People v. Foster

2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U
Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided September 27, 2022·No. 2-21-0556·Unpublished·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U No. 2-21-0556 Order filed September 27, 2022

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 15-CF-1333 ) ORANE R. FOSTER, ) Honorable ) David Paul Kliment, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Brennan and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to sustain both of defendant’s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and the convictions did not violate one-act, one- crime principles. Affirmed.

¶2 After a jury trial, defendant, Orane R. Foster, was convicted of two counts of aggravated

criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 2014)) and sentenced to two concurrent

three-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (2) alternatively, one of his convictions should be

vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We affirm. 2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. First Trial and Direct Appeal

¶5 In 2015, defendant was charged with five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and

two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of victim, S.L., in that he touched her sex organ.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault

of a child under 13 years of age (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014)) and two counts of

aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a victim under 13 years of age (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i)

(West 2014)). The trial court sentenced defendant to six years’ imprisonment on each of the four

counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, to run consecutively, and three years’ imprisonment

on both counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, to run concurrently with each other but

consecutively to the sentences imposed for predatory criminal sexual assault, for a total of 27

years’ imprisonment.

¶6 On direct appeal, defendant: (1) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on three of the

four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault; (2) alleged, in the alternative, one-act, one-crime

violations; and (3) alleged certain voir dire violations. This court determined that the evidence

was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for two counts of sexual penetration with a finger

and two counts of sexual penetration with an object. People v. Foster, 2020 IL App (2d) 170683,

¶¶ 36-44. Turning to the third issue, which we reviewed for prong-one plain error, we concluded

that there was a Zehr violation (People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477-78 (1984)) and, because the

evidence, though sufficient, was closely balanced, there was plain error. Id. ¶¶ 60-63 (as S.L. did

not “tell the same story that she earlier told the section 115-10 [(725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2016)]

witnesses,” whose testimony, along with defendant’s, was consistent, the case was “a contest of

credibility between the accounts of the section 115-10 witnesses and that of the defendant, and

-2- 2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U

credibility was the only basis on which this case could be decided.”). Accordingly, we reversed

and remanded for a new trial and did not reach the one-act, one-crime issue. Id. ¶¶ 63-65.

¶7 B. Second Trial

¶8 1. Pretrial Rulings

¶9 Certain pretrial rulings issued prior to the first trial remained in effect for the second trial.

Specifically, the trial court had allowed the State to introduce, as substantive evidence under

section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) and provided S.L. testified at

trial, S.L.’s prior statements made to Jazmin Lopez, Patricia (Patty) Sanchez, Celia Sanchez, and

Pam Ely. The court also granted the State’s motion to admit medical hearsay, and Dr. Raymond

Davis was also permitted to testify, pursuant to section 115-13 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-13

(West 2020)) about S.L.’s hearsay statements.

¶ 10 2. State’s Case-in-Chief

¶ 11 The second trial commenced on July 19, 2021. The State’s theory of the case was that, in

August 2015, S.L., age six and while on a trip to Disney World with her father, Sergio L., and his

girlfriend, Jazmin, disclosed that defendant had been touching her private parts. Defendant, age

22, had moved into her mother’s home in Aurora that summer. When S.L. returned to Aurora with

her father and Jazmin, they went to her grandmother, Celia’s, home and S.L. told Celia and her

aunt, Patty, that defendant had been touching her private parts. Afterwards, family members

contacted the police. S.L. was subsequently interviewed by Ely at the Kane County Child

Advocacy Center and told Ely that defendant came to her room at night and hurt her and she

wanted him out of her home. Dr. Davis examined S.L., and the exam was normal.

¶ 12 a. Sashonie (Sasha) M.

-3- 2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U

¶ 13 Sashonie (Sasha) M., S.L.’s mother, works as a customer-care specialist and had one child,

S.L., who was born on February 3, 2009. She has lived in a two-bedroom apartment in Aurora for

about seven years. Starting in June 2015, defendant temporarily moved into Sasha’s apartment.

He was to live in the apartment for about 60 days before returning to college. Sasha knew

defendant because he was her then-best friend, Ashley Washington’s, cousin. Defendant’s father

had “kicked” defendant out of his home.

¶ 14 Defendant lived in Sasha’s apartment for 63 days, sleeping on a couch in the living room.

S.L. slept in her own room at the time. Defendant worked in a factory during the day, and Sasha

worked from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. She had a babysitter for S.L.

¶ 15 While defendant lived with Sasha, Sasha would go to the Dollar Store across the street and

leave S.L. with defendant. Sasha would be gone for no longer than 10 minutes. The Dollar Store

shares a parking lot with Sasha’s apartment. When Sasha went to the store, S.L. was in bed.

During the summer, her bedtime was 8 or 9 p.m. The first time that Sasha went to the store that

summer, S.L. was asleep but, when Sasha returned, S.L. was awake. She was not upset or crying

when Sasha arrived home.

¶ 16 One day, when defendant first moved in in June, Sasha was in the kitchen, while defendant

and S.L. were in the living room. S.L. was on a pillow close to defendant’s lap. S.L. looked

uncomfortable and scared. Sasha called S.L. to the kitchen because she had previously told S.L.

not to sit on anybody’s lap. In July 2015, Sasha was vacuuming her bedroom late one afternoon

and S.L. ran inside the bedroom with a weird look that Sasha had never seen. She questioned S.L.

about the look, but S.L.

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People v. Foster, 2022 IL App (2d) 210556-U (Ill. Ct. App. 2022).

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