People v. Fleming

2025 IL App (1st) 220584-U

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 220584-U

SECOND DIVISION August 19, 2025

No. 1-22-0584

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) 12 CR 20961, 15 CR 15050 ) EDDIE FLEMING, ) Honorable ) Michell McDowell Pitman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ) _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Evidence was sufficient to prove guilt. Defendant did not show error or prejudice in joinder of offenses or joinder of defendants. Prosecutor did not make prejudicial comments in closing argument.

¶2 On October 9 and 10, 2012, several young men went on a crime spree through Chicago

and the south suburbs that left two people dead and several others robbed or carjacked. The State

charged defendant Eddie Fleming with both murders and some—but not all—of the other crimes.

The case culminated in a dual jury trial, with separate juries hearing evidence about the alleged

crime spree involving Fleming and his codefendant, Darrell Leverson. The jury found Fleming

guilty of two counts of murder and several armed robberies. He now sits in prison for life. No. 1-22-0584

¶3 Fleming appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that he was

prejudiced when evidence of Leverson’s crimes (with which Fleming was not charged) was

admitted at his trial, and that the prosecutor made prejudicial comments in closing. We affirm.

¶4 BACKGROUND

¶5 The crimes here spanned multiple days and cities and involve a lengthy cast of

characters. Much, though not all of this crime spree was previously recounted in our decision

regarding codefendant Leverson. See People v. Leverson, 2024 IL App (1st) 211083, ¶¶ 8-47.

¶6 Broadly speaking, the State alleged that Fleming and Leverson were part of a crew that

committed several felonies, beginning on October 9 and stretching into the following day. When

all was said and done, multiple people had been robbed or carjacked, one person had been shot

at, and two others lay dead. In the State’s telling, Fleming, Leverson, and Kevin Eason (who is

not party to this appeal) were the principal players in the crime spree.

¶7 Eason was not part of the simultaneous trial. From the record, it appears this was due to

his desire to proceed pro se. So while Eason is part of the overall story, we will omit any

mention of which crimes he was charged with his or his legal proceedings going forward.

¶8 The State charged Fleming in two separate indictments. In 2012, Fleming was charged

with the first-degree murder of Derrick Hampton and the armed robberies of Gregory Harris and

Ravetta Moore. His codefendant Leverson was charged with these and other offenses in that

same 2012 indictment. In 2015, the State charged Fleming with the first-degree murder and

attempted armed robbery of Gary Clarke committed on the same day as the offenses in the 2012

indictment. (The reason for this three-year delay is neither clear to us nor relevant.)

¶9 Our facts come from Fleming’s and Leverson’s simultaneous trial before separate juries.

For ease, we will break down the chronology as the general background, including an uncharged

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offense; the offense charged only against Fleming; the offenses charged against both Fleming

and Leverson; and the offenses charged only against Leverson. Fortunately, these different

categories follow a chronological timeline in that order. And as we will see, some of the crimes

occurred only minutes apart from one another.

¶ 10 I. General Background

¶ 11 A. Rental of Getaway Vehicles (October 5)

¶ 12 As the State portrayed it, Fleming’s criminal scheme began on October 5, 2012. On that

day, Fleming called Chalynda Simpson and asked her and her sister, Fantasia, to go with him to

rent some cars. Fleming suggested to Simpson that they should go to the Hertz Rental Car station

at O’Hare Airport with a woman named “T.T.” to get the cars. The next morning, very early,

Fleming came by and picked up the Simpson sisters. They picked up T.T. on their way to the

airport. The foursome drove to O’Hare, where T.T. gave the Simpsons fraudulent credit cards

with their names on them. Using those cards, they rented a silver Jeep Liberty SUV and a Chevy

Malibu sedan. Later that day, Simpson took the Malibu, and Flemming left with the Jeep.

¶ 13 B. Robbery/Carjacking of Deonte Gordon (October 6) (Uncharged)

¶ 14 At around 10 p.m. that night, on October 6, Deonte Gordon and two friends drove to a

convenience store in Harvey. Gordon’s friends hopped out and went inside while Gordon stayed

in his car, a Ford Taurus sedan. Gordon noticed a silver Jeep Liberty parked next to him at the

store’s drive-through window. After realizing his trunk was open, Gordon got out of the car and

went to close it. As he got back into the car, he heard someone say something to him. Gordon

turned around to see two people had gotten out of the Jeep and were coming toward him. One of

them had a gun. The two men held Gordon at gunpoint and took his cell phone and wallet.

Gordon tried to get back in his car, but the men pulled him out and drove away in it. The Jeep

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soon followed. Gordon went inside the store and called the police.

¶ 15 About a month later, Gordon went to the police station and identified Eason in a

photograph as the person who pointed a gun at him. He identified Fleming as the person who

drove the Jeep. But he admitted he could not be positive of either identification.

¶ 16 II. Offense Charged Against Fleming: Murder of Gary Clarke (Oct. 9, 8:18 pm)

¶ 17 A few days later, on October 9, 2012, Fleming picked up Darrius Bradley, his cousin, in

the Jeep. Kevin Eason and Devonte Jackson were in the car as well, but Bradley did not know

either of them at the time. The four men drove to a house in south Chicago, on May Street near

57th or 58th Streets, to buy some marijuana in a place Bradley referred to as “the weed block.”

At trial, Bradley testified that when they got there, Fleming, Eason, and Jackson got out of the

car and walked around the corner to buy some weed.

¶ 18 After a few minutes, Bradley moved to the driver’s seat of the car. He could not see the

others, but shortly after, Bradley heard some gunshots. He did not know what was happening,

but everyone came running back to the car. Bradley saw a black gun in Eason’s hand, which he

put into his jacket. Jackson jumped into the passenger seat next to Bradley, while Eason and

Fleming climbed into the back of the Jeep. Bradley drove off and went back to where he had

been picked up, near 70th and Morgan streets, where he got out of the Jeep and walked away.

¶ 19 Later, police interviewed Bradley. He identified pictures of Fleming, Eason, and Jackson,

a photo of the Jeep, and a photo of a gun that Eason had carried. At trial, the State played video

clips of Bradley’s interview, where he told investigators that he did not stay in the car, but

instead went to the “weed house” while Jackson stayed behind. Bradley also told police that

Fleming talked about truck drivers having a lot of money and remembered seeing a white semi-

truck. When he was on the witness stand, Bradley admitted that what he told police in the

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interview was what really happened.

¶ 20 At that same time, Andrew Jackson was at home in the 5800 block of South Aberdeen

Street in Chicago. (Aberdeen and May streets are next to each other.) Jackson’s brother, Gary

Clarke, had come into town for a visit. Clarke, a semi-truck driver, had parked his truck in an

empty lot next to Jackson’s home. The night was stormy, so Jackson went into the basement to

work on a circuit breaker. Clarke, meanwhile, stayed out by his rig. At about 8:18 p.m., Jackson

heard Clarke say to someone “I don’t have any money, I don’t have any money,” which was met

by another voice saying, “Give me the money. Give me the money.”

¶ 21 Jackson went over to a window in the basement to see what was going on outside and

saw someone pointing a gun at Clarke. The gunman had an “afro” style haircut, was light

skinned, and stood no more than 5’8” or 5’9” tall. Two other men were near the front of the

truck, and one more was at the rear, standing near the side of the house.

¶ 22 Jackson tried to use his cell phone to call 9-1-1 but couldn’t get reception in the

basement. He was moving around the house to find a signal when he heard a gunshot. Jackson

ran outside and saw Clarke in his truck, but the men who had been there were all gone. Jackson

got into the truck and tried to lift his brother out, but his brother was not moving, and Jackson

saw blood on the floor of the cab. Clarke later died of a gunshot wound.

¶ 23 III. Offenses Charged Against Both Fleming and Leverson

¶ 24 A. Armed Robbery of Greg Harris (Oct. 9, 10:25 pm)

¶ 25 Approximately two hours after Gary Clarke’s murder, at about 10 p.m., Gregory Harris

hopped off a Pace bus in south suburban Dolton. He had come from Chicago to visit his friend,

Tisha Prince, who lived near Blouin Drive and Ellis Street. While Harris was walking down

Ingleside Street, near the corner of 158th, two men came up and robbed him at gunpoint. One

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man was tall, the other short, but Harris could not tell what race they were. The men took

Harris’s designer Pelle jacket, a bag with a PlayStation 3 video game system Harris had been

carrying, his watch, and his wallet. The men dashed down 158th Street; while they ran off, the

shorter man yelled at Harris to turn around or he would be shot. Harris took off the opposite way.

¶ 26 B. Murder of Derrick Hampton (Oct. 9, 10:27 pm)

¶ 27 Meanwhile, Nicole White was at her house in the 1000 block of Blouin Drive at around

10 p.m. She lived there with her parents, Denise and Derrick Hampton. White was at home while

her father was outside, preparing to go to work. At around 10:30 p.m., White heard a noise

outside and went to the back of the house. She walked out onto the driveway and saw her father

on the ground, near his bag and some 2-by-4 pieces of lumber. White then rushed to the front of

the house and saw a man across the street who was shouting that he had just been robbed.

¶ 28 That man Wallace saw was Harris, who had gone to his friend’s house after the robbery.

When he got there, he heard more gunshots coming from the east, further down Blouin Drive. He

walked down the street and saw a person lying on a driveway. Police eventually arrived and

spoke with Harris, and he told them that he had just been robbed and that it might be related to

the shooting, though he did not want to file a report. But Harris later went to the police station

and identified Leverson in a lineup as one of the robbers. Harris also said that he saw a gray SUV

drive by him about 15 minutes before he had been robbed.

¶ 29 Curtis Rentson, a Dolton police officer, responded to a call of shots fired on Blouin Drive

on the night of October 9. When he got to the scene of the shooting, he saw Derrick Hampton

lying in the driveway near a side door to the building. A woman who said she was Hampton’s

wife told him he had been shot, and an ambulance came to take Hampton to the hospital. Renton

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later went to the hospital, where he learned that Hampton had died of his wounds. Nobody

witnessed the shooting or could identify the shooters.

¶ 30 C. Armed Robbery of Ravetta Moore (Oct. 9, 10:49 pm)

¶ 31 About twenty minutes after Derrick Hampton’s murder, just before 11 p.m., Ravetta

Moore was driving to a friend’s house in Calumet City to celebrate her birthday. She stopped at

an intersection, where a Jeep Liberty also pulled up. The driver of the Jeep waved her through

the interchange, and she continued on to her friend’s house.

¶ 32 Upon arriving, Moore parked near the bottom of the driveway. While she was on her

phone, she looked up and saw a man she later identified as Eason coming toward her, carrying a

gun. He told her to get out of the car, and she did. After she got out, a taller man who was

wearing a mask took her purse and threw her to the ground. The men riffled through her purse

and took her phone, then ransacked her car before leaving. Moore later identified a gun found in

a car connected to Eason and Leverson as the one that was used during her robbery; police later

recovered a purse she identified as hers. Further, Gregory Harris’s state identification card was

found on the same driveway where Moore was robbed.

¶ 33 IV. Offenses Charged Against Leverson Only

¶ 34 A. Carjacking of Robert Hopkins, Joyce Johnson (Oct. 9, 11:03 pm)

¶ 35 About ten minutes after the Ravetta Moore robbery, Robert Hopkins and Joyce Johnson

were together at Hopkins’s house. They had parked their cars next to each other in Hopkins’s

driveway at around 11 p.m. and were outside when a young man approached Hopkins, pointed a

gun in his face, and demanded money from him. Another man appeared and searched through

Hopkins’s pockets, taking his keys and phone. The men ordered Hopkins to lie on the ground.

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¶ 36 Next, the men went over to Johnson, who had been sitting in her car. The man with the

gun told Johnson to get out, and after she did, she gave him a debit and credit card and some

cash. Then, one of the men took Hopkins’s dark blue-colored Lexus, while the other got into

Johnson’s Chevrolet Equinox. Both then drove off with the stolen cars. Johnson later testified

that she saw them follow a silver Jeep, which had been parked on the street. A few days after the

robbery, Hopkins identified Eason as one of the robbers but was unable to recognize the second

robber. Johnson admitted later that she did not tell police about seeing the silver Jeep when she

spoke with investigators immediately after the crime.

¶ 37 B. Armed Robbery of Willie Douglas (Oct. 9, 11:15 pm)

¶ 38 Roughly ten minutes after those carjackings, about a quarter past 11 p.m., Willie Douglas

and his girlfriend were together in Douglas’s car in Riverdale. A dark-colored car pulled up next

to his, and two men jumped out. One had a gun; he opened the driver’s door and ordered

Douglas out and to the ground. The men then went through Douglas’s car, and the man with the

gun riffled through Douglas’s pockets and took his bank card, his cell phone, and a leather

jacket. A few days later, Dougles met with police and pointed out that there had been some

unauthorized withdrawals from his bank account. He then identified Eason as the gunman and

Leverson as the other man who went through his car. Douglas did not mention Fleming and said

he only saw two men during the robbery.

¶ 39 C. Attempted Murder of Angel Feaster (Oct. 9, 11:45 pm)

¶ 40 About a half-hour later, Angel Feaster was parked in front of her house in south Chicago

while her child slept in the rear. She was talking on her phone when a dark-blue Lexus pulled up

next to her. Two people were inside the Lexus, which backed up and blocked Feaster in. The

passenger, who was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt, jumped out of the car and pulled out a

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silver semi-automatic handgun, walked to the driver’s side of Feaster’s car, and tried to get in.

Feaster threw her car into reverse and began to back up when she heard a gunshot. She sped off

with the Lexus in pursuit, but she lost them when she drove to the Harvey Police Station.

¶ 41 D. Armed Robbery of Phillips Neal (Oct. 10, 12:40 am)

¶ 42 Finally, spilling past midnight into the first hour of October 10, Philip Neal was pulling

into his driveway when he saw a dark-colored Lexus drive down his street and park in front of

the driveway. A man wearing a black hooded sweatshirt hopped out, walked up to Neil’s car, and

tapped on the window with a gun while telling Neil to get out of the car. Neal obeyed. The man

put the gun up against Neil’s head, demanded money, and ordered him to his knees. Another

man, whom Neil later said was Eason, went through Neil’s pocket’s and took his money, keys,

phone, a Blackberry, and a bag with a computer. The two men drove off in the Lexus.

¶ 43 V. Subsequent Investigation and Events

¶ 44 Shortly thereafter, Officer Clarence Ayers responded to a call of an armed robbery

involving a dark-colored Lexus. He eventually came across the Lexus and chased it; the pursuit

ended when the Lexus crashed into the side of a building. Two people, neither of whom Ayers

could see, jumped out and ran off in opposite directions.

¶ 45 Police searched the abandoned Lexus and found a Smith and Wesson semi-automatic

pistol inside, near the front passenger seat. Ballistics testing later concluded that the bullet from

Derrick Hampton’s body and shell casings found on the scene had been fired from the recovered

gun. Additionally, ballistics matched the bullet recovered from Gary Clarke’s body to the same

gun. When later shown a picture of the gun, Harris, Moore, and Douglas all said it was the same

one the robbers used. There was a medley of DNA profiles found on the gun. Leverson could not

be excluded as one contributor to the mix.

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¶ 46 Neil’s backpack, computer, and Blackberry were also found in the Lexus, as was

Douglas’s identification card, his debit card, and an ATM receipt. Additionally, police were able

to match a DNA profile found on the steering wheel to Eason, and a DNA profile from the

passenger-side airbag to Leverson.

¶ 47 Sometime later, Chalynda Simpson, the woman who originally helped Fleming rent the

Jeep Liberty with fraudulent credit cards, called him to trade the Malibu she had rented with the

Jeep. Fleming eventually came by with the Jeep, and Simpson noticed that it was damaged;

Fleming told her it was because a gun had accidentally gone off. Simpson changed her mind and

decided to keep the Malibu instead. But a few days later, the police called Simpson and told her

they were looking for her and her sister. Simpson then called Fleming and told him to take the

Malibu, and Fleming came by to pick it up.

¶ 48 Later, on October 10, at about 4:40 p.m., Riverdale Police Officer Plumey was on patrol

when he was asked to help Chicago police, who were chasing a silver Jeep Liberty going east on

144th Street. When Plumey got there, he saw the silver Jeep, which looked like it had just

crashed into a fence. Several people were getting out of the car and fled.

¶ 49 At about the same time, Detective Coleman of the Dolton Police Department was on duty

when he heard that police were chasing a silver Jeep. Coleman drove to 114th Street and Lowe in

Riverdale and heard from another officer that police were chasing several Black men who had

gotten out of the crashed Jeep and fled. One of the men was described as light-skinned with a

slim build, and Coleman saw a man matching that description running down 144th Street toward

a house on South Emerald. Officers later arrested that man, Leverson, who was taken to the

Dolton Police Station.

¶ 50 Police later found Gregory Harris’s Pelle coat in the Jeep, along with a DNA profile that

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matched Fleming on the driver’s side door. A profile matching Eason’s DNA profile was found

on a bottle in the Jeep, as was another water bottle, which had Leverson’s fingerprints on it.

¶ 51 On October 12, 2012, Sergeant Chuck Weeden of the Lansing Police Department went to

Kevin Eason’s house. After getting permission from Eason’s parents, Weeden searched Eason’s

bedroom and found a shoe that matched another found in the black Lexus and one 9mm round of

ammunition. After later procuring a search warrant, officers recovered an empty box of 9mm

ammo, a purse with Ravetta Moore’s ID card in it, and Joyce Johnson’s keys.

¶ 52 A few days later, on October 13, 2012, police interviewed Phillip McNulty, who had

been arrested but not charged in connection with the crime spree. That interview was recorded

and later played for the jurors. McNulty told officers that he was in the Jeep with Leverson,

Eason, and Fleming when it had crashed after the high-speed chase the day before. At trial,

however, McNulty said he could not remember if Leverson and Fleming were in the car, but that

he knew each of them.

¶ 53 That same day, Illinois State Police Agent Chanto Iverson went to Tatiera Weathers’s

home in the 6000 block of South Morgan, looking for a white Chevy Malibu. While he was

waiting outside the home, Iverson saw the Malibu drive up Morgan and stop at 61st Street. It

then sped off down 61st, and Iverson ran back to his car and tried to follow. With the help of

some other officers in the area, Iverson caught up to the Malibu in the 6200 block of May Street,

where it had been abandoned. Other police officers who were responding eventually arrested

four people, including Fleming, Darius Bradley, Wille Egleston, and Jessie Bowens.

¶ 54 Meanwhile, still on October 13, 2012, Oak Forest Police Officer Belcher was

interrogating Michael Joe at the Burnham Police Department. (How police came to believe Joe

was tied to the robberies was never made clear.) Belcher interviewed Joe a total of four times

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over two days; each interview except the first one was recorded. In those interviews, Joe said that

Fleming came to see him sometime after 10 p.m. on October 9. At the time, Fleming was driving

a Jeep, and he and Fleming hung out in it for about an hour while Fleming waited for Leverson

and Eason. Fleming showed Joe a Coach purse (later identified as Moore’s) and a PlayStation

(which had been taken from Harris). Joe took the purse and PlayStation, and said he gave them

to Eason the next day.

¶ 55 On October 15, 2012, prosecutor Jack Costello summoned Michael Joe before a grand

jury investigating the crime spree and murders. A transcript of that testimony was entered into

evidence during Fleming’s trial. Joe told the grand jurors that, on October 9, 2012, he got into a

silver Jeep with Fleming. Joe said that he had seen Fleming—and only Fleming—driving the

Jeep around for about a week. While in the car, Fleming showed Joe a bag which had a

PlayStation and purse in it, which he gave to Joe. The next day, Fleming came by to pick up Joe.

Together they went to get Leverson and Eason. Joe said that he saw a Pelle coat in the back of

the car, that Fleming told him that the PlayStation and purse had come from a “lick” (slang for a

robbery), and that Leverson and Eason were with him at the time. Fleming also told Joe that

Leverson and Eason were in a car they had stolen.

¶ 56 At trial, Joe changed his tune considerably. In court, he testified that, while he knew both

Leverson and Fleming, he did not know about any of the crimes involved in the case. In what

became a running theme of his trial testimony, Joe said he did not remember Fleming coming to

his house on October 9 or giving him the purse and PlayStation. In fact, when he was in front of

the jury, Joe seemed to remember little, if anything, about what happened.

¶ 57 Joe did admit he was interviewed by police and testified before the grand jury.

Recordings of his interviews with police and a transcript of his testimony to the grand jurors

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were entered into evidence. So too were photographs of various pieces of evidence that Joe had

previously identified that he saw or knew about, including a picture of Harris’s Pelle jacket, the

Coach purse, the silver Jeep, the gun involved in the crimes, and pictures of Eason, Leverson,

and Fleming.

¶ 58 To reiterate, the State charged Fleming and codefendant Leverson in a 2012 indictment

with the murder of Derrick Hampton and the armed robberies of Greg Harris and Ravetta Moore.

The 2012 indictment also charged Leverson, but not Fleming, with the additional offenses that

occurred later in that short time span: the carjackings of Robert Hopkins and Joyce Johnson, the

armed robberies of Willie Douglas and Phillip Neal, and the attempted murder of Angel Feaster.

¶ 59 Three years later, in 2015, the State charged Fleming with Gary Clarke’s murder in a

separate indictment.

¶ 60 Before trial, the State moved to join Fleming’s crime-spree charges with the Clarke

murder charges because they were part of the same criminal transaction. Fleming objected,

arguing that he would be prejudiced by the joinder. Over his objection, the court granted the

State’s motion and joined the 2012 indictment with the 2015 one. The case began to move

toward trial, with Leverson and Fleming opting to have juries decide their guilt.

¶ 61 Fleming’s counsel also said, several times in pretrial proceedings, that he was going to

file a motion to sever, and the State said there would be no objection to that severance. On a later

court date, the parties again discussed severing Leverson from Fleming, and the State repeated

that it had no issue with severing the defendants in the case and having dual juries—one for

Leverson, the other for Fleming.

¶ 62 On April 3, 2019, Fleming’s charge in the Clarke case was consolidated with the 2012

crime-spree indictment and moved to Markham, where he and Leverson awaited trial on the

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crime-spree charges. The trial court noted that, based on the joinder rulings, Leverson would be

tried with Fleming.

¶ 63 A few months later, Leverson’s attorney filed a motion to sever his case from Fleming. In

court, counsel for Leverson said that he anticipated that Fleming would try to point the finger at

Leverson, and thus the two would have antagonistic defenses. The State agreed to the motion.

¶ 64 The court granted the motion and severed Leverson from Fleming. The parties would

pick two separate juries, the court said, and “each Defendant’s jury will hear proper evidence

with regards to each Defendant.” The court admonished defense counsel: “So, counsel, I will

reply upon you to let me know which jury will hear which evidence.”

¶ 65 While Leverson and Fleming picked separate juries, their trials were held at the same

time, and both juries heard the great majority of the evidence. There were key pieces of

testimony that one jury did not hear, however. For example, Fleming’s jury was not present

when the State played a recording of Leverson’s interview with police, and Leverson’s jury did

not see Fleming take the stand in his own defense.

¶ 66 At trial, and in addition to testimony from the victims and other eyewitnesses, the State

presented several key pieces of evidence about the investigation into the crime spree. In the

Clarke killing, Paul Presnell, a Chicago Police forensic investigator, testified that he recovered a

spent ammunition cartridge from the grass near the passenger side of Clarke’s truck and swabbed

the side of Clarke’s truck for DNA samples. One of the DNA profiles found on the truck

included that of Eason. Police also recovered the bullet from Clarke’s body after an autopsy.

¶ 67 Sean Grosvenor, with the Illinois State Police, helped investigate the scene where

Hampton was killed and collected two spent 9mm cartridges from the scene. Grosvenor later

went to the morgue and collected the bullet recovered from Hampton’s body. ISP investigator

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Casey Morin processed the silver Jeep after it had crashed, taking swabs for DNA and lifting

several dozen latent fingerprints from inside and outside of the car. Morin also found one plastic

bottle on the front passenger seat and another under the seat; he swabbed the openings of each

for DNA. In addition, Morin collected a cell phone, a brown coat, and a blue hooded sweatshirt.

¶ 68 Several DNA profiles found on the cars were later tied back to the suspects. One DNA

profile found on the driver’s side door handle of the silver Jeep matched Fleming’s profile. As

for the fingerprints found on the Jeep, investigators matched four of them—found on the driver’s

door, the rearview mirror, and radio—to Fleming.

¶ 69 Additionally, Justin Barr, an ISP forensic scientist, examined the ballistics evidence in

the case. Barr testified that the gun recovered from Lexus after it had crashed was the gun that

fired the bullets that killed Clarke and Hampton. Barr also tied the recovered cartridges found

from the scene of both crimes to the same gun. And, in her testimony at trial, Moore identified

that same gun as the one the man who robbed her used.

¶ 70 Fleming, meanwhile, testified in his own defense. On the stand, Fleming generally denied

any role in the crimes on October 9 and 10. He testified that, on October 4, 2012, he and his

friend, Dave, picked up Chalynda Simpson and her sister to rent some cars. Fleming said that a

woman named T.T. agreed to pay him $100 for every person who rented a car using fraudulent

credit cards that T.T. would provide. After picking up the Simpson sisters, the foursome drove to

O’Hare and went to Hertz. Fleming left with a silver Jeep Liberty, which he was supposed to

give to T.T. the next day. But Fleming said he ignored her phone calls and kept the car.

¶ 71 On October 6, Fleming gave the Jeep to Leverson, he said, for $40. Leverson promised to

return the Jeep by that evening but kept the car overnight. The next morning, he told Fleming he

wanted to buy the car. Fleming called T.T., who agreed to sell the car to Leverson for $300; but

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Fleming told Leverson the car cost $400. Leverson paid the $400, and Fleming pocketed the

extra $100. He also claimed Bradley and Joe were lying when they said he had been involved in

the Clarke murder or the robberies.

¶ 72 Fleming testified that he saw Leverson in the Jeep on October 9, 2012, but did not got in

the car with him. He denied being involved in the charged offenses but admitted that, on October

10, he learned that Leverson had been arrested. Several people called him, he said, because the

cars they had rented with the fake credit cards were involved in the crime spree. Fleming

admitted he took the Malibu back from Simpson, and that he was arrested fleeing from it.

¶ 73 In closing argument, the State placed Fleming at the center of the spree. The prosecutor

argued that the “crime wave was begun and orchestrated by this Defendant, Eddie Fleming, by

Eddie Fleming and his partners in crime, his crew of jump-out armed robbers, and jump-out

hijackers.” Fleming was the “guy in charge” of everything, the State said, because he was the

oldest and “got the little shorties to go out and do his dirty work, the shorties to go out and jump

out and do the robberies.” The State also argued that Fleming’s demeanor while testifying was

further proof he was “not going to take no. Nobody is going to tell that guy what to do.”

¶ 74 During deliberations, the jury sent out two jury notes. One asked if Fleming was legally

responsible for Eason’s actions because Fleming was 20 years old, while Eason was 16. The

court told the jurors that the law of accountability did not reference age. After more

deliberations, the jury found Fleming guilty of all counts. After a sentencing hearing where

Fleming argued his age should be considered, the court sentenced him to natural life for the

murders and 20-year sentences for the armed robberies. This appeal followed.

¶ 75 ANALYSIS

¶ 76 Before this court, Fleming identifies three issues. First, he alleges the evidence was

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insufficient to convict him because, in his telling, it was wholly circumstantial and relied on two

unreliable witnesses, Darrius Bradley and Michael Joe. Second, he was prejudiced because his

jury heard evidence about Leverson’s crimes with which Fleming was not charged. And third,

the State committed prejudicial misconduct when it painted him as the orchestrator of the crime

spree in closing arguments. We address his arguments in that order.

¶ 77 I. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶ 78 Due process requires the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary

to convict a person of an offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the

reviewing court asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Circumstantial evidence may be enough to sustain

a conviction. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007). The same standard of review applies

whether the evidence is circumstantial or direct. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 49.

¶ 79 The fact finder’s judgments as to witness credibility and the reasonable inferences to be

drawn from the evidence are entitled to great deference. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272

(2008). We must examine the evidence with due consideration to the fact that the jury saw and

heard the witnesses. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999).

¶ 80 Fleming starts with strong points: Nobody testified that they saw him shoot Clarke or

Hampton. He did not confess to the murders or any of his charged crimes. There was no video

evidence of Fleming committing the crimes. And the two victims that Fleming was convicted of

robbing, Gregory Harris and Ravetta Moore, did not identify Fleming before or at trial. There

was little—if any—direct evidence that Fleming was involved in those specific crimes.

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¶ 81 The State built a case against Fleming entirely of circumstantial evidence, then tied the

disparate pieces together into a narrative. Indeed, there are threads that Fleming was involved in

various parts of the crime spree. Looking at all the evidence, the State wove a compelling

narrative that, while Eason and Leverson might have been the principal players, Fleming was just

offstage, helping orchestrate and support the events. That is, on its own, compelling evidence of

his guilt; when two or more people engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts

in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered the acts of all

the parties, and they are all equally responsible for the consequences of those acts. 725 ILCS 5/5-

2(c) (West 2020); People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 21.

¶ 82 Fleming focuses heavily on the testimony of Michael Joe and Darius Bradley, so we start

there. Fleming’s challenge to their credibility requires us to examine whether a rational juror

could believe them, in light of all the other evidence in the case. That is the kind of question for

which our deference to the jury, who saw both witnesses testify, is necessarily at its greatest.

People v. Tatum, 2019 IL App (1st) 162403, ¶ 45.

¶ 83 Bradley, remember, was with the crew when Clarke was murdered. At trial, he testified

that on October 9, 2012, Fleming came by driving a silver Jeep and picked him up. Eason and

Devonte Jackson were already in the car. The foursome drove to 58th and May streets to buy

some marijuana. Bradley stayed in the Jeep while the other three went around the corner to make

their purchase. After a few minutes, Bradley heard a gunshot, and then Fleming, Eason, and

Jackson came running back to the Jeep. Eason had a gun in his hand.

¶ 84 Bradley’s testimony lined up with that of Andrew Jackson, Clarke’s brother. Jackson

testified that Clarke was visiting him in the 5800 block of South Aberdeen Street when he was

killed. Aberdeen Street is one block east of May, where Bradley said the crew parked the silver

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Jeep. When Jackson was in the basement of his house, he heard his brother say something to the

effect of “I don’t have any money” when another voice demanded money from him. Jackson

looked outside the basement window and saw four men, one with a gun, surrounding his brother.

Shortly after, Jackson heard a gunshot and went outside to find his brother dead. Bradley’s trial

testimony, at a minimum, put Fleming at the scene of the crime—which was important since

Jackson could not identify the men he saw confronting Clarke before he was shot.

¶ 85 To be sure, Bradley’s stories were not always consistent. After being shown video clips

of what he had previously told investigators, Bradley’s story changed. He admitted he got out of

the car and went to buy weed, while Jackson was the one who stayed behind in the Jeep. Bradley

also told investigators that, right before the robbery, that Fleming said truck drivers often had a

lot of money, giving him a motive to rob Clarke.

¶ 86 In Fleming’s eyes, this flip makes Bradley’s statements and testimony wholly

unbelievable, and thus we should set aside his testimony completely. But it is the job of the trier

of fact to resolve any inconsistencies or conflicts in the testimony. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.

When confronted with which version of his story was the truth—his original testimony, or what

he told the police—Bradley later admitted on the stand that what he told police was what

happened. Either way, the jury heard him testify and was in a superior position to decide what to

believe; his testimony is not so fanciful as to make it wholly unreliable.

¶ 87 The same could be said of Michael Joe’s testimony. At trial, Joe testified to little more

than that he knew Leverson and Fleming. But that’s not what he told investigators and a grand

jury before trial. In each instance, Joe said he was with Fleming in the silver Jeep on October 9,

the day the crimes began. While they were waiting for Leverson and Eason, Fleming showed Joe

a red bag that had a Coach purse and a PlayStation in it; the former had been stolen from Moore,

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the latter from Harris. Fleming admitted to Joe that those items were taken in robberies.

¶ 88 Both Joe’s statement to investigators (which was video recorded) and his testimony,

under oath, to the grand jurors, was admitted as substantive evidence. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1

(West 2020). The jurors were free to consider his prior inconsistent statements as much as his

live testimony before them. We are not required to weigh a prior inconsistent statement any less

than other evidence, since prior inconsistent statements alone can support a conviction. See, e.g.,

People v. Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 426, 439 (2002).

¶ 89 Fleming also notes that there is no evidence that he was present at the robberies of Harris

or Moore or Hampton’s murder. But as noted, Joe put the spoils of those robberies in Fleming’s

hands, along with an admission that he knew they were stolen. And there is ample proof that the

infamous silver Jeep that Fleming helped rent was present at or near every crime in this case.

¶ 90 It is that Jeep that ties the nefarious players together—beginning with Fleming procuring

it with fake credit cards just a few days earlier. A DNA profile matching Fleming’s was found on

the Jeep after it crashed. Deonte Gordon tentatively identified Fleming as the man driving a

silver Jeep that Eason and another man got out of when they robbed and carjacked him on

October 6. Fleming picked Bradley up in the Jeep before they, Eason, and another man went to

buy weed in the same place, and at the same time, Clarke was shot and killed.

¶ 91 Harris said he saw a gray SUV drive past him before he was mugged, and Moore saw the

silver Jeep right before she was robbed. After two men took Robert Hopkins’s Lexus and Joyce

Johnson’s Chevy, they sped off, following a silver Jeep. And the gun that killed Clarke and

Hampton, and which Harris and Moore identified as the gun the robber used, was found in

Hopkins’s car.

¶ 92 These disparate pieces of evidence, plus Bradley and Joe, sufficiently tie Fleming to the

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crimes in this case. In other words, while Bradley and Joe may have had inconsistent stories, the

wealth of other facts gave the jurors reason to believe one version of their testimony over the

others. Bradley put Fleming at the scene of Clarke’s murder and provided him with a motive to

rob Clarke. Jackson, Clarke’s brother, heard men demand money from his brother before he was

shot. The gun recovered from the Lexus, stolen by Leverson and Eason, fired the shot that killed

Clarke.

¶ 93 Joe, meanwhile, put Fleming with Eason and Leverson in the Jeep on the night of the

robberies and with the spoils of the crimes. Harris and Moore both identified Eason and

Leverson as the people who robbed them, and police recovered several stolen items from places

where Eason and Leverson’s DNA and fingerprints were found.

¶ 94 That was the purpose of Bradley and Joe’s evidence—it allowed the State to show that

Fleming, the man who fraudulently rented the silver Jeep, was at the scene of Clarke’s murder

and was with Eason and Leverson when they robbed Harris and Moore. And, more importantly,

it made it reasonable for jurors to believe one version of their stories over the other.

¶ 95 As Fleming was charged as accountable for Eason and Leverson’s actions, there need not

be any evidence that he committed any one particular crime as the principal. People v. Jackson,

2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 45. Participation in a common criminal design is not necessarily

explicit. People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 32. Multiple eyewitnesses identified either

Leverson or Eason (or both) as the people who robbed them, and Joe and Bradley tied Fleming to

them both. That Fleming “voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with

knowledge of its design supports an inference he shared the common purpose” of the group and

is accountable for its acts. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13.

¶ 96 In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence here is not so improbable or

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unsatisfactory that it gives rise to a reasonable doubt of Fleming’s guilt. The evidence was more

than sufficient to sustain Fleming’s conviction.

¶ 97 II. Joinder

¶ 98 Next, Fleming claims the court erred when it joined the charges related to the Clarke

murder with the charges stemming from the crime spree. We have struggled to understand

Fleming’s argument here and will need to unpack it to explain why.

¶ 99 As a reminder, the court joined the Clarke-murder charges (Case number 15 CR 15050),

for which only Fleming was charged, with the charges in the other indictment (Case number 12

CR 20961), which involved a string of offenses that began roughly two hours later, for some of

which Fleming was charged and for some of which he was not. Fleming appears to be arguing

that this particular joinder—the joinder of the charges from the two indictments—was error,

because it allowed Fleming’s jury to hear evidence that related only to crimes attributed to

Leverson and not him.

¶ 100 We say “this particular joinder” because this case involved several joinders. Putting aside

the indictment for the Clarke murder (15 CR 15050), the other indictment (12 CR 20961) itself

joined a myriad of offenses that began at about 10:20 pm on October 9, 2012 and spilled into

October 10 at roughly 12:40 am. See 725 ILCS 5/111-4(a) (West 2008) (permitting joinder of

related offenses in one indictment). That indictment also joined two defendants, Fleming and

Leverson. See id. § 111-4(b) (permitting joinder of defendants involved in related offenses).

¶ 101 In other words, there were three joinders in this case: (1) the joinder of multiple offenses

related to the crime spree in case number 12 CR 20961; (2) the joinder of the two defendants in

that same crime-spree indictment; and (3) the joinder of the Clarke-murder charges from case

number 15 CR 15050 with those in the crime-spree indictment. Which one is Fleming attacking?

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¶ 102 In the body of his argument, Fleming clearly chooses the third one: he argues that “[t]he

trial court abused its discretion by granting, over defense counsel’s objection, the State’s motion

to join the two cases.” (Emphasis.) And indeed, that was the only joinder in which the trial court

played a role; the other two joinders were the State’s doing when they indicted Fleming (and

Leverson) for the crime-spree charges in 2012.

¶ 103 But that feels like an odd choice of joinder to attack, given the prejudice Fleming alleges:

“Joining the two cases allowed the State to introduce evidence that prejudiced Fleming because

the State argued that he was accountable for Leverson’s actions and the jury could not be

expected to disregard the numerous additional crimes committed by Leverson when considering

only the charges against Fleming.” The prejudice Fleming identifies has little to do with the

joinder of the Clarke-murder charges with the crime-spree charges and much more to do with the

State’s original joinder of multiple offenses and both defendants in case number 12 CR 20961,

the crime-spree indictment, which included crimes for which Fleming was not charged.

¶ 104 So strictly speaking, if Fleming is only attacking the joinder of the charges from the

Clarke-murder indictment with those in the crime-spree indictment, then his requested relief

should be limited to a new trial on the 2015 Clarke-murder charges only, because the 2012

crime-spree indictment already had the problem of mixing in charges unrelated to Fleming. The

only alleged taint stemming from the joinder of the Clarke-murder charges could be to those

isolated charges, solely directed at Fleming. But Fleming does not limit his requested relief to the

conviction for the Clarke murder. He wants a new trial on all charges. That does not follow.

¶ 105 On the other hand, the heading of Fleming’s argument, which we do not usually credit as

part of the substantive argument, gets much closer to what we believe Fleming is truly arguing,

that he “was denied a fair trial by being tried jointly with co-defendant Leverson where the sheer

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number and severity of the subsequent crimes committed by Leverson was so prejudicial that a

jury could not reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence for the multiple

defendants.” That heading, quite clearly, is an attack on the joinder of the two defendants in the

same trial. And for the most part, that is the problem that Fleming identifies in his brief.

¶ 106 To its credit, the State, trying to cover its bases, addresses Fleming’s joinder argument in

every conceivable iteration. It argues that all the offenses—both those initially joined in the

crime-spree indictment, and later the Clarke-murder charged joined with them—were properly

joined and that Leverson and Fleming were properly joined as defendants. (Fleming did not try

to clear up any confusion in his reply brief, which made no mention of the joinder argument.)

¶ 107 We will not deny Fleming his piece here, but neither will we consider arguments he has

not raised in any way whatsoever on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)

(points not raised on appeal are forfeited); People v. Polk, 2014 IL App (1st) 122017, ¶ 49

(same). Generally speaking, there are two ways to challenge a joinder on appeal—claiming that

the standard for joinder was not met and claiming that, even if it was met, the joinder resulted in

prejudice in some fashion.

¶ 108 Fleming in no way argues the first point. He does not claim or even hint that the standard

for joinder, in whatever iteration, was not met. Charges may be joined in the same indictment if

they “are based on the same act or on 2 or more acts which are part of the same comprehensive

transaction.” 725 ILCS 5/111-4(a) (West 2008). And multiple defendants may be joined in the

same indictment if “they are alleged to have participated in the same act or in the same

comprehensive transaction out of which the offense or offenses arose.” Id. § 111-4(b). See

People v. Fleming, 2014 IL App (1st) 113004, ¶ 36.

¶ 109 Fleming does not even cite these statutes, much less argue that these crimes did not arise

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from the same comprehensive transaction or that the codefendants were not alleged to have

participated in them. So we can set those questions aside.

¶ 110 But however awkwardly he frames it, Fleming surely does argue that he was prejudiced

by being tried alongside Leverson and thus having some of the Leverson-only charges attributed

to him. And no doubt, regardless of whether the standard for joinder is met, that joinder may

prejudice a defendant, denying him a fair trial. See People v. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d 80, 92 (1985).

¶ 111 But even properly understood, Fleming’s argument does not fly. A defendant has a

remedy when he objects to a joinder due to a fear of unfair prejudice. If a defendant believes that

he “is prejudiced by a *** joinder of separate charges or defendants for trial,” he may ask the

court to “order separate trials, grant a severance of defendants, or provide any other relief as

justice may require.” 725 ILCS 5/114–8 (West 2008).

¶ 112 And that is exactly what happened here. Leverson, as it happened, was the one who asked

for a severance. The State did not object. And Fleming agreed as well; in fact, his attorney

repeatedly indicated that he would seek a severance before Leverson’s motion saved him the

trouble. So the court severed Fleming from Leverson to prevent the very prejudice about which

Fleming now complains.

¶ 113 Fleming got a separate jury. The trial court put everything in place so that Fleming could

ensure that his jury heard only the evidence against him, not his codefendant Leverson, ruling

that “we will select two juries on this matter,” that “each Defendant’s jury will hear proper

evidence with regards to each Defendant,” but with the critical caveat that “counsel, I will rely

upon you to let me know which jury will hear which evidence.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 114 The ball was then in Fleming’s court to raise the appropriate objections or requests to

dismiss his jury when evidence that pertained only to Leverson’s alleged crimes was admitted.

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That happened on at least one occasion, when Fleming’s jury was dismissed while Leverson’s

jury heard testimony about Leverson’s confession and watched the videotape of that confession.

And of course, Fleming’s jury was dismissed when the State gave its closing argument directed

at Leverson.

¶ 115 But Fleming has cited to no instance in the record when his jury heard evidence only

pertaining to Leverson over the objection of Fleming’s counsel. That last part, of course, is key.

It was incumbent on Fleming’s counsel, not the trial court, to raise the prospect of dismissing

Fleming’s jury if potential testimony pertained only to Leverson and not Fleming. The court

made that much clear from the outset, and given counsel’s superior knowledge of the trial

evidence compared to that of the trial court, that was the only sensible way to proceed.

¶ 116 Fleming cannot complain about the admission of testimony to which he failed to object at

the appropriate time. That is not only a fundamental principle of forfeiture, see People v.

Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15; it is even more acutely appropriate here, given that the trial court

had clearly given Fleming’s counsel the right and the responsibility to speak up when necessary

and seek dismissal of the Fleming jury where appropriate.

¶ 117 Simply put, if Fleming’s jury heard evidence pertaining to crimes attributed only to

Leverson, the fault lies with no one but Fleming, who failed to seek the appropriate relief at the

time despite being invited and instructed to do so. Again, Fleming cites to no example where he

raised that request and was denied, and it is not our place to abandon our role as neutral arbiter

and scour the record for such examples, particularly on behalf of an appellant charged with

convincing us to reverse the judgments below. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323 (2010).

¶ 118 In any event, as far as we have seen in the record, regarding the evidence admitted that

pertained only to Leverson, Fleming’s counsel did not ask the court to excuse Fleming’s jury.

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For example, Fleming’s counsel cross-examined Robert Hopkins and Jennifer Johnson, victims

of the carjackings for which Fleming was not charged, and even answered in the affirmative

when the court asked, before Johnson testified, if “both juries” should be present. So we fail to

see how he can be heard now to complain that his jury heard their testimony.

¶ 119 III. Prejudicial Comments in Closing Argument

¶ 120 Last, Fleming claims the State made prejudicial comments in closing argument that

denied him a fair trial. He points to the prosecutor’s comments that Fleming “spearheaded” the

events in question, that he was the “boss” of and “in charge” of Leverson and Eason. Fleming

says the prosecutor’s comments were “based on nothing but the fact that Fleming was the oldest

of three defendants.” Since the State’s theory was that Fleming was accountable for Leverson’s

and Eason’s actions, these comments confused the jury and prejudiced Fleming.

¶ 121 Fleming acknowledges he failed to object to these comments in closing argument. He

says we should review this issue for plain error under either prong of that doctrine. See People v.

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005). Alternatively, he claims his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to these comments. See People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984).

¶ 122 But if no error occurred, then obviously no plain error could have occurred. People v.

Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 49. And for purposes of an ineffectiveness claim, if no error

occurred, then Fleming could not have suffered prejudice for counsel’s failure to object, either.

People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 133 (prejudice required under first prong of plain-error

review mirrors that of prejudice required for ineffectiveness claim); People v. Potts, 2021 IL App

(1st) 161219, ¶ 196. So we begin with the question of whether any error occurred at all.

¶ 123 The purpose of closing argument is to give the parties a final chance to recap the

evidence, apply the law to that evidence, and argue why the law and evidence compel a favorable

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verdict. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005). The State is afforded wide latitude in

closing argument. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 91, 123 (2007).

¶ 124 Prosecutorial comments that are not based on any evidence may be highly prejudicial and

inflammatory. People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394, 406-07 (1990). But a prosecutor may comment

on and draw legitimate inferences from evidence or testimony in the record. People v.

Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 445 (1988). On appeal, we review the closing arguments in their

entirety, placing the challenged remarks in context. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 122.

¶ 125 At various points throughout closing argument, the State claimed that Fleming

“spearheaded that crime wave back on October 9th of 2012,” that “Eddie Fleming, he’s the guy.

He’s the man. He is the guy in charge” of Leverson and Eason, who “were supposed to come

back and meet up with their boss, Eddie,” after committing their crimes. Fleming points as well

to this passage where the State characterized him:

“He was the one in charge. He was the oldest at the time. He was 20. He got the little

shorties to go out and do his dirty work, the shorties to go out and jump out and do the

robberies. Of course he stayed in the car. He’s the one running the show. He got those

younger kids to do exactly what he wanted and to follow his orders.”

¶ 126 The State made all these comments, says Fleming, despite the fact that “[t]he State did

not introduce any evidence that Fleming played a leadership role in these incidents or in any way

directed his co-defendants’ actions.” In Fleming’s eyes, these comments were solely based on

the age disparity between Fleming and his younger codefendants.

¶ 127 We agree with the State, however, that these comments were based on reasonable

inferences from the record. When Fleming went with the Williams sisters to rent the silver Jeep

with fraudulent credit cards, he procured the getaway vehicle that made repeated appearances

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throughout the crime spree. In the State’s telling, Fleming was the one “that orchestrated this

whole scheme of renting cars. *** He’s running the show.” By renting the cars with fraudulent

credit cards—which seemingly would be untraceable—Fleming set in motion the series of events

of October 9 and 10. That’s nothing more than a reasonable inference from the evidence at trial.

¶ 128 And the State based at least part of its argument that Fleming was the leader on the

testimony of other witnesses as well as the testimony of Fleming himself:

“[O]ver the last couple of weeks listening to testimony, listening to the evidence,

listening to his friends and the people that he hung out with back then, the people that he

felt the most comfortable with back then, listening to all their testimony, and especially

after yesterday, listening to his testimony on the stand yesterday, I think it's crystal clear

that Eddie Fleming, he’s the guy. He’s the man. He is the guy in charge. You saw his

demeanor yesterday. He was not going to take no. Nobody is going to tell that guy what

to do.”

¶ 129 These comments fall well within the latitude given to the State in closing argument. They

were sufficiently based on record testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the

evidence. We thus find no error of any kind, much less plain error. And as noted, that dooms

Fleming’s ineffectiveness claim for failing to object to these comments as well.

¶ 130 CONCLUSION

¶ 131 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in all respects.

¶ 132 Affirmed.

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