NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 180656-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0656 October 26, 2020 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Vermilion County DEONTAE L. FRANKLIN, ) No. 17CF534 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Nancy S. Fahey, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not err in imposing a 24-year sentence.
¶2 Following a June 2018 trial, a jury found defendant, Deontae L. Franklin, guilty
of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)). In August 2018,
the trial court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
defendant to 24 years in prison for aggravated battery with a firearm where the court
(1) misapprehended the trial evidence, (2) considered an improper aggravating factor in
characterizing the circumstances of the offense, (3) refused to consider defendant’s mitigation
evidence as a factor in sentencing, and (4) failed to consider defendant’s demonstrated potential
for rehabilitation. We affirm. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In July 2017, the State charged defendant by information with aggravated battery
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)) (count I) and aggravated unlawful use of
a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2)(3)(C) (West 2016)) (count II). Prior to trial, the State
dismissed count II.
¶6 A. Defendant’s Jury Trial
¶7 Below, we summarize the relevant testimony elicited during defendant’s June
2018 jury trial.
¶8 1. Lashawn Clark
¶9 Lashawn Clark, defendant’s ex-girlfriend, testified that on July 29, 2017, she
lived in an apartment at 1227 Clarence Street in Danville, Illinois. Clark indicated that when she
lived on Clarence Street, defendant stayed with her four to five times a week and defendant kept
clothes there in a closet.
¶ 10 Clark recounted that around 4 a.m. on July 29, 2017, defendant and two of his
cousins came to her apartment to hang out. At one point, defendant and his two cousins argued
about family issues. Next, a “very intoxicated” man she did not know came into her apartment.
Clark observed this man with a bottle of Bacardi in his hand, and he asked people for drugs.
Clark testified everyone was irritated with this man and they asked him to leave. While the man
initially left, at some point, the man came back inside the apartment. Clark stated the man’s
behavior exacerbated everyone’s anger, particularly where defendant and his cousins had been in
an argument before the man arrived.
¶ 11 Around 7 a.m., Clark went into her bathroom because she was afraid the family
was going to fight “the drunk man.” While in the bathroom, Clark heard one gunshot and stayed
-2- in the bathroom for about a minute. Clark then left the bathroom, grabbed her keys, locked the
door to her apartment, and left in a red or maroon van with defendant to go to his uncle’s house.
Clark testified that when she exited the bathroom everyone had left and gone their separate ways.
Clark never saw defendant with a gun.
¶ 12 Clark represented that around 10 a.m. on August 1, 2017, police officers came to
her apartment to talk with her about the incident and defendant’s whereabouts. Clark let the
officers into her apartment where officers observed defendant in the back bedroom.
Subsequently, the officers arrested defendant. The officers also searched Clark’s apartment and
found a handgun inside a wall in the closet defendant used. Clark told police she had never seen
the gun before.
¶ 13 2. Bobby Hansbrough
¶ 14 Bobby Hansbrough, the shooting victim, testified that on the night of July 28,
2017, he drank alcohol and possibly used cocaine at his brother’s house. In the early morning of
July 29, 2017, Hansbrough left his brother’s house to walk to his niece’s house when he saw two
men he knew standing outside of an apartment at 1227 Clarence Street. Hansbrough joined the
two men in conversation. At the time Hansbrough came across the two men, he was drinking
from a bottle of alcohol.
¶ 15 Hansbrough and the two men eventually went inside the apartment. Hansbrough
testified there were other people in the apartment he did not know. Hansbrough said everyone
was drinking and having a good time except defendant who “seemed upset” and “hyper, like he
was upset about something[.]” Hansbrough also stated “one time [defendant] came into the
living room brandishing a firearm.” At some point defendant asked Hansbrough to leave the
-3- apartment, so he left the apartment with the bottle of alcohol in his hand. Hansbrough testified
he intended to walk to his niece’s house.
¶ 16 After Hansbrough left the apartment, he heard a door open and someone walking
behind him. Hansbrough turned around and saw defendant holding the same “chrome gun with
the black handle in his hand[.]” Hansbrough estimated defendant shot him in the stomach from
about 10 feet away. When asked what happened when the bullet hit him in the stomach,
Hansbrough replied, “[i]t hit my right hip and knocked my leg from up out under me and I hit the
ground.” Hansbrough testified no argument arose between defendant and him before defendant
shot him.
¶ 17 After Hansbrough fell, he looked at defendant who was trying to move the slide to
fire the gun again. However, the gun appeared to have jammed. Hansbrough stated, “it looked
like he wanted to shoot me again[.]” Defendant never shot at Hansbrough a second time.
Rather, defendant said, “F this shit” and went back into the apartment. Hansbrough then heard
people coming outside and someone saying, “Get in the van[,]” but Hansbrough did not see who
got into the van. He only heard the van start up and drive off. Hansbrough testified he observed
a red or maroon van parked in the front of the apartment when he arrived at the apartment.
¶ 18 An ambulance transported Hansbrough to the hospital where he stayed for seven
days. Doctors removed two feet of intestine from Hansbrough’s body. Doctors were unable to
remove the bullet from his right hip, which affected his gait and disturbed his sleep. Hansbrough
had a permanent surgical scar from his groin to the middle of his stomach.
¶ 19 Hansbrough also addressed his criminal history. Specifically, Hansbrough
recounted a 2012 conviction for criminal trespass to a residence and his 2007 conviction for
aggravated battery to a police officer.
-4- ¶ 20 3. Juan Garza
¶ 21 Juan Garza testified that on July 29, 2017, he lived across the street from Clark’s
apartment. Around 7 a.m. on July 29, 2017, Garza arrived home from work and observed two
men he did not recognize arguing outside. Garza went inside his house and then he heard “two
pops[,]” which he thought were gunshots. Garza looked out his window and saw Hansbrough
lying on the ground and a maroon van leaving the scene. Garza testified he did not see who
drove or was in the van and he also could not identify the shooter. Garza did recall observing the
maroon van at the apartment complex a few times prior to July 29, 2017. After Garza looked out
his window, he went over to check on Hansbrough and called 911.
¶ 22 4. Officer Brian Lange
¶ 23 Brian Lange, a police officer with the Danville Police Department, testified that
on July 29, 2017, he responded to a call reporting a gunshot victim at 1227 Clarence Street.
Once he arrived on scene, Officer Lange observed Hansbrough lying on the ground with his hand
over his stomach. Officer Lange indicated Hansbrough was conscious and breathing but unable
to speak. Officer Lange asked Hansbrough if he knew who shot him, and Hansbrough nodded
his head but did not give a name. Officer Lange then asked Hansbrough if a maroon van was
involved in the incident, and Hansbrough again nodded his head.
¶ 24 Officer Lange testified officers recovered a shell casing on the ground about a
foot to a foot-and-a-half away from where Hansbrough’s head rested. Police also recovered a
bottle of alcohol bearing Hansbrough’s fingerprints.
¶ 25 5. Detective Patrick Carley
¶ 26 Patrick Carley, a detective with the Danville Police Department, detailed that after
an initial investigation, Detective Phil Wilson created a photo array of potential suspects to show
-5- Hansbrough. Then, Detective Carley and Detective Wilson went to the hospital to show
Hansbrough the photo array. After looking at the photo array, Hansbrough identified defendant
as the person who shot him.
¶ 27 On August 1, 2017, Detective Carley was one of the officers who went to Clark’s
apartment to locate and arrest defendant. Detective Carley indicated officers found a gun in a
bedroom and he took pictures of the gun. The gun was a chrome and black handgun.
¶ 28 6. Detective Phil Wilson
¶ 29 Phil Wilson, a detective with the Danville Police Department, testified that on
August 1, 2017, he was one of the officers who went to Clark’s apartment to locate and arrest
defendant. Upon entry into Clark’s apartment, Detective Wilson observed defendant in a
bedroom. After Clark gave the officers permission to search her apartment, officers found two
firearms in a bedroom closet. Detective Wilson identified the two firearms as a wood-handled
revolver and a chrome .380-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Detective Wilson retrieved the
firearms.
¶ 30 Detective Wilson testified the chrome semiautomatic handgun had a live round in
the chamber, meaning the gun was ready to be fired. Detective Wilson testified that in a
semiautomatic gun, if the slide is open and somebody inserts the magazine hard enough, the
round will automatically be fed into the chamber. Otherwise, the individual would have to pull
back on the slide to chamber another round. Detective Wilson inventoried the gun and took
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) swabs from the slide and trigger.
¶ 31 Detective Wilson recounted he prepared the photo array shown to Hansbrough.
Detective Wilson and Detective Carley showed Hansbrough the photo array while he was in the
-6- hospital. Detective Wilson confirmed Hansbrough identified defendant as the person who shot
him.
¶ 32 7. Officer Travis Spain
¶ 33 Travis Spain, a police officer with the Danville Police Department, testified he
was one of the officers who went to Clark’s apartment on August 1, 2017, to locate and arrest
defendant. Upon arrival at Clark’s apartment, she consented to officers searching her apartment.
Officer Spain searched a bedroom closet and noticed a piece of drywall in the closet had been cut
out and put back in. Officer Spain removed the piece of drywall and observed a gun on the floor.
Officer Spain then notified Officer Carley of the presence of the gun.
¶ 34 8. Hali Carls-Miller
¶ 35 Hali Carls-Miller, a firearms expert with the Illinois State Police crime laboratory,
testified she fired test shots from the .380-caliber handgun recovered from Clark’s apartment and
compared the expelled cartridge cases to the cartridge case officers recovered at the scene of the
shooting. Carls-Miller determined the cartridge case from the scene was fired from the .380-
caliber handgun recovered from Clark’s apartment.
¶ 36 9. Stipulations
¶ 37 The parties stipulated the DNA analysis performed on swabs from the handgun
contained DNA from at least one person, but the profile was incomplete and unsuitable for
comparison. The parties also stipulated that Hansbrough’s blood-alcohol content (BAC) upon
arrival at the hospital on July 29, 2017, was 0.252.
¶ 38 10. Jury Verdict
¶ 39 At the close of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of aggravated
battery with a firearm.
-7- ¶ 40 B. Sentencing
¶ 41 In July 2018, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. At the August 2018
sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court took into consideration
defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) and the victim’s impact statement.
Defendant’s PSI contained defendant’s criminal, employment, and substance-abuse history.
Specifically, defendant was convicted in 2013 of possession of a controlled substance in
Vermilion County case No. 13-CF-131 and received second-chance probation—which was
terminated successfully. Defendant also had several traffic citations. Defendant disclosed he
consumed a half pint of alcohol daily and used marijuana up to four or five times a day.
Defendant acknowledged he needed substance-abuse treatment or counseling.
¶ 42 The court also heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Defendant called
three witnesses to testify.
¶ 43 Ramona Robinson, defendant’s mother, testified she owned a daycare, and
defendant assisted her with the children and performed repairs around the facility. Robinson
indicated things would be difficult for her in defendant’s absence. Robinson also informed the
court defendant received good grades in school, ran track, played basketball, and never gave his
teachers or her any trouble.
¶ 44 Jamenesha Franklin, defendant’s sister, described defendant as “her protector[.]”
Defendant helped her with her three children, one of whom died a few months before the
shooting incident. Franklin testified her daughter was diagnosed with cancer, and defendant
drove them to Memphis, Tennessee, to seek medical treatment. Franklin also represented that
defendant was like a father to her two sons. He took them to the park and played sports with
them.
-8- ¶ 45 Brandi Brooks, mother to defendant’s seven-year-old son, testified she
rescheduled an interview in order to appear in court to testify on defendant’s behalf. Brooks
testified she and defendant were great at co-parenting. Defendant paid child support and spent
time with their son.
¶ 46 After defendant’s witnesses testified, the parties presented their sentencing
recommendations. Defendant faced a mandatory prison sentence of 6 to 30 years. The State
sought a 25-year prison sentence. Defense counsel urged the court to impose the minimum
six-year prison sentence.
¶ 47 Defendant made a statement in allocution. In allocution, defendant stated, “I just
want to tell you, Ms. Fahey, that 35 years of my life, never did any harm to anybody, never was a
violent person. I know I’ve been convicted of a violent crime, but violence is not me. It’s not
me at all. I’m just—I want you to consider that when you sentence me today.”
¶ 48 Ultimately, the trial court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment,
followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. In sentencing defendant, the court stated,
“Well unfortunately, as you said it yourself, this is a violent
crime, and obviously, none of us were there to know what really
happened, but the jury heard enough evidence to find you guilty of
this charge, and while I certainly respect your family members for
coming in here and supporting you, and I believe what they are
telling me about you, that doesn’t alleviate the crime that was
committed and the harm that was done to another individual. You
know, you—Mr. Hansbrough, no matter how annoying he may
have been, nothing that the Court heard during the trial amounted
-9- to an excuse or a valid reason to shoot this person in the back, and
then to flee and leave him bleeding there on the pavement. It’s just
inexcusable. It’s disgusting, really. I mean, it’s really disgusting
that you would, number one, felt like it was necessary to resort to
that type of behavior; and number two, that you had absolutely no
remorse or empathy after you committed the crime and you left
him laying there bleeding. It’s just lucky that someone found him,
or he probably would have been dead, and you would have been
facing much more serious charges than you are now.
I think the statutory—the non-statutory factors that—let me
start with the mitigating factors. Certainly, the testimony from
your family members, they are sad about this, they are upset about
this, they want you in their life. They see you as somebody totally
different than the person that committed this crime, and I
understand that. But none of that testimony, in my opinion, rose to
the level of a substantial hardship to your family. I mean, it
certainly rises to the level of sadness and emptiness, and they will
miss you, but it didn’t rise to the level, even with your son, as a
substantial hardship, in the Court’s opinion, so I’m not considering
that as a factor in mitigation, and the bottom line is, you are
responsible for your own actions.
When I look at the factors in aggravation, specifically the
non-statutory ones that [the State] brought out, I do agree that this
- 10 - occurring in a residential area puts a number of people at risk, not
just the person you shot, so that is definitely a concern of the Court
and something the Court takes into consideration. And once again,
I’ve already mentioned it, but there was no—not that there is a
valid reason for shooting another person, unless it’s self defense,
which certainly wasn’t the situation in this case. I mean, you shot
him as he was walking away. He was annoying you guys. You
wanted to get rid of him. He was leaving and he was walking
away, and you shoot him. It’s just—you know, no excuse or
reason to support, you know, doing that. And once again, you left
him laying there bleeding. He had serious, life-threatening
injuries, which are going to affect him for the rest of his life. So
those are all non-statutory factors that the Court is considering.
And I consider the factors in mitigation that are laid out in
the statute. Obviously, your conduct caused offer [sic] threatened
serious harm to another person. You have a history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity, albeit a very minimal history, but
there is a history, and the biggest factor is that the sentence is
necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. Gun
violence in our community is rampant, and it’s—you know, it’s not
just your community. The community belongs to everyone in this
courtroom, and so everybody in this courtroom is put at risk by
activity like this, and it’s indefensible, inexcusable, and I just
- 11 - absolutely cannot tolerate it, and I have to send a strong message to
those of you participating in this type of activity that I’m not going
to tolerate it.
So having regard to the nature and circumstance of the
offense, and to the history, character and condition of the offender,
the Court is sentencing you to 24 years in the Illinois Department
of Corrections, three years mandatory supervised release, which
used to be called parole. The sentence will be served at 85 percent.
You’ll get credit for 367 days served, and that’s from August 1,
2017, through August 2, 2018. You would be ordered to pay costs,
fees, fines and assessments ***.”
¶ 49 C. Motion to Reconsider
¶ 50 In August 2018, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. Defendant
claimed his sentence was excessive and the trial court erred in analyzing certain factors.
Specifically, the court’s consideration that Hansbrough was shot in the back while walking away
was improper, as the evidence showed Hansbrough was shot in the stomach, and Garza’s
testimony that the two men were arguing before the gunshot undermined Hansbrough’s
testimony that he and defendant exchanged no words before the gunshot. Further, the court erred
in considering the nonstatutory aggravating factor that the location of the shooting put others at
risk, where the evidence showed the gunshot was at close range. The court also placed improper
emphasis on gun violence in the community in general and incorrectly found no mitigation
existed in this case. Following argument, the court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 51 This appeal followed.
- 12 - ¶ 52 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 53 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him
to 24 years in prison for aggravated battery with a firearm where the court (1) misapprehended
the trial evidence; (2) considered an improper aggravating factor in characterizing the
circumstances of the offense; (3) refused to consider his mitigation evidence as a factor in
sentencing; and (4) failed to consider his demonstrated potential for rehabilitation. In response,
the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 24 years’
imprisonment and any error in the court’s findings was harmless. The State also suggests
defendant has forfeited his arguments on appeal where no objection was made during the
sentencing hearing.
¶ 54 Initially, we determine whether defendant has forfeited his arguments on appeal.
In this instance, we follow our supreme court and conclude it was not necessary for counsel to
interrupt the judge and indicate she was allegedly committing error in imposing sentence. See
People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 266, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986). Moreover, defense
counsel filed a detailed motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence raising the sentencing issues
put forward in this appeal. Therefore, we decline to find forfeiture. We now turn to defendant’s
claims.
¶ 55 The trial court has discretion in sentencing and we will not reverse a sentence
absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. Such
discretion in sentencing is necessary because “the trial court is in a better position to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence at the sentencing hearing ***.”
People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137, 817 N.E.2d 1110, 1115 (2004).
- 13 - ¶ 56 The trial court errs where the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirit and
purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v.
Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). As the court determines an
appropriate sentence, “a defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with
the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence and
punishment, must be equally weighed.” People v. Hernandez, 319 Ill. App. 3d 520, 529, 745
N.E.2d 673, 681 (2001). “A sentence which falls within the statutory range is not an abuse of
discretion unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Franks,
292 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779, 686 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1997).
¶ 57 In determining defendant’s sentence, the trial court considered the information in
the PSI, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the recommendations of counsel,
defendant’s statement in allocution, and the relevant statutory and nonstatutory factors in
aggravation and mitigation. The court summarized its reasoning for sentencing defendant to 24
years’ imprisonment by discussing the specific facts of the shooting, the potential hardships
placed on defendant’s family by his incarceration, the risk of harm the shooting caused to others,
the seriousness of the harm to the victim, defendant’s criminal history, the need for deterrence,
and the prevalence of gun violence in the community.
¶ 58 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to
24 years in prison. Defendant asserts the court misapprehended the trial evidence where the
court described defendant as having shot Hansbrough in the back. Specifically, defendant points
to the following statement by the court: “[N]o matter how annoying he may have been, nothing
that the Court heard during the trial amounted to an excuse or a valid reason to shoot this person
- 14 - in the back, and then to flee and leave him bleeding there on the pavement.” Further, the court
stated,
“I mean, you shot him as he was walking away. He was annoying
you guys. You wanted to get rid of him. He was leaving and he
was walking away, and you shoot him. It’s just—you know, no
excuse or reason to support, you know, doing that. And once
again, you left him laying there bleeding.”
¶ 59 Defendant argues the trial court improperly stated Hansbrough was shot in the
back when really, he was shot in the stomach. Moreover, defendant argues the court’s finding
Hansbrough was walking away when defendant approached and shot him was incorrect based on
the testimony of Garza who saw two men arguing before he heard a gunshot.
¶ 60 The evidence in the record shows defendant asked Hansbrough to leave Clark’s
apartment and he obliged. As he walked away, Hansbrough heard someone behind him and
turned around to see who was behind him. As Hansbrough turned around, defendant shot him in
the stomach; specifically, the shot entered Hansbrough’s stomach and lodged into his right hip.
The evidence shows Hansbrough was walking away and not directly facing defendant when he
was shot. Therefore, the court did not misapprehend the evidence where it stated defendant shot
Hansbrough as he walked away.
¶ 61 Moreover, while Garza testified he observed two men arguing before he heard a
gunshot, he was inside his home when he heard the gunshot and failed to see the actions
immediately before the shooting. This was apparent where Garza stated he was inside his home
when the gunshot went off and thus unable to identity the shooter. Based on the evidence,
Garza’s testimony does not speak to what happened immediately before the shooting and
- 15 - whether Hansbrough was walking away when defendant shot him. After reviewing the record,
we find the trial court did not err in its characterization of the events prior to the shooting.
¶ 62 Next, defendant argues the trial court considered an improper aggravating factor
in characterizing the circumstances of the offense. Specifically, defendant asserts the trial court
erred in considering the location of the shooting as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. The court
stated, “I do agree [with the State] that this occurring in a residential area puts a number of
people at risk, not just the person you shot, so that is definitely a concern of the Court and
something the Court takes into consideration.”
¶ 63 Defendant asserts the area of the shooting, an apartment complex where multiple
people live, should not have been considered as a nonstatutory aggravating factor because the
evidence shows defendant only fired one shot at Hansbrough while approximately 10 feet from
Hansbrough. Defendant further asserts no other persons were outside at the time of the shooting
and when the police knocked on apartment doors as they canvased the scene, no one answered.
¶ 64 We find the trial court did not err in considering the location of the shooting as a
nonstatutory aggravating factor at sentencing. While the evidence shows no one else was outside
at the exact moment defendant shot Hansbrough, other people were in the vicinity of the
apartment complex at the time. Multiple witnesses testified to a group of people inside Clark’s
apartment immediately before the shooting and Garza, who lived across the street from Clark’s
apartment, testified he witnessed two men fighting when he arrived home from work and later
heard two gunshots while in his home. Therefore, consideration of the location of the shooting
as a nonstatutory aggravating factor was not improper where the risk of harm to others was
present.
- 16 - ¶ 65 Further, defendant argues the trial court relied on the aforementioned improper
factor to conclude that the circumstances of the offense were so serious as to justify a sentence
18 years above the minimum sentence and 6 years below the maximum sentence. Defendant
contends the trial court barely mentioned the degree of harm to Hansbrough in its findings.
Defendant asserts the seriousness of the offense is the most important factor that a court must
consider in fashioning an appropriate sentence. See People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96,
109, 772 N.E.2d 833, 845-56 (2002).
¶ 66 We find, based on the record, the trial court considered the harm to the victim as a
nonstatutory aggravating factor. The court addressed the harm to the victim three times when
giving its reasoning at sentencing. Specifically, the court stated,
“It’s just inexcusable. It’s disgusting, really. I mean, it’s really
disgusting that you would, number one, feel like it was necessary
to resort to that type of behavior; and number two, that you had
absolutely no remorse or empathy after you committed the crime
and you left him laying there bleeding. It’s just lucky that
someone found him, or he probably would have been dead, and
you would have been facing much more serious charges than you
are now.”
The court further stated, “And once again, you left him lying there bleeding. He had serious,
life-threatening injuries, which are going to affect him for the rest of his life.” Last, the court
stated, “Obviously, your conduct caused offer [sic] threatened serious harm to another person.”
Therefore, we find the court properly considered the degree of harm to Hansbrough and did not
abuse its discretion in considering the relevant nonstatutory aggravating factors.
- 17 - ¶ 67 Next, defendant argues the trial court refused to consider defendant’s mitigation
evidence as a factor in sentencing. Specifically, defendant asserts he presented three witnesses at
sentencing and the court explicitly declined to consider their testimony in mitigation where the
court stated, “I’m not considering that as a factor in mitigation.”
¶ 68 “When mitigation evidence is before the court, it is presumed that the sentencing
judge considered the evidence, absent some indication, other than the sentence imposed, to the
contrary.” People v. McCarthy, 213 Ill. App. 3d 873, 878-88, 572 N.E.2d 1219, 1228 (1991).
¶ 69 Here, all the evidence relied upon by defendant as evidence in mitigation was
before the trial court in the PSI and the testimony presented at the sentencing hearing. Contrary
to defendant’s assertion, the court considered the support of defendant’s family, the impact on
defendant’s family, defendant’s prior minimal criminal history, and other relevant statutory
factors in mitigation.
¶ 70 The trial court expressly considered the impact of a sentence upon defendant’s
family but determined the hardship to the family did not rise to the level necessary to reduce his
sentence. Specifically, the court stated, “But none of that testimony, in my opinion, rose to the
level of a substantial hardship to your family. I mean, it certainly rises to the level of sadness
and emptiness, and they will miss you, but it didn’t rise to the level, even with your son, as a
substantial hardship ***.” Defendant fails to show the court did not consider the evidence in
mitigation where the court recognized the potentially mitigating evidence, but found the
evidence unpersuasive and of a quality that failed to rise to the level required to be considered in
mitigation.
¶ 71 Defendant further argues the trial court failed to take into consideration his
alcohol and substance-abuse problems as a factor in mitigation. Defendant asserts the PSI
- 18 - indicated he suffered from alcohol and substance abuse where he disclosed he consumed a half
pint of alcohol daily and used marijuana up to four or five times a day.
¶ 72 A trial court is not required to expressly indicate its consideration of all mitigating
factors and the weight given to them. People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 43, 2
N.E.3d 333. Here, while the trial court did not expressly mention defendant’s alcohol or
substance-abuse problems at sentencing, the court took the PSI into consideration when
sentencing defendant. The only time defendant mentioned having alcohol or substance-abuse
problems was in the PSI. Therefore, the court did not err in failing to discuss defendant’s
alcohol or substance abuse problems when handing down defendant’s sentence. We find the
court’s appraisal of the weight to be given to the mitigating evidence was not an abuse of
discretion.
¶ 73 Last, defendant argues the trial court failed to consider his demonstrated potential
for rehabilitation. Defendant asserts he exhibited rehabilitative potential where he helped his
mother with her daycare, helped his sister with her children, paid child support to his son’s
mother, had one prior felony conviction and received second-chance probation, expressed a
desire for rehabilitation, and was a good student in school.
¶ 74 “Where the sentencing court examines a presentence report, it is presumed that
the court considered the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” People v. Wright, 272 Ill. App.
3d 1033, 1046, 651 N.E.2d 758, 766 (1995).
¶ 75 Here, the trial court took into consideration the PSI prior to sentencing defendant.
The PSI indicated defendant scored high on tests for risk to reoffend. Defendant was convicted
in 2013 of possession of a controlled substance in Vermilion County case No. 13-CF-131 and
received second-chance probation—which was terminated successfully. As part of his
- 19 - second-chance probation, defendant was “ordered to obtain a substance[-]abuse assessment and
comply with the recommendations.” However, defendant described that prior to his
incarceration, he consumed a half pint of alcohol daily and used marijuana up to four or five
times a day. Therefore, we find based on the record, the court did not fail to consider
defendant’s rehabilitative potential. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
explicitly discuss whether defendant exhibited rehabilitative potential.
¶ 76 We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 24
years in prison. The court’s determination reflected a balancing of the appropriate factors with
an emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history, character, and condition
of the offender; and the need for deterrence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 77 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 78 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 79 Affirmed.
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