People v. Funderbunk

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Funderbunk

122 A.D.3d 515, 997 N.Y.S.2d 63

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 20, 2014

Docket13554 5628/09

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 122 A.D.3d 515 (People v. Funderbunk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Funderbunk, 122 A.D.3d 515, 997 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J., at suppression hearing; Cassandra M. Mullen, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered October 26, 2010, as amended December 10, 2010, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to a term of four years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. The only police activity challenged on appeal is an officer’s act *516 of opening a car door during a lawful traffic stop, which ultimately led to the recovery of contraband. Defendant concedes that the police were entitled to order the occupants to come out of the car (see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]), but argues that they were not entitled to open a car door without individualized suspicion of criminality.

Opening a door is a minimally intrusive safety precaution, incident to a valid automobile lawful traffic stop (People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 [1982], revg on dissent 81 AD2d 893, 895-896 [2d Dept 1981]). Such an action is comparable to, and actually less intrusive than, ordering the occupants to exit the car. We find nothing in People v Garcia (20 NY3d 317 [2012]) to suggest that David L. should no longer be followed.

Here, an officer acted reasonably in opening a door because the car’s excessively tinted windows obstructed the view of the car’s interior, including the rear seat passenger area, and the officer heard a fellow officer direct the rear passenger to stop moving and place his hands in view. Accordingly, opening the door was a reasonable safety precaution (see e.g. People v Gonzalez, 298 AD2d 133 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 558 [2002]).

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

Concur— Tom, J.E, Friedman, Andrias, Feinman and Kapnick, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J., at suppression hearing; Cassandra M. Mullen, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered October 26, 2010, as amended December 10, 2010, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to a term of four years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. The only police activity challenged on appeal is an officer’s act *516 of opening a car door during a lawful traffic stop, which ultimately led to the recovery of contraband. Defendant concedes that the police were entitled to order the occupants to come out of the car (see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]), but argues that they were not entitled to open a car door without individualized suspicion of criminality.

Opening a door is a minimally intrusive safety precaution, incident to a valid automobile lawful traffic stop (People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 [1982], revg on dissent 81 AD2d 893, 895-896 [2d Dept 1981]). Such an action is comparable to, and actually less intrusive than, ordering the occupants to exit the car. We find nothing in People v Garcia (20 NY3d 317 [2012]) to suggest that David L. should no longer be followed.

Here, an officer acted reasonably in opening a door because the car’s excessively tinted windows obstructed the view of the car’s interior, including the rear seat passenger area, and the officer heard a fellow officer direct the rear passenger to stop moving and place his hands in view. Accordingly, opening the door was a reasonable safety precaution (see e.g. People v Gonzalez, 298 AD2d 133 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 558 [2002]).

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

Concur— Tom, J.E, Friedman, Andrias, Feinman and Kapnick, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

122 A.D.3d 515, 997 N.Y.S.2d 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-funderbunk-nyappdiv-2014.

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