Opinion
VOGEL (Miriam A.), J.
Christopher Lepte Ervin was convicted by jury of burglary and forcible rape, with a finding that the rape was committed
during a residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (b)),
and he thereafter admitted allegations that he had suffered a prior attempted robbery conviction in 1982 and two prior felony convictions in 1993 (unlawfully taking a vehicle and possession of a firearm by a felon) for which he served a single prior prison term.
Ervin was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years to life for the rape (§ 667.61, subd. (b)), plus 5 consecutive years for the 1982 prior (§ 667, subd. (a)), with a 4-year concurrent sentence imposed for the burglary count, a term of 20 years to life. The “remaining priors” were stricken. Ervin appeals, contending the maximum sentence the trial court should have imposed was a determinate 16-year sentence under the three strikes law, not an indeterminate life sentence with a 15-year minimum term under section 667.61, subdivision (b).
^e People also appeal, contending Ervin should have been sentenced for the rape under
both
the three strikes law
and
section 667.61, subdivision (b), to a term of 30 years to life.
We agree with the People.
Discussion
With one qualifying prior, Ervin’s rape sentence
under the three strikes law
would have been a determinate term (three, six or eight years), doubled—a maximum of 16 years, with his conduct credits limited so that he would have to serve at least 80 percent of the term. (§§ 261; 264, subd. (a); 667, subds. (c)(5), (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) As imposed, Ervin’s sentence
under subdivision (b) of section 667.61
is an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, with his conduct credits limited so that he must serve at least 85 percent of 15 years.* ***
Ervin contends that, because he has a prior, he should have been sentenced under the three strikes law and not under section
667.61, subdivision (b). The People not only object to Ervin’s attempt to reduce his sentence, but contend the statutes are cumulative, not alternative, and that Ervin’s sentence under section 667.61 should have been doubled. We agree with the People.
About six months after the Legislature enacted the three strikes law as urgency legislation (Stats. 1994, ch. 12, §§ 1, 2), it adopted section 667.61 (Stats. 1994, ch. 447, § 1), the “one strike law.”
(People
v.
Rayford
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 8 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369] [§ 667.61 is commonly known as the “ ‘One Strike’ ” law].)
Accordingly, our analysis of the issue before us begins with the presumption that the Legislature was aware of the three strikes law when section 667.61 was enacted
(People
v.
Bunyard
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1238 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795])—and ends with the fact that there is no apparent reason in law or logic to believe the Legislature intended either law to operate exclusively of the other. As relevant to this issue, we do not find any ambiguity in section 667.61 or in any part of the three strikes law, and where, as here, two statutes are not inconsistent, both will be given effect.
(People
v.
Bunyard, supra,
45 Cal.3d at p. 1238.) What this means is that Ervin, convicted of a violent rape during a burglary, must be sentenced to a term of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivision (b), and that his sentence must be doubled under the three strikes law.
(Hsu
v.
Abbara
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804] [the words of a statute are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent];
Kizer
v.
Hanna
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 8 [255 Cal.Rptr. 412, 767 P.2d 679];
Cisneros
v.
Vueve
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 910 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682].) As the People point out, the three strikes law and section 667.61 serve different objectives—the former punishes recidivism, the latter aggravated sex offenses—and there is simply no reason for suggesting that a recidivist criminal ought to be rewarded rather than penalized because his latest offense is sufficiently heinous to bring him within the provisions of section 667.61.
To avoid this conclusion, Ervin contends the two statutes should be “reconciled by applying the three strikes law to recidivists whose present crimes are punishable under the three strikes law and by applying section 667.61 to first time offenders and to recidivists whose prior crime does not fall within the scope of the three strikes law.” The problem with this approach is that it is contrary to the language of both statutes. Section 667.61 applies to certain first time sex offenders and to recidivists who have previously committed any of seven specified sex crimes, six of which are “serious” felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law.
Under Ervin’s approach, we would effectively gut section 667.61 by eliminating the very persons clearly included by the language of that statute. We would also have to ignore the provisions in section 667 that it is to be applied “m
addition to any other enhancement or punishment provisions
which may apply" and that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, [its provisions] shall be applied
in every case
in which a defendant has a prior [serious or violent] felony conviction.” (§ 667, subds. (e), (f)(1), italics added.) Ervin’s interpretation cannot be what the Legislature intended.
Finally, Ervin relies on a sentence taken out of context from a footnote in
People
v.
Jenkins
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 234 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224], to support his assertion that the “Supreme Court has indicated . . . the three strikes law controls over section 667.61.” His analysis fails. In
Jenkins,
the Supreme Court considered the relationship of the three strikes law to the old habitual offender scheme under section 667.7. In that context, the Supreme Court suggested that “[i]f the prosecution pleads and proves that a defendant qualifies for sentencing under the three strikes scheme . . . , the defendant must be sentenced pursuant to its provisions, even if he or she otherwise would qualify for sentencing under section 667.7 or some other sentencing statute.”
(People
v.
Jenkins, supra,
10 Cal.4th at p. 238, fn.
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Opinion
VOGEL (Miriam A.), J.
Christopher Lepte Ervin was convicted by jury of burglary and forcible rape, with a finding that the rape was committed
during a residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (b)),
and he thereafter admitted allegations that he had suffered a prior attempted robbery conviction in 1982 and two prior felony convictions in 1993 (unlawfully taking a vehicle and possession of a firearm by a felon) for which he served a single prior prison term.
Ervin was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years to life for the rape (§ 667.61, subd. (b)), plus 5 consecutive years for the 1982 prior (§ 667, subd. (a)), with a 4-year concurrent sentence imposed for the burglary count, a term of 20 years to life. The “remaining priors” were stricken. Ervin appeals, contending the maximum sentence the trial court should have imposed was a determinate 16-year sentence under the three strikes law, not an indeterminate life sentence with a 15-year minimum term under section 667.61, subdivision (b).
^e People also appeal, contending Ervin should have been sentenced for the rape under
both
the three strikes law
and
section 667.61, subdivision (b), to a term of 30 years to life.
We agree with the People.
Discussion
With one qualifying prior, Ervin’s rape sentence
under the three strikes law
would have been a determinate term (three, six or eight years), doubled—a maximum of 16 years, with his conduct credits limited so that he would have to serve at least 80 percent of the term. (§§ 261; 264, subd. (a); 667, subds. (c)(5), (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) As imposed, Ervin’s sentence
under subdivision (b) of section 667.61
is an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, with his conduct credits limited so that he must serve at least 85 percent of 15 years.* ***
Ervin contends that, because he has a prior, he should have been sentenced under the three strikes law and not under section
667.61, subdivision (b). The People not only object to Ervin’s attempt to reduce his sentence, but contend the statutes are cumulative, not alternative, and that Ervin’s sentence under section 667.61 should have been doubled. We agree with the People.
About six months after the Legislature enacted the three strikes law as urgency legislation (Stats. 1994, ch. 12, §§ 1, 2), it adopted section 667.61 (Stats. 1994, ch. 447, § 1), the “one strike law.”
(People
v.
Rayford
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 8 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369] [§ 667.61 is commonly known as the “ ‘One Strike’ ” law].)
Accordingly, our analysis of the issue before us begins with the presumption that the Legislature was aware of the three strikes law when section 667.61 was enacted
(People
v.
Bunyard
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1238 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795])—and ends with the fact that there is no apparent reason in law or logic to believe the Legislature intended either law to operate exclusively of the other. As relevant to this issue, we do not find any ambiguity in section 667.61 or in any part of the three strikes law, and where, as here, two statutes are not inconsistent, both will be given effect.
(People
v.
Bunyard, supra,
45 Cal.3d at p. 1238.) What this means is that Ervin, convicted of a violent rape during a burglary, must be sentenced to a term of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivision (b), and that his sentence must be doubled under the three strikes law.
(Hsu
v.
Abbara
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804] [the words of a statute are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent];
Kizer
v.
Hanna
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 8 [255 Cal.Rptr. 412, 767 P.2d 679];
Cisneros
v.
Vueve
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 910 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 682].) As the People point out, the three strikes law and section 667.61 serve different objectives—the former punishes recidivism, the latter aggravated sex offenses—and there is simply no reason for suggesting that a recidivist criminal ought to be rewarded rather than penalized because his latest offense is sufficiently heinous to bring him within the provisions of section 667.61.
To avoid this conclusion, Ervin contends the two statutes should be “reconciled by applying the three strikes law to recidivists whose present crimes are punishable under the three strikes law and by applying section 667.61 to first time offenders and to recidivists whose prior crime does not fall within the scope of the three strikes law.” The problem with this approach is that it is contrary to the language of both statutes. Section 667.61 applies to certain first time sex offenders and to recidivists who have previously committed any of seven specified sex crimes, six of which are “serious” felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law.
Under Ervin’s approach, we would effectively gut section 667.61 by eliminating the very persons clearly included by the language of that statute. We would also have to ignore the provisions in section 667 that it is to be applied “m
addition to any other enhancement or punishment provisions
which may apply" and that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, [its provisions] shall be applied
in every case
in which a defendant has a prior [serious or violent] felony conviction.” (§ 667, subds. (e), (f)(1), italics added.) Ervin’s interpretation cannot be what the Legislature intended.
Finally, Ervin relies on a sentence taken out of context from a footnote in
People
v.
Jenkins
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 234 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224], to support his assertion that the “Supreme Court has indicated . . . the three strikes law controls over section 667.61.” His analysis fails. In
Jenkins,
the Supreme Court considered the relationship of the three strikes law to the old habitual offender scheme under section 667.7. In that context, the Supreme Court suggested that “[i]f the prosecution pleads and proves that a defendant qualifies for sentencing under the three strikes scheme . . . , the defendant must be sentenced pursuant to its provisions, even if he or she otherwise would qualify for sentencing under section 667.7 or some other sentencing statute.”
(People
v.
Jenkins, supra,
10 Cal.4th at p. 238, fn. 2.) What this means is that a second or third strike defendant is not entitled to a
benefit
(that is, a shorter sentence) under section 667.7 or some other sentencing statute, not that he cannot be punished
more severely
when the three strikes law is permissibly applied.
In
Jenkins,
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, with an allegation that he was an habitual offender (§ 667.7) found true, and the issue was whether he should be sentenced under section 190, subdivision (a),
to a term of 15 years to life, or under section 667.7. As the Supreme Court explained, the evident purpose of section 667.7—to provide a distinct and
more severe
sentencing scheme for violent habitual offenders—plainly means that the statute applies to murderers as well as criminals who commit other less serious felonies. “[T]he court must choose among three alternatives in determining the minimum period of imprisonment—one being ‘any period prescribed by Section 190 ... .’ Therefore, when the qualifying felony conviction is murder, the minimum period of required imprisonment under section 667.7 must be determined
with reference to the term of imprisonment that a murderer otherwise would be required to serve if he
or she were sentenced under section 190 (provided section 667.7’s threshold of a 20-year minimum term is met).”
(People
v.
Jenkins, supra,
10 Cal.4th at pp. 243-244, italics added.) Under the three strikes law, a second striker’s “determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice
the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.”
(§ 667, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) Ervin’s punishment for the current felony conviction is found in section 667.61, subdivision (b). Following the reasoning of
Jenkins,
therefore, we use both statutes to determine Ervin’s sentence, not just one as suggested by Ervin.
(People
v.
Ruiz
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1658-1661 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 561].)
For these reasons, Ervin’s sentence cannot stand. Although we could certainly modify it ourselves if there was any certainty about the priors, this record does not permit that shortcut. As noted at the outset, remand is necessary so that the trial court can exercise its discretion and decide whether to strike any of Ervin’s priors. By way of illustration only (and without expressing a view about the manner in which the trial court ought to exercise its discretion), we note that, assuming one qualifying prior (the 1982 attempted robbery) and one prior prison term (the 1993 crimes), the maximum sentence the trial court could impose would be an indeterminate term of 15 years to life (§ 667.61, subd. (b)), with the 15-year minimum doubled (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1); 667, subd. (e)(1)), plus five years for the prior (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus one year for the prior prison term (§ 677.5, subd. (b)), and with a concurrent four-year term for the burglary, for a total term of 36 years to life.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed but Ervin’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Ortega, Acting P. J., and Masterson, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 12,1996, and the petition of appellant Christopher Lepte Ervin for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 5, 1997.