Filed 4/28/14 P. v. Fowler CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E058364
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1200809)
CURTISHA SHANAY FOWLER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Larrie R. Brainard, Judge.
(Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa
Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Defendant Curtisha Fowler appeals from the trial court’s order authorizing her to
be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic medications under Penal Code Section 1370.
Although defendant argues the order fails to meet each of the four factors set forth in Sell
v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166 (Sell), the trial court was clearly not required to base
its order on these factors. Given that this is defendant’s sole basis for challenging the
order, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
First Declaration of Mental Incompetency and Involuntary Medication Order
On January 5, 2012, the People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with
mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury
(§ 245).1 Regarding the assault charge, the People alleged defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a) and 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). These charges also led
to a probation violation petition. The mayhem and assault charges stem from a
confrontation with defendant’s cell mate in which defendant bit off part of her cell mate’s
finger.
Also on that date, the trial court declared doubt as to defendant’s mental
competence, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two doctors to examine her.
On February 14, 2012, the trial court found defendant mentally incompetent to
stand trial. On March 7, 2012, the court committed defendant to Patton State Hospital
(Patton) for a maximum of three years.
1 All section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 On June 14, 2012, Patton filed a petition to authorize the administration of
involuntary medication pursuant to section 1370, subd. (a)(2)(C).
On November 2012, the hospital filed a certificate of mental competence. On
December 7, 2012, the court found defendant’s mental competence had been restored and
reinstated criminal proceedings.
Second Declaration of Incompetency and Involuntary Medication Order
On December 11, 2012, four days after the court declared defendant restored to
mental competence, defense counsel orally moved under section 1368 to question
defendant’s mental competence. The court declared doubt as to defendant’s mental
competence, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed a doctor to examine her.
On January 16, 2013, after reviewing the doctor’s report, the court again declared
defendant incompetent. The court appointed Dr. Harvey Oshrin to examine defendant
regarding whether she should be involuntarily medicated. The court also ordered a
placement evaluation from County Mental Health. On February 11, 2013, a placement
evaluation was filed recommending defendant be placed at Patton. The record does not
contain a copy of Dr. Oshrin’s report regarding whether defendant should be
involuntarily medicated.
On March 7, 2013, the court held its hearing under section 1370 to determine
whether to order involuntary administration of antipsychotic medicine to defendant. On
that date, defense counsel filed a memorandum opposing such an order, citing a lack of
sufficient information in Dr. Oshrin’s report. The People’s sole witness was Dr. Oshrin.
He testified that defendant was a danger to others. Dr. Oshrin also opined that the
3 involuntary administration of antipsychotic medicine was substantially likely to render
the defendant competent to stand trial and would be in her best medical interest. The
defense did not offer any contrary testimony, but vigorously cross-examined Dr. Oshrin
as to the basis for his opinions. At the conclusion of Dr. Oshrin’s testimony, the People
argued that the primary ground for ordering involuntary medication was that defendant
was a danger to others. The People’s secondary ground was that the involuntary
medication would render defendant competent to stand trial and would be in her best
medical interest. Defense counsel argued that defendant was willing to voluntarily take
antipsychotic medications and so no order was necessary. Secondarily, the defense
argued that: 1) Dr. Oshrin’s testimony did not establish that he knew enough about her
medical history to opine whether taking the proposed medication was in her best medical
interest; and 2) Dr. Oshrin was not specific enough about what the treatment plan and
specific medicine would be. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared that
defendant was a danger to others if not medicated. The court added that, even if
defendant were not a danger to others, the People had established the alternative ground
that the antipsychotic medication was likely to render defendant competent to stand trial.
The court ordered Patton to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to
defendant.
On March 8, 2013, the court committed defendant to Patton for a maximum of
three years.
This appeal followed.
4 DISCUSSION
The Issues
Defendant argues the trial court’s order that she be involuntarily medicated is
invalid under the factors set forth in Sell.2 Although, as defendant correctly points out,
“the Sell factors generally govern the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medications when the sole or primary purpose is to render the patient competent to stand
trial,” she also claims, without resort to any legal authority whatsoever, that these factors
“cannot be ignored in situations where other reasons might exists as, for example, the
patient is a danger to other or to himself.”
The People counter that the trial court had no duty to consider the Sell factors
because it based its order on the theory that defendant is a danger to others when she is
not medicated, rather on the theory that the involuntary medication would render her
competent to stand trial.
Statutory and Case Law Background
“A defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial must be committed to a
state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, to another treatment
facility, or placed on outpatient status. [Citation.] [¶] The treatment the hospital can
administer is not without constitutional limits. An individual has a constitutionally
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Filed 4/28/14 P. v. Fowler CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E058364
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1200809)
CURTISHA SHANAY FOWLER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Larrie R. Brainard, Judge.
(Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa
Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Defendant Curtisha Fowler appeals from the trial court’s order authorizing her to
be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic medications under Penal Code Section 1370.
Although defendant argues the order fails to meet each of the four factors set forth in Sell
v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166 (Sell), the trial court was clearly not required to base
its order on these factors. Given that this is defendant’s sole basis for challenging the
order, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
First Declaration of Mental Incompetency and Involuntary Medication Order
On January 5, 2012, the People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with
mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury
(§ 245).1 Regarding the assault charge, the People alleged defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a) and 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). These charges also led
to a probation violation petition. The mayhem and assault charges stem from a
confrontation with defendant’s cell mate in which defendant bit off part of her cell mate’s
finger.
Also on that date, the trial court declared doubt as to defendant’s mental
competence, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two doctors to examine her.
On February 14, 2012, the trial court found defendant mentally incompetent to
stand trial. On March 7, 2012, the court committed defendant to Patton State Hospital
(Patton) for a maximum of three years.
1 All section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 On June 14, 2012, Patton filed a petition to authorize the administration of
involuntary medication pursuant to section 1370, subd. (a)(2)(C).
On November 2012, the hospital filed a certificate of mental competence. On
December 7, 2012, the court found defendant’s mental competence had been restored and
reinstated criminal proceedings.
Second Declaration of Incompetency and Involuntary Medication Order
On December 11, 2012, four days after the court declared defendant restored to
mental competence, defense counsel orally moved under section 1368 to question
defendant’s mental competence. The court declared doubt as to defendant’s mental
competence, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed a doctor to examine her.
On January 16, 2013, after reviewing the doctor’s report, the court again declared
defendant incompetent. The court appointed Dr. Harvey Oshrin to examine defendant
regarding whether she should be involuntarily medicated. The court also ordered a
placement evaluation from County Mental Health. On February 11, 2013, a placement
evaluation was filed recommending defendant be placed at Patton. The record does not
contain a copy of Dr. Oshrin’s report regarding whether defendant should be
involuntarily medicated.
On March 7, 2013, the court held its hearing under section 1370 to determine
whether to order involuntary administration of antipsychotic medicine to defendant. On
that date, defense counsel filed a memorandum opposing such an order, citing a lack of
sufficient information in Dr. Oshrin’s report. The People’s sole witness was Dr. Oshrin.
He testified that defendant was a danger to others. Dr. Oshrin also opined that the
3 involuntary administration of antipsychotic medicine was substantially likely to render
the defendant competent to stand trial and would be in her best medical interest. The
defense did not offer any contrary testimony, but vigorously cross-examined Dr. Oshrin
as to the basis for his opinions. At the conclusion of Dr. Oshrin’s testimony, the People
argued that the primary ground for ordering involuntary medication was that defendant
was a danger to others. The People’s secondary ground was that the involuntary
medication would render defendant competent to stand trial and would be in her best
medical interest. Defense counsel argued that defendant was willing to voluntarily take
antipsychotic medications and so no order was necessary. Secondarily, the defense
argued that: 1) Dr. Oshrin’s testimony did not establish that he knew enough about her
medical history to opine whether taking the proposed medication was in her best medical
interest; and 2) Dr. Oshrin was not specific enough about what the treatment plan and
specific medicine would be. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared that
defendant was a danger to others if not medicated. The court added that, even if
defendant were not a danger to others, the People had established the alternative ground
that the antipsychotic medication was likely to render defendant competent to stand trial.
The court ordered Patton to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to
defendant.
On March 8, 2013, the court committed defendant to Patton for a maximum of
three years.
This appeal followed.
4 DISCUSSION
The Issues
Defendant argues the trial court’s order that she be involuntarily medicated is
invalid under the factors set forth in Sell.2 Although, as defendant correctly points out,
“the Sell factors generally govern the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medications when the sole or primary purpose is to render the patient competent to stand
trial,” she also claims, without resort to any legal authority whatsoever, that these factors
“cannot be ignored in situations where other reasons might exists as, for example, the
patient is a danger to other or to himself.”
The People counter that the trial court had no duty to consider the Sell factors
because it based its order on the theory that defendant is a danger to others when she is
not medicated, rather on the theory that the involuntary medication would render her
competent to stand trial.
Statutory and Case Law Background
“A defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial must be committed to a
state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, to another treatment
facility, or placed on outpatient status. [Citation.] [¶] The treatment the hospital can
administer is not without constitutional limits. An individual has a constitutionally
2 Briefly, these factors are: 1) the importance of the government interest at stake; 2) whether the order sought will significantly further the government interest; 3) whether the order is necessary to further the government interest; and 4) whether the drugs are medically appropriate and in the patient’s best medical interest. (People v. Christiana (2012) 190 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1049.)
5 protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
medication under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.]”
(People v. O’Dell (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 562, 568.)
Section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i), provides three grounds upon which a court
may base an order to involuntarily treat a mentally incompetent defendant with
antipsychotic drugs: 1) serious harm to the defendant’s mental or physical health will
result if his mental disorder is not treated with antipsychotic medication (subd.
(a)(2)(B)(i)(I)); 2) the defendant is a danger to others (subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II); and 3) the
antipsychotic medication is likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial, under
specified circumstances (subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(III).
However, the statute is very specific that the court may not use the “competent to
stand trial” ground to involuntarily medicate the defendant unless it has first found that
the defendant does not meet the criteria for the first two grounds. “The court shall not
order involuntary administration of psychotropic medication under subclause (III) of
clause (i) unless the court has first found that the defendant does not meet the criteria for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication under subclause (I) of clause (i)
and does not meet the criteria under subclause (II) of clause (i).” (§ 1370, subd.
(a)(2)(B)(ii).)
Here, the trial court based its order on defendant’s dangerousness to others, and so
under subdivision (a)(2)(B)(ii), its decision cannot, by law, be based on the likelihood
that defendant can be involuntarily medicated into competency to stand trial. For this
reason alone, the Sell factors relied upon by defendant in this appeal are irrelevant.
6 If that were not enough, case law is very clear that the Sell factors do not apply to
an involuntary medication order based on a defendant’s dangerousness to others under
subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(II): “In Sell, the Supreme Court held that the government could
involuntarily medicate a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to render him competent
to stand trial only if four factors are present: (1) ‘important governmental interests are at
stake’; (2) involuntary medication will ‘significantly further’ the concomitant state
interests of timely prosecution and a fair trial; (3) ‘involuntary medication is necessary to
further those interests’; and, (4) ‘administration of the drugs is medically
appropriate . . . ’ [Citation.] [¶] These factors do not apply when the antipsychotic
medication is proposed for a different purpose, i.e., related to a defendant’s
dangerousness . . . . [Citation.]” (People v. O’Dell, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 562, 569.)
Conclusion
Here, the trial court’s decision to order that defendant be involuntarily treated with
antipsychotic drugs was based on her dangerousness to others, thus precluding the
necessity to justify the order using the Sell factors set forth above. Because defendant
does not challenge the order on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the finding
that she poses a danger to others, we must affirm the court’s order.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order of March 7, 2013, that defendant be involuntarily treated
with antipsychotic drugs is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
7 RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
KING J.