CORRIGAN, J.
In these consolidated cases, we consider the scope of the Michigan Penal Code provision that criminalizes the “knowing possession” of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4). Defendants intentionally accessed and purposely viewed depictions of child sexually abusive material on the Internet. The [4]*4only child sexually abusive material later found on their computers, however, had been automatically stored in temporary Internet files.1
Defendants contend that because the prosecution failed to establish that they knowingly possessed child sexually abusive material, the district courts erred by binding them over for trial. We hold that the term “possesses” in the phrase “[a] person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material” in MCL 750.145c(4) includes both actual and constructive possession. Contrary to defendants’ arguments, the evidence presented at the preliminary examinations established that defendant Flick and defendant Lazarus did more than passively view child sexually abusive material on the Internet. When any depiction of child sexually abusive material was displayed on each defendant’s computer screen, he knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control over that depiction. As a result, each defendant constructively possessed those images, which amounts to possession of child sexually abusive material. Consequently, we af[5]*5firm the Court of Appeals judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PEOPLE v FLICK, DOCKET NO. 138258
Federal agents identified defendant Steven Edward Flick as a purchaser of access to a website containing child pornography during April, September, and October 2002. In May 2006, federal agents and Jackson County Sheriffs Detective Duaine Pittman obtained a search warrant for defendant Flick’s computer and seized it. A forensic examination of the computer revealed child pornographic images on the hard drive. In a subsequent interview with Detective Pittman, defendant Flick acknowledged that he paid by credit card to access websites containing child pornography. Defendant Flick also admitted that he had downloaded child pornographic images on his computer. Defense forensic computer analyst Larry Dalman also examined the computer. Dalman corroborated the results of the forensic examination performed by a specially trained federal agent, which located “numerous” child pornographic images on defendant Flick’s hard drive. However, Dalman reported that each image had been deleted or was located in the computer’s temporary Internet files.
The prosecution charged defendant Flick with possession of child sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(4). Defendant Flick moved to dismiss in the district court, arguing that he had not “possessed” child pornography as required by the statute. The district court denied the motion, observing that “it stretches the imagination somewhat to argue that a person does not possess child pornography where he admits he purchased it and downloaded it no matter [6]*6where it appears on his computer system.” Defendant Flick subsequently moved to quash the information in the circuit court, contending that the evidence established that he merely viewed, rather than knowingly possessed, child pornography. The circuit court denied the motion and refused to dismiss the case.
Defendant Flick filed a delayed application for leave to appeal. After granting the application and consolidating defendant Flick’s appeal with the prosecution’s appeal in People v Lazarus,2 the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court order denying defendant Flick’s motion to quash the information and dismiss the case in an unpublished opinion per curiam.3 Defendant Flick then applied for leave to appeal in this Court.
B. PEOPLE v LAZARUS, DOCKET NO. 138261
Federal agents linked defendant Douglas Brent Lazarus’s e-mail information to an online child pornography subscription purchased using his credit card. In September 2006, Detective Pittman interviewed defendant Lazarus. During the interview, defendant Lazarus stated that he knew that his former spouse had turned over to federal agents the computer that the couple had purchased together. Defendant Lazarus admitted that he looked at child pornography and acknowledged that he paid by credit card to access websites containing child pornographic images.
Joshua Edwards, a specially trained federal agent, searched defendant Lazarus’s computer. The forensic search revealed “a large number of websites that con[7]*7tained titles indicative of child pornography” and approximately 26 “banners strung together” of child pornographic images. Edwards explained that “there would be more images if you counted each one from the banner.” Among the 26 banner images, either 12 or 14 images resided in the “allocated space” of defendant Lazarus’s computer. The allocated space of defendant Lazarus’s computer also housed two pornographic movies in which the persons depicted “appeared to be under the age of 18.” According to Edwards, allocated space meant “files that are not deleted and are still on a hard drive that the user could access.” Edwards testified that the images found in the unallocated space of the computer also remained accessible until the file is “overwritten with new data,” which he analogized to a person’s setting aside a video cassette recording of a television show. Edwards acknowledged, however, that each depiction was located in the computer’s temporary Internet files.
The prosecution charged defendant Lazarus with possession of child sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(4). Defendant Lazarus moved to quash the information in the district court, arguing that the existence of child pornographic images in his computer’s temporary Internet files did not establish “knowing possession.” The district court denied defendant Lazarus’s motion. Defendant Lazarus renewed his motion to quash in the circuit court, asserting that he had “simply engaged in the passive viewing of the images on his computer screen,” and that passive viewing did not constitute possession of child pornography. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion to quash.
The prosecution appealed as of right. After consolidating the prosecution’s appeal with defendant Flick’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court order quashing the information and dismissing the case [8]*8against defendant Lazarus in an unpublished opinion per curiam.4 The Court of Appeals also interpreted MCL 750.145c(4). The panel concluded that although child sexually abusive images were located in defendants’ temporary Internet files, “[b]ecause defendants unquestionably possessed the computers in which the detectives found multiple contraband images of child pornography,” the prosecution established probable cause that defendants possessed child sexually abusive material. The Court of Appeals further held that “the evidence that defendants sought, paid for, received and viewed the child pornographic images, and that the images continued to reside in their computers, suffices to establish a reasonable inference that defendants knowingly possessed the contraband.” Defendant Lazarus then applied for leave to appeal in this Court.
We granted both applications for leave to appeal and directed the parties to address:
(1) whether intentionally accessing and viewing child sexually abusive material on the Internet constitutes “knowing possession” of such material under MCL 750.145c(4); and (2) whether the presence of automatically created “temporary internet files” on a computer hard drive may amount to “knowing possession” of child sexually abusive material or may be circumstantial evidence that defendant “knowingly possessed” such material in the past.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute is a question of statutory interpretation. We [9]*9review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 554; 773 NW2d 616 (2009). When reviewing a district court’s bindover decision, we review the court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for an abuse of discretion, but we review the court’s rulings concerning questions of law de novo. People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 427; 703 NW2d 774 (2005).
III. ANALYSIS
Both defendants were charged under MCL 750.145c(4), which provides in pertinent part:
A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know the child is a child or that the child sexually abusive material includes a child or that the depiction constituting the child sexually abusive material appears to include a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 750.145c(l)(m) defines “child sexually abusive material” as including “any depiction, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, including a developed or undeveloped photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic visual image, computer diskette, computer or computer-generated image, or picture . . . .”6
[10]*10Defendants concede that they intentionally bought access to websites containing depictions of child pornography or “child sexually abusive material” under MCL 750.145c(l)(m). However, defendants argue that MCL 750.145c(4) criminalizes the knowing possession of child sexually abusive material, rather than the accessing and viewing of such material. Because viewing child pornography on the Internet is distinct from possessing it, they contend that the district courts erred by binding defendants over for trial.
The prosecution responds that because each defendant intentionally paid to access websites containing child pornography and admitted placing child pornography on his computer, and child pornographic images remained in each defendant’s temporary Internet files, the district courts did not abuse their discretion in binding defendants over for trial. The statute criminalizes the knowing possession of “any child sexually abusive material,” which includes in relevant part an “electronic visual image” or “computer or computer-generated image . . . .”
The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. People v Lowe, 484 Mich 718, 721; 773 NW2d 1 (2009). “The touchstone of legislative intent is the statute’s language.” People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50; 753 NW2d 78 (2008). The words of a statute provide the most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intent and [11]*11should he interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the overall context in which they are used. Lowe, 484 Mich at 721-722. An undefined statutory word or phrase must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or phrase is a “term of art” with a unique legal meaning. People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151-152; 730 NW2d 708 (2007); MCL 8.3a. When we interpret the Michigan Penal Code, we do so “according to the fair import of [the] terms, to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law.” MCL 750.2.
The primary question in interpreting MCL 750.145c(4) is the meaning of the term “possesses” in the phrase, “[a] person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material....” The statute does not define the term “possesses.” Typically, when a statute fails to internally define terms, we accord those terms their ordinary meaning. People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 641; 720 NW2d 196 (2006). In doing so, it is often helpful to consult the definitions in a lay dictionary. Id. Where the undefined term has a unique legal meaning, however, it “shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a; see People v Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 100; 185 NW 770 (1921) (“A well recognized rule for construction of statutes is that when words are adopted having a settled, definite and well known meaning at common law it is to be assumed they are used with the sense and meaning which they had at common law unless a contrary intent is plainly shown.”). Because the term “possesses” has a unique legal meaning, we interpret the phrase “[a] person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material” in accordance with its settled meaning in legal dictionaries and at common law.7
[12]*12In MCL 750.145c(4), the term “possesses” is a verb. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines the verb “possess” as “[t]o have in one’s actual control; to have possession of.”8 The legal definition of the verb “possess” further directs our attention to the related concepts of “control” and “possession.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines the noun “control” as “[t]he direct or indirect power to direct the management and policies of a person or entity, whether through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise; the power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee.” It defines the noun “possession” as “1. [t]he fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over property. 2. [t]he right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object. 3. [sjomething that a person owns or controls. 4. [a] territorial dominion of a state or nation.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) also contains 27 separate subentries in addition to these definitions of “possession.”
[13]*13The definitions of “control” and “possession” provide helpful insight regarding how we should interpret the term “possesses,” particularly in light of the surrounding context provided by the Legislature. The Legislature reasonably selected the verb “possesses” to communicate that only a person who has the power to exercise a degree of dominion or control over “any child sexually abusive material” is sufficiently culpable to fall within the scope of MCL 750.145c(4). That is, the possessor holds the power or authority to control or exercise dominion over child sexually abusive material at a given time. Moreover, the Legislature enumerated what constitutes “child sexually abusive material” in great detail, including, in relevant part, “any depiction, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, including a developed or undeveloped photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic visual image, computer diskette, computer or computer-generated image, or picture, or sound recording which is of a child or appears to include a child engaging in a fisted sexual act....” MCL 750.145c(l)(m). A review of the entire subsection reveals that the Legislature intended to broadly encapsulate any depictions, storage devices, and reproductions of child sexually abusive material in MCL 750.145c(l)(m). Thus, the Legislature chose to prohibit the possession of a wide range of child sexually abusive material. However, the Legislature also modified the verb “possesses” with the adverb “knowingly,” thereby requiring a specific mens rea or knowledge element as a prerequisite for establishing criminal culpability under MCL 750.145c(4). Stated another way, unless one knowingly has actual physical control or knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a depiction of child sexually abusive material, including an “electronic visual image” or “computer image,” either directly or through another [14]*14person or persons, one cannot be classified as a “possessor” of such material.
Moreover, this interpretation of the term “possesses” is consistent with the established meaning of possession in Michigan caselaw. In our criminal jurisprudence, possession is either actual or constructive. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748 (1992); People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). Possession can be established with circumstantial or direct evidence, and the ultimate question of possession is a factual inquiry “to be answered by the jury.” Hill, 433 Mich at 469. Proof of actual physical possession is not necessary for a defendant to be found guilty of possessing contraband, including a controlled substance. Wolfe, 440 Mich at 519-520. “Although not in actual possession, a person has constructive possession if he ‘knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons ....’” Hill, 433 Mich at 470, quoting United States v Burch, 313 F2d 628, 629 (CA 6, 1963). Dominion or control over the object need not be exclusive. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d 517 (1995). This Court has described constructive possession of an article in the context of firearms as when “there is proximity to the article together with indicia of control.” Hill, 433 Mich at 470. Similarly, when analyzing whether the defendant had constructive possession of cocaine, the Court stated “[t]he essential question is whether the defendant had dominion or control over the controlled substance.” Konrad, 449 Mich at 271.
Konrad further described the meaning of “dominion or control” in the context of a controlled substance, stating:
In the foremost discussion of what is necessary to have dominion or control over drugs, Judge Posner explained that [15]*15a defendant “need not have them literally in his hands or on premises that he occupies but he must have the right (not the legal right, but the recognized authority in his criminal milieu) to possess them, as the owner of a safe deposit box has legal possession of the contents even though the bank has actual custody.” United States v Manzella, 791 F2d 1263, 1266 (CA 7, 1986). [Konrad, 449 Mich at 271.]
In Konrad, the Court held that “[t]he evidence permits the conclusion that the defendant had paid for the drugs and that they were his — that is, that he had the intention and power, in the sense referred to by Judge Posner, to exercise control over them.” Id. at 273. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit differentiated actual from constructive possession, explaining that “[a]ctual possession exists when an individual knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time, and constructive possession exists when a person does not have physical possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”9 Having reviewed the meaning of possession at common law along with the relevant legal definitions and surrounding statutory context, we conclude that the term “possesses” in MCL 750.145c(4) includes both actual and constructive possession. We further conclude that a defendant constructively possesses “any child sexually abusive material” when he knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the contraband either directly or through another person or persons.
When the term “possesses” is viewed in this light, defendants’ arguments that they merely viewed, rather than knowingly possessed, child sexually abusive mate[16]*16rial are untenable. It is undisputed that each defendant purposely operated his computer to locate websites containing child sexually abusive material and voluntarily used his credit card to purchase access to websites with depictions of such material. Upon subscribing to these websites and intentionally accessing the depictions of child sexually abusive material contained there, defendants knowingly had the power and the intention at a given time to exercise control or dominion over the contraband depictions of child sexually abusive material that appeared as either “electronic visual images” or “computer images” on their computer screens. Defendants’ insistence that they merely viewed child sexually abusive material is a chimerical distinction that ignores defendants’ intention and power to exercise control or dominion over the depictions of child sexually abusive material displayed on their computer screens— material that defendants sought and paid for the right to access. Indeed, the many intentional affirmative steps taken by defendants to gain access and control over child sexually abusive material belie their claims that they merely viewed the depictions.
The evidence in both cases established that defendants did more than passively view child sexually abusive material. Defendant Flick admitted that he paid by credit card to download child sexually abusive material on his computer, and numerous images of such material were found on defendant Flick’s hard drive. Larry Dalman, the forensic computer analyst retained by defendant Flick, reported that each image had been deleted. Defendant Flick’s admission that he downloaded child sexually abusive material, coupled with Dalman’s report that images of child sexually abusive material had been deleted, sufficiently establishes that at a minimum defendant Flick knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control [17]*17over the depictions of child sexually abusive material on his computer screen. Just as a criminal defendant cannot dispose of a controlled substance without either actually physically controlling it or having the right to control it,10 a defendant cannot intentionally procure and subsequently dispose of a depiction of child sexually abusive material without having either actual or constructive possession. Defendant Lazarus’s computer also contained child sexually abusive material that he purposely sought and paid to access. According to Joshua Edwards, multiple depictions of child sexually abusive material found on the hard drive were accessible. Regardless of whether the only remaining presence of child sexually abusive material on defendant Lazarus’s computer was located in his temporary Internet files, the contraband depictions at issue are the “electronic visual images” or “computer images” on his computer screen, and not the automatically created temporary Internet files.
When defendants purposely accessed depictions of child sexually abusive material on their computer screens, each defendant knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control over the depiction in myriad ways with a few keystrokes or mouse clicks. For example, defendants could: (1) print a hard copy of the depiction, (2) resize it, (3) internally save it to another folder on the hard drive, (4) externally save it using a CD-R or USB flash drive, (5) set the depiction as a screen saver or background theme, (6) share the depiction using a file-streaming network, (7) e-mail it, (8) post the depiction as a link on a website, (9) use the depiction to create a video or slide show, or (10) delete the depiction from the hard drive. We emphasize that a defendant knowingly having the power and the [18]*18intention at a given time to exercise control or dominion over the depiction on his computer screen is similar to a defendant coming across contraband while walking down the street and taking additional intentional affirmative steps to knowingly possess it. In this regard, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals offered the following helpful analogy:
“If a person walks down the street and notices an item (such as child pornography or an illegal narcotic) whose possession is prohibited, has that person committed a criminal offense if they look at the item for a sufficient amount of time to know what it is and then walks away? The obvious answer seems to be ‘no.’ However, if the person looks at the item long enough to know what it is, then reaches out and picks it up, holding and viewing it, and taking it with them to their home, that person has moved from merely viewing the item to knowingly possessing the item by reaching out for it and controlling it. In the same way, the defendant in this case reached out for prohibited items and, in essence, took them home.”[11]
Whether the defendant initially views the contraband while walking down the street or while accessing the Internet, it is not the initial viewing that amounts to knowing possession. Rather, it is the many intentional affirmative steps taken by the defendant to gain actual physical control, or to knowingly have the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the contraband either directly or through another person or persons, that distinguishes mere viewing from knowing possession. In either case, the [19]*19prosecution must establish that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of child sexually abusive material.
By contrast, if a person accidentally views a depiction of child sexually abusive material on a computer screen, that person does not “knowingly possess” any child sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(4). For example, imagine a person who purchases a ticket and sits in a theater expecting to see a critically acclaimed film, but the motion picture projectionist instead inserts a film containing child sexually abusive material. When that person views the unexpected depiction of child sexually abusive material on the theater screen, he does not “possess” child sexually abusive material because he accidentally viewed a film as a result of the actions of a rogue projectionist. Similarly, imagine a person who accesses a website where one would not expect depictions of child sexually abusive material to appear, but a depiction appears on the website as a result of computer hackers. That person did not intentionally seek out depictions of child sexually abusive material or purposely view such depictions. Rather, the unsolicited depiction appeared on the computer screen, and once that person realized the contents of the website, he undertook efforts to remove the depiction from his computer screen. Under these facts, a person does not “possess” child sexually abusive material by virtue of his accidental viewing of a contraband depiction on the Internet.12
[20]*20IV RESPONSE TO DISSENT
The dissent concludes that MCL 750.145c(4) should not be interpreted to authorize a trial court to bind over a defendant who admits that he intentionally accessed and purposely viewed depictions of child sexually abusive material on the Internet. We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion because the Legislature drafted MCL 750.145c(4) in broad terms, criminalizing the knowing possession of “any child sexually abusive material.” Our interpretation ascertains and gives effect to the legislative intent based on the words of the statute, the surrounding context, and the unique legal meaning of the term “possesses.” Contrary to the dissent’s analysis, we believe that the evidence in these consolidated cases provides a sufficient basis to conclude that neither district court abused its discretion in binding defendants over for trial. At trial, both defendant Flick and defendant Lazarus will have ample opportunity to develop a full factual record and dispute whether the prosecution can successfully establish the “knowing possession” of child sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(4).
We agree with the dissent that it is important to understand the interrelated roles of the computer user and the computer in the creation and deletion of temporary Internet files. After discussing a law review note and providing select excerpts of federal agent Joshua Edwards’s testimony, the dissent correctly notes that “it is the computer, not the user, that creates and deletes the TIFs.” However, both sources upon which the dissent relies stand for a more nuanced proposition. [21]*21That is, a computer user engages in the volitional search for depictions of child sexually abusive material on the Internet, which causes the computer to create temporary Internet files. As the law review note explains, “[t]hese volitional searches for child pornography provide a user with access to and control over child pornography images.”13 When asked whether a computer user would have to take “some proactive measure” before temporary Internet files containing images of child sexually abusive material would appear on a computer hard drive, Edwards responded, “[y]es, someone would have had to put them on the hard drive.” Therefore, the dissent’s sources clarify that the creation and deletion of temporary Internet files by a computer depends on the volitional actions taken by the computer user.
Finally, the dissent asserts that our constructive possession analysis creates “unnecessary confusion.” In fact, the dissent manufactures this confusion by conflating our preliminary review of the legal definition of the undefined term “possesses” in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) with our subsequent discussion of the adverb “knowingly.” When read in context, there is no confusion. We have carefully reviewed the meaning of the term “possesses” in the context of MCL 750.145c(4), in legal dictionaries, and in our criminal jurisprudence to conclude that the term “possesses” refers to both actual and constructive possession. On the basis of the established meaning of construc[22]*22tive possession in Michigan caselaw, we hold that a defendant constructively possesses child sexually abusive material when he knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the contraband either directly or through another person or persons. Because our holding is unambiguous and entirely consistent with existing caselaw, we reject the dissent’s efforts to create confusion about our analysis where none exists.
V CONCLUSION
The Internet has become the child pornographer’s medium of choice. It strains credibility to think that the Legislature intended the provision at issue — designed to protect children from sexual abuse — to preclude the prosecution of individuals who intentionally access and purposely view depictions of child sexually abusive material on the Internet. A statute outlawing the knowing possession of “any child sexually abusive material” is consistent with the societal desire to protect children by preventing the dissemination of child pornography to an audience with the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control over such contraband depictions. Our interpretation supports the statute’s purpose in a manner consistent with the statutory language.
The district courts did not err in binding defendants over for trial. Both defendants intentionally accessed and purposely viewed child sexually abusive material on the Internet. When the “electronic visual image” or “computer image” of such material was displayed on each defendant’s computer screen, he knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control over the depiction displayed. Accordingly, in [23]*23each case, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WEAVER (except for part IV), Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.
5 483 Mich 1024, 1024-1025 (2009).