People v. Frazier

2024 IL App (1st) 231387-U

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 231387-U

FOURTH DIVISION Order filed: October 17, 2024

No. 1-23-1387

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 11993 ) ) Honorable DEONTE FRAZIER, ) James B. Linn, ) Jennifer Coleman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, presiding.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford concurs in the judgment. Justice Ocasio dissents in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The Terry stop and subsequent pat-down of the defendant were warranted when the defendant was in a high-crime area, repositioned an item in his waistband in a manner consistent with the adjustment of a firearm, and acted nervously when approached by police. The circuit court also did not err in sentencing the defendant to a middle-of-the-range sentence when the court acknowledged the defendant’s mitigation arguments and instead placed greater weight on his lengthy criminal history. No. 1-23-1387

¶2 The defendant, Deonte Frazier, appeals his conviction of one count of unlawful possession

of a weapon by a felon, which resulted from a Terry stop and a subsequent pat-down. He contends

that the circuit court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress and in sentencing him to 8 years

in prison without sufficiently considering certain mitigating factors. We see no merit to his

arguments and affirm.

¶3 On September 20, 2022, the defendant, who was out on bond from a charge of unlawful

use of a weapon by a felon in case 21CR10866, was at a gas station in Chicago when he was

approached by two police officers. Believing that he was carrying a concealed weapon, the officers

patted down the defendant and found a firearm. The defendant was then arrested and ultimately

charged with one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and two counts of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The defendant moved to suppress the officers’ recovery of

the weapon, arguing in the motion that the police had no reason to believe that he was armed.

¶4 At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress, Officer Demetrius Prothro testified

that on September 20, 2022, he and his partner, Officer Carl Smith, were on patrol on the east side

of District Six in an unmarked police vehicle. Both officers were wearing plain clothes with tactical

vests identifying them as police, as well as utility belts containing firearms and handcuffs. The

officers initially saw the defendant getting out of his vehicle at a gas station, which Prothro

described as “an area of heavy attention based off of that district.” As the defendant was exiting

the vehicle, Prothro “observed him reposition an item from his right rear waistband area.” Prothro

testified that he had observed similar movements hundreds of times before, and he estimated that

ninety percent of the time he later found contraband in that area. The officers parked their car and

followed the defendant inside “to conduct a field investigation or at least have a conversation [with

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the defendant] at that moment.” Inside the store, they found the defendant at the register with an

unlit cigar of suspected cannabis hanging from his mouth. According to Prothro, the defendant

was breathing heavily and had wide eyes.

¶5 Prothro testified that, “due to characteristics, the furtive movement, along with the area that

we were,” he asked the defendant if he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons on him, after which the

defendant, in Prothro’s words, “looked down, paused, and related to me, not verbatim, ‘No.’ ”

Without asking consent, Prothro then patted down the defendant and found a loaded firearm on

the defendant’s waist. A subsequent records search revealed that the defendant did not have a

Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card or a Concealed Carry License (CCL), and as a result,

the defendant was arrested. Prothro admitted that at the time of the search he was not aware of any

active warrants or investigatory alerts related to the defendant. A recording of the encounter from

Prothro’s body-worn camera was then played for the court.

¶6 Following Prothro’s testimony, the court gave an oral ruling denying the defendant’s

motion to suppress:

“The Court heard the witness testify and I saw the video which corroborated

basically everything that you said. The officer is on patrol. It's a high crime area where he's

always got to be alert for things. He sees [the defendant] acting in a manner which drew

his attention and raised some suspicions moving objects around in his waistband. He

suspected there may be contraband there based on past experience and based on the area

where he was.

When inside he saw [the defendant] with what looked like marijuana in his mouth

albeit not lit but a marijuana cigarette. Asked him if he had anything. [The defendant] didn't

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look him in the eye and didn't give him a definitive answer. He just looked down and said

no and appeared to be nervous. Apparently, the officer did the briefest of pat-downs. It

wasn't like a full fledge search. It was a very brief pat-down right where this happened

moments, less than a minute, after this encounter. Well less than a minute. Found exactly

what he suspected might be there, which is a gun.

I'm not finding it supports the Fourth Amendment [sic] by this very brief encounter

and the pat-down under the circumstances that it happened. The motion to suppress is

respectfully denied.”

¶7 The defendant moved for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to suppress, which

the circuit court also denied. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on the charge of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon, following which the jury found the defendant guilty of that

charge.

¶8 At the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the applicable sentencing

range was 3 to 14 years in prison. The State argued that, as an aggravating factor, the defendant

had a significant prior criminal history that included convictions for possession of a controlled

substance; aggravated resisting an officer; aggravated battery; possession of cannabis with intent

to sell or deliver; possession of a controlled substance; and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

The State also noted that at the time of the offense at issue the defendant was out on bond on the

unlawful-use-of-a-weapon charge in case 21CR10866, of which he was ultimately convicted. The

State asked that the defendant’s sentence in the present case run consecutively to his sentence in

case 21CR10866.

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¶9 The defendant informed the court that he was thirty-six years old and has a close and

supportive relationship with both his mother and his seventeen-year-old daughter. Prior to his

arrest in this case, he had been continuously employed as a delivery driver since 2010 and had also

worked for a staffing company since 2016. He suffers from anxiety and depression, both of which

he would like to treat, and he was not affiliated with any gang. During his time in custody, he had

completed four separate school courses and almost fifty hours of coursework, as well as 6 days of

self-improvement programs. The defendant asked for a minimum sentence to be served

concurrently to his sentence in case 21CR10866. Defense counsel also seemed to ask for leniency

on the basis that the defendant’s prior counsel made numerous attempts to speak with the

defendant’s privately retained counsel from case 21CR10866 to work on a global disposition of

both cases, but the private counsel was unresponsive, preventing a more favorable resolution of

the defendant’s cases. The defendant made a statement in which he suggested that the evidence

did not tell the whole story, and he stated that he has a daughter who needs him and that all of the

work that he does is for her.

¶ 10 The circuit court agreed with the State that two aggravating factors under section 5-5-3.2(a)

of Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2022)) were present, namely

that the defendant has a history of prior criminal activity (see id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(3)) and that the

defendant was out on bond on a felony charge and was later convicted of that charge (see id.

§ 5-5-3.2(a)(12)). The court noted that it found that defendant’s aggravated battery conviction to

be “most disturbing.” The court also stated that, “I recognize that [defense] counsel has an

argument that is very well placed in mitigation about the defendant's history. I will note though

that he has been consistently arrested.” The court further observed that the defendant had neither

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caused nor threatened serious harm, a mitigating factor under section 5-5-3.1(a)(1) (730 ILCS 5/5-

5-3.1(a)(1) (West 2022)). However, the court found that “there is far more aggravation than

mitigation here given his background.” The court ultimately imposed an 8-year sentence to be

served consecutively to his sentence in case 21CR10866. Defense counsel made an oral motion to

reconsider the sentence, but did not subsequently file a written motion to reconsider. This appeal

follows.

¶ 11 The defendant raises two issues in this appeal. First, he challenges the circuit court’s denial

of his motion to suppress, arguing that the Terry stop and pat-down were unjustified. Second, he

argues that the court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors during sentencing and that his

sentence is excessive. We find both arguments to be without merit and will address each in turn.

¶ 12 The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution generally requires that any

government search or seizure be authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. People v.

Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (2002). However, at issue in this case is the exception to that rule

outlined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a

brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has

committed, or is about to, commit a crime.” People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 (citing Terry,

392 U.S. at 22). “The officer must have a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that criminal activity

is afoot.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)). “The investigatory stop must be

justified at its inception and the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,

taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the governmental

intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.” Id. (citing Terry, 392

U.S. at 20-21). When evaluating the validity of a stop, we look at the totality of the circumstances

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and objectively consider, “ ‘would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or

the search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was

appropriate?’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). Further, once an officer has initiated a stop,

if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect “is armed and presently dangerous to the officer

or others, the officer may conduct a pat down search or frisk to determine whether the person is

carrying a weapon.” People v. White, 2020 IL App (1st) 171814, ¶ 20 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at

24). When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we “accord great deference to

the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the

manifest weight of the evidence; however, we will review de novo the ultimate question of the

defendant's legal challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress.” People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.

2d 425, 431 (2001) (citing In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000)).

¶ 13 The defendant argues that Officers Prothro and Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to justify

both the initial Terry stop and the resulting pat-down. In support, he cites caselaw holding that the

sight of a bulge in a suspect’s clothing is insufficient to justify a stop (see, e.g., People v. Goodum,

356 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (2005)) and he further argues that, even if a firearm were visible, the

stop still would not have been warranted because possessing a firearm is not necessarily a crime

(see People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 40 (“[P]olice cannot simply assume a person

who possesses a firearm outside the home is involved in criminal activity.”)). He also contends

that, once stopped, there was no evidence that he posed a danger to the officers so as to justify the

pat-down. The State counters that the totality of the circumstances supported both the stop and the

pat-down, as the defendant was in a high-crime area, repositioned an item in his waistline, and

acted nervously and evasively when confronted by police. We agree with the State that, when

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considering those three factors and the totality of the circumstances, both the initial Terry stop and

the subsequent pat-down were justified.

¶ 14 First, we consider the location of the encounter, as “[a] person's presence in a high crime

area is a relevant factor in deciding whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police

have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.” People v. Harris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103382,

¶ 12. The circuit court in this case found that the stop occurred in a high-crime area, and that

finding has support in the record. Indeed, Officer Prothro testified that the gas station in question

was “an area of heavy attention based off of that district” and that the stop was motivated in part

by “the area that they were [in].” Although the defendant challenges this characterization of the

gas station as a high-crime area as conclusory, whether an area can be referred to as one of high

crime is a factual issue (id. ¶ 13), and we defer to the circuit court’s factual findings unless they

are against the manifest weight of the evidence. On this issue, the defendant has not pointed to any

evidence from the hearing on his motion to suppress countering or undermining the court’s finding

that the gas station in question was a high-crime area. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court’s

finding on that point was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Jackson, 2012

IL App (1st) 103300, ¶ 35 (“[A]n officer's uncontradicted and undisputed testimony, which is

accepted by the trial court, is sufficient to support a trial court's finding that the incident occurred

in a high-crime area.” (citing People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 310-11 (1998))); see also People

v. Smith, 2023 IL App (3d) 230060, ¶ 34 (noting that we will only disturb a court’s factual findings

in ruling on a motion to suppress “if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding

itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” (citing People v. Deleon,

227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008))).

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¶ 15 The second factor at issue is the defendant’s conduct when getting out of his vehicle. The

defendant argues that adjusting a bulge in his pants is insufficient to warrant a stop, and he cites

several cases establishing the principle that “[a] single bulge in a defendant's clothing, by itself,

does not justify a Terry stop and pat-down search.” Goodum, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. While that

rule has indeed been well-established, Officer Prothro did not merely observe a bulge in the

defendant’s clothing. Rather, he testified that the defendant “reposition[ed] an item from his right

rear waistband area.” This is an important distinction because the repositioning or adjustment of

item in the waistband area more strongly implies the presence of a weapon than does the sight of

a simple bulge. See United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “it

was reasonable to infer that [the defendant] was carrying a gun in his waistband” when a detective

observed the defendant “reach underneath his jacket and shirt and adjust a weighty object

concealed at the center of his waistline”); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 727 Fed. Appx. 725,

727 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that it was reasonable to infer the presence of a firearm when the

defendant was “holding something against his midsection with his left hand” and then “moved his

right hand so that both of his hands were against his midsection, as if to protect his waistband

area”); United States v. Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an officer

reasonably believed that a defendant who moved his hand toward his pocket was carrying a

weapon because “experience has shown that a subject who pats his waistband may be trying to

confirm that his gun is concealed and secured”). Based on Officer Prothro’s description of the

defendant’s actions, we disagree with the defendant’s application of bulge principles to the present

case and instead believe that it was reasonable to infer the presence of a weapon from the

defendant’s adjustment of an item in his waistband.

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¶ 16 The third relevant factor in this case is the defendant’s nervousness and evasiveness. See

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in

determining reasonable suspicion***.”). While nervousness alone is not enough to create

reasonable suspicion, “[n]ervousness is more salient to the reasonable determination calculus when

it accompanies other suspicious behavior or circumstances suggesting a risk to officer safety.”

United States v. Howell, 958 F.3d 589, 600 (7th Cir. 2020). In this case, Officer Prothro testified

that the defendant had wide eyes, was breathing heavily, and when asked by Prothro whether he

was armed he looked down and hesitated before answering. These observations are relevant to the

overall calculus.

¶ 17 When we view the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that the

police officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the Terry stop and to pat down the defendant

for a potential weapon. As we have discussed, the defendant was in a high-crime area, repositioned

an item in his waistband in a manner consistent with the adjustment of a concealed weapon, and

appeared nervous when confronted by police. Caselaw supports the conclusion that these facts

together supplied reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop and a subsequent pat-down. See

Spears v. Leporace, 449 Fed. Appx. 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a Terry stop and pat-

down were justified when, while in a bar in a high-crime area, the suspect arched his back, adjusted

something in his waistband, and, when asked by police whether he had a firearm, acted nervously,

looked away from the officer and toward the exit, and hesitated before answering); see also United

States v. Wallace, 450 Fed. Appx. 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen an officer observes suspicious

behavior he reasonably believes is intended to conceal a weapon, he is justified in searching for

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the weapon.”). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to

suppress.

¶ 18 In his second issue, the defendant contests his 8-year sentence, arguing that the length of

the sentence is excessive and demonstrates that the court failed to appropriately balance the goals

of rehabilitation and retribution. “The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a

sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v. Alexander, 239

Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010) (citing People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000)). “ ‘The trial judge has

the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing

court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have

weighed these factors differently. [Citation.]” Id. (quoting Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209). For these

reasons, when a defendant contends that his sentence is excessive, we review the court’s decision

for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the sentence differs greatly from the spirit and

purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v.

Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99 (citing People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36).

¶ 19 We initially note that the defendant did not preserve this sentencing challenge by filing a

written motion to reconsider his sentence. See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 69 (1998) (“As a

general rule, the failure to object to an alleged error at sentencing and in a post-sentencing motion

results in a waiver of that error on appeal.”). However, waiver notwithstanding, we see no error in

the circuit court’s imposition of the defendant’s sentence.

¶ 20 The defendant contends that the court failed to adequately consider the evidence in

mitigation, as purportedly shown both by the court having only explicitly mentioned the fact that

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he did not cause or threaten serious harm and by the court’s statement that it was balancing that

factor against his criminal history. However, “[t]he trial judge is not required to detail precisely

for the record the exact process by which she determined the penalty nor is she required to

articulate her consideration of mitigating factors nor is she required to make an express finding

that defendant lacked rehabilitative potential.” People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002)

(citing People v. Redmond, 265 Ill. App. 3d 292, 307 (1994)). Instead, we “presume[] that the trial

court considered only appropriate factors in sentencing, unless the record affirmatively shows

otherwise.” Id. (citing People v. Lurks, 241 Ill. App. 3d 819, 827 (1993)).

¶ 21 The record of the sentencing proceeding belies the defendant’s contention that the court

failed to consider his evidence in mitigation, which, it is worth mentioning, was not overwhelming.

To the contrary, during the sentencing hearing the court explicitly acknowledged the defendant’s

mitigation argument, stating, “I recognize that [defense] counsel has an argument that is very well

placed in mitigation about the defendant's history.” Rather, the record instead reflects that the court

simply placed greater weight on the defendant’s criminal history, with the court’s next immediate

comment being, “I will note though that he has been consistently arrested,” and with the court later

stating, “there is far more aggravation than mitigation here given his background.” This weighing

of the various sentencing factors was within the court’s discretion (see Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at

212), and the court was correct that the defendant’s criminal history is extensive. Even though

most of his convictions were for non-violent offenses, the fact remains that, as the court observed,

the defendant has “consistently” been in trouble with the law, and he was out on bond at the time

that he committed the offense at issue in this case. Given that history, we cannot say that the court

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abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to 8 years in prison, a term that is in the middle

of the potential range of 3 to 14 years.

¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

¶ 24 JUSTICE OCASIO, dissenting:

¶ 25 For a police officer to force a person to submit to the temporary investigative seizure known

as a Terry stop, he “must reasonably suspect that the person apprehended is committing or has

committed a criminal offense.” People v. Lozano, 2023 IL 128609, ¶ 35. Before the officers in this

case stopped Deonte Frazier, all they knew was that, while getting out of his car to go into a gas

station, he adjusted something at his waist that could have been a gun. (Of course, it could have

been something else—A fashionable fanny pack? A colonoscopy bag?—but the Terry reasonable-

suspicion standard does not require officers to rule out alternative explanations.) The sum of their

knowledge was that he might be armed. That’s it. Carrying a gun is not ipso facto against the law,

so “police cannot simply assume a person who possess a firearm outside the home is involved in

criminal activity.” People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 40. If there was a basis for

reasonably suspecting that Frazier was illegally possessing a gun, then an investigative stop would

be justified. But there was nothing here suggesting illegal possession, and mere possession is not

a sufficient justification.

¶ 26 How, then, does the majority conclude that the stop was justified? It gives two reasons.

¶ 27 The first is that Frazier “appeared nervous when confronted by police.” After viewing the

bodycam video, I would describe Frazier’s demeanor as not only calm and composed but

remarkably so given that that two police officers were surrounding him and putting hands on him.

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Putting that aside, though, the stop itself obviously cannot be justified by what Frazier did in

response to it. Frazier’s supposedly nervous reaction might be relevant to the validity of the

nonconsensual pat-down, but we cannot reach that question without first determining whether the

initial stop was permissible. Lozano, 2023 IL 128609, ¶ 35 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.

323, 326 (2009)).

¶ 28 That leaves only one thing: the majority relies on the trial court’s finding that Frazier was

in a “high-crime area.” With all respect to my colleagues, that is not good enough. See People v.

Harris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103382, ¶ 14 (“A conclusory and unsubstantiated statement that a

location is a ‘high crime area’ is insufficient to establish that consideration for purposes of

justifying a Terry stop.”). An officer’s claim that a stop occurred in a high-crime area “ ‘requires

careful examination by the court.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d

1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)). Why? “ ‘[B]ecause such a description, unless properly limited and

factually based, can easily serve as a proxy for race and ethnicity.’ ” Id. (quoting Montero-

Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138). It also serves as a convenient ex post facto justification for a

suspicionless stop. The authors of a study of stops conducted in New York City between 2007 and

2012 described the results as showing that “officers [were] claiming that every block in New York

City is high crime at one time or another.” Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-

Based High-Crime Areas, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 345, 350 (2019).

¶ 29 If an investigative stop was purportedly justified because it took place in a high-crime area,

the court must ask why. Is the observed behavior consistent with a type of crime that is unusually

common in that area? Id. (citing United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2007)). Are

criminal acts focused on a particular part of a neighborhood, such as a specific intersection? Id.

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(citing Wright, 485 F.3d at 54). Is the area experiencing a notable uptick in certain criminal

activity? Id. (citing Wright, 485 F.3d at 54). Stated more generally, the court should evaluate how

local circumstances, whatever they might be, affect how a reasonable officer might interpret

otherwise innocuous conduct. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (explaining that

officers need not “ignore the relevant characteristics of a location” when deciding whether to make

an investigative stop).

¶ 30 So, what it is about East Chatham that made Frazier’s behavior more indicative of a crime

than it would have been in East Lakeview? The answer: nothing. The only evidence found in the

record that goes beyond conclusory assertions that the area had “high crime” or was “an area of

heavy attention” was one officer’s trial testimony that the area the gas station was in was “known

for high crime, narcotic [sic], gang conflict, and shootings.” Taking that at face value, so what?

Frazier was walking into a gas station, not lingering on a street corner, flashing gang signs, or

rolling down a rear window to do a drive-by. The label “high-crime area” has no significance unto

itself. When divorced from factual meaning, it does not supply reasonable suspicion that is

otherwise lacking. To hold otherwise would mean that people who live in, work in, shop in, or

merely travel through “high-crime areas” are inherently more criminally suspect than everybody

else.

¶ 31 The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures applies regardless of race,

class, creed, or locality. The officers in this case might have reasonably suspected that Frazier had

a gun, but the evidence did not disclose a basis for reasonably suspecting that Frazier was

committing or about to commit a criminal offense, and the fact that Frazier happened to be in a

“high-crime area” makes no difference under the circumstances of this case. Because the gun was

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found during a search arising out of an investigative stop not supported by a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity, the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. For these reasons,

I respectfully dissent.

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