People v. Garcia

39 Misc. 3d 482
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 13, 2013
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 39 Misc. 3d 482 (People v. Garcia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Garcia, 39 Misc. 3d 482 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Nicholas Iacovetta, J.

This opinion addresses whether a Frye hearing is required before the prosecution can introduce the results of low copy number (hereinafter LCN) DNA testing or testimony concerning the forensic statistical tool (hereinafter FST) used to calculate likelihood probability ratios when testing a mixture containing several DNA profiles (see Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 [DC Cir 1923]).

Defendant is charged under indictment No. 2650/09 with the crime of murder in the second degree, Penal Law § 125.25 (3), and related crimes. The autopsy lists the cause of death as homicidal asphyxia caused, in part, by a sock placed in the victim’s mouth and duct tape used to bind her face and limbs.

LCN DNA testing of human DNA found on a piece of duct tape recovered from the victim’s ankles indicated the presence of a mixture of DNA material from at least two individuals. DNA comparisons were made by the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (hereinafter OCME) between the above DNA mixture and defendant’s DNA profile. Although OCME could not declare a positive match between the two samples, it also could not “exclude” defendant’s DNA profile as a contributor to the DNA mixture found on the duct tape. OCME used the FST to perform a statistical analysis using a mathematical equation based on Bayes’ Theorem1 to determine the likelihood ratio2 that defendant and one unknown, unrelated person are included in the above DNA mixture rather than two unknown, unrelated individuals. OCME concluded [484]*484that the DNA mixture found on the sample taken from the duct tape “is 586 times more probable if the sample originated from this defendant and one unknown, unrelated person than if it originated from two unknown, unrelated persons” (see defense affirmation, July 9, 2012, exhibit B).

Expert testimony based on scientific principles or procedures is admissible but only if the thing from which the deduction is made is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs (see Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 [1923]). The Frye test asks whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally (see People v Wesley, 83 NY2d 417, 422 [1994]). The particular procedure need not be “unanimously indorsed” by the scientific community but must be “generally acceptable as reliable” (see People v Middleton, 54 NY2d 42, 49 [1981]). Whether a particular technique represents a new or novel science is a separate and distinct inquiry from whether the scientific technique was applied correctly in a particular case (see Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 447 [2006]). A Frye hearing is necessary only if expert testimony involves “novel or experimental matters” (see People v Byrd, 51 AD3d 267, 274 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 956 [2008], citing Parker v Crown Equip. Corp., 39 AD3d 347, 348 [1st Dept 2007]). The application of a generally accepted technique, even though its application in a specific case was unique or modified, does not require a Frye hearing (see Byrd, 51 AD3d 267; Styles v General Motors Corp., 20 AD 3d 338 [1st Dept 2005]). The Frye test concerns only the acceptability and reliability of the scientific technique and not the “adequacy of the specific procedures used to generate the particular evidence to be admitted” (see Wesley, 83 NY2d at 422).

A Frye hearing is necessary “only when the opposing party makes a timely request for such inquiry supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique” (see State v Harris, 152 Ariz 150, 152, 730 P2d 859, 861 [Ariz Ct App 1986]). Defendant’s motion fails to meet that initial threshold because it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence demonstrating that either LCN DNA testing or the FST, when properly performed, is generally not acceptable in the scientific community. Instead it merely cites some experts who do not endorse the procedures used in this case. That is not a sufficient basis for granting a Frye hearing. [485]*485“General acceptance” does not mean unanimous acceptance (see Wesley, 83 NY2d at 423). The defense affirmations do not dispute the prosecutor’s main assertion, seen below, that many courts in multiple jurisdictions, as well as many other scientists and professional organizations, find the above procedures generally acceptable. Merely referencing two ongoing hearings in other counties without providing this court with any testimony from those hearings, or the affirmations by opposing counsel upon which the hearings are based, or simply citing an upcoming seminar which includes a panel discussion on reforms in the admission of DNA evidence, with no specific mention of LCN DNA testing or the FST, is likewise not a sufficient basis for granting a Frye hearing in this case. There is no doubt, as seen below, that both LCN DNA testimony and the FST, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.

OCME uses high copy number (hereinafter HCN) PCR3 based STR4 DNA profiling when testing 100 picograms5 or more of DNA. This PCR based technique of HCN DNA profiling was deemed generally acceptable and reliable making it admissible without the necessity of a pretrial hearing over a decade ago (see People v Hall, 266 AD2d 160 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 948 [2000]).

OCME uses LCN DNA profiling when testing less than 100 picograms of DNA. The difference between HCN and LCN testing is that in LCN testing the amplification process used to increase the number of copies of DNA is repeated 31 times instead of 28 times. This permits OCME to test smaller amounts of DNA. HCN DNA and LCN DNA testing, except for the above slight variation in the number of amplifications, employ the same four steps in analyzing the DNA sample: extraction,6 [486]*486quantification,7 amplification8 and electrophoresis.9 The same issues that arise in LCN DNA profiling can also arise in HCN DNA profiling: stutter,10 allelic drop-out,11 and allelic drop-in12 (see People v Megnath, 27 Misc 3d 405, 413 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2010]). An individual receives half their DNA from their mother and half from their father. A person thus has two alleles at each locus, i.e., one from each parent (see defense affirmation, July 9, 2012 at 5, ¶ 8; People’s affirmation, July 27, 2012 at 3). This makes it relatively easy to determine if a single source DNA sample matches a suspect. A mixture of DNA contains more than two alleles at each locus which means that at least two people are present. This requires a forensic scientist to determine which alleles at a locus belong to one person and which belong to another. There is nothing new or novel about LCN DNA profiling. It simply represents the application of accepted and reliable procedures that are applied in a modified manner (see Byrd, 51 AD3d 267).

“A court need not hold a Frye

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Bluebook (online)
39 Misc. 3d 482, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-garcia-nysupct-2013.