2026 IL App (1st) 241368 No. 1-24-1368 Opinion filed March 13, 2026 Sixth Division ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 94 CR 10738 ) ANGELO EVANS, ) The Honorable ) Peggy Chiampas, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Gamrath specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 A lawful sentence requires understanding the defendant as an individual, particularly
young defendants. The law requires sentencing courts to account for how youth, trauma, and
neurological development affect a young defendant’s decision-making and capacity for
rehabilitation.
¶2 Angelo Evans was 17 years old when he committed horrific crimes. He also had been
shaped by years of severe abuse, neglect, and instability. After significant changes in juvenile- No. 1-24-1368
sentencing law, this court remanded for resentencing. The sentencing court nonetheless reimposed
the same 90-year sentence.
¶3 After a thorough review of the record, including transcripts of the original trial and both
the sentencing and the resentencing hearing, we cannot affirm. The severity of the offense alone
does not relieve a duty to follow the governing law. The sentencing court erred in applying the
statutory framework required for juvenile sentencing. Those errors undermine confidence in the
sentence. We therefore reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 Angelo Evans received an aggregate sentence of 90 years in prison at his original
sentencing hearing. Years later, significant changes in the law occurred as courts began to
recognize the various ways in which youth impacts decision-making and the potential for
rehabilitation. Following the guidance of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), People v. Buffer,
2019 IL 122327, and the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)),
this court ordered Evans resentenced in accordance with these changes. But the sentencing court
imposed the same sentence.
¶6 Jury Trial
¶7 KRW, a family friend, testified about Evans sexually assaulting her and then attempting to
kill her in the early hours of April 7, 1994. Evans came to her apartment requesting to make a
phone call. KRW was with her 22-month-old. Once inside, Evans entered KRW’s bedroom,
attacked her, held her down, and raped her. He also placed his forearm around her neck until she
lost consciousness.
¶8 On regaining consciousness, KRW found Evans stabbing her in the back with a knife. He
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then poured rubbing alcohol on her, set her head on fire, and left the room. She attempted to escape,
but Evans blocked the door. She managed to extinguish the flames before trying to call the police,
but the cord had been cut.
¶9 After Evans left, KRW sought help from a neighbor. KRW sustained 14 stab wounds and
first and second-degree burns on 80% of her face and 9% of her body. Both of her lungs were
punctured. Before being taken to the hospital, she identified Evans.
¶ 10 Evans made several statements to the police. At first, he said KRW made sexual advances
toward him, and when Evans refused to go further, she became angry, grabbed the knife, and
stabbed herself. He later admitted to the stabbings and setting her on fire. In a second interrogation,
he suggested that KRW had been interested in him and that he followed her into the bedroom,
forced her to the bed, strangled her, and stabbed her. In a written statement, he claimed that when
she said she would call the police to accuse him of rape, he took a knife from her, cut the phone
wire, and stabbed and set her on fire.
¶ 11 The jury found Evans guilty of attempt first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual
assault.
¶ 12 Sentencing
¶ 13 Evans faced a maximum of 90 years in prison. The trial court evaluated the presentence
investigation report, and both parties presented evidence.
¶ 14 The State called two witnesses in aggravation. A youth officer testified that, at 12 years old
and living in a group home, Evans and three older boys held down a 15-year-old boy while two of
the boys fondled him. A detective recounted his arrest of Evans, about 16 years old at the time, for
an armed robbery in which Evans admitted using a BB gun.
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¶ 15 Evans presented past psychological reports conducted in 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1991,
which he claimed reflected medical issues stemming from the abuse and neglect he had
experienced during childhood. The State objected on relevance, noting Evans had been found fit
for trial. As Evans attempted to argue his “severe psychological problems,” the trial court upheld
the State’s objection.
¶ 16 The trial court found three factors in aggravation: (i) Evans’s actions caused and threatened
serious bodily harm, (ii) Evans had a history of delinquency, and (iii) a sentence was necessary to
deter others. The court added that the attempt first degree murder was ruthless and heinous.
¶ 17 The trial court held that no statutory mitigating factors applied:
“I do not know whether this defendant has any rehabilitative potential. He is a young
person. His actions in this case in my opinion epitomize the results of what is occurring in
our society due to the breakdown of the family. However, that does not excuse nor justify
these actions.”
¶ 18 The court imposed a total of 90 years, consisting of 60 years for the attempt first degree
murder and 30 years for the aggravated criminal sexual assault.
¶ 19 Direct Appeal
¶ 20 On appeal, Evans contended that his 90-year aggregate sentence was excessive. This court
affirmed the sentence, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion. People v. Evans, No. 1-
96-3368 (1997) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 21 Collateral Proceedings
¶ 22 In 2001, Evans filed a postconviction petition, alleging that his sentence was
unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The trial court dismissed it,
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and this court affirmed. People v. Evans, 1-01-1806 (2002) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 23 In 2009, he sought relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)), raising issues unrelated to his sentence. The trial
court again dismissed, and this court affirmed. People v. Evans, 1-09-2183 (2011) (unpublished
summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 24 Successive Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 25 In 2014, Evans filed a successive postconviction petition, arguing that his aggregate 90-
year sentence violated the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) because the sentence was
tantamount to a term of life without parole for crimes committed as a juvenile. He alleged that
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), applied retroactively to cases on collateral review
and he had shown cause and prejudice.
¶ 26 The court denied leave to file, and initially, this court affirmed. People v. Evans, 2017 IL
App (1st) 143562. But the supreme court intervened. See People v. Evans, No. 122701 (Ill. Nov.
24, 2021) (supervisory order). Ultimately, we granted a summary motion in Evans’s favor, vacated
his sentences, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 27 2024 Resentencing
¶ 28 At the 2024 resentencing, the State argued that “eligibility for parole removes his new
sentence from the penumbra of Miller, Buffer, etc.” See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42. The State
cited the infractions Evans committed while in the Department of Corrections, his past contacts
with the legal system, and the circumstances of the offense to argue that Evans should receive the
same sentence. The State did not cite or discuss the statutory mitigating factors under section 5-
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4.5-105(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024)).
¶ 29 Evans’s memo cited the 12 statutory mitigating factors under section 5-4.5-105 of the Code
(id.), noting, in part, Evans’s involvement in the child welfare system, past mental health
evaluations, and expressions of remorse. It also noted that he had served 30 years in prison so far.
¶ 30 Evans appended a 2023 mitigation report detailing a traumatic upbringing, including his
parents’ alcohol consumption, which may have caused fetal alcohol syndrome, and neglect, which
resulted in Evans living with family members and in residential and group homes. The report
included portions of medical records that indicated depression between 1986 and 1991 and a
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 2018. The report included letters from
Evans’s family, a warden at Menard Correctional Center, a program manager at Precious Blood
Ministry of Reconciliation, and his GED certificate. And it quotes Evans saying he “take[s] full
responsibility for [his] actions,” and “I know what I did was wrong and I can’t say it enough
[KRW] I am sorry.”
¶ 31 At the resentencing hearing, the State called KRW, who, at age 50, discussed her ongoing
struggles with trust, anger, self-esteem, and depression. She denied that she pursued Evans on the
night of the offense, as Evans had suggested in the 2022 presentence investigation. She wished for
Evans to spend the rest of his life in prison.
¶ 32 The State also presented exhibits, including a document showing that Evans was arrested
four times as a juvenile for theft, possession of a controlled substance, criminal sexual abuse, and
armed robbery of a jacket with a BB gun. In addition, Evans had a conviction for possession of a
weapon in Cook County jail while awaiting trial. Finally, the State presented a Department of
Corrections record showing 36 tickets, with the last one in 2006.
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¶ 33 Evans called mitigation specialist Dr. Lillian Huang Cummins. She testified consistently
with her report that Evans’s abusive and neglectful upbringing spanned his time at home, under
parental care, and in other homes; that his mother abused alcohol; and the possibility of fetal
alcohol syndrome, though it was never diagnosed. Evans’s mother relinquished her parental rights
over Evans and his siblings when Evans was nine, after years of beatings and psychological torture.
And he experienced physical and sexual abuse at the group homes. Besides a borderline intellectual
disability, Evans had been depressed, suicidal, and suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.
¶ 34 Dr. Cummins concluded that Evans lacked maturity and impulse control when he
committed this offense at age 17. Likewise, while he was given a series of tickets during his first
decade in prison, his brain was still developing. She testified that his disadvantaged childhood and
fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, along with his youth, affected his decision-making on the night of
the offense. She spoke of the positive changes Evans had made, including earning his GED, taking
college classes, seeking therapy, working, and earning a place in a medium-security facility.
¶ 35 Evans presented the testimony of Fred Weatherspoon, who said that Precious Blood
Ministry of Reconciliation could help him with housing, employment, and provide other programs
and services to assist with reentry into society. Weatherspoon met Evans in prison.
¶ 36 Before imposing the sentence, the sentencing court announced it reviewed the “extensive
trial transcripts as well as the evidence in this case.” It considered the presentence investigation,
“the extensive mitigation report,” the testimony of witnesses, and the arguments of counsel.
Finally, the sentencing court stressed it considered “all statutory and non-statutory factors in
aggravation and mitigation, whether specifically mentioned or not.”
¶ 37 As for the statutory factors in aggravation, the sentencing court found (i) Evans’s conduct
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caused serious harm, (ii) he had a history of prior delinquency, and (iii) the sentence would be
necessary to deter others from committing the same offense.
¶ 38 In mitigation, the sentencing court considered Evans’s age and unstable family, which was
“outlined extensively in the mitigation report.” The sentencing court asserted that Evans’s
eligibility for parole “removes” his new sentence from “the penumbra” of Miller, Buffer, and other
cases.
¶ 39 The sentencing court then considered mitigation under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)), using an earlier version that had nine rather than 12 factors
and was consistent with the State’s argument.
¶ 40 As to age and impetuosity, the sentencing court noted that Evans was 17 years old and
known to KRW and her family. It stressed how Evans used the excuse of an emergency to gain
entry, sexually assault her, and “ignited her on fire to eliminate her as a witness.” The sentencing
court noted, “as argued by the State, [Evans] was never diagnosed with any kind of psychiatric or
neurological disorder.”
¶ 41 Moving on to outside pressure, this factor was “absent” because Evans “acted alone” and
was “the sole perpetrator.” The sentencing court stressed, “There was no familial pressure or any
type of negative influence.”
¶ 42 The third factor concerned Evans’s family, home, educational, and social background. The
sentencing court said that Evans’s “home environment was an environment that no child should
ever be subjected to.” But “services***were available” to him, including KRW’s family, who
provided him with support, guidance, and a home.
¶ 43 For potential for rehabilitation, Evans had successfully attended programs and “has not
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been [idle] during his incarceration,” but the sentencing court pointed out the disciplinary tickets.
¶ 44 The sentencing court explained that it had already discussed the circumstances of the
offense at the start of the hearing. Next, it found the degree of participation not mitigating because
Evans had acted alone and the attack was premeditated. Concerning whether Evans could
meaningfully participate in his defense and had prior contact with the criminal justice system, the
judge observed that Evans had counsel at trial and had prior contact with the criminal justice
system, though no prior adjudications.
¶ 45 For the ninth factor, expression of remorse, the sentencing court said Evans “chose not to
make a statement, and it’s his right not to,” and acknowledged that he “indicated he was sorry” in
the 2023 mitigation report. But in the 2022 presentence investigation, Evans blamed KRW for
pursuing him and supposedly not letting him leave before the attack and, thus, Evans “has
expressed no, in this [c]ourt’s opinion, real remorse at all in this case.”
¶ 46 The sentencing court concurred with the findings of the original trial judge: (i) “that the
sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same type of offense; (ii) “that [Evans’]
actions were exceptionally brutal and heinous; (iii) “that he, in fact, caused severe bodily injury,”
and (iv) “that the sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual assault must be served consecutively
to the attempt first degree murder.”
¶ 47 Evans received a sentence of 90 years in prison. A motion to reconsider was denied.
¶ 48 ANALYSIS
¶ 49 Evans raises both constitutional and statutory challenges. We resolve this appeal on
statutory grounds alone. Because the sentencing court failed to comply with section 5-4.5-105(a)
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of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024)), resentencing is required. We, thus, do not
reach his claims under the Illinois and federal constitutions.
¶ 50 Plain Error
¶ 51 Evans seeks a review based, in part, on the plain-error doctrine, arguing the sentencing
court’s errors undermined the framework of the resentencing hearing. The State responds that no
error occurred because the sentencing court “implicitly” considered each mitigating factor. We
disagree.
¶ 52 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must object at trial and include the objection in a
posttrial motion. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 40 (2009). But we may address unpreserved errors
when (i) the evidence is closely balanced, or (ii) the alleged error affected the fairness of the trial
and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 602-03
(2008); see generally People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 180 n.1 (2005) (“The plain-error test ***
is more aptly described as a standard to help a reviewing court determine when to excuse
forfeiture.”).
¶ 53 Plain error review begins by asking whether an error occurred. People v. Johnson, 2024 IL
130191, ¶ 44. If an error is identified, we then must determine if Evans’s assertion meets the second
prong of the plain-error doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 49-50. The burden rests with Evans. Id. ¶ 43. We review
this ultimate issue de novo. Id. ¶ 51.
¶ 54 Section 5-4.5-105
¶ 55 We remanded this case for resentencing consistent with Graham, 560 U.S. 48, Buffer, 2019
IL 122327, and the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)). These cases acknowledge that
juveniles like Evans possess transient qualities that mitigate their crimes. Furthermore, the statute
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specifies qualities that a court must consider before imposing a sentence. See generally Buffer,
2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36 (observing, Illinois legislature enacted section 5-4.5-105, which contains list
of mitigating factors “taken from and *** consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile
defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”).
¶ 56 This appeal does not ask us to reweigh mitigating and aggravating evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the sentencing court. Evans asks whether the sentencing court (i) complied
with the statute and (ii) made the record mandated by section 5-4.5-105(b). Where the record
affirmatively shows the court proceeded under an incomplete statutory framework, the error is
legal, not discretionary, and is reviewed de novo. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 51.
¶ 57 Although the parties took disparate positions before the sentencing court, they now agree
that the statute in effect at resentencing contained 12 mitigating factors. See People v. Clark, 2024
IL 127838, ¶ 73 (holding version of section 5-4.5-105(a) in effect at sentencing applied, even
though offense occurred before effective date). Under section 5-4.5-105(a), in sentencing, the court
must consider:
“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense,
including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of
cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure,
familial pressure, or negative influences;
(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background,
including any history of parental neglect, domestic or sexual violence, sexual exploitation,
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physical abuse, or other childhood trauma including adverse childhood experiences (or
ACEs);
(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;
(5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including
the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;
(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history;
(9) the person’s involvement in the child welfare system;
(10) involvement of the person in the community;
(11) if a comprehensive mental health evaluation of the person was conducted by a
qualified mental health professional, the outcome of the evaluation; and
(12) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an
expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses
not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as
an aggravating factor.” (Emphases added.)730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024) (italicized
portions became effective January 1, 2024).
The version in effect before Evans’s resentencing in 2024, listed the nine non-italicized factors.
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022).
¶ 58 The version of section 5-4.5-105(a) in effect at Evan’s resentencing governed, and nothing
in the nine-factor version conflicted with the additional factors (in effect on January 1, 2024).
Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and harmonized if possible. See 5
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ILCS 70/6 (2024) (courts must construe together statutes on same subject matter unless statutes
create irreconcilable conflict); see also People v. Ullrich, 135 Ill. 2d 477, 483 (1990) (“If the two
enactments are capable of being construed so that both may stand, the court should so construe
them.”). Accordingly, the sentencing court was required to consider—and specify on the record—
its consideration of all 12 factors.
¶ 59 Omitted Factors
¶ 60 The parties agree that the sentencing court adopted the State’s argument and referenced 9
of the 12 factors. As the State notes, the court was “presumably looking at only the nine-factor
version, as [it] specifically referred to and individually addressed ‘the nine youth factors[.]’ ”
Ordinarily, this affirmative showing would suffice to establish error. See People v. Hibbler, 2019
IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 65 (reviewing de novo whether defendant affirmatively showed court
failed to comply with sentencing statute).
¶ 61 The State contends, however, that the sentencing court “implicitly” considered the missing
factors. See, e.g., Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶ 76 (holding, record as whole showed court considered
pertinent mitigation). For example, regarding missing factor nine, the State asserts: “Implicit in
considering defendant’s family and home environment, specifically ‘history of parental neglect’
*** is a consideration of defendant’s involvement in the child welfare system.” The argument fails
for three reasons.
¶ 62 First, as Evans explains, the State conflates distinct statutory factors. Generally, “[e]ach
word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should
not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. As written, factor three
concerns a person’s upbringing, while factor nine concerns the environment outside of that context.
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730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(3), (9) (West 2024). Therefore, we decline to collapse factor nine into
factor three by conflating the phrases “history of parental neglect” and “child welfare system.”
¶ 63 Second, the sentencing court did not comply with section 5-4.5-105(b)’s record-
specification requirement, which the State concedes, but only for the missing factors. See id. § 5-
4.5-105(b) (“The trial judge shall specify on the record its consideration of the factors under
subsection (a) of this Section.”). Even accepting the State’s contention that the parties presented
evidence relating to the missing factors, including elements of factor three and factors ten and
eleven, the record shows the court failed to “specify on the record” its consideration of those
missing factors. Id. So contrary to the State’s contention, collapsing factors does not satisfy that
statutory obligation, which the court appeared to appreciate by specifically referring to each factor
by number.
¶ 64 Third, the record reflects that Evans’s sentencing memo cited and discussed his
involvement in the child welfare system as mitigation under factor nine of the 2024 version of the
statute. Yet the sentencing court omitted mentioning this contention in its analysis of the “youth
factors.” We will not infer implicitly what the sentencing court expressly declined to do. People v.
Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 420 (1996) (“We ordinarily presume that the trial judge knows and
follows the law unless the record indicates otherwise.”).
¶ 65 Accordingly, we take the sentencing judge at its word when assessing whether it omitted
several mitigating factors from its sentencing decision. See id. In context, the court’s statement—
that it considered “the nine youth factors”—demonstrates clear or obvious error. Johnson, 2024 IL
130191, ¶¶ 44-48 (finding context demonstrated court committed clear or obvious error at
sentencing).
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¶ 66 Misapplied Factors
¶ 67 Evans contends that the sentencing court considered improper factors. He focuses on
factors one, three, four, nine, ten, and eleven, contending the court “rejected the statutory youth
mitigation framework.” We review this issue de novo. See Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897,
¶ 65 (noting whether court complied with sentencing statute presents question of law reviewed
de novo).
¶ 68 The statutory framework arises from the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Miller,
567 U.S. 460, which found unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that mandated life in prison
without the possibility of parole for those under the age of 18. Id. at 489. The Court emphasized
that the fact finder must have the opportunity to consider mitigating factors before imposing the
harshest penalty on a juvenile. Id. Those factors should reflect consideration of a juvenile’s youth
and its attendant characteristics. Id. at 483.
¶ 69 After Miller, the General Assembly enacted section 5-4.5-105(a) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105
(West 2016)), which contains a list of mitigating factors “taken from and *** consistent with
Miller[ ].” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36. For ease of analysis, we categorize the 12 factors in
section 5-4.5-105 into three categories: (i) decision-making capacity, (ii) circumstances of the
offense, and (iii) rehabilitative potential. The sentencing court’s errors impacted its analysis of (i)
decision-making capacity and (iii) rehabilitative potential.
¶ 70 Decision-Making Capacity
¶ 71 Impetuosity and Maturity
¶ 72 In addressing factor one—Evans’s age, impetuosity, and maturity (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
105(a)(1) (2024))—the sentencing court erred by equating planning with the lack of impetuosity
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and maturity. At resentencing, the court found Evans (i) was 17 years old, (ii) knew KRW and her
family, (iii) planned the attack, and (iv) was “never diagnosed with any kind of psychiatric or
neurological disorder.” These findings, however, did not address impetuosity and maturity as the
statute uses them. Although the court was free to accept or reject expert opinions, the absence of a
formal diagnosis did not relieve it of the statutory obligation to evaluate the evidence bearing on
Evans’s developmental maturity and decision-making capacity. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458,
493 (1989) (noting, “purpose of the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing is
to insure that the discretion of the sentencing authority is exercised in an informed manner, based
upon the evidence at hand and not on extraneous influences; on reason not caprice”).
¶ 73 “Impetuosity” and “maturity” in juvenile sentencing are grounded in “psychology and
brain science,” highlighting “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72. “Impetuosity” refers to the tendency among
juveniles to prioritize short-term rewards over longer-term risks, a behavior that typically resolves
with maturity. See id. Additionally, “maturity,” refers to developmental maturity, noting that
“adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order executive
functions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id at 472 n.5 (citing Brief for Amici Curiae
American Psychological Association et al. at 4).
¶ 74 The sentencing court’s reasoning, which the State echoes on appeal, concentrated on the
nature of the offense without considering the science of juvenile brain development as to Evans.
Although the court found the crime was premeditated and planned, on remand it should consider
Evans’s impetuosity and maturity as defined in Miller and codified under section 5-4.5-105(a).
Planning is expressly addressed under factor six, which concerns a defendant’s level of
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participation and planning before the offense. It cannot substitute for the separate statutory inquiry
under factor one into a juvenile’s impetuosity and developmental maturity.
¶ 75 Personal History
¶ 76 The sentencing court overlooked factors nine, eleven, and a part of factor three. 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-105(a)(3), (9), (11) (West 2024). Although it acknowledged in general terms that “no
child” should endure Evans’s upbringing, it did not specify on the record how the statutory
components of factor three—the child welfare system, prior mental health evaluations, and
violence and physical abuse—bore on his decision-making at the time of the offense.
¶ 77 The State maintains that the sentencing court “based [Evans’s] sentence, in large part, on
the seriousness of the offense.” Nevertheless, the State has not demonstrated that the sentencing
court “implicitly” considered how Evans’s many traumas hindered his brain development, making
him more susceptible to poor decision-making. The statute requires the sentencing court to make
a record demonstrating consideration of each statutory factor, and here the record shows omission
of factors nine through eleven. See id. § 5-4.5-105(b) (“The trial judge shall specify on the record
its consideration of the factors under subsection (a) of this Section.”). Again, the sentencing court
did not.
¶ 78 Rehabilitative Potential
¶ 79 The sentencing court also erred with regard to factor ten on communal involvement and
factor four on rehabilitation. See id. § (a)(4), (10). Properly understood, factors ten and four apply
to “Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of
change.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).
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¶ 80 But the sentencing court focused on Evans’s disciplinary infractions from his early years
in custody without explaining how it evaluated nearly two decades of progress and good behavior,
which included obtaining his GED, taking college courses, positive response to therapy, and
working his way from kitchen staff to lawn care. Consequently, the sentencing court failed to
conduct the analysis the statute demands.
¶ 81 Prong Two
¶ 82 Evans contends that errors affected the “framework” of the resentencing hearing, rendering
it an unreliable method for evaluating mitigating and aggravating evidence. See Johnson, 2024 IL
130191, ¶ 89. We agree.
¶ 83 Before weighing factors in aggravation and mitigation, the sentencing court stated that
Evans’s eligibility for parole “removes” his sentence from “the penumbra” of Miller and later
cases. See Penumbra, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (noting, in constitutional law,
Supreme Court has recognized that Bill of Rights has penumbras containing implied rights). The
State first advanced this framing in its resentencing memo, and the court did so at the resentencing
hearing.
¶ 84 By focusing on parole eligibility, the State misconstrued section 5-4.5-105(a)’s
codification of Miller. Indeed, by omitting any citation to or discussion of the statutory mitigating
factors under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024)) in its memo,
the State left the impression that only supreme court caselaw on Miller was pertinent at
resentencing.
¶ 85 Contrary to the State’s premise, the General Assembly’s understanding of Miller was
central to the court’s sentencing decision. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36 (observing, section 5-
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4.5-105(a) contains list of mitigating factors “taken from and *** consistent with Miller’s
discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”). Section 5-4.5-105(a)
reflects and codifies Miller’s insights on youth and its attendant circumstances without regard to
offense type or sentence length. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2024) (applying whenever
“person commits an offense and the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense”). In other words, the legislature understood the penumbra of Miller to sweep
broadly, extending beyond the refinements of subsequent caselaw.
¶ 86 Miller identified several core principles: (i) juveniles have transient qualities that mitigate
their crimes, (ii) these traits are not “crime-specific,” and (iii) the development of a juvenile must
be considered a “relevant mitigating factor of great weight.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 476. While
the supreme court has narrowed the circumstances in which these insights apply, the General
Assembly incorporated them comprehensively so they would inform section 5-4.5-105(a)’s many
factors in mitigation, again without regard to offense or sentence. See People v. Reyes, 2025 IL
App (2d) 210423-B, ¶ 41 (“That body decided, after due consideration and debate, to implement
the teachings of Miller by enacting section 5-4.5-105 of the Code, which lists potential mitigating
factors to be considered in addition to the general statutory mitigating and aggravating factors
when sentencing juvenile offenders.” (Emphasis omitted.)).
¶ 87 At the original sentencing hearing, the trial judge remarked, “I do not know whether this
defendant has any rehabilitative potential.” That uncertainty underscores the importance of the
statutory protections later enacted: sentencing juveniles without the protections of section 5-4.5-
105(a) leads to consequences that are “unmeasurable” and a proceeding that “cannot reliably serve
its function.” See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
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¶ 88 Decades later, we still lack meaningful findings about Evans’s rehabilitative potential or
decision-making capacity. Proceeding under the State’s framing, the sentencing court (i) did not
address a significant portion of the statutory factors, (ii) treated the planning of the offense as
indicative of a lack of impetuosity and maturity, (iii) emphasized the nature of the offense while
giving insufficient consideration to the implications of the science of juvenile brain development
for Evans, (iv) gave no weight to Evans’s horrific life experiences in its assessment of his decision-
making during the offense, and (v) failed to account for the chronology facts indicating a cessation
of disciplinary incidents over time and a positive response to treatment.
¶ 89 By misapprehending the relationship between Miller and section 5-4.5-105(a), the State
urged and the sentencing court adopted a sentencing framework that departed from the governing
law. The court did not simply consider an improper factor in aggravation. See Johnson, 2024 IL
130191, ¶¶ 86-87. The court failed to perform the essential task we assigned on remand.
¶ 90 And just as a reviewing court will not evaluate the sufficiency of a verdict reached after an
erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt (Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281), we will not affirm a 90-year
sentence imposed on a juvenile without consideration of the protections afforded by section 5-4.5-
105(a). We invoke Sullivan by analogy to underscore that when a court proceeds under an
incomplete legal framework, the resulting judgment cannot be deemed reliable. See generally
Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 90 (categorizing errors under prong two). The appropriate remedy is
to reverse and remand for a new resentencing hearing. See People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369
(1999) (“Where a trial court’s exercise of discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous rule of
law, appellate review is required to permit the exercise of discretion consistent with the law.”).
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¶ 91 To be sure, our decision neither reweighs factors nor imposes a sentence. See People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (2010) (reversing judgment of appellate court reducing sentencing
and reinstating sentence trial court imposed). Rather, we direct the sentencing court to exercise its
discretion within the bounds of the law when resentencing Evans. See Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369.
¶ 92 Because the sentencing court proceeded under a truncated framework, on remand, it must
conduct a new sentencing hearing under the full statutory scheme, weighing all 12 factors, and
imposing a sentence consistent with supreme court precedent, this decision, and the Code. See 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2024).
¶ 93 Issues Not Addressed
¶ 94 Evans raised several issues that we do not address. Because we resolve this appeal on
statutory grounds, we do not reach his constitutional argument. Our supreme court has repeatedly
admonished us that “cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible,”
with constitutional issues reached “only as a last resort.” In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006).
¶ 95 Regarding the statutory issue, we also do not address Evans’s alternative arguments for
excusing forfeiture. Because we agree with his contention about prong two, we will not evaluate
his argument on prong one. See Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 92 (suggesting errors “amenable to
harmless error analysis” might “not be reviewed under the second prong of the plain error rule”).
And because his counsel cited the new version of section 5-4.5-105 in his sentencing memo, we
will not explore whether counsel “acted unreasonably by not arguing the statutes *** [the earlier
one and the current one] *** should be read together.”
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¶ 96 Reassignment
¶ 97 Lastly, Evans requests that a different judge preside over his resentencing “because the
sentencing judge exposed its unwillingness to consider the statutory mitigating sentencing
factors.” In support, he cites People v. Serrano, 2016 IL App (1st) 133493, ¶ 45, and Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). We decline.
¶ 98 Our supreme court overruled Serrano “to the extent [that opinion] found that an appellate
court may sua sponte order reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand for reasons other
than bias, the probability of bias, or prejudice on the part of the trial judge in a postconviction
proceeding.” People v. Class, 2025 IL 129695, ¶ 52. Also, the supreme court has allowed leave to
appeal in People v. Morris, where an appellate court assigned resentencing to a different judge,
finding that the original judge had “predetermined” the sentencing decision. People v. Morris,
2023 IL App (1st) 220035, ¶¶ 61-64, appeal allowed, No. 129992, (Ill. Nov. 26, 2025).
¶ 99 Generally, “judicial rulings almost never constitute a valid basis for a claim of judicial
partiality or bias.” Class, 2025 IL 129695, ¶ 51. But the general rule gives way when the potential
for bias arises, like where the record “indicat[es] that the circuit court will fail to correct its legal
error or fail to apply the [proper] standard on remand.” Id.
¶ 100 Our mandate ordered resentencing in accordance with Graham, 560 U.S. 48, Buffer, 2019
IL 122327, and the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)). Nothing in the record suggests bias
on the part of the judge. See Class, 2025 IL 129695, ¶ 51 (high degree of favoritism or antagonism
supports finding bias). Rather, the errors arose from the State’s briefing and argument, defense
counsel’s failure to object, and the existence of two versions of the statute at the time of
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¶ 101 Disposition
¶ 102 We do not direct the sentencing court to impose a specific sentence; that decision, exercised
within the statutory framework, remains within its discretion.
¶ 103 Reversed and remanded with directions.
¶ 104 JUSTICE GAMRATH, specially concurring:
¶ 105 I concur with the decision to remand for resentencing so that the sentencing court may
specify on the record its consideration of factors nine, ten, and eleven under the current version of
section 5-4.5-105(a) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024)). See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West
2024) (sentencing court shall specify on the record its consideration of section 5-4.5-105(a)
factors). However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s view that the court erred in its
application of factors one, three, and four.
¶ 106 In addressing factor one, impetuosity and maturity, the sentencing court considered
Evans’s age, the fact he acted alone without outside pressure, and that he preplanned the horrific
crime. The court carefully reviewed Dr. Cummins’s opinion about Evans’s susceptibility to poor
decisions, impulsivity, and rash behaviors, but concluded the exceptionally heinous crime was not
impetuous. It was premeditated, planned, and unprovoked. Evans lied to gain entrance to the
victim’s apartment, slyly followed her to the bedroom and raped her in front of her young child,
cut the phone cord so she could not make a call, and tried to kill her in a shockingly brutal manner
to silence her so she could not be a witness against him. These facts go to the core of factor one,
directly relating to Evans’s impetuosity and maturity, as outlined in Miller.
¶ 107 As for factors three and four, relating to Evans’s childhood background and rehabilitation,
I do not think the sentencing court overlooked any evidence. Although the court must specify on
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the record its consideration of the sentencing factors (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2024)), it
need not explain every piece of mitigating evidence it weighed. We presume the court considered
it all. See People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 69 (when mitigating evidence is presented,
we presume the court considered it absent some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence
itself); People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19 (same).
¶ 108 Additionally, the sentencing court said it did consider everything: “the presentence
investigation report; the extensive mitigation report that was submitted on behalf of Mr. Evans;
and the testimony of both Mr. Weatherspoon and Dr. Cummins as well; the arguments of counsel;
all statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether specifically
mentioned or not; the history and character of the defendant and having due regard for the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship.”
The court acknowledged Evans’s young age, horrible upbringing, instability, and trauma. It
recognized Evans’s progress in prison, noting his successful completion of several programs
following a history of numerous major disciplinary infractions in his first decade in prison. The
court listened to the defense counsel, thoroughly read Dr. Cummins’s report multiple times, and
considered her testimony regarding Evans’s experience of abuse and neglect, his mother’s
struggles with alcoholism and mistreatment, as well as his childhood depression and PTSD. After
taking everything into account, the court exercised its discretion to impose a sentence that reflected
the particular facts and circumstances and the seriousness of Evans’s offense. But for the omission
of an explicit reference to factors nine, ten, and eleven, I would find no fault with the court’s
sentencing framework.
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People v. Evans, 2026 IL App (1st) 241368
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 94-CR- 10738; the Hon. Peggy Chiampas, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Ann B. McLennan, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Erin K. Slattery, and Amy McGowan, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
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