and his father was “pushing him out,” we cannot

find that the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the verbal altercations was arbitrary or

fanciful. Officer Schultze’s testimony about the police responses on that day was relevant, in that

it helped explain both the making of the statement that the defendant did not get along with his

20 father and a possible reason that the defendant needed a place to stay. Both the defendant’s

relationship with the victim and the circumstances for the making of the statement were relevant

to the State’s theory about motive. The trial court found that the probative value of the evidence

was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and we cannot disagree. Additionally,

the jury was given a limiting instruction to only consider the testimony on the issue of the

defendant’s motive. As such, any danger of undue prejudice was minimized. See People v.

Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 49 (“Absent some indication to the contrary, we must presume that

jurors follow the law as set forth in the instructions given them.”).

¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s claim that the admission

of the defendant’s statement and the police response to arguments between the defendant and his

partner was arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would take the view

adopted by the trial court. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

the State’s motion in limine and admitting the testimony at trial.

¶ 59 C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 60 Next, the defendant asserts that during closing arguments, the State committed

prosecutorial misconduct when it improperly misstated the evidence at trial, shifted the burden of

proof to the defendant, improperly vouched for evidence that was not admitted at trial, and mocked

the defense. The defendant acknowledges there was no objection to these statements at trial and

that he did not include the alleged errors in his posttrial motion. The issue is therefore forfeited.

See People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (5th) 190426-B, ¶ 30.

¶ 61 The defendant, however, invokes the plain error exception to the forfeiture rule. Normally,

a court will only excuse forfeiture of errors concerning comments made at trial where the

comments were so inflammatory that the defendant could not have received a fair trial or so

21 flagrant as to threaten the deterioration of the judicial process. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 637

(2000). The defendant argues that second prong plain error applies, which permits this court to

consider unpreserved error if an error occurred that is so serious it affected the fairness of the

defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of

the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007). The burden of persuasion lies

with the defendant. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). The first step in plain error

review is to determine whether an error occurred at all. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565.

¶ 62 Defendants arguing for reversal of their conviction based upon improper closing argument

face a difficult burden. People v. Holmon, 2019 IL App (5th) 160207, ¶ 48. Improper remarks

made during closing argument warrant reversal only if those remarks resulted in substantial

prejudice to the defendant. People v. Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 48. Substantial

prejudice occurs if the improper remarks constitute a material factor in the defendant’s conviction.

Id. If we determine the remarks were not a material factor in the outcome of the trial, the “defendant

cannot meet his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result.” Holmon,

2019 IL App (5th) 160207, ¶ 53. While it is difficult to overturn a conviction based solely on

improper remarks during closing arguments, improper arguments may be prejudicial enough to

undermine a defendant’s substantial rights if the prosecutor’s remarks have the “effect of

undermining the entire trial.” People v. Brooks, 345 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953 (2004).

¶ 63 Prosecutors are generally afforded wide latitude during closing argument. Holmon, 2019

IL App (5th) 160207, ¶ 49. They “may comment on the evidence and on any fair and reasonable

inference the evidence may yield.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 142 (2009). In reviewing

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments, we must examine the State’s and the

defendant’s closing arguments in their entirety and consider the complained-of comments in their

22 proper context. People v. Rush, 294 Ill. App. 3d 334, 340 (1998). The challenged remarks must

also be considered in the context of the trial court’s instructions that arguments are not evidence,

that the State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and

that the defendant need not prove his innocence. People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 44.

¶ 64 Here, the defendant first argues that the following statements made by the State during its

closing arguments were improper because they misstated the evidence at trial:

(1) “remember in the front of your mind that the defendant told you he did it. He

told you with his words. He told you with his actions, and my opening remarks are going

to be very heavy on his statement to Detective Koontz and Detective Osborn. He told you

that he did it. He talked about his relationship with his father, and he described him as a

distant family member.”

(2) “He also told you he was the only one with the opportunity to commit this crime

on the morning of May 13, 2020.”

(3) “What did Ron Minks say? What did he tell you? He said the defendant had a

gun; that he saw him walk by him with that gun. I’m not going to mess with it. You can

watch the video of him walking down Cherry Street when he comes back out of the alley

and heads back to his home.”

(4) “The only reasonable explanation is that the gunshot residue came from the 12

shots from the gun Ron Minks saw [the defendant] carrying.”

(5) “the mailman saw him with it. *** Ron Minks runs into officers before he can

get back to his vehicle, tells them what he saw, and then goes to the police station and

identifies the video.”

23 (6) “There is an eyewitness account of the defendant carrying a black handgun

down Cherry Street after the shooting and apparent flight.”

¶ 65 During closing arguments, the prosecution is barred from misstating the law or facts of the

case, from making remarks that diminish their burden of proof, or from commenting on factual

matters not based on the evidence. People v. Roach, 213 Ill. App. 3d 119, 124-25 (1991). The

defendant argues that the State misstated the facts of the case by making the above comments

regarding the defendant telling the jury that he committed the crime. There was no evidence offered

at trial that the defendant confessed or literally told anyone that he killed his father.

¶ 66 The State’s comments during closing arguments that the “defendant told you he did it” with

his words and actions, taken in context with the entire closing argument, was an invitation for the

trier of fact to draw reasonable inferences from the defendant’s words and actions. The State did

not argue that the defendant literally confessed to the murder; it argued that the jury could

determine that the defendant was guilty through the specific examples offered of the defendant’s

statements and actions prior to and after the murder. The State played numerous clips of the

defendant’s own words from his interview and various jail calls with his family. Before each clip

the State introduced, it discussed the inference it was asking the jury to draw from the evidence

presented. The State’s argument was that, while “[the defendant] didn’t say ‘I pulled the trigger’

in that interview, he told you why he did.” The State played a series of clips and argued that the

defendant provided evidence that implicated himself when he, inter alia, told the jury that he did

not have a close relationship with his father, that he had a difficult time talking to his father, that

his father was telling him he had to go, and that he did not see anyone else at the home at the time

of the murder. The State highlighted the defendant’s comment that he and his father talked that

24 morning, and that his father said something “slick” to him, but not “tough.” The State argued that

“the evidence showed what was going on.”

¶ 67 The defendant also argues that the State misstated the evidence in its discussion regarding

Ron Minks identifying the defendant. Ron Minks did not know the defendant, and he did not

identify him per se. Ron Minks testified that on May 13, 2020, he was delivering mail in the area

of the murder and observed a black male in a dark blue shirt hoodie with dreadlocks walk past

him, and in the man’s right hand he carried a black semiautomatic handgun. He continued to

observe the man walking up Cherry Street towards 17th Street, where he lost sight of him in the

alley between 17th and 18th Streets. When he returned to his vehicle, he told responding officers

what he saw. Ron Minks then looked at People’s exhibit 39, a surveillance video which showed

an individual walking down the street. Ron Minks testified that he recognized the individual by

the blue jacket or hoodie.

¶ 68 Detective Osborn testified that he had reviewed surveillance video from a street camera in

the area of the murder with Ron Minks during his investigation. The portion of the video reviewed

depicted a man walking westbound in the 1500 and 1700 blocks of Cherry Street. Detective Osborn

testified that he “showed [Ron Minks] the images of the suspect so he could identify that that was

the same suspect he had seen on May 13 walking westbound on Cherry Street.” Ron Minks

indicated that it was.

¶ 69 Detective Koontz testified that when they arrived at the scene of the murder and arrested

the defendant, “there was a blue jacket inside the house that matched the description of the jacket

that the mail carrier had identified and the cameras had seen the defendant wearing.” The blue

jacket was found in the dining room hanging on the back of a chair and was introduced as People’s

exhibit 19.

25 ¶ 70 Assistant Chief Brands testified that he reviewed video from street cameras in the area and

identified the defendant walking around the neighborhood. Assistant Chief Brands also identified

Ron Minks walking in the neighborhood at the same time. Assistant Chief Brands identified the

individual in the blue jacket depicted in the video as the defendant by his appearance and by his

jacket, which was blue and gray with a marking on the left chest. People’s exhibit 19 was

introduced into evidence. The jury had the opportunity to view the video the State purported to

depict the defendant, who was present in court and to compare the defendant, and the clothing

collected from him, to the exhibits and the individual depicted in the video.

¶ 71 While Ron Minks did not identify the black man with dreadlocks and a blue jacket he saw

walking on Cherry Street at the time he was delivering mail as the defendant, he identified the man

depicted on video surveillance from street cameras as the man that he saw. The man depicted on

the video surveillance from the street cameras matching that description had been identified as the

defendant. Defense counsel, at trial, admitted that the defendant was identified in the footage, thus

inviting, or at least agreeing to, the identification.

¶ 72 When viewing the context of the closing argument as a whole and the evidence presented

at trial, the prosecutor’s remarks were neither substantially prejudicial to the defendant nor

material to his conviction. We do not find error in the State’s comments; however, if error

occurred, it was not reversible error. Accordingly, the contested prosecutorial remarks during the

State’s closing arguments did not constitute reversible error.

¶ 73 Next, the defendant argues that the State made several improper arguments which

improperly shifted the burden of proof where it stated:

(1) the defendant “never put anybody else in that residence”;

26 (2) “[t]here was never a suggestion to the police somebody else may have done this.

There was never a question from [the defendant] to the detectives about stop messing with

me. Go find the guy that did this. Never a suggestion of anybody else. Never a suggestion

of an alternate suspect”; and

(3) with regard to the “them” the defendant was referring to in the clip while talking

to his sister “[t]here was more of that call. If counsel believed I was misrepresenting who

he was talking to, he could have played the rest of the call, but it was clear from what he

said that he was referring to Rhonda.”

¶ 74 Defense counsel, during cross-examination of Assistant Chief Brands, highlighted other

figures or vehicles in the area of the murder caught on the street cameras’ video recordings. The

defense also called Damon Owens, who testified that he saw an individual on Cherry Street dressed

in black directly after he heard what he thought were fireworks. Later he saw a blonde woman

arrive back at 1820 Cherry Street, and he saw a heavyset black man with no shirt on grab her and

saw her eventually run to a red car and drive off. Owens testified that the two individuals were not

the same man. The defense theory of the case was that someone other than the defendant shot his

father.

¶ 75 While it is improper for the State to argue facts not in evidence (Johnson, 2023 IL App

(5th) 190426-B, ¶ 33), it was clear from the questioning at trial that the defense theory of the case

was that it was someone other than the defendant, maybe the man in black that Damon Owens saw

in the street, a man in white seen briefly on the video of Cherry Street, or someone else entirely.

The evidence presented by the defense was clearly an attempt to imply that someone else killed

the victim.

27 ¶ 76 Thus, the State’s remarks were offered in response to the defendant’s theory of the case.

“Statements will not be held improper if they were provoked or invited by the defense counsel’s

argument.” People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 204 (2009). The defendant’s case implied that

someone else, possibly the man in black or the figure in white, killed the victim. The State’s

comments point out that the defendant, who was in the home with his father at the time he was

shot multiple times, never told police there was anyone else in the residence and never suggested

police find the rightful perpetrator during his interview.

¶ 77 These comments were not an attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, but

rather, were arguments regarding the evidence, and the inferences that one could make from the

defendant’s interview, and in response to the defendant’s theory of the case. Thus, we do not find

that they were improper. Even if the State’s comments were somehow improper, the jury

instructions stated that the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt

remains on the State throughout the case and the State’s comments did not substantially prejudice

the defendant in a manner that resulted in depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

¶ 78 Next, the defendant argues that part of the State’s closing argument improperly shifted the

burden of proof to the defense when it implied the defendant needed to offer certain video

evidence. In closing, the State discussed a call that was played for the jury of the defendant

speaking with his sister at the jail. The defendant had said “And then, Pops was, you know, like,

he was just telling me, like, I don’t know. He was basically, like, the last three or four—three or

few days telling me to go because of them. I don’t know.” The State argued the statement went to

motive. Defense counsel argued that the “them” the defendant was talking about was unclear.

Defense counsel stated, in closing, “Well, who is them? Who is them? The State’s evidence on

this point is not clear at all; especially, for a party that bears the burden of carrying proof beyond

28 a reasonable doubt. But what is clear is [the defendant] did not say because of me.” Defense

counsel continued: “Is [the defendant] talking about his kids when he’s talking about them, or is

he talking about someone else? The State’s case for motive is not clear on this point.” In rebuttal,

the State made the comment, in response to the defendant’s argument, that defense counsel could

have played the rest of the call. The State then vouched that it was clear from what the defendant

said that he was referring to Rhonda. The defendant argues on appeal that the comment shifted the

burden of proof and improperly vouched for evidence not introduced at trial.

¶ 79 The defense is not required to produce any evidence, and the prosecution cannot attempt

to shift the burden of proof to the defense. People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 80. The

prosecution, however, does not shift the burden of proof when it “respond[s] to comments by

defense counsel that clearly invite a response.” Id. For example, “a prosecutor is permitted to

comment on a defendant’s failure to produce evidence where a defendant with equal access to the

evidence assails the prosecutor’s failure to produce that evidence.” Id. We do not find that the State

improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in this exchange.

¶ 80 The State did, however, make an impermissible implication that he knew something that

the jury did not, by referencing a portion of a video exhibit that was not played for the jury, and

thus, was not in evidence. See People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 18. The State

indicated to the jury that facts outside of the record made his theory of what the defendant meant

by “them” more likely. See id. (citing United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 253-54 (6th Cir.

2001) (explaining that improper vouching can stem from an implied guarantee of truthfulness

based on facts outside the record)). As such, we find that the State made an improper argument by

vouching for a portion of a video exhibit that was not in evidence.

29 ¶ 81 After determining that the argument was improper, we must address whether the comments

resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant and constituted a material factor in his conviction.

People v. Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 111653, ¶ 68. There was not strong evidence of a motive for

the defendant to kill his father. What circumstantial evidence was presented for motive, however,

had little to do with who “them” was referring to in the defendant’s statement. What the defendant

meant by “them” is of little import to the issue. Defense counsel argued that “them” did not mean

the defendant, but could have meant Rhonda, the children, or someone else. As it relates to motive,

the operative portion of the defendant’s statement was that the defendant’s father was telling the

defendant he had to go. The State was not arguing that the defendant was angry based on whose

fault it was that his father was telling him to go. The improper marks were of minimal importance

to any contentious point at trial, and thus do not rise to the level implicating a contrary verdict. We

find that the improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction and, as such, they

do not constitute reversible error.

¶ 82 Finally, the defendant argues that the State improperly mocked the defense by stating, “I

thought they were going to argue Rhonda Wesley did it from the grassy knoll *** maybe they’re

going to say the couch did it and that because there is gunshot residue on the couch, the couch did

it.” Unless predicated on evidence that defense counsel behaved unethically, it is improper for a

prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of attempting to create a reasonable doubt by confusion,

misrepresentation, or deception. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 82 (2003). While we agree with

the defendant that the prosecutor’s use of language went beyond responding to the matters raised

by defense counsel, we do not consider this comment to have been unduly prejudicial such that it

would have affected the verdict in this case. Consequently, we conclude that this remark does not

constitute reversible error.

30 ¶ 83 Although the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, we do not find

that individually, or in combination, the comments warrant reversal. The errors were not so

egregious as to deny the defendant a fair trial or challenge the integrity of the judicial process.

Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of persuasion, and the procedural default of

forfeiture applies.

¶ 84 D. Cumulative Error

¶ 85 The defendant’s final argument is that the trial court’s alleged errors resulted in the

cumulative effect of denying the defendant a fair trial. As such, the defendant argues that reversal

is necessary even if no individual error requires reversal. This argument is moot since we have

found no error in the trial court’s rulings on the defendant’s motion to suppress statements,

admittance of certain evidence at trial, and any errors in the State’s closing argument would not

amount to reversible error when considered together.

¶ 86 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 87 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s

motion to suppress statements, the admittance of prior bad acts testimony was not an abuse of

discretion, and the prosecutor’s closing argument did not result in reversible error. Therefore, we

affirm the defendant’s conviction.

¶ 88 Affirmed.