People v. Engel

2022 IL App (3d) 210053-U
Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided March 23, 2022·No. 3-21-0053·Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 210053-U

Order filed March 23, 2022

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT

2022

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Tazewell County, Illinois, )

v. ) Appeal No. 3-21-0053 ) Circuit No. 19-CF-543 )

MICHAEL S. ENGEL, ) Honorable ) Katherine S. Gorman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices McDade and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of seven years’ imprisonment.

¶2 The defendant, Michael S. Engel, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The circuit court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The defendant appeals.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In October 2019, the State charged the defendant by information with three felonies that

allegedly occurred in Mackinaw, Illinois. Count I alleged criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(3) (West 1996) now 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2018)) in that the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon M.E. in that he made contact between his mouth and the penis of M.E., who was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense and a family member of the defendant. Count II alleged aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (West 1996) now 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b) (West 2018)) in that the defendant committed an act of sexual conduct upon M.E. when the defendant caused M.E. to touch the defendant’s penis for the purpose of the defendant’s sexual gratification or arousal and M.E. was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense and a family member of the defendant. Count III alleged aggravated sexual criminal abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (West 1996) now 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b) (West 2018)) in that the defendant knowingly committed an act of sexual conduct upon M.E. in that the defendant touched M.E.’s penis for the purpose of the defendant’s or M.E.’s sexual gratification or arousal and at the time of the offense M.E. was under 18 years old and a family member of the defendant. The State alleged that these acts occurred between October 13, 1997, and October 12, 2001, and the defendant was subject to an extended statute of limitations. M.E. is the defendant’s biological, now adult, son (born October 1983).

¶5 The defendant pled guilty to counts II and III, and the State dismissed count I. There was no agreement as to sentencing. Counts II and III were Class 2 felonies subject to concurrent terms of four years’ probation or three to seven years’ imprisonment. Day-for-day sentencing applied with two years’ MSR and lifetime sex offender registration. The matter proceeded to sentencing.

¶6 A. Presentence Investigation Report

¶7 The presentence investigation (PSI) report provided that the defendant was retired but he mows lawns to keep himself busy. His work history included working with disabled children and

adults. A former employer, where the defendant worked with adults with developmental disabilities, provided that there were no instances of policy violations but there were interactions with male residents that made some staff uncomfortable, such as when the defendant took the male residents to his house to go swimming. The former employer provided, in general, the issue involved the defendant being too physically close, and he was terminated for this behavior.

¶8 During the interview, the defendant detailed instances of sexual abuse in his own childhood. Also, the defendant blamed M.E.’s wife for the trouble he was in because she was a counselor and pushed M.E. to go to the police. The defendant stated “[M.E.] knows I was just teaching him.” He also stated that he did not believe that M.E. would be able to put together such a detailed victim statement without assistance. The defendant was hurt that M.E. went to the police. He stated that he did not believe that he did anything wrong, and he did not know why he did not have a relationship with either of his sons because he was only trying to help M.E. understand his body. When asked why he committed the offense, the defendant stated that he thought he was instructing M.E., they had an open relationship, and M.E. was slow and not understanding.

¶9 When the defendant was asked if he believed what he did was a crime, he stated “I did it as I thought I was teaching him about his body, it dawned on me what he wanted. It is pretty upsetting that he has turned on me like this, I don’t think I deserve to go to jail over this. I’m not out looking for people to molest. *** I don’t feel I raped him.”

He went on to state

“I started talking to my son about sex. I showed him how to wash and clean himself when we showered together. Did I touch him? Yes. I showed him his penis will get hard, and I told him things about masturbation. He had a thing where he liked to

tickle his stomach, must have come across his penis, next thing I knew he ejaculated. I was scared, then he would ask me to tickle his stomach, then we would have another sex talk. When he was a teen he did have his shirt off then he took his pants off and wanted me to play with it. I didn’t for long. He watched me masturbate three or four times. I never made him touch it, he did it on his own accord.”

¶ 10 The report also explained that the defendant blamed his other son C.E. for exposing his pornography addiction. While recalling the past, the defendant became angry and said that C.E. installed spyware on his computer to see what he was doing. The report concluded that the defendant’s protective factors included his lack of criminal history, his financial status, and his lack of a substance abuse history. His risk factors included the lack of support the defendant receives from his family and his failure to take responsibility for his actions in the offense.

¶ 11 B. Sex Offender Evaluation

¶ 12 The sex offender evaluation summarized that the defendant (1) acknowledged having committed elements of the sexual offenses, (2) was able to intellectually understand the legal consequences involved for an adult engaging in sexually inappropriate contact with a minor, (3) was able to understand the psychological and sociological impact of adults engaging in sexual contact with children, (4) verbalized remorse for his abusive behaviors against M.E., and (5) denied sexual attraction to pre-pubescent or pubescent children. However, the evaluator believed that, based on the defendant’s conduct, it appeared likely that the defendant underreported his sexual attraction and/or interest in minors either on a historic or current basis. The LSI-R identified the defendant as a low risk for future sexual/violent and general criminal recidivism. His combined STATIC-99R and STABLE-2007 sexual re-offense risk was identified in the very low risk range. The defendant was deemed an appropriate candidate for sex offender treatment. Goals of treatment

included full acknowledgement of personal responsibility for illegal sexual behaviors, identifying factors that contributed to his sexual offending, understanding his offense cycle, and continuing development and enhancement of his empathetic understanding of his sexual behavior and the consequences created for the victims and/or others involved.

¶ 13 C. Testimony

¶ 14 1. M.E.

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People v. Engel, 2022 IL App (3d) 210053-U (Ill. Ct. App. 2022).

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