IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 -I 3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) /'"'"-, r ~,~~ ,r· ~ r~,
) CRIMINAL CASE N61:CF0121-12' 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER JAMES STEVEN ESPINOSA, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7
8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 dismiss, filed November 23, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on February 11, 2013. Assistant 11 Attorney General James C. Collins, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered the 13 parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 On February 10, 2012, the Superior Court dismissed criminal charges against Defendant 17 because he was not arraigned within sixty (60) days of the filing of the complaint pursuant to 18 People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 14. People v. Espinosa, CF0702-10, Decision and Order (Super. 19 Ct. Guam Feb. 10, 2012). The charges were dismissed without prejudice because the Court 20 found no misconduct, bad faith or prejudice suffered by Defendant from the arraignment delay. 21 Id. at 4-6. 22 On February 22, 2012, the Government filed the present indictment to reprosecute the 23 charges that were dismissed without prejudice. On November 23, 2012, Defendant moved to 24 dismiss this case on the grounds that the first case should have been dismissed with prejudice. 25 Defendant argues that the Court has jurisdiction to review the prior dismissal and that a prompt 26 arraignment violation should be automatically dismissed with prejudice. The Government 27 argues that Defendant cannot challenge the characterization of dismissal after the remedy was 28 denied by the trial court and Defendant failed to appeal the issue.
Page 1 of 4 DISCUSSION
2 1. Jurisdiction 3 Under Guam law, the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear causes 4 exclusively vested in the Supreme Court, including the review of final orders of the Superior 5 Court in criminal cases. See 7 GCA §§ 3105 and 3107. When a criminal defendant is not 6 promptly arraigned within 60 days pursuant to Rasauo, 2011 Guam 14, "[t]he issue of whether 7 or not the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice should be decided in the first 8 instance by the trial court." !d. at~ 16. A trial court's decision on the merits of a prompt 9 arraignment should only be reexamined or amended pursuant to the appellate and supervisory 10 jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court. See generally 7 GCA § 3107; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 11 Cranch) 137, 175,2 L.Ed 60 (1803) ("It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it 12 revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that
13 cause."). 14 In this case, there is no allegation or evidence of a prompt arraignment violation. 15 Defendant moves to dismiss this case merely on the basis ofhow a different judge characterized 16 the dismissal in a wholly separate case. Defendant would have this Court dismiss the present 17 case solely in order to upset the ruling of a different judge in a separate case not before this 18 Court, yet the Court knows of no authority that would allow it to do so. Defendant argues that 19 this Court has jurisdiction to review the merits of a prior characterization of dismissal because 20 he did not have standing to appeal the issue until the charges were re-filed in this case. (Motion 21 to Dismiss, 1, Nov. 19, 2012 (citing People v. Tingzon, CRA 12-012, Order (Sup. Ct. Guam 22 Jun. 22, 2012).) Even if Defendant now has standing to appeal the prior dismissal, this Court is 23 devoid of authority to review the separate trial record and to amend the final order of a separate 24 trial court. Defendant certainly does not cite any authority by which this Court may review the
25 previous court's order. 1 Thus Defendant's motion shall not be granted. 26
27 1 Defendant cites People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam 19 n. 14, which allows a trial court to dismiss a re-file 28 indictment after in finds that the prosecutor moved to dismiss under 8 GCA § 80.70(a) in bad faith. This authorit
Page 2 of4 11
2. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice 2 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court may dismiss this case because it disagrees with 3 the prior characterization of dismissal, the Court shall not do so here. Defendant argues that any 4 prompt arraignment violation under 8 GCA § 60.10 must be remedied by an automatic 5 dismissal with prejudice. The Court does not agree. 6 Cases that evaluate delay in the statutory speedy trial context are instructional for the 7 purposes of prompt arraignment under 8 GCA § 60.10. People v. Julian, 2012 Guam 26 ~ 35. 8 A statutory speedy trial violation does not require automatic dismissal with prejudice. See US. 9 v. Perez, 2011 WL 2294194, at *3 (D. Ct. Guam Jun. 8, 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), 10 "Speedy Trial Act"); US. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336-337, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 11 (1998); and US. v. Lewis, 518 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)). Federal courts examine the 12 following factors to characterize a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act: (1) the seriousness of 13 the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to dismissal; (3) the impact of 14 reprosecution on the administration of the speedy trial statute and on the administration of 15 justice; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Lewis, 518 F.3d at 1176. However, the Defendant 16 as movant has not presented any such factual evidence to this Court and, because this evidence, 17 if it exists, would be found in a wholly separate case, it is not before this Court to analyze on its 18 own. 19 Further, Defendant argues that evidence of prejudice to him is not necessary to dismiss 20 with prejudice. (Def. Mtn. at p. 7.) To the contrary, reprosecution is not barred without an 21 examination of the prejudice suffered by the Defendant as a result ofthe delay. See, e.g., Perez, 22 2011 WL 2294194 at *7-8; Doggett v. US., 505 U.S. 647, 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992) 23 (prejudice typically includes oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the 24 accused, and the possibility the accused's defense will be impaired by dimming memories and 25
26 does not apply to Defendant's argument here, that any reprosecution after a prompt arraignment violation should b 27 automatically barred regardless of bad faith or prejudice. Gutierrez cannot apply here where there is no allegation o evidence of bad faith in the reprosecution of this case. 28
Page 3 of 4 loss of exculpatory evidence). Some instances of delay can even occur without the anxiety of a 2 bond or other conditions of release and each case of delay should receive a particular 3 examination ofthe prejudice suffered. See, e.g., People v. Stephen, 2009 Guam 8 ~ 11; 8 GCA 4 § 20.60. Unfortunately, Defendant fails to offer evidence of actual prejudice suffered by him 5 and, furthermore, fails to illustrate that the length of delay in this particular case is such that it 6 constitutes presumptive prejudice. Thus this Court has nothing before it to consider in this vein. 7 Finally, the Court does not agree that a dismissal without prejudice is a frivolous remedy 2 8 that only causes additional delay. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342. For all of these reasons, the 9 Court shall not automatically bar reprosecution when an arraignment is delayed and 10 Defendant's motion shall not be granted on this basis.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 -I 3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) /'"'"-, r ~,~~ ,r· ~ r~,
) CRIMINAL CASE N61:CF0121-12' 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER JAMES STEVEN ESPINOSA, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7
8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 dismiss, filed November 23, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on February 11, 2013. Assistant 11 Attorney General James C. Collins, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered the 13 parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 On February 10, 2012, the Superior Court dismissed criminal charges against Defendant 17 because he was not arraigned within sixty (60) days of the filing of the complaint pursuant to 18 People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 14. People v. Espinosa, CF0702-10, Decision and Order (Super. 19 Ct. Guam Feb. 10, 2012). The charges were dismissed without prejudice because the Court 20 found no misconduct, bad faith or prejudice suffered by Defendant from the arraignment delay. 21 Id. at 4-6. 22 On February 22, 2012, the Government filed the present indictment to reprosecute the 23 charges that were dismissed without prejudice. On November 23, 2012, Defendant moved to 24 dismiss this case on the grounds that the first case should have been dismissed with prejudice. 25 Defendant argues that the Court has jurisdiction to review the prior dismissal and that a prompt 26 arraignment violation should be automatically dismissed with prejudice. The Government 27 argues that Defendant cannot challenge the characterization of dismissal after the remedy was 28 denied by the trial court and Defendant failed to appeal the issue.
Page 1 of 4 DISCUSSION
2 1. Jurisdiction 3 Under Guam law, the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear causes 4 exclusively vested in the Supreme Court, including the review of final orders of the Superior 5 Court in criminal cases. See 7 GCA §§ 3105 and 3107. When a criminal defendant is not 6 promptly arraigned within 60 days pursuant to Rasauo, 2011 Guam 14, "[t]he issue of whether 7 or not the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice should be decided in the first 8 instance by the trial court." !d. at~ 16. A trial court's decision on the merits of a prompt 9 arraignment should only be reexamined or amended pursuant to the appellate and supervisory 10 jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court. See generally 7 GCA § 3107; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 11 Cranch) 137, 175,2 L.Ed 60 (1803) ("It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it 12 revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that
13 cause."). 14 In this case, there is no allegation or evidence of a prompt arraignment violation. 15 Defendant moves to dismiss this case merely on the basis ofhow a different judge characterized 16 the dismissal in a wholly separate case. Defendant would have this Court dismiss the present 17 case solely in order to upset the ruling of a different judge in a separate case not before this 18 Court, yet the Court knows of no authority that would allow it to do so. Defendant argues that 19 this Court has jurisdiction to review the merits of a prior characterization of dismissal because 20 he did not have standing to appeal the issue until the charges were re-filed in this case. (Motion 21 to Dismiss, 1, Nov. 19, 2012 (citing People v. Tingzon, CRA 12-012, Order (Sup. Ct. Guam 22 Jun. 22, 2012).) Even if Defendant now has standing to appeal the prior dismissal, this Court is 23 devoid of authority to review the separate trial record and to amend the final order of a separate 24 trial court. Defendant certainly does not cite any authority by which this Court may review the
25 previous court's order. 1 Thus Defendant's motion shall not be granted. 26
27 1 Defendant cites People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam 19 n. 14, which allows a trial court to dismiss a re-file 28 indictment after in finds that the prosecutor moved to dismiss under 8 GCA § 80.70(a) in bad faith. This authorit
Page 2 of4 11
2. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice 2 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court may dismiss this case because it disagrees with 3 the prior characterization of dismissal, the Court shall not do so here. Defendant argues that any 4 prompt arraignment violation under 8 GCA § 60.10 must be remedied by an automatic 5 dismissal with prejudice. The Court does not agree. 6 Cases that evaluate delay in the statutory speedy trial context are instructional for the 7 purposes of prompt arraignment under 8 GCA § 60.10. People v. Julian, 2012 Guam 26 ~ 35. 8 A statutory speedy trial violation does not require automatic dismissal with prejudice. See US. 9 v. Perez, 2011 WL 2294194, at *3 (D. Ct. Guam Jun. 8, 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), 10 "Speedy Trial Act"); US. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336-337, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 11 (1998); and US. v. Lewis, 518 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)). Federal courts examine the 12 following factors to characterize a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act: (1) the seriousness of 13 the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to dismissal; (3) the impact of 14 reprosecution on the administration of the speedy trial statute and on the administration of 15 justice; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Lewis, 518 F.3d at 1176. However, the Defendant 16 as movant has not presented any such factual evidence to this Court and, because this evidence, 17 if it exists, would be found in a wholly separate case, it is not before this Court to analyze on its 18 own. 19 Further, Defendant argues that evidence of prejudice to him is not necessary to dismiss 20 with prejudice. (Def. Mtn. at p. 7.) To the contrary, reprosecution is not barred without an 21 examination of the prejudice suffered by the Defendant as a result ofthe delay. See, e.g., Perez, 22 2011 WL 2294194 at *7-8; Doggett v. US., 505 U.S. 647, 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992) 23 (prejudice typically includes oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the 24 accused, and the possibility the accused's defense will be impaired by dimming memories and 25
26 does not apply to Defendant's argument here, that any reprosecution after a prompt arraignment violation should b 27 automatically barred regardless of bad faith or prejudice. Gutierrez cannot apply here where there is no allegation o evidence of bad faith in the reprosecution of this case. 28
Page 3 of 4 loss of exculpatory evidence). Some instances of delay can even occur without the anxiety of a 2 bond or other conditions of release and each case of delay should receive a particular 3 examination ofthe prejudice suffered. See, e.g., People v. Stephen, 2009 Guam 8 ~ 11; 8 GCA 4 § 20.60. Unfortunately, Defendant fails to offer evidence of actual prejudice suffered by him 5 and, furthermore, fails to illustrate that the length of delay in this particular case is such that it 6 constitutes presumptive prejudice. Thus this Court has nothing before it to consider in this vein. 7 Finally, the Court does not agree that a dismissal without prejudice is a frivolous remedy 2 8 that only causes additional delay. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342. For all of these reasons, the 9 Court shall not automatically bar reprosecution when an arraignment is delayed and 10 Defendant's motion shall not be granted on this basis. 11 ///
12 ///
13 CONCLUSION 14 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. 15
16 SO ORDERED this 1-.5'1 day of May, 2013. 17
20 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II Judge, Superior Court of Guam 21
26 2 "Dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction: it forces the Government to obtain a new indictment if i
27 decides to reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Given th burdens borne by the prosecution and the effect of delay on the Government's ability to meet those burdens 28 substantial delay well may make reprosecution, even if permitted, unlikely." Jd.
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