People v. Gastelum CA6

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 4, 2024
DocketH051460
StatusUnpublished

This text of People v. Gastelum CA6 (People v. Gastelum CA6) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Gastelum CA6, (Cal. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Filed 12/4/24 P. v. Gastelum CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051460 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 194184)

v.

BRUXS GASTELUM,

Defendant and Appellant.

Penal Code section 1172.75 requires resentencing where a person is in custody for a current judgment that includes an enhancement “imposed” under former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), unless the enhancement was imposed for certain sexually violent offenses. (Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subds. (a), (c); unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant Bruxs Gastelum appeals from the denial of his section 1172.75 request for a full resentencing. Defendant’s entitlement to relief turns on whether a prior prison term enhancement was “imposed” within the meaning of section 1172.75, subdivision (a) when the one-year additional punishment was struck. In keeping with this court’s decisions in People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, rev. granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino) and People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276 (Renteria), we conclude defendant is entitled to resentencing. I. BACKGROUND Defendant was convicted in 1997 of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). It was further found true that defendant had a prior prison term (former section 667.5, subd. (b)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and four prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)). Denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions under section 1385, the trial court sentenced him under the Three Strikes law to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life for the two felonies, consecutive to an additional five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony. (A six-month jail term for the misdemeanor was satisfied by time served.) As for the enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), the trial court stated: “The prison prior, having been found true, which is a one-year prior, I strike the punishment for that in the interest of justice.” On remand for resentencing in 1999, the trial court reimposed the original sentence, concluding that the burglary and firearm possession offenses were separate crimes for purposes of section 654. In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant under section 1172.75, subdivision (b) as currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement imposed under former section 667.5, subdivision (b). The prosecution opposed resentencing, arguing that defendant was ineligible because the prison prior enhancement had not been imposed and executed. Adopting the prosecution’s interpretation of section 1172.75, the trial court denied defendant’s request for resentencing. II. DISCUSSION This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1281–1282.) The issue is whether an enhancement was “imposed,” as that term is used in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), when the sentencing court struck the additional punishment for that enhancement. Defendant argues the trial court misconstrued section 1172.75 and a prison prior enhancement is “imposed” whenever it is included in a judgment, even if the 2 corresponding punishment is struck. The Attorney General contends section 1172.75 applies only to prison prior enhancements that were both imposed and executed (despite having conceded in previous cases that an enhancement was “imposed” even if the additional punishment was stayed—see, e.g., Renteria, at pp. 1279–1280). We agree with defendant that the Legislature did not intend the scope of section 1172.75 to be so limited. Section 667.5, which previously contemplated a one-year sentencing enhancement for any prior felony conviction resulting in a prison sentence within a prescribed period, now allows an enhancement only for prior sexually violent offenses. (§ 667.5, subd. (b); Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed” under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), except for those enhancements imposed for sexually violent offenses, is now “legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), italics added.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (b) tasks CDCR with identifying “those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)” and providing that information to the appropriate trial court. That court is then tasked with verifying that a defendant’s current judgment “includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a)” and, if so, resentencing the defendant. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The resentencing court shall also “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Postconviction mitigating factors may be considered. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) The Legislature’s choice to mandate full resentencing for eligible defendants indicates that its intent was not simply to eliminate the one-year sentences directly 3 attributable to the now-invalid enhancements. It instead appears to have intended that sentences be ameliorated as much as possible, subject to the limiting principle that a now- invalid enhancement was “imposed”.1 That apparent overarching intent informs our reading of the word “imposed” as used in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), which is susceptible of multiple interpretations. (See People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 [“the word ‘impose’ applies to enhancements that are ‘imposed and then executed’ as well as those that are ‘imposed and then stayed’ ”] (Gonzalez); People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 311 [the word, as used in § 1172.75, “is at least somewhat ambiguous”], rev. granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson).) In Gonzalez, the California Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word “imposed” in a different statutory context: section 12022.53, subdivision (f), which provides that only “one additional term of imprisonment” for a firearm enhancement “shall be imposed per person for each crime.” Taking into consideration other provisions of section 12022.53, which functioned to “ensure execution of the maximum enhancement”, the Supreme Court concluded that “imposed” as used in that context meant “imposed and then executed” rather than “imposed and then stayed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1126–1130.) Here, unlike in Gonzalez, the relevant statute refers not to the imposition of a “term of imprisonment” but instead to the imposition of an

1 The uncodified section of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which created what is now section 1172.75, declares the Legislature’s intent “to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing” by applying its repeal of sentencing enhancements for prior prison terms retroactively “to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements.” (Stats. 2021, ch.

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In Re Pacheco
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 799 (California Court of Appeal, 2007)
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Bluebook (online)
People v. Gastelum CA6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-gastelum-ca6-calctapp-2024.