People v. Fedick

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Fedick

132 A.D.2d 968, 518 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49433

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 10, 1987

StatusPublished

This text of 132 A.D.2d 968 (People v. Fedick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Fedick, 132 A.D.2d 968, 518 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49433 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict him of arson. The well-established test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving the People the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, the facts from which the inference of defendant’s guilt is drawn are inconsistent with his innocence and exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis (People v Giuliano, 65 NY2d 766, 767-768; People v Marin, 65 NY2d 741, 742). The inferences which could be drawn from the evidence here are inconsistent with innocence and there are no logical gaps in the People’s case which cannot be bridged by the drawing of reasonable, permissible inferences. Accordingly, we conclude that the arson conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Cattaraugus County Court, Sprague, J.—arson, third degree.) Present— Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict him of arson. The well-established test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving the People the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, the facts from which the inference of defendant’s guilt is drawn are inconsistent with his innocence and exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis (People v Giuliano, 65 NY2d 766, 767-768; People v Marin, 65 NY2d 741, 742). The inferences which could be drawn from the evidence here are inconsistent with innocence and there are no logical gaps in the People’s case which cannot be bridged by the drawing of reasonable, permissible inferences. Accordingly, we conclude that the arson conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Cattaraugus County Court, Sprague, J.—arson, third degree.) Present— Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

132 A.D.2d 968, 518 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-fedick-nyappdiv-1987.