2026 IL App (1st) 260500-U
SECOND DIVISION June 16, 2026
No. 1-26-0500B
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) 26CR1833 ) MAURICE ELLIS, ) Honorable ) Anjana M. J. Hansen Defendant-Appellant. ) and James Murphy, ) Judges Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Affirming the trial court’s order granting the State’s detention petition because the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption is great that defendant committed a detainable offense; that defendant posed a real and present safety threat; and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. No. 1-26-0500B
¶2 Defendant, Maurice Ellis, appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s verified
petition for pretrial detention pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024)).
¶3 The record on appeal shows that defendant was arrested on January 31, 2026, and was
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)
(West 2024). The next day, February 1, 2026, the State filed a petition for a pretrial detention
hearing, and defendant appeared before the court.
¶4 The court initially asked for information regarding defendant’s pretrial supervision
assessment (PSA), and the pretrial officer responded: “New criminal activity scale four, failure to
appear scale three. PSA Score coincides with Pretrial Supervision Level Two.”
¶5 The State then argued that the “proof is evident and the presumption is great” that defendant
committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender, based on
the following proffer. On January 31, 2026, at about 5:15 p.m., officers stopped defendant’s
vehicle after observing a traffic infraction and a broken driver’s side taillight. During the stop,
officers smelled an odor of fresh cannabis coming from inside the vehicle. Officers asked
defendant for his driver’s license and proof of insurance, and defendant was unable to provide
proof of insurance. Officers asked defendant if he had any weapons inside the vehicle and if he
had a firearm owner’s identification (FOID) card or concealed carry license (CCL). Defendant
responded that he did not have a FOID card or CCL.
¶6 The officers believed defendant’s responses were “squirmy,” and they “ran the defendant’s
name,” at which point they asked him to step out of the vehicle to conduct a narcotics search. As
defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed a green leafy substance, which they suspected to
be cannabis, on the driver’s side floorboard. During the search, officers observed that the glove
2 No. 1-26-0500B
compartment was locked. Defendant told the officers that he would be grateful if they could get
inside the glove compartment, because a previous owner had locked it with a pin and defendant
had never been able to get inside. Officers opened the glove compartment and recovered a loaded
gun with an extended magazine and laser sight. In the same glove compartment, officers recovered
documents containing defendant’s name and address. The arrest report indicates that the
documents were receipts for a city sticker and a “doctor lab prescription.”
¶7 Officers learned that the firearm was stolen from Memphis, and that defendant had two
prior felony convictions: a 2009 armed robbery conviction, for which defendant was sentenced to
10 years’ imprisonment; and a 2014 armed robbery conviction, for which defendant was sentenced
to 11 years’ imprisonment. The State noted that defendant’s criminal record also included a 2009
conviction for manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance, for which he received two years
of “special probation,” and a 2021 misdemeanor battery conviction.
¶8 Based on the above proffer, the State argued that the proof was evident or presumption
great that defendant committed the charged offense. The State further argued that defendant posed
a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community because he was not
forthcoming about having a firearm in the vehicle, and the firearm was found in a glove
compartment that also contained documents with his name and address. The State asserted that
defendant knew he could not possess a firearm because he had multiple felony convictions and he
had no “lawful ability to be carrying that firearm.” Finally, the State argued that no conditions
short of pretrial detention could mitigate the risk defendant posed because electronic monitoring
would not prevent defendant from obtaining or possessing another firearm.
¶9 In response, defense counsel argued that the court should deny the State’s petition because
the statute governing pretrial detention suggests that the court should “consider the admissibility
3 No. 1-26-0500B
of the evidence.” Counsel believed the facts supported “a very strong motion to suppress here
down the line.” Counsel stated that, although the officers claimed to observe the odor of fresh
cannabis, the inventory from the search did not suggest that cannabis was found, and defendant
was not charged with any cannabis-related offenses. Counsel also stated that defendant did not
constructively possess the firearm because there was no suggestion that officers found a key to the
glove box, and, according to defendant, officers had to “jimmy” the glove box open with a knife.
¶ 10 Counsel also argued that defendant was not dangerous because, after being discharged from
parole, he had a three-year-old daughter, obtained a commercial driver’s license (CDL), and earned
his GED. Counsel also stated that defendant worked for UPS, attended church, and took pain
medication for a back injury. Based on the above, defense counsel asked the court to deny the
State’s petition to detain and release defendant “on reasonable conditions.”
¶ 11 In reply, the State noted that defendant not only possessed a firearm, but that the firearm
had an extended magazine and a laser sight attachment. The State argued that defendant knew he
should not possess any firearm, much less a firearm with features which made it even more
dangerous.
¶ 12 In ruling, the court explained that the State was required “to prove three things *** by clear
and convincing evidence”—that the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant
committed a detention-eligible offense; that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety
of any person, persons, or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case; and
that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that safety risk.
¶ 13 The court stated that it took
“into account the facts of the case, the nature of the offense, the aggravation
presented, the mitigation presented, the arguments [of] both counsels, both in favor
4 No. 1-26-0500B
[of] and opposed to the granting of the petition, the pretrial scores, pretrial’s
recommendation, the PSA, as well as the other statutory factors in aggravation and
mitigation under the Pretrial Fairness Act.”
¶ 14 The court explained that unlawful possession of a weapon by a repeat felony offender was
a Class X felony and a detainable offense.
¶ 15 The court acknowledged that defense counsel had made “some good arguments,” but based
on the sworn arrest report and the State’s proffer, the State met its “burden in regards to prong
number one by *** clear and convincing evidence.” In particular, the court noted that defendant
told officers that the glove box was locked by a previous owner and that he could not get into it.
The court found that the statement was “basically a lie” because when officers opened the glove
box, they found the gun along with two receipts bearing defendant’s name. The court reasoned
that defendant “obviously *** had access” to the glove box because his documents were inside it
with the gun. The court also emphasized that the gun was loaded and had a laser sight and extended
magazine.
¶ 16 Regarding the second prong, the court found that defendant posed a real and present threat
to the safety of any person, persons, or the community based on a “number of different factors.”
The court observed that the “UUW felon” and FOID statutes prohibit felons from possessing guns
“because of the dangerousness component,” and “because it’s in the interest of public safety.” The
court emphasized that the gun “was loaded, had a laser, and had an extended magazine,” and
expressed that there was “no benign reason for any individual, let alone a felon, to possess any
gun” with those features. The court also stated that defendant clearly had access to illegal guns
despite his status as a “repeat felony offender.”
5 No. 1-26-0500B
¶ 17 Finally, the court explained that electronic monitoring and home confinement were “the
most restrictive set of conditions short of detention.” Those conditions, however, would not
sufficiently mitigate the safety risk posed by defendant because electronic monitoring “cannot
monitor whether a defendant possesses a firearm or not” because it “monitors location, it does not
monitor behaviors.”
¶ 18 The court also found that defendant’s statement that he did not have access to the glove
box showed that defendant was “lying to law enforcement,” which suggested defendant’s
“unwillingness or *** inability to comply” with conditions of release. Finally, the court noted that
electronic monitoring allows a defendant at least two days of movement per week, and the court
was “not convinced that the public will be safe with any amount of movement or presence in the
community” by defendant.
¶ 19 The court also expressed that it considered defendant’s PSA score and the recommendation
of “Pretrial Supervision Level Two,” but found the PSA “was not controlling” because it “uses
generic factors,” lacks “nuance,” and “does not consider the specific underlying facts of the case”
or the “total number of convictions.”
¶ 20 Thereafter, defendant secured new counsel, who filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(h) on February 24, 2026, and an amended motion on February 26, 2026.
Counsel argued that there was a “change in circumstances” after the court’s initial detention
hearing, because counsel had since reviewed discovery, the body-worn camera footage, and
defendant’s background.
¶ 21 Counsel argued the State had failed to prove defendant knowingly possessed the firearm
because it was not known “how long the weapon had been stored in the locked glove compartment,
whether anyone else had access to the vehicle, and when the recovery of the weapon went beyond
6 No. 1-26-0500B
the scope of the officer’s search.” Counsel argued that the officers did not mention noticing an
odor of cannabis on the body-worn camera footage, and the officers stated on the footage that the
interior of the vehicle “smelled good.” Counsel also asserted that there was “no evidence pointing
to whether [defendant] knew that a firearm was stored in the locked glove box of the vehicle he
was driving,” and that the body-worn camera footage also suggested that defendant told officers
that his “girlfriend is another individual who uses the vehicle.” Counsel argued that because
“officers never saw [defendant] holding or carrying a gun, the gun was inaccessible
and not visible to the officers, and there is another individual whom [sic] has had
access to the vehicle, the State has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that [defendant] had unlawful possession over the weapon recovered from inside
the locked glove box in the vehicle.”
¶ 22 Counsel further argued that defendant was not dangerous because the charge was “not of a
violent nature,” and his prior felony convictions were over 10 years old. Counsel stated that
defendant had a daughter, had a CDL, was employed, attended church, and took medication for a
back injury. Counsel further asserted that defendant was “fully compliant with officers during the
entirety of the stop and prior to his arrest,” and that he did not “attempt to flee or evade arrest.”
Counsel noted that defendant’s PSA score corresponded to “Pretrial Supervision Level Two,” and
stated that he if he were released with conditions, he would “have no issues in being fully compliant
with such conditions.”
¶ 23 Finally, counsel argued electronic monitoring or home detention could mitigate any risk
posed by defendant, and that the State’s argument that electronic monitoring would not keep
defendant from possessing weapons was “generic, unsubstantiated, and wholly reliant on the
allegations being made in this case.” Counsel contended that defendant’s “demonstrated
7 No. 1-26-0500B
compliance with the officers on scene exhibits that he is capable of complying with any and all
court orders imposed by” the court.
¶ 24 Defendant’s motion for relief was heard on March 17, 2026. The State summarized the
evidence in the case consistent with its proffer from the prior hearing and argued that defendant
should remain detained.
¶ 25 Counsel argued there was a “change in circumstances” because counsel had since been
able to review the body-worn camera footage, which showed that defendant had a valid CDL, that
officers found no cannabis, and that the glove box was locked. Counsel acknowledged that, after
looking on the floor of the vehicle, officers “pick[ed] up *** little buds” and said, “this is the
cannabis,” but argued that there was “no way” the officers “smelled this small bud” shown on the
footage.
¶ 26 Counsel also argued that there were “issues with the searches and there is a warrant
requirement.” Counsel stated that defendant was in handcuffs and “in custody” at the time when
officers began asking him questions about the glove box, and that there is “an argument that they
should have read him his Miranda [rights] at that time.”
¶ 27 Regarding defendant’s dangerousness, counsel acknowledged that defendant “has a
background,” but stated that the charged offense was “not inherently danger[ous],” and defendant
was “compliant” with the officers during the encounter.
¶ 28 Finally, counsel asserted that, even if the court found that defendant posed a danger, “there
are a combination of conditions that can mitigate that danger.” Counsel tendered mitigation
evidence, including various certificates, tax and employment documents, and letters of support.
Counsel further stated that defendant had one child and another who “will be here soon,” and that
he provided support and cared for his nieces and nephews.
8 No. 1-26-0500B
¶ 29 In ruling, the court initially explained that, although the parties had made arguments in
terms of whether there had been a change in circumstances since the initial hearing, the court
believed that such a showing was not necessary at a hearing on a Rule 604(h) motion for relief.
The court explicitly stated that it had reviewed the written detention order, the transcript from the
prior hearing, and the mitigation evidence submitted by the defense, including character letters.
The court acknowledged that defendant “probably ha[d] a motion with regards to your arguments
about a bad stop and Miranda,” but at this point, the court was required to consider “whether the
proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed an eligible offense. And at
the end of the day, the defendant is the only one in the car.” The court found it significant that
defendant claimed he did not have access to the glove box, and “yet when it’s opened, there’s two
receipts in it along with the weapon.” The court stated that defendant “clearly knew” the gun was
inside the glove compartment and was trying to avoid taking responsibility when the officers
eventually recovered it.
¶ 30 The court further found that defendant posed a real and present threat because he was a
“repeat felony offender. He’s not supposed to have a gun. And yet he still did, riding around in a
car, and indicating that he didn’t know how to open a glove box where the gun was [found].”
¶ 31 Finally, the court found that electronic monitoring and home confinement would not
mitigate the threat because they do “not monitor behavior,” they “monitor geography. And with
someone who is already a convicted felony offender who isn’t supposed to have a gun and had a
gun anyway,” such conditions would not “deter him from doing the same thing moving forward.
So at this time, the defendant will stay detained.”
¶ 32 Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 17, 2026.
9 No. 1-26-0500B
¶ 33 In this court, defendant contends that the court erred in ordering him to be detained pretrial
because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or
presumption great that defendant committed the offense of possession of a firearm by a repeat
felony offender; that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of a person, persons, or the
community; and that there is no condition or combination of conditions that can mitigate that
threat.
¶ 34 Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability,
Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act or Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) amended the Code by
“abolishing traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with
conditions of release.” People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 20. “Section 110-6.1(e) of
the Code presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release and places the burden of
justifying pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence on the State.” People v. Stock, 2023
IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 11; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024).
¶ 35 For the State to obtain an initial detention order, the Act requires three showings by “clear
and convincing” evidence:
“(1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
committed a qualifying offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), (2) that
the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any
person or persons or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West
2022)) or a likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)), and (3) that no condition or combination of
conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
10 No. 1-26-0500B
community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)).” Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 20.
¶ 36 The State or the defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of proffer based
upon reliable information. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2024). Our standard of review of
pretrial release determinations is dependent on whether the trial court heard live witness testimony
or whether the parties proceeded solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence. Where
the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary
evidence, this court stands in the same position as the trial court and may conduct its own
independent review of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. People v.
Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. Because no live testimony was presented at defendant’s detention
hearings, we will employ a de novo standard here.
¶ 37 In this case, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat
felony offender (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2024)), a detainable offense (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(6)(D) (West 2024)). A person is guilty of the offense “if he or she receives, sells, possesses,
or transfers any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more times of any combination”
of certain offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2024).
¶ 38 Defendant does not dispute that he was convicted of the requisite prior offenses—2009 and
2014 convictions for armed robbery. Rather, defendant argues that there was “no evidence within
the record” to show that he “unlawfully possessed the firearm” recovered from the locked glove
compartment. Defendant contends that to “establish that [defendant] had possession over the
weapon recovered, the State must prove constructive possession” based on defendant’s
“knowledge of the presence of the weapon” and defendant’s “immediate and exclusive control
over the area where the weapon was found.” Defendant contends that there was no evidence to
11 No. 1-26-0500B
establish how long the firearm was in the glove compartment, or that defendant knew that it was
there.
¶ 39 “[C]onstructive possession of a firearm may be shown where the person has knowledge of
the presence of the weapon and exercises immediate and exclusive control over the area where the
firearm is found.” People v. Brown, 2020 IL 124100, ¶ 11. A person may have constructive
possession of contraband even if “others have access to the area where the contraband was
recovered.” People v. Spencer, 2016 IL App (1st) 151254, ¶ 25. “Constructive possession is often
proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.” People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶
23.
¶ 40 Initially, we note that at the detention stage, the State is not required to prove defendant’s
guilt of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Luna, 2024 IL App (2d)
230568, ¶ 9. Here, the State’s proffer established that defendant was the driver and sole occupant
of a vehicle, and officers recovered the loaded firearm from the locked glove box along with
documents bearing defendant’s name and address. Although defendant claimed he could not access
the glove box because a prior owner locked it, the court found that explanation was contradicted
by the fact that his documents were found inside the same locked compartment as the gun.
Moreover, as the court explained, defendant’s statement suggests that defendant “clearly knew”
that the firearm was inside the glove compartment and that he was trying to avoid taking
responsibility for the gun when it was eventually recovered. See Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st)
131874, ¶ 40 (a defendant’s knowledge “may be established by evidence of the defendant’s acts,
declarations or conduct from which the inference may be fairly drawn that he knew of the existence
of the contraband where it was found”). Based on the State’s proffer, we conclude that the State
met its burden to show that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed
12 No. 1-26-0500B
the detainable offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender. See People
v. Shaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 232083-U, ¶ 17 (affirming the finding that there was clear and
convincing evidence that defendant constructively possessed a firearm where “the State’s proffer
*** established that the firearm was found in the vehicle’s glove box. [The defendant] was the
owner of the vehicle and at the time of the arrest, the only other occupant was his four-year-old
son.”)
¶ 41 Defendant, however, also contends that the State failed to meet its burden to show that he
committed the charged offense because the officers “went beyond the scope of the search” in
opening the locked glove compartment, and the officers’ allegation that they observed an “odor of
fresh cannabis” was used to justify a “fishing expedition.”
¶ 42 Defendant’s argument “rests on an assumption not found in the Code: that the court may
consider only admissible evidence when ordering defendants detained.” People v. Jones, 2024 IL
App (1st) 240367-U, ¶ 20; see also People v. Parker, 2026 IL App (1st) 260240-U, ¶ 22 (the Code
does not “require the State [to] use only admissible evidence in its proffer”). To the contrary, the
statute provides that the “rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not
apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing,” and that a defendant
“may not move to suppress evidence” at a detention hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(5), (6) (West
2024). However, “evidence that proof of the charged crime may have been the result of an unlawful
search or seizure, or both, or through improper interrogation, is relevant in assessing the weight of
the evidence against the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(6) (West 2024). This court has
explained that such a statutory framework “makes sense as a practical matter” because detention
hearings are often held at an “early stage of the prosecution, [when] the parties likely have not
completed discovery, and the investigation may not even be complete.” People v. Wright, 2024 IL
13 No. 1-26-0500B
App (4th) 240187, ¶ 34. In such circumstances, a court “cannot be expected to rule on complicated
evidentiary questions as part of a detention hearing.” Id.
¶ 43 At a detention hearing, a court is tasked with “answering questions such as whether the
proof is evident or the presumption is great that defendant committed the crime in question; not
whether he will likely be found guilty at trial.” (Emphasis in original) People v. Frye, 2025 IL App
(2d) 250381-U, ¶ 14. As the trial court recognized, defendant may have an argument for a future
motion to suppress, which can be considered more fully by the trial court at the appropriate time.
However, based on the evidence that was before the trial court, we conclude that the State met its
burden in establishing that the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed
the charged offense.
¶ 44 Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove that he poses a real and present threat
to the safety of a person, persons, or the community. Defendant argues that the evidence shows he
is a father and provider to his nieces and nephews, that he is “gainfully employed” at UPS, and
that he started a remodeling company. Defendant contends that his criminal convictions are “over
ten years old and are not representative of [his] character.” Defendant also asserts that he was
compliant and respectful toward the officers during the encounter and did not attempt to flee from
the scene or evade the officers.
¶ 45 The statute provides a nonexhaustive list of factors a court should consider when
determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any individual,
individuals, or the community. These include the “nature and circumstances of any offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex
offense”; the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” including the defendant’s “prior
criminal history”; and “[w]hether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapon
14 No. 1-26-0500B
or weapons.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2024). No one factor is determinative, and the court
must base its decision on an individualized assessment. People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th)
231028, ¶ 15; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2024).
¶ 46 Based on our review of the statutory factors, we find that the State established by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant poses a safety threat. The nature and circumstances of the
offense charged in this case suggest that defendant, a repeat felony offender, was driving a vehicle
on a public roadway while possessing a loaded gun with an extended magazine and laser sight.
¶ 47 This court has explained that the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat
felony offender, previously termed “armed habitual criminal” (see Pub. Act 103-822, § 20 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2025) (amending 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7)), is specifically aimed at “the danger associated with
repeat felons having firearms” (People v. Martin, 2018 IL App (1st) 152249, ¶ 23). Our legislature
has pronounced that, “in order to promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of the public,
it is necessary and in the public interest to provide a system of identifying persons who are not
qualified to acquire or possess firearms.” 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2024). Defendant, as a convicted
felon, is explicitly prohibited from possessing a firearm, and accordingly, his possession of a
firearm “goes directly against the legislature’s stated purpose of promoting and protecting the
safety of the public from the unlawful possession of firearms by certain individuals.” People v.
Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶ 28 (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2022)).
¶ 48 Moreover, the firearm that defendant is charged with possessing was reported to have been
stolen, and it was loaded and equipped with an extended magazine and laser sight—features which
increase the dangerousness of that firearm. See People v. Salley, 2025 IL App (1st) 242240-U, ¶
23 (“It wasn’t just a gun, it was a gun with a laser sight and a magazine.”); Shaw, 2024 IL App
(1st) 232083-U, ¶ 20 (finding that defendant posed a safety risk where the firearm he was charged
15 No. 1-26-0500B
with possessing “had a laser sight with an extended magazine”). In these circumstances, we find
that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present
threat to the safety of a person, persons or the community.
¶ 49 Finally, defendant contends that the State failed to prove that there is no condition or
combination of conditions that can mitigate any safety threat he poses. Defendant asserts that the
court’s conclusion that electronic monitoring would not stop him from possessing another firearm,
and that electronic monitoring “monitors locations, [and] not behaviors,” are “ ‘sweeping
generalizations’ ” which are “insufficient to ‘satisfy the statutory requirements that the State prove
that no set of conditions can mitigate’ any alleged threat [defendant] is said to pose.”
¶ 50 Defendant relies on People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, for his contention that
“sweeping generalizations” are insufficient to support a finding that the State met its burden on
the third prong. Defendant’s reliance on Lopez is misplaced.
¶ 51 In Lopez, the 18-year-old defendant was charged with illegal possession of a firearm
without a FOID card, and after a hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to be released on
electronic monitoring. The State appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, agreeing that the State
had failed to show that there were no conditions of release that could mitigate the defendant’s
safety threat to the public. Id. ¶ 20. In doing so, the court noted that the defendant had no prior
criminal background, lived at home with his family, was not affiliated with any gang, and “there
was no evidence that the defendant ever used a firearm or had a history of violent behavior.” Id.
The court explained that “[s]weeping generalizations, such as ‘defendants don’t follow orders’ or
that conditions of release are loosely monitored do not satisfy the statutory requirements that the
State prove that no set of conditions can mitigate a defendant’s real and present threat.” Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 52 Here, however, the court did not rely on “generalizations” to find that no conditions could
16 No. 1-26-0500B
mitigate the safety threat posed by defendant. Rather, the court based its decision on an
individualized consideration of proper statutory factors, including the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of defendant. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2024).
¶ 53 Here, defendant is a repeat felony offender with two prior armed robbery convictions, and
the State’s proffer showed that he possessed a loaded firearm with an extended magazine and laser
sight. As the trial court recognized, the State’s proffer also suggests that defendant “lie[d]” to
police officers when he claimed he was unable to access the locked glove box, because receipts
bearing defendant’s name were found in the glove box with the gun. The circumstances of the
offense and defendant’s prior criminal background suggest that conditions short of detention
would not adequately mitigate the safety threat defendant poses to the public. See People v.
Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 29 (the defendant’s “criminal history, particularly prior
felonies involving firearms, *** demonstrated his dangerousness and history of noncompliance
and disregard for conditions or restrictions”); People v. Suggs, 2024 IL App (1st) 240723-U, ¶ 31
(“Defendant flaunted the law because as a convicted felon, he was prohibited from possessing the
firearm, a fact which gives no assurance that he would comply with any conditions of release.”).
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 55 Affirmed.