People v. Estrada

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-0821
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 240821-U No. 1-24-0821 Order filed May 22, 2026 Sixth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 13 CR 00382 ) ROBERTO ESTRADA, ) The Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.

¶2 Postconviction counsel must make necessary amendments to a petitioner’s claims. But

counsel need not formulate new claims. And when counsel files a Rule 651(c) certificate, we

presume counsel did what the rule requires unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise.

¶3 Roberto Estrada contends that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

when litigating two claims: one about an exculpatory video, the other involving a DNA expert.

Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that counsel provided reasonable assistance regarding No. 1-24-0821

the video claim. Nor did counsel have a duty to formulate a new, more specific claim regarding a

DNA expert. We affirm.

¶4 Background

¶5 Roberto Estrada petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in multiple ways. The circuit court summarily dismissed the pro se petition,

but this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

¶6 On remand, appointed counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and, later, responded to the

State’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the State’s motion on all but one claim. After

an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the remaining claim.

¶7 Estrada appeals, contending appointed counsel provided unreasonable assistance when

litigating two claims dismissed at the second stage: (i) trial counsel failed to introduce an

exculpatory video, and (ii) trial counsel failed to consult with and call a DNA expert.

¶8 Discovery

¶9 The State’s discovery included, among other things, a DVD. Trial counsel acknowledged

receiving that video exhibit at a pretrial hearing. The disc appears on the State’s long-form answer

as Inventory no. 12767311 and on the list of exhibits impounded after trial, though no party used

it at trial. The disc is not part of this appellate record, so we do not know what is on it.

¶ 10 Jury Trial

¶ 11 M.P. testified she was sexually assaulted while waiting for a bus. She never saw her

assailant’s face because he grabbed her from behind and threw her to the ground. She testified that

she fought back and bit his hand as he covered her mouth to stop her from screaming. He fled

when a passerby approached.

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¶ 12 A neighbor saw what was happening, dialed 911, and went outside to help. As he

approached M.P., he saw a man wearing a dark hoodie run away and climb over a chain-link fence

into the next yard. The police arrived soon after. The neighbor showed the officers the area where

the assailant fled. Officers then discovered two IDs and a cellphone lying in the grass near the

fence.

¶ 13 Chicago Police officer Nelson Crespo and his partner arrived to find two men and M.P.,

who was sitting on a bench. Crespo spoke with the neighbor and searched the area. He recovered

a cellphone, a military ID, and an Illinois driver’s license from the grass near the fence. Both IDs

bore Estrada’s name. Sergeant Lessner, who did not testify, arrived after the recovery of the IDs

and cellphone.

¶ 14 Chicago police detective Mark Regal and his partner went to the scene, in part to “locate

any *** video surveillance camera in the area.” Using information from the IDs, they contacted

Estrada’s sister the following morning. Estrada was not there, so they left their contact information.

¶ 15 That afternoon, Estrada came to police headquarters and spoke to Regal and his partner.

Regal advised Estrada of his Miranda rights before interviewing him.

¶ 16 Estrada said that, after leaving a bar, a police sergeant stopped his car. The sergeant drove

Estrada to a different location and released him. Regal stated that Estrada said he then became

involved in two incidents, but “he couldn’t tell me which one happened first.”

¶ 17 One incident involved a fight with four Latino men, but he was not robbed because “he had

his cell phone, his wallet, and his [IDs] after that incident.” The other incident occurred when he

grabbed “an unknown girl,” pushed her to the ground, and ran away. He then hailed a cab and

found his car.

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¶ 18 Regal asked about specific acts that were committed against M.P. Estrada said he could

not remember them, but he could not deny them because he could not remember. Estrada

acknowledged that the IDs and cellphone recovered by police belonged to him and said he did not

realize they were missing.

¶ 19 Estrada voluntarily provided a DNA sample. The State introduced photographs showing

scratches on Estrada’s face, knee, elbow, and hands.

¶ 20 DNA evidence recovered from a bite injury on M.P.’s hand revealed a mixture of DNA

profiles. The major profile matched M.P., and the results could not exclude Estrada as a contributor

to the minor profile. And “approximately 1 in 160 million black, 1 in 7.3 million white, or 1 in 18

million Hispanic unrelated individuals [could not] be excluded from having contributed to the

minor male DNA profile.”

¶ 21 After the defense called three witnesses to attest to Estrada’s good character, Estrada

testified. He said that after drinking with friends for several hours, he left a bar on the north side

around midnight intoxicated. He decided to drive home, but before reaching the expressway,

Chicago police sergeant Stephen Lessner stopped him. Estrada gave Lessner his driver’s license

and insurance card and admitted he had been drinking. He also gave Lessner his military ID.

Lessner ordered him out of the car and patted him down, taking his cellphone and wallet. Lessner

then drove Estrada to an unfamiliar neighborhood and lectured him about drinking and driving

before telling him to get out.

¶ 22 Estrada began walking but soon got into a fight with four men he encountered on the street.

They beat him but eventually “lost interest” and ran away. Estrada hailed a cab and located his car.

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He drove to his friend’s house, and after no one answered the door, he slept in his car for a while

before going to his sister’s house.

¶ 23 Estrada’s sister gave him Detective Regal’s business card. Estrada called Regal and went

to the police station. Regal showed him a photograph of a woman who had been attacked the night

before and told him that his military ID, driver’s license, and cellphone were found at the scene.

Estrada denied attacking the woman or telling Regal that he had pushed a woman to the ground.

¶ 24 In rebuttal, Chicago Police detective Edward Heerdt testified that he and Detective Regal

interviewed Estrada, who told them he had acted aggressively and pushed a woman to the ground

the night before. Estrada said he did not know whether he had sexually penetrated the woman

because he could not remember, but he could not deny doing so.

¶ 25 The jury convicted Estrada of four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. At

sentencing, the trial court merged count one with count three and count two with count four, and

sentenced Estrada to two consecutive terms of eight years in prison.

¶ 26 Direct Appeal

¶ 27 On direct appeal, Estrada contended the trial court erred at sentencing. This court affirmed.

People v. Estrada, 2016 IL App (1st) 141674-U.

¶ 28 Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 29 i. Original Proceedings

¶ 30 Estrada petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance. We focus on three claims.

¶ 31 First, Estrada alleged that trial counsel failed to advise him of his sentencing exposure

before he rejected a plea offer.

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¶ 32 Second, Estrada alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce an

exculpatory video disclosed in discovery. (“There is a video in the Discovery that was not shown

to Defendant nor at trial.”) He attached the page from the report of proceedings showing that trial

counsel acknowledged receipt of the video exhibit. Estrada asserted that his mother had viewed

the video, and it showed no one at the bus stop during the assault. (“[Defendant’s mother] states

video does not show Defendant. Also, no crime is shown on the video.”) He did not attach an

affidavit from his mother, explaining that he could not obtain one because he was incarcerated.

¶ 33 Third, Estrada alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult or call an

expert witness on DNA evidence because the jury, “hearing only [the] State’s [expert] witness,

may have weighed inconclusive DNA against” him.

¶ 34 The circuit court dismissed Estrada’s petition at the first stage, and Estrada appealed. This

court reversed the dismissal, finding the claim about plea bargaining stated the gist of a

constitutional violation. People v. Estrada, 2021 IL App (1st) 170657-U. We remanded for second-

stage proceedings, including the appointment of counsel. Id.

¶ 35 ii. Remand

¶ 36 On remand, appointed counsel adopted all claims in Estrada’s pro se petition and filed a

651(c) certificate. Counsel averred:

“1. I have consulted with the petitioner, Roberto Estrada by mail to ascertain his or her

contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights.

2. I have examined the record of proceedings at the trial, including the common law record,

report of proceedings and any exhibits in possession of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

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3. I have made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an

adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions. I am adopting all of the Petitioners pro

se motions.”

¶ 37 The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing in part that each claim lacked supporting

documentation. As to the video claim, the State argued Estrada “fail[ed] to attach evidence,

affidavits, or records that are necessary to support the claim[] or explain their absence.” The State

maintained that Estrada’s “status as a prisoner” did not excuse his failure to support the claim.

Likewise, regarding the DNA expert, the State argued Estrada failed to attach an affidavit from a

proposed expert or explain the significance of the potential testimony.

¶ 38 Postconviction counsel responded, again adopting Estrada’s claims. Concerning the video,

counsel reiterated that: (i) Estrada “is relying on his mom’s observation of the video,” (ii) there “is

no attached video or affidavit from the mother,” and (iii) Estrada could not “get an affidavit

because he is in prison.” As for the DNA expert, counsel reiterated that trial counsel was ineffective

for “not call[ing] an expert witness to challenge the evidence the state introduced and [relying]

solely on cross-examination[.]”

¶ 39 At the hearing on the motion, the circuit court questioned postconviction counsel about the

plea-negotiation claim. Counsel acknowledged that he had not attached an affidavit from Estrada.

The parties agreed to a continuance for counsel to try to obtain an affidavit from trial counsel.

¶ 40 At the next court date, postconviction counsel stated that he had done everything he could

to contact trial counsel but could not obtain an affidavit. The circuit court dismissed nearly all

claims, agreeing with the motion to dismiss. The court advanced only the guilty plea claim to an

evidentiary hearing.

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¶ 41 At the evidentiary hearing, Estrada testified that trial counsel told him about a 10-year plea

offer, but he rejected it because he did not commit the offense. In contrast, both trial counsel and

the trial prosecutor testified that the State never extended a plea offer. The circuit court denied this

final claim, finding, in part, that no plea offer had been made.

¶ 42 Analysis

¶ 43 Estrada contends that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by

(i) failing to support the petition with the exculpatory video or an affidavit describing its content

and (ii) failing to attach an affidavit from a DNA expert.

¶ 44 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) provides

criminal defendants an opportunity to collaterally challenge their conviction, sentence, or both,

based on a substantial violation of their federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Edwards,

2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. Although no constitutional right exists to counsel during postconviction

proceedings, the Act and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules together guarantee counsel provides

“reasonable assistance.” People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 361 (1990). To ensure reasonable

assistance, postconviction counsel must: (i) consult the defendant to ascertain their claims,

(ii) examine the trial record, and (iii) make any amendments necessary to adequately present the

defendant’s contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 45 Counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate attesting that he consulted with Estrada by mail “to

ascertain his [] contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights.” Counsel also “examined the

record of proceedings at the trial, including the common law record, report of proceedings, and

any exhibits in possession of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.” After considering whether

amendments were necessary, counsel adopted all of Estrada’s claims. Although filing a Rule

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651(c) certificate alone does not establish compliance, it creates a rebuttable presumption that

counsel provided reasonable assistance, absent an affirmative showing otherwise in the record.

People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶ 33.

¶ 46 Estrada bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by demonstrating that counsel

failed to substantially comply with the rule. People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. We review

de novo counsel’s compliance with Rule 651(c). People v. Frey, 2024 IL 128644, ¶ 21.

¶ 47 Exculpatory Video

¶ 48 Estrada contends postconviction counsel “did not indicate[] in his filings or on the record[]

that he made any attempt to obtain the [exculpatory] video.” Further, counsel “fail[ed] to amend

the pro se petition to include the referenced video, an affidavit from Estrada’s mother, or even an

affidavit from Estrada himself.” We disagree.

¶ 49 The record establishes that the video was part of the trial record. As Estrada alleged in his

pro se petition, “There is a video in the Discovery that was not shown to Defendant nor at trial.”

He attached the page in the report of proceedings where trial counsel acknowledged receipt of the

video exhibit. Indeed, the State’s long-form answer in discovery referenced a DVD, which the

State tendered to trial counsel under Inventory no. 12767311. And while it was not played at trial,

the DVD appears on the list of impounding exhibits in the circuit clerk’s possession.

¶ 50 Reviewing the video satisfied postconviction counsel’s duties and obligations under Rule

651(c). The rule exists “to ensure that counsel shapes the petitioner’s claims into proper legal form

and presents those claims to the court.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 43-

44 (2007). To that end, postconviction counsel averred that he “examined *** any exhibits in

possession of the Clerk of the Circuit Court,” which included the DVD.

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¶ 51 Contrary to Estrada’s argument, affidavits from Estrada or his mother would matter only

if the video were exculpatory. To conclude otherwise, we would have to presume either that (i) the

video was exculpatory or (ii) postconviction counsel found the video to be exculpatory. The law

and the record permit neither conclusion.

¶ 52 We cannot speculate about the DVD’s content because Estrada failed to include the

impounded exhibit in the record on appeal. As we often observe, “an appellant has the burden to

present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error.”

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984). Without the video in the record, there is no factual

basis for an affidavit from Estrada or his mother. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 (“Any doubts which

may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”).

¶ 53 Nor may we speculate that postconviction counsel viewed the video and found it

exculpatory. Counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate creates a rebuttable presumption of reasonable

assistance, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary in the record. Schlosser, 2012 IL App

(1st) 092523, ¶ 33. Because the record contains nothing about the video’s content, we presume

counsel reasonably concluded that it did not exculpate Estrada. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21

(noting, petitioner bears burden to overcome presumption of reasonable assistance).

¶ 54 Accordingly, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption, arising from the Rule 651(c)

certificate, that no amendment was necessary to support this claim.

¶ 55 DNA Expert

¶ 56 Estrada next contends postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing

to “identify a possible defense expert, attach an affidavit from an expert, or explain the significance

of an expert’s potential testimony.” Again, we disagree.

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¶ 57 A petitioner is entitled to reasonable assistance. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 163 (1993)

(holding petitioners under Act are “not entitled to the advocacy of counsel for purposes of

exploration, investigation[,] and formulation of potential claims”). Although counsel may refine

or supplement existing claims, “reasonable assistance” requires that counsel amend a pro se

petition when necessary to present the petitioner’s allegations. People v. Rials, 345 Ill. App. 3d

636, 641 (1st Dist. 2003).

¶ 58 Estrada alleged in his pro se petition, “[T]rial counsel failed to retain or consult with an

expert *** to either rebuke or simplify the [testimony of] the State’s DNA expert.” As Estrada

acknowledges on appeal, the petition did not identify “a particular expert witness who could have

testified on his behalf. It did not explain the significance of their potential testimony, how it would

have benefitted Estrada’s defense, or even how it would have undermined the State’s expert’s

testimony.”

¶ 59 The State responds that Estrada bore the initial “obligation to inform counsel with

specificity of the identity of witnesses who should have been called in his defense.”

People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 61 (1999) (quoting People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 247-48

(1993)). Estrada “also [had] an obligation to inform counsel generally of the information which

such witnesses might have offered at trial.” Id.

¶ 60 The parties agree the pro se claim lacked that information. They disagree on whether

postconviction counsel had a duty to formulate some new, more specific claim involving a DNA

expert.

¶ 61 Settled caselaw holds that counsel had no duty to formulate a new, more specific claim.

Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 163. Absent a showing in the record that Estrada provided specific factual

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allegations, we presume counsel fulfilled the duties under Rule 651(c), consistent with the

certificate. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21 (noting, petitioner bears burden to overcome

presumption of reasonable assistance). As pleaded, Estrada’s claim was so generalized that no

amendment was necessary. That counsel litigated and lost a weak claim does not establish that

Estrada received unreasonable assistance. See Williams, 186 Ill. 2d at 61-62 (holding,

postconviction counsel “clearly had no obligation to seek out a blood-type expert”).

¶ 62 Affirmed.

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