People v. Garza CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 22, 2025
• Docket: E084260
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Garza CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084260

v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF2400474)

EDDIE NEAL GARZA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Louis R. Hanoian, Judge.

Affirmed.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

A jury found defendant and appellant Eddie Neal Garza guilty of willfully and

unlawfully attempting to evade a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.4; count 1); evading

police with willful and wanton disregard for public safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2;

count 2); unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle without owner’s consent with a prior

vehicle theft conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a);

count 3); grand theft vehicle with a prior vehicle theft conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 496,

subd. (a), 666.5, subd. (a); count 4); misdemeanor possession of burglar tools (Pen. Code,

§ 466; count 5); and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,

subd. (a); count 6). Defendant stipulated to the prior vehicle theft convictions alleged in

counts 2 and 3. The trial court found that defendant had suffered at least eight prior

felony convictions. Defendant was sentenced to a total aggregate term of three years,

eight months with 236 days credit for time served. Defendant appeals from an order after

judgment. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm

the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2024, a white Ford F-250 pickup truck was stolen from CVAC

Systems, Incorporated in Riverside County. The theft was discovered by James

Chapman, the primary driver of the truck.

2 On March 14, 2024, at 11:00 a.m., Murrieta Police Department Officer Peter

Larsen received a “Flock” notification on his phone indicating a stolen white Ford F-250

had been detected by a traffic camera. The officer located the vehicle in a parking lot.

Once the officer confirmed the truck was stolen, the officer called for backup. After the

vehicle pulled into a parking spot, Officer Larsen stopped behind the truck, got off his

motorcycle, pulled his firearm, and told the occupants to “turn the vehicle off and put

your hands out the window.” The occupants were a male and female.

The occupants did not get out as directed. Instead, the vehicle sped away at a high

rate of speed. Officer Larsen activated his lights and sirens and gave pursuit. The truck

exited to Los Alamos Road, crossed the paved center median and drove in the wrong

direction. The truck weaved between stopped vehicles at a high rate of speed. It

eventually entered Interstate 215 North by using an exit ramp and traveled in the wrong

direction on the shoulder. Officer Larsen did not follow the truck onto the freeway.

Officer Larsen lost sight of the truck around Murrieta Hot Springs and broadcasted a

description of the truck and the direction it was traveling.

The truck eventually collided with a concrete culvert. Officer Fawsi Murra

responded to the accident. She recovered a gray backpack from behind the driver’s seat.

The backpack contained California identification cards belonging to defendant Eddie

Neal Garza and Sally Franco. There was a letter from the Utah State Tax Commission

addressed to defendant and two citations, one written to defendant and one to Franco.1

1 The backpack was entered into safekeeping but it was later destroyed by the police department, as well as the contents of the backpack.

3 There was also a black bag with a passport inside found in the truck. Officers swabbed

several parts of the truck for DNA. No results were admitted into evidence.

Officer Garrett James found defendant and the female walking in the area of

Ranch House and Graystone, in the direction of the area where the suspects had fled to.

Not many people walk in that area at around 11 a.m. Defendant’s shoes had dirt on them

consistent with the area in which the truck crashed. After arresting defendant, Officer

James found a shaved key in defendant’s wallet. Shaved keys are commonly used to

steal older model vehicles. Methamphetamine was also found on defendant’s person.

Officers identified defendant as the person who may have been involved in the vehicle

theft. The female with defendant was later identified as April Groves.

An amended information charged defendant with willfully and unlawfully

attempting to evade a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.4; count 1); evading police with

willful and wanton disregard for public safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 2); unlawfully

taking or driving a vehicle without owner’s consent with a prior vehicle theft conviction

(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a); count 3); grand theft

vehicle with a prior vehicle theft conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 496, subd. (a), 666.5,

subd. (a); count 4); misdemeanor possession of burglar tools (Pen. Code, § section 466;

count 5); and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,

subd. (a); count 6). It was further alleged that defendant had suffered eight prior felony

convictions that constituted a factor in aggravation.

On June 7, 2024, outside the presence of the jury, defendant stipulated to the prior

vehicle theft convictions alleged in counts 3 and 4.

4 On June 12, 2024, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the alleged

aggravating factor.

Following the People’s case-in-chief, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1. The court denied the motion.

On June 13, 2024, the jurors represented that they had reached a verdict as to two

counts but were hung, 11 to 1, on the other four counts. The court asked if a readback of

testimony might be helpful and only one juror (TJ01) indicated that it would be. The

court then read the standard jury instruction encouraging jurors to continue deliberating.

The next day, the jurors clarified that while two votes were taken, only the second

vote was 11 to 1. The first vote was 10 to 1, with one juror abstaining.

On June 14, 2024, the original jury foreperson (TJ03) advised the court that juror

number 11 (TJ11) had looked something up on the internet and tried to share it during

deliberations. When questioned by the court, TJ11 admitted to looking up a map of the

area in which defendant was arrested that showed a pathway and claimed to have not

shown anyone else. Jurors TJ01, TJ02, TJ07, and TJ208 did not hear what TJ11 said

about looking something up on the internet. Juror TJ04 heard TJ11 say she found another

aerial view of the location. TJ11 was told that the jury could not look at the image and

she showed it to no one. TJ05 remembered TJ11 saying something about a map she

found online. TJ06 heard someone mention finding a map on the internet but did not

know which female juror said it. Jurors TJ09, TJ10 and TJ12 all heard TJ11 say she

looked up a map of the location on her phone. Jurors TJ03 and TJ07 indicated they did

not see the map and it would not influence their deliberations. The court excused juror

5 TJ11. Juror TJ06 also expressed concern with the foreperson (TJ03). The juror believed

that the foreperson misrepresented the previous votes to the court and that the foreperson

was also not open to hearing anyone else’s opinion and stated she would not change her

mind. A later question from the jury indicated TJ06 was now the foreperson. At the

conclusion of the court’s questioning of the jurors, defense counsel made a motion for a

mistrial, which was denied by the court.

On June 17, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty as charged of all six counts. In

a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had suffered at least eight

prior felony convictions. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of three years,

eight months as follows: the middle term of three years on count 3, plus one-third the

middle term or eight months on count 1. The court stayed the sentence on counts 2 and 4

pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and imposed a concurrent term on count 5 and

dismissed count 6 in the interest of justice pursuant to the People’s motion. The court

awarded defendant 118 actual days plus 118 conduct credits, for a total presentence credit

of 236 days. The court also ordered defendant to pay a $300 restitution fine; a stayed

$300 parole revocation fine; $200 in court security fees; and $150 in criminal conviction

assessments. Defendant timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

After defendant appealed, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to

represent him. Upon examination of the record, counsel has filed a brief under the

authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California

6 (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the

facts and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court to conduct an independent

review of the record. Counsel identifies the possible issue as whether the trial court erred

in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct.

We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he

has done so. In his general conclusory letter brief, defendant appears to argue there was

insufficient evidence, juror bias or court’s failure to grant motion to dismiss based on

juror misconduct, and discovery violation due to the destroyed backpack.

“In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to

review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether

it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of

solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) In undertaking this

review, our job does not include reweighing conflicts in the evidence or assessing witness

credibility. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480; see People v. Zaragoza (2016)

1 Cal.5th 21, 44 [it is not the task of a reviewing court to “resolve credibility issues or

evidentiary conflicts”].) Moreover, “unless the testimony is physically impossible or

inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a

conviction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)

Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to convict defendant as charged.

There is no dispute that a white Ford F-250 pickup truck was stolen in Riverside County

and that defendant had previously been convicted of vehicle theft. Defendant and the

7 female occupant fled at a high rate of speed when Officer Larsen attempted to stop the

vehicle. A pursuit thereafter ensued with defendant driving with wanton and willful

disregard for public safety. The truck crossed a paved center median, drove in the wrong

direction, weaved between stopped vehicles at a high rate of speed, and traveled the

wrong direction on the shoulder on the freeway. The truck eventually collided with a

concrete culvert. Defendant and his female occupant were found near the area where

they had fled. Defendant’s shoes had dirt on them consistent with the area in which the

truck crashed. Defendant had a shaved key in his wallet and methamphetamine in his

possession. In addition, a gray backpack was discovered in the truck behind the driver’s

seat. The backpack contained California identification cards belonging to defendant, as

well as a letter addressed to defendant and two citations, one written to defendant.

Although the backpack and its contents were destroyed by law enforcement, defense

counsel thoroughly examined the officer as to this fact in an attempt to undermine law

enforcement’s credibility. Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence to

convict defendant as charged.

We also reject defendant’s claim of juror bias or court’s failure to grant motion to

dismiss based on juror misconduct. “The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a

criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial and unbiased jury. [Citations.] A

deprivation of that right can occur even if only one juror is biased. [Citation.]” (People

v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 98 (Brooks).) “When a court becomes aware of possible

juror misconduct, it must ‘ “ ‘ “make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary” to

determine whether the juror should be discharged.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The nature of the

8 court’s inquiry may consist of a full hearing or informal questioning of the juror in the

presence of counsel. [Citation.] ‘The specific procedures to follow in investigating an

allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court’s discretion.’

[Citation.]” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1170; see Pen. Code, § 1089

[trial court may discharge juror for good cause if juror unable to perform duty].)

“ ‘[T]he presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed,

if a reviewing court concludes after considering the entire record, including the nature of

the misconduct and its surrounding circumstances, that there is no substantial likelihood

that the juror in question was actually biased against the defendant. [Citations.] Our

inquiry in this regard is a “mixed question of law and fact” subject to independent

appellate review. [Citation.] But “ ‘[w]e accept the trial court’s credibility

determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial

evidence.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 98-99.)

Applying these principles, we conclude that although substantial evidence

supports the conclusion TJ11 juror committed misconduct, the presumption of prejudice

was amply rebutted and the court did not err by refusing to declare a mistrial or dismiss

the case. A review of the record reveals that the trial court thoroughly examined the

jurors concerning juror misconduct and excused the offending juror (TJ11).

Accepting the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings, and in

light of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the record as a whole, we

conclude there was no substantial likelihood the jurors were actually biased against

defendant. The evidence of misconduct consisted of one juror (TJ11) looking up a map

9 of the area in which defendant was arrested and trying to share it to other jurors during

deliberations. Most of the jurors reported not hearing what TJ11 said and others

reporting that they told TJ11 that she could not share that information. The record

includes no evidence any juror was biased against defendant or his counsel, or prejudged

the case. Moreover, because the trial court quickly learned of the information, it was able

to question the jurors and evaluate what occurred while the jurors’ memories were fresh.

It was the trial court that was in the best position to observe the jurors’ demeanor and

determine whether they were biased. (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 334.)

After conducting an extensive inquiry of the jurors, the court further admonished them to

not research or discuss the case and to keep an open mind. These admonitions were

sufficient, and defendant’s claim the jurors were biased is pure speculation. (People v.

Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 857 [rejecting defendant’s assertion of juror misconduct,

we presume the jury understands and follows the trial court’s instructions].)

In conclusion, although TJ11 committed misconduct, based on an examination of

the entire record, the inference of bias was rebutted. The trial court did not err by

denying the mistrial motion, and reversal is not required. Thus, defendant’s federal and

state constitutional rights to an impartial and unbiased jury were not violated.

Finally, we reject defendant’s implied claim of discovery violation. Due process

guarantees under the federal Constitution imposing a duty on the state to preserve

“evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.”

(California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488; see Arizona v. Youngblood (1988)

488 U.S. 51.) Such evidence “ ‘must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent

10 before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be

unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’ ” (People v.

Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837.) Rather than establishing the apparent exculpatory

value of the lost evidence, a defendant also may show that the “ ‘ “ ‘potentially useful’ ” ’

” evidence was destroyed as a result of bad faith. (People v. Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th

395, 424-425.) In this case, there is no indication in the record that law enforcement

destroyed the backpack and its content found in the stolen truck in bad faith or that the

evidence was exculpatory. In fact, the destroyed evidence was more useful to the

prosecution than defense. We find no discovery violation.

An appellate court conducts a review of the entire record to determine whether the

record reveals any issues which, if resolved favorably to defendant, would result in

reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-

442; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 447-448; Anders v. California, supra, 386

U.S. at p. 744; see People v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109-112.)

Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have

independently reviewed the entire record for potential error and find no arguable error

that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

11 IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON J. We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL J.