2023 IL App (1st) 200492-U No. 1-20-0492 Third Division September 20, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 03 CR 8607(01) v. ) 03 CR 8607(02) ) JOHN FULTON and ANTHONY MITCHELL, ) The Honorable ) LeRoy K. Martin, Jr., Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding. ) ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices D.B. Walker and R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of defendants’ petitions for certificates of innocence is reversed, where the circuit court’s findings as to the voluntariness of defendants’ confessions is unclear from its decision.
¶2 In 2006, after simultaneous jury trials, defendants John Fulton (Fulton) and Anthony
Mitchell (Mitchell) were convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and
concealment of the homicidal death of victim Cristopher Collazo (Collazo). Both defendants
received identical sentences of 31 years for the murder, 25 years for the aggravated kidnapping,
and 3 years for the concealment of homicidal death, with the sentences to be served No. 1-20-0492
concurrently. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, but were remanded for
resentencing, where defendants received consecutive sentences of 25 years for the murder, 6
years for the aggravated kidnapping, and 2 years for the concealment of homicidal death.
¶3 Both defendants separately filed postconviction petitions pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, and, in 2019, the circuit court granted both petitions and vacated defendants’
convictions. The State ultimately nol-prossed the charges instead of retrying the cases.
¶4 In June 2019, each defendant filed a petition for a certificate of innocence pursuant to
section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2018)),
claiming that they were actually innocent of the crimes for which they had been convicted. The
circuit court denied the petitions, finding that neither defendant had established his actual
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendants now appeal and, for the reasons
that follow, we reverse the circuit court’s denial and remand for further proceedings.
¶5 BACKGROUND
¶6 In the early morning hours of March 10, 2003, a witness discovered the body of Collazo
lying in an alley on the south side of Chicago; he had been bound, gagged, beaten, and set on
fire. After an investigation by police, defendants Fulton and Mitchell, along with codefendant
Antonio Shaw, 1 were indicted on multiple counts of first-degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, and concealment of a homicidal death.
¶7 Trials
¶8 Fulton and Mitchell were tried simultaneously, but before separate juries. At trial, the
State’s theory was that Mitchell was Fulton’s accomplice in the murder of Collazo, which
1 Charges against Shaw were dismissed prior to trial, after his motion to suppress statements he made to police was granted. 2 No. 1-20-0492
occurred as revenge for an incident in which Collazo had robbed Fulton. Fulton presented an
alibi theory of defense, claiming that he was at home with his girlfriend at the time of the
murder; Mitchell also relied on Fulton’s alibi as his defense. Although the State introduced
evidence that both defendants had confessed to the murder, both Fulton and Mitchell contended
that those confessions were false.
¶9 As relevant to the instant appeal, the evidence at trial established the following.2 In
February 2003, approximately a month prior to Collazo’s death, Fulton and Collazo were
involved in a deal to purchase a firearm which had been arranged with the help of a mutual
friend named Johnitta Griffin, known as “Precious.” Fulton had contacted Precious, informing
her that he was interested in purchasing a firearm and asking whether she knew anyone who
would sell him one. Precious connected Fulton with Collazo, and the three engaged in a three-
way call about the purchase. Fulton and Collazo agreed to meet at a location on Diversey
Avenue to make the transaction.
¶ 10 Unbeknownst to Fulton, Collazo and his friend, Marcus Marinelli, developed a plan to rob
Fulton when he arrived to purchase the firearm. When Fulton arrived, Collazo escorted him
inside the building, where Marinelli pointed a handgun at him and demanded money. Fulton
handed Marinelli a wad of bills, which Marinelli presumed to be $300—the asking price for
the firearm—but which ultimately turned out to be only $14. After robbing Fulton, Collazo
and Marinelli ran away to a friend’s home.
2 As both defendants challenged their convictions on direct appeal, we relate the evidence at trial largely as set forth in our prior decisions. Since the evidence presented at trial is relevant to the determination of whether defendants are entitled to certificates of innocence, we relate it in considerable depth. 3 No. 1-20-0492
¶ 11 Shortly after the robbery, Mitchell—pretending to be Fulton’s brother—called Precious,
telling her that Collazo had robbed Fulton and demanding his money back. Precious also
received multiple telephone calls from Collazo, bragging about the robbery. On March 7, 2003,
a few days before Collazo was killed, Fulton called Precious and demanded his money back,
threatening to hurt Collazo if she did not return his money.
¶ 12 On March 9, 2003, Collazo called Precious at approximately 3 p.m. to inform her that he
was planning on visiting Marisol Caldero, Precious’ godmother, that evening. Precious
informed Collazo that she would be at Caldero’s home, but not until later that evening.
According to Precious’ grand jury testimony, which she later recanted at trial, at approximately
4 p.m., Fulton called Precious again asking about the money, and Precious informed Fulton
about Collazo’s plan to visit Caldero that evening. Precious provided several details about
Collazo and his plans, including where he was going, which bus he was likely to take, what he
would be wearing, and his physical description. Precious arrived at Caldero’s home at
approximately 10:30 p.m. and was told that Collazo had called 15 to 20 minutes earlier to find
out if Precious had arrived. Precious waited for Collazo, but he never called back and never
arrived.
¶ 13 At approximately 3 a.m. on March 10, 2003, a man named Sid Taylor called 911 after
looking out his window into the alley behind his apartment on the south side of Chicago and
observing a fire burning. Collazo’s burned body was discovered lying on a partially charred
cardboard box. He was bound and gagged and covered in a plastic material; his hands were
behind his back, and his hands and legs were wrapped together. Taylor informed police that he
had observed two African-American males standing near the fire, one wearing a red jacket and
the other wearing a black jacket. An autopsy revealed that Collazo’s body had been beaten
4 No. 1-20-0492
prior to his death, and the medical examiner opined that the cause of death was multiple blunt
force trauma injuries, with a significant contributing factor being asphyxiation due to the gag
in his mouth; Collazo was deceased before his body was set on fire.
¶ 14 Investigators spoke with Collazo’s family, who identified Marinelli as one of Collazo’s last
contacts before his death. Marinelli informed them about Collazo’s plans to visit Caldero, as
well as the robbery of Fulton. Investigators also spoke with Precious, who confirmed the details
of the robbery but became “evasive” when asked whether she had contact with Fulton on the
evening of March 9 or early morning of March 10. Precious was later taken to the police station
for questioning, where she was interviewed by an assistant State’s attorney (ASA) and
informed him that she had spoken with Fulton on the evening of March 9 and had provided
him with Collazo’s whereabouts; she later testified consistently with her statement before a
grand jury.
¶ 15 On March 18, 2003, detectives arrested Fulton at his home and brought him to Area One
headquarters for questioning. Fulton’s vehicle was also searched, and fingerprints of
codefendant Shaw were found underneath the spare tire cover in the trunk. During an initial
conversation with detectives, Fulton identified photos of Collazo, Marinelli, and Precious and
indicated that they were involved in robbing him when he attempted to purchase a gun; Fulton
was not questioned about the murder at that time.
¶ 16 During a second conversation, Fulton denied involvement in Collazo’s death. Fulton was
brought to the polygraph unit for a polygraph examination, but before the examination, Fulton
made an inculpatory statement to the detective conducting the examination, telling the
detective that he spoke with Precious on March 8, where she told him that Collazo would be
attending a party on March 9. Fulton spoke with Mitchell and Shaw and decided to beat Collazo
5 No. 1-20-0492
up. Following Precious’ directions, the three drove to the north side of Chicago in Fulton’s
vehicle and observed Collazo exit the bus. They then beat Collazo and placed him in Fulton’s
trunk. After driving for some time, they pulled over, removed Collazo from the trunk, bound
him with duct tape, and placed a plastic bag over his head before returning him to the trunk.
They continued driving until they reached the south side of Chicago, where they found a
refrigerator box in an alley and placed Collazo inside. Fulton then poured gasoline on the box
from a gas can Fulton kept inside his vehicle, then lit the box on fire. After the conversation
with the detective conducting the polygraph examination, the detectives investigating the
matter decided a polygraph was not necessary and instead drove Fulton to view the various
crime scenes, returning to Area One headquarters at approximately 2 a.m.
¶ 17 After returning, Fulton spoke to ASA McRay Judge and gave him a statement which was
consistent with his previous statements. At the end of the conversation, ASA Judge spoke to
Fulton outside the presence of detectives, where Fulton leaned over and said, in a low voice,
“what if I were to tell you that everything I just told you I made up.” ASA Judge asked if Fulton
was telling him what happened or merely suggesting a hypothetical, and Fulton responded,
“No, that’s what happened.” ASA Judge asked why Fulton would make up such a story, and
Fulton responded that he wanted to “shut the detectives up,” but that he was not intimidated
by, or fearful of, the detectives. Fulton then informed ASA Judge that he had been with his
girlfriend on the evening in question, that she had been ill, and that he had taken her to the
hospital.
¶ 18 ASA Judge reminded Fulton that he had previously indicated that he, Mitchell, and Shaw
had been wearing a white hoodie, a red hoodie, and a black hoodie at the time. Fulton explained
that he had made that information up, as he knew that either Mitchell or Shaw owned a black
6 No. 1-20-0492
hoodie, and Fulton owned both a white hoodie and a red hoodie, so he could say that he allowed
his friend to borrow a hoodie. ASA Judge asked Fulton what his response would be if he knew
that a witness observed two offenders standing next to Collazo’s body, one wearing a red top
and one wearing a black top. Fulton responded, “that wouldn’t be very good for me, would it?”
Fulton, however, maintained that he had fabricated the story. ASA Judge believed that Fulton
was lying, but nevertheless informed detectives of Fulton’s alibi.
¶ 19 The next day, on March 19, 2003, Fulton spoke with ASA Jake Rubenstein, where he
informed ASA Rubenstein of the earlier robbery and again indicated that he had been with his
girlfriend on the evening of the murder. Fulton told ASA Rubenstein that they had been at the
hospital until 3 a.m., when they went home and went to sleep. ASA Rubenstein asked Fulton
about his previous conversation with ASA Judge, and Fulton stated that his confession was a
lie. ASA Rubenstein asked how Fulton would know the details of what to say, and Fulton
responded that he had overheard the detectives talking about the case.
¶ 20 Later that evening, Mitchell was arrested. Upon arrest, Mitchell denied involvement in the
murder, but said he could not recall his precise whereabouts on the evening of March 9 and
speculated that he may have been at a cousin’s house.
¶ 21 On March 20, 2003, ASA Rubenstein spoke to the detectives investigating the matter, and
they visited the scene where Collazo’s body had been discovered, as well as the hospital where
Fulton’s girlfriend had allegedly been treated. ASA Rubenstein spoke with both defendants
again, but neither provided any new information.
¶ 22 On March 21, 2003, while he was at Area One headquarters concerning a different case,
ASA Rubenstein again spoke with Fulton, who indicated that his previous alibi was a lie and
7 No. 1-20-0492
again confessed to the murder. ASA Rubenstein asked Fulton why he had changed his story,
and Fulton said that he feared Mitchell and Shaw would attempt to blame him for the murder.
¶ 23 Also on March 21, 2003, Mitchell confessed to the murder; his confession was recorded
on video, and was largely consistent with the statements made by Fulton.
¶ 24 At trial, both defendants’ defense was primarily centered on Fulton’s alibi, as well as
casting doubt as to the plausibility of the State’s theory. For instance, an employee of the
Chicago Transit Authority testified that, according to the bus schedule, the last Foster Avenue
bus (the bus route that Collazo was alleged to have taken) would have arrived at 8:21 p.m. on
the evening of the murder. A Comcast employee also testified that a pay-per-view movie was
ordered on Fulton’s television at 11 p.m. on March 9, 2003. Yolanda Henderson, Fulton’s
girlfriend, also testified that Fulton had taken her to the hospital on March 9, 2003, after which
they returned home for the night, and identified photos and videos showing (1) Fulton and
Henderson leaving their apartment building at 8:09 p.m. on March 9; (2) them arriving at the
hospital at 8:33 p.m.; (3) Fulton entering the apartment building at 10:57 p.m. and exiting at
11:30 p.m.; (4) Fulton and Henderson returning to the apartment building at 11:53 p.m.; and
(5) them leaving the apartment building the following morning at 7:56 a.m. Telephone records
also did not show any phone calls between Fulton and Precious on March 9, 2003.
¶ 25 In response to Fulton’s alibi evidence, the State claimed that Fulton could have left his
apartment building through the back door. Accordingly, in rebuttal, the State called an
investigator to testify that there were no security cameras in the back area of Fulton’s apartment
building. The investigator also identified several photos of the rear of the apartment building,
in which no cameras were visible.
8 No. 1-20-0492
¶ 26 Following closing arguments, both juries found defendants guilty. Fulton and Mitchell
were each sentenced to 31 years for first-degree murder, 25 years for aggravated kidnapping,
and 3 years for concealment of a homicidal death, with the sentences to run concurrently.
¶ 27 Direct Appeals
¶ 28 Both defendants filed appeals of their convictions. In his appeal, Mitchell contested (1)
whether there was sufficient evidence of his guilt, (2) whether the trial court erred in denying
his motions to quash arrest and to suppress statements, and (3) whether the closing argument
of the prosecution was improper. People v. Mitchell, No. 1-06-3359 (2010) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Mitchell’s conviction was affirmed, but the case was
remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. Id.
¶ 29 In his appeal, Fulton contested (1) whether the police had probable cause to arrest him, (2)
whether his motion to suppress statements was properly denied, (3) whether the evidence was
sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) whether the prosecution made
improper comments during closing argument. People v. Fulton, No. 1-07-0058 (2010)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). As with Mitchell, Fulton’s
conviction was affirmed but the case was remanded for resentencing. Id.
¶ 30 Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 31 In 2013, Mitchell filed a postconviction petition,3 in which he alleged (1) that the State had
violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense, (2) that Mitchell’s trial counsel had been ineffective, and (3) that
newly discovered evidence established his actual innocence. Specifically, Mitchell alleged
3 While it is undisputed that Fulton filed a similar postconviction petition, Fulton’s petition is not contained in the record on appeal. 9 No. 1-20-0492
that, at trial, the State argued that Fulton had been able to leave his apartment building via the
back door in order to evade all surveillance. New evidence, however, established that there
were multiple surveillance cameras at Fulton’s apartment building, including one at the back
door—a fact which the State never disclosed at trial. Mitchell further alleged that the police
officers who interrogated Fulton and Mitchell had a “pattern and practice of coercing and
falsifying confessions from innocent people” using the same tactics used on them, but this
information was never disclosed to Mitchell. Finally, Mitchell alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly investigate the apartment building’s surveillance system, for
failing to question prospective jurors about their feelings about false confessions, and for
failing to investigate the “brutal and unique method of killing,” which was affiliated with a
particular street gang to which Fulton did not belong. In the alternative, if counsel was not
ineffective for failing to properly investigate the building’s surveillance system, Mitchell
alleged that the evidence as to the surveillance cameras constituted newly discovered evidence
which supported an actual innocence claim.
¶ 32 In response, the State agreed that an evidentiary hearing was warranted on Mitchell’s Brady
claim, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and his actual innocence claim to the extent
that such claims relied on the presence or absence of surveillance cameras focused on the rear
lobby exit of the apartment building. With respect to Mitchell’s remaining claims, however,
the State requested that such claims be dismissed as there were insufficient legal or factual
bases to support them.
¶ 33 The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issues concerning the presence
of surveillance cameras in 2018. At the hearing, Tamala Boyette, a former property manager
for the apartment building, testified that there were three security cameras installed in the lobby
10 No. 1-20-0492
of the building, which had been installed in the 1990s and updated in 2002; the cameras were
located “[i]n the back facing the mailbox,” in front of the elevator, and in the building
entryway, and their purpose was to record traffic entering and exiting the building. Boyette
testified that, while residents could enter or exit the building through the back door, they would
still be required to pass through the lobby and would be in view of the cameras. Other witnesses
called by the defense testified to a letter sent to building residents in August 2002 which
indicated that cameras would be installed in the lobby area.
¶ 34 Michael Sanfratello, the principal of a security installation company, testified on behalf of
the State that his company entered into a contract to install security systems in the apartment
building in 2002, but that the contract did not include the installation of a surveillance camera
near the back door. Instead, the company installed a key fob system on the back door, which
required wiring to run from a junction box located near the door. On cross-examination,
Sanfratello testified that a resident returning through the back door would be required to use a
fob to enter the building, which would capture the identity of the fob holder. Sanfratello further
testified that a camera could later be affixed to the junction box, and that his company was not
the exclusive provider of cameras for the building; Sanfratello, however, testified that his
company was still working on the installation in July 2003 and there was no camera installed
at that time.
¶ 35 After the hearing, defendants supplemented their postconviction petitions to add
allegations concerning evidence of the key fob and reader installed on the back door.
¶ 36 In February 2019, the circuit court granted defendants’ postconviction petitions, vacating
their convictions and ordering new trials. The circuit court found that the jury did not receive
evidence as to whether there was a functioning camera at the rear entrance of Fulton’s
11 No. 1-20-0492
apartment building, nor did it hear about the key fob reader at the back door. The court
observed that there was no physical evidence connecting either defendant to the crime, with
the only “real evidence” being “the inconsistent statement of an 18-year-old John Fulton taken
*** during a period of four days and was unrecorded.” Thus, the court found that “whether
you want to title [the] lack of disclosure as a Brady violation or ineffective assistance of
counsel, the end result is the same as far as [defendants] are concerned.” The court determined
that this evidence should have been presented to the jury and its absence prejudiced defendants
and deprived them of a fair trial.
¶ 37 In May 2019, the State nol-prossed all charges against both defendants, stating that due to
the age of the case and the status of the witnesses, it would be unable to satisfy its burden of
proof on retrial.
¶ 38 Certificate of Innocence Proceedings
¶ 39 In June 2019, Fulton and Mitchell each filed nearly-identical petitions for certificates of
innocence pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code, in which each defendant alleged that he was
actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted.
¶ 40 The State filed objections to both petitions, claiming that defendants failed to prove that
(1) they were innocent of the offenses charged and (2) they did not contribute to their own
convictions.
¶ 41 After hearing arguments from both parties, the circuit court ultimately denied the petitions.
The court found the State’s arguments that defendants had brought about their own convictions
to be unpersuasive, noting that “a fair argument can be made that they have, but I don’t believe
they have.” Thus, the court found that the main focus was whether defendants had proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that they were actually innocent. While the circuit court
12 No. 1-20-0492
observed that defendants had raised “compelling arguments,” it ultimately found that
defendants were unable to satisfy the requirement of actual innocence. The court based its
determination in large part on its finding that Mitchell “gave a credible statement” when he
confessed. The court found that, “while we can argue about some of the details of that
statement, it appears to me, through his demeanor; his coolness; *** the way he *** spoke and
the way he was able to fill in certain details, it convinced me of the truthfulness of at least what
I consider to be very important parts of that statement.” The court further stated that it had
considered the statements of Precious, and her conversations with both defendants, noting that
“we could debate some of the details, and I’ve debated and considered all of those things, over
and over and over again.” The court observed that the burden remained on defendants to
establish their innocence and found that, considering Mitchell’s statement, Precious’
statements, and the prior altercation between Fulton and Collazo, “I just remain unconvinced
that [defendants] are able to sustain their burden.”
¶ 42 This appeal follows.
¶ 43 ANALYSIS
¶ 44 On appeal, the sole issue is whether the circuit court erred in denying defendants’ petitions
for certificates of innocence. As an initial matter, the State asks us to strike the “Nature of the
Case” and “Statement of Facts” sections of defendants’ appellate brief, claiming that they are
argumentative and contain unsupported factual assertions in violation of Supreme Court Rule
341(h). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The Illinois Supreme Court Rules have the force
of law (Grant v. Rancour, 2020 IL App (2d) 190802, ¶ 16 n.1), and we may strike a brief in
violation of the rules (Carter v. Carter, 2012 IL App (1st) 110855, ¶ 12). While we agree with
the State that these sections are argumentative and lack appropriate citations to the record,
13 No. 1-20-0492
these violations do not hinder or preclude our review, and we therefore decline to strike
defendants’ brief either in whole or in part. See id. We turn, then, to consideration of
defendants’ arguments on appeal.
¶ 45 Both defendants sought certificates of innocence pursuant to section 702 of the Code,
which provides that a petitioner may obtain a certificate of innocence if he proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he was convicted of one or more felonies, sentenced to
prison, and served all or part of the sentence; (2) the judgment of conviction was reversed or
vacated and he was subsequently found not guilty at a new trial or the charges were dismissed;
(3) he is innocent of the charged offenses; and (4) he did not voluntarily cause or bring about
his conviction through his own conduct. 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West 2018); People v.
Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 50; People v. McIntosh, 2021 IL App (1st) 171708, ¶ 43. Here,
three of the four elements are not in dispute; while the State argued below that defendants had
brought about their own convictions through their confessions, it does not make this argument
on appeal. Thus, the sole question is whether each defendant established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that he “is innocent of the offenses charged.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3) (West
2018).
¶ 46 There is a split of authority as to the standard of review to be applied to certificate of
innocence determinations. Compare People v. Rodriguez, 2021 IL App (1st) 200173, ¶ 44
(applying abuse of discretion standard of review), with McIntosh, 2021 IL App (1st) 171708,
¶ 40 (applying manifest weight of the evidence standard of review). See also Washington, 2023
IL 127952, ¶ 47 (noting split in authority but declining to resolve it). In this case, however, we
reach the same conclusion regardless of the standard applied.
14 No. 1-20-0492
¶ 47 In denying defendants’ petitions below, the circuit court found that, while defendants had
raised “compelling arguments,” they were nevertheless unable to establish that they were
actually innocent of the charged offenses. As noted, the court based its determination in large
part on its finding that Mitchell “gave a credible statement” when he confessed, finding that,
“while we can argue about some of the details of that statement, it appears to me, through his
demeanor; his coolness; *** the way he *** spoke and the way he was able to fill in certain
details, it convinced me of the truthfulness of at least what I consider to be very important parts
of that statement.” Defendants contend that the circuit court’s reliance on Mitchell’s statement
was inappropriate, as Mitchell’s statement was “involuntary” and therefore presumptively
unreliable, while the State maintains that Mitchell’s statement was properly considered as it
was voluntary.
¶ 48 The difference in the parties’ positions can be traced to the circuit court’s finding as to the
fourth required element for a certificate of innocence, namely, the requirement that the
petitioner did not “voluntarily cause or bring about” his conviction through his own conduct.
See 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West 2018). Below, the State contended that defendants had failed
to establish this element, as they confessed to killing Collazo. Defendants, in response,
maintained that their confessions were false. In ruling on the petitions, the circuit court found
the State’s arguments that defendants had brought about their own convictions to be
unpersuasive, noting that “a fair argument can be made that they have, but I don’t believe they
have.” As the primary evidence against defendants was their confessions, this finding
implicitly cast doubt upon the voluntariness of those confessions. See, e.g., Washington, 2023
IL 127952, ¶ 59 (finding that the defendant did not voluntarily bring about his own conviction
where the defendant’s confession was due to the abusive and coercive conduct of police). The
15 No. 1-20-0492
court, however, nevertheless relied on Mitchell’s confession in finding that defendants had not
established their innocence, suggesting that it found the confession worthy of belief.
¶ 49 As noted, certificate of innocence proceedings are reviewed under a deferential standard
of review, either for an abuse of discretion or under a manifest weight of the evidence standard.
See Rodriguez, 2021 IL App (1st) 200173, ¶ 47 (a circuit court abuses its discretion “only when
its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the
view adopted by” the court); McIntosh, 2021 IL App (1st) 171708, ¶ 42 (a finding of fact is
against the manifest weight of the evidence “only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or
when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence”). In this
case, the circuit court clearly gave careful consideration to the parties’ arguments and the trial
record, noting that it had “read, reread, pondered and mulled over all the exhibits, transcripts,
videos and pleadings” prior to its ruling and even rescheduling its ruling date when it found
the matter required further contemplation. Despite the circuit court’s efforts, however, we
nevertheless must find that we are unable to properly review the circuit court’s decision, as its
conclusion as to defendants’ confessions—especially Mitchell’s confession, which was
expressly relied upon in its decision—is unclear. Accordingly, while we recognize that these
proceedings have been ongoing for some time, we nevertheless find that the cause must be
remanded to the circuit court, so that the basis for any decision on defendants’ petitions is
clearly set forth in its ruling.
16 No. 1-20-0492
¶ 50 CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of defendants’ petitions
for certificates of innocence and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with our decision.
¶ 52 Reversed and remanded.