People v. Fullerton

2024 IL App (5th) 230086-U
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedFebruary 23, 2024
Docket5-23-0086
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2024 IL App (5th) 230086-U (People v. Fullerton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Fullerton, 2024 IL App (5th) 230086-U (Ill. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

2024 IL App (5th) 230086-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 02/23/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0086 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Macon County. ) v. ) No. 06-CF-659 ) DOMENIC E. FULLERTON, ) Honorable ) Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that the respondent remained a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In 2008, the respondent, Domenic E. Fullerton, was adjudicated a sexually dangerous

person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDP Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West

2008)), and the trial court committed him to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC), until such time as he was no longer a sexually dangerous person. On May 21, 2021, the

respondent filed an application for discharge or conditional release pursuant to section 9(a) of the

SDP Act, alleging that he had recovered and was no longer a sexually dangerous person. Id. § 9(a).

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a written order finding that the respondent remained

sexually dangerous and denying his application. The respondent appeals, arguing that the trial

1 court erred in denying his application for conditional release because he has made dramatic

improvement in his treatment, and that the trial court’s findings and denial of his application was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

¶3 I. FACTS

¶4 On May 9, 2006, the respondent was charged by information with two counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child against J.G., a minor under the age of 13. 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1

(West 2006). On August 10, 2006, the State filed a petition to declare the respondent a sexually

dangerous person pursuant to the SDP Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq (West 2006)). On April 25,

2008, after a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found the respondent to be a sexually dangerous

person and committed the respondent to the custody of the IDOC.

¶5 On May 21, 2021, the respondent filed a pro se application for discharge or conditional

release pursuant to section 9(a) of the SDP Act (id. § 9(a)), alleging that he had recovered and was

no longer a sexually dangerous person. The respondent alleged that, for the reasons detailed in his

application, the penultimate step in his pursuit of recovery would be a period of conditional release,

with conditions and risk prevention measures in place. The respondent further alleged that he had

a safe and adequate release plan in place that would serve the dual objective of providing essential

protection to the public, and allowing the necessary liberty to establish that he was fully recovered.

The respondent requested that the trial court grant him conditional release from commitment. The

trial court appointed counsel to represent the respondent.

¶6 On August 25, 2021, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois entered its appearance on

behalf of the acting director of the IDOC. On November 8, 2021, the trial court ordered the IDOC

to appoint an evaluator and file a statutorily mandated socio-psychiatric evaluation report on the

2 respondent. See id. § 9(a). On March 31, 2022, the IDOC filed a sexually dangerous persons

evaluation report prepared by Dr. Kristopher Clounch, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist and

sex offender evaluator. On September 13, 2022, the respondent filed a motion for the appointment

of an expert witness, which was denied by the trial court on the same day. Also on the same date,

the respondent requested the matter proceed to jury trial and the matter was rescheduled.

¶7 The trial court conducted a recovery hearing on the respondent’s application on January

24, 2023. Prior to the presentation of testimony, and after the proper admonishments by the trial

court, the respondent waived jury trial by written waiver. The State’s only witness was Dr.

Clounch, and defense counsel stipulated to Dr. Clounch’s qualifications and to being an expert in

assessing individuals under the SDP Act. Dr. Clounch testified that he was an employee of

Wexford Health Services that contracts with the State of Illinois to perform sexually

dangerous persons evaluations and that he had performed an in-person evaluation of the

respondent on March 16, 2022.

¶8 Dr. Clounch testified that the respondent was previously diagnosed with depression

and suicidal thoughts. Dr. Clounch had primarily diagnosed the respondent with a pedophilic

disorder, sexually attracted to males non-exclusive, which related to his being a sexually

dangerous person. Dr. Clounch stated that the respondent’s diagnosis indicated that he had

sexual behaviors, fantasies and/or urges to engage in sexual conduct with prepubescent

children typically under the age of 13. Dr. Clounch indicated that the respondent had shown

prior propensity to commit acts of sexual violence or molestation, citing the fact that the

respondent had been arrested on two separate occasions for engaging in sexual contact with

two young males. The first occasion was in 1988, when he was charged and convicted of

criminal sexual assault for engaging in anal sex with a 5-year-old unrelated male, K.H. The

3 second occasion was in 2006, when he was charged with two counts of predatory criminal

sexual assault of a child for engaging in oral and anal sex with a 7-year-old unrelated male,

J.G.

¶9 Dr. Clounch explained that in both of these cases, as well as other offenses that the

respondent reported, the respondent displayed grooming behaviors by meeting the families

and then either moving in with the family or providing babysitting services, thereby giving

him open access to the child, and ultimately, offending upon the child on multiple occasions.

Dr. Clounch elaborated on the respondent’s uncharged conduct, stating that the respondent

had initially indicated he had five victims. However, upon being challenged with his previous

report of having 10 victims, the respondent stated that he had peeped on or watched four or

five male victims and then there were five contact victims. Two of those contact victims were

the ones he was arrested for. The other three incidents were with a 5-year-old male family

member, and the respondent sexually penetrated the child on four or five occasions when the

respondent was 13 or 14 years old. Further, over a period of one to two years, the respondent

sexually offended another male family member when he was between the ages of 7 and 10.

Lastly, Dr.

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Related

People v. Bailey
937 N.E.2d 731 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2010)
People v. Hancock
2014 IL App (4th) 131069 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2014)
People v. Holmes
2016 IL App (1st) 132357 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2016)
People v. Houde
2019 IL App (3d) 180309 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2019)

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2024 IL App (5th) 230086-U, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-fullerton-illappct-2024.