People v. Flores

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Flores

52 A.D.2d 540, 382 N.Y.S.2d 86, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12085

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 13, 1976

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 52 A.D.2d 540 (People v. Flores) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Flores, 52 A.D.2d 540, 382 N.Y.S.2d 86, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12085 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

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Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered January 9, 1974, convicting defendant upon a jury verdict of robbery (second degree), burglary (second degree) and grand larceny (third degree), unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reversing the conviction for grand larceny (third degree), vacating the sentence imposed thereon and dismissing that count of the indictment, and, as so modified, affirmed. The count of grand larceny (third degree) was a lesser included concurrent count to robbery (second degree) (see People v Pyles, 44 AD2d 784). The reversal and dismissal of the grand larceny count does not affect the validity of the robbery conviction (see People v Mulligan, 29 NY2d 20, 24; People v Chestnut,' 26 NY2d 481, 491-492). We find that there was no improper curtailment of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witness Agosto, nor was defendant denied a fair trial because of the prosecutor’s comments in summation. We find, also, that the sentence imposed on defendant was not excessive. Concur—Stevens, P. J., Kupferman, Murphy, Birns and Silverman, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered January 9, 1974, convicting defendant upon a jury verdict of robbery (second degree), burglary (second degree) and grand larceny (third degree), unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reversing the conviction for grand larceny (third degree), vacating the sentence imposed thereon and dismissing that count of the indictment, and, as so modified, affirmed. The count of grand larceny (third degree) was a lesser included concurrent count to robbery (second degree) (see People v Pyles, 44 AD2d 784). The reversal and dismissal of the grand larceny count does not affect the validity of the robbery conviction (see People v Mulligan, 29 NY2d 20, 24; People v Chestnut,' 26 NY2d 481, 491-492). We find that there was no improper curtailment of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witness Agosto, nor was defendant denied a fair trial because of the prosecutor’s comments in summation. We find, also, that the sentence imposed on defendant was not excessive. Concur—Stevens, P. J., Kupferman, Murphy, Birns and Silverman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

52 A.D.2d 540, 382 N.Y.S.2d 86, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12085, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-flores-nyappdiv-1976.

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