People v. Escalera

143 Misc. 2d 779, 541 N.Y.S.2d 707, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 632
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedApril 25, 1989
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 143 Misc. 2d 779 (People v. Escalera) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Escalera, 143 Misc. 2d 779, 541 N.Y.S.2d 707, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 632 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Michael A. Gary, J.

Defendant is charged with criminal sale of marihuana in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 221.40), unlawful possession of marihuana (Penal Law § 221.05) and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument (Penal Law § 220.45). The complaint alleges that defendant sold a bag of marihuana for $10 to an undercover police officer, and once arrested he was found to possess four more bags of marihuana and one hypodermic instrument.

At arraignment, in order to convert the complaint into an information, the People filed with the court a long-form supporting deposition, containing a series of paragraphs with boxes to check where applicable — a format approved in People [780]*780v Hohmeyer (70 NY2d 41 [1987]), and in compliance with CPL 100.30. Insofar as relevant, the first page of the properly executed form contains a paragraph in which the undercover officer corroborates the contents of the complaint, and adds that he gave the recovered substances to another officer, Police Officer John Rodelli, for "field testing”. The second page of the supporting deposition contains two paragraphs in which Police Officer John Rodelli states that he tested both the substances purchased from the defendant and the substances recovered incident to his arrest. The last part of the two paragraphs reads as follows: "I used a Duquenois-Levine Reagent System field test and carefully followed the directions on the kit. (I have received special training in the identification of marijuana, including field testing procedures.) The substance, which had the color, texture, and distinctive odor of marijuana, field tested positive for marijuana.” This was signed under a jurat by Police Officer Rodelli.

Upon filing, the People requested that the court declare the complaint had thereby been converted to an information. (No laboratory report is required to prove possession of a hypodermic instrument. [People v Strong, 42 NY2d 868 (1977).]) Defense counsel objected on the ground that conversion could only be accomplished by the filing with the court of a standard police laboratory report showing the presence of marihuana. The court reserved decision for a formal motion addressing the issue presented: whether for a charge of possession or sale of marihuana the affirmative opinion of a police witness who has received special training in the identification of marihuana coupled with a positive test result yielded by that same witness who has performed a chemical field test on the recovered substance is sufficient to convert a complaint into an information.

An information must contain nonhearsay, factual allegations sufficient to establish a prima facie case as to each charge in the complaint. (People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137-139 [1987]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; 100.15 [3].) A prima facie case is that quantum of competent and admissible evidence such that, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction. (People v Harvin, 126 Misc 2d 775 [1984].)

In the only Court of Appeals decision addressing the issue of expert testimony as to the identity of marihuana, the alleged marihuana itself was not available for testing. The defendant’s conviction for sale of marihuana was reversed because [781]*781it rested on the testimony of a witness who identified it on the basis of his two or three isolated experiences taking the drug. (People v Kenny, 30 NY2d 154, 157 [1972].) Since a witness who testifies to the identification of a drug is essentially an expert witness, the Kenny court rejected this witness’ qualifications as a basis for his opinion. More recent Appellate Division decisions and those of courts of other jurisdictions clearly establish that a drug user can qualify as an expert witness in the identification of a drug not produced as evidence in court. (People v Lynch, 85 AD2d 126 [4th Dept 1982] [buyers testified defendant sold them marihuana and phencyclidine]; People v Jewsbury, 115 AD2d 341 [4th Dept 1985] [indictment sustained where accomplice buyer testified in Grand Jury that what defendant sold him was cocaine; corroboration consisted of taped conversations but no drugs were recovered]; see generally, Annotation, 95 ALR3d 978.) In Jewsbury (supra, at 343), the Appellate Division described the test laid down in Lynch for a drug user to qualify as an expert witness: "drug users who speak from experience and observation with drugs can identify drugs in court. If users can demonstrate a knowledge of the narcotic, they are competent to testify. The weight to be given the testimony is for the jury to determine.”

As noted earlier, an information must contain nonhearsay factual allegations sufficient to establish a prima facie case. This is exactly the same standard of proof necessary to support an indictment. (People v Alejandro, supra, at 138; see, CPL 190.65 [1] [a].) Accordingly, since a drug user’s expert testimony on the identification of a controlled substance is sufficient to support an indictment for the sale of cocaine (People v Jewsbury, supra), it can be logically inferred that, given the same standard of proof, an expert drug user’s supporting deposition could convert a complaint for criminal sale of marihuana into an information. In similar fashion, it would seem that a supporting deposition from a police officer specifically trained in the identification of marihuana would have the same effect.

Nonetheless, most lower courts which have considered the need for expert evidence in marihuana cases have held that a laboratory report must be filed to convert a complaint into an information. (People v Harvin, supra; People v Ranieri, 127 Misc 2d 132 [1985]; People v Blow, 127 Misc 2d 1054 [1985]; People v McGriff, 139 Misc 2d 361 [1988]; contra, People v Hernandez, 124 Misc 2d 376 [1984]; People v McMillan, 125 [782]*782Misc 2d 177 [1984] [dicta]; People v Paul, 133 Misc 2d 234 [1986] [dicta].) Their rationale is, notwithstanding the police officers’ averments in the complaints, that what they recovered is marihuana, a significant percentage of laboratory reports subsequently filed with the court do not support the officers’ allegations. (See, People v McGriff, supra, at 364.)

While it may seem anomalous that a drug user’s expertise can convert a complaint for sale of marihuana into an information while a police officer’s may not, the anomaly is easily resolved by an examination of the facts of the previously cited cases. Where a drug user is allowed to give expert testimony concerning the identification of a drug, the basis of the expertise is the witness’ actual use of the drug in question on numerous occasions and his experience concerning its repeated, similar effects on his person. (People v Lynch, supra, at 127, and cases cited therein; see also, Annotation, 95 ALR3d 978.) In contrast, the common thread of those cases which have held a lab report is necessary for conversion is that the basis for the police officer’s opinion is an extremely limited examination of the recovered substance and, therefore, cannot qualify as expert opinion. (See, People v Kenny, supra.) As succinctly stated in McGriff (supra, at 364): "A police officer is simply not in a position to provide the factual predicate required for an information by his mere observation that a substance is marihuana.”

Applying McGriff’s

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Bluebook (online)
143 Misc. 2d 779, 541 N.Y.S.2d 707, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-escalera-nycrimct-1989.