People v. Ellinger

2025 IL App (5th) 250612-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 4, 2025
• Docket: 5-25-0612
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250612-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/04/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0612 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 25-CF-153 ) GABRIEL W. ELLINGER, ) Honorable ) Jerry E. Crisel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Hackett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief are affirmed.

¶2 The defendant, Gabriel W. Ellinger, appeals the July 22, 2025, order from the trial court of

Jefferson County that granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release and the July 30, 2025,

denial of his motion for relief and immediate release. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal,

and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the defendant.

OSAD filed a notice in lieu of a Rule 604(h)(7) memorandum. We acknowledge that the defendant

is not required to file a memorandum, and the motion for relief will represent the defendant’s

argument on appeal. The defendant’s motion for relief argues that the State did not meet its burden

in showing that the defendant committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant posed a real and

1 present threat to specific persons or the community, and that no conditions or combination of

conditions could mitigate that threat. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 21, 2025, the defendant was charged with residential burglary, a Class 1 felony.

720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2024). On the same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny the

defendant pretrial release. The petition alleged that the defendant committed a forcible felony, and

that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.

¶5 On July 22, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition. During the hearing,

the defendant was also present for another pending case, Jefferson County case 24-CF-182. The

State then called Officer Mike Wilson of the Mt. Vernon Police Department (MVPD) to testify.

Officer Wilson testified that at approximately 9:59 a.m. on July 20, 2025, Kaitlyn Ramsey called

to report a white male wearing a dark hood and mask in the downstairs of her home. Ramsey

observed the man throwing Milwaukee tools that belonged to her over the fence in her backyard.

The items were located in an attached mudroom to her home. She attempted to confront the man,

but he took off on foot.

¶6 Officer Wilson testified that the MVPD search did not immediately locate the defendant,

so they began asking neighbors if they had seen anything. One of the witnesses stated that he saw

a man matching that description and recalled that the man had very recognizable facial tattoos.

Another officer recalled that the defendant matched that description and was commonly in the area

because the mother of his child, Abigail Beahringer, lived nearby. The officers learned that a phone

number typically belonging to Beahringer called 911 after the burglary call, but the caller did not

say anything. The 911 department followed up with the caller, and Beahringer said that the

defendant was having a seizure, so she called, but he told her to hang up and then left the residence.

2 Law enforcement officers then went to the area where Beahringer said he had walked, and there

they saw a man generally fitting his description. The man was holding a black hoodie when Captain

Wilton of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office saw him. When the man saw law enforcement, he

jumped a fence, dropped the hoodie he was carrying, and attempted to flee on foot. Captain Wilton

then detained him.

¶7 Officer Wilson said that he located the black hoodie the man was holding, which had a lot

of white and gray writing on it. Officer Wilson reviewed nearby security footage, which showed

the same clothing described by Ramsey, which the defendant was wearing when Captain Wilton

detained him. The security footage showed the defendant in the backyard of the residence,

dropping things over the fence, and Ramsey approaching the defendant before he picks up the

items. The defendant then leaves as she approaches. Ramsey positively identified the defendant as

the man who burglarized her home from a photo lineup.

¶8 The defendant was later interviewed, and he said that he was at Beahringer’s house to take

care of his son, but he never left the residence. Officers interviewed Beahringer, and she stated

that the defendant was at her home, but he came and went from the residence. Further, when she

called 911, the defendant had just arrived back at the residence after walking on foot.

¶9 On cross-examination, Officer Wilson stated that Ramsey did not directly see the defendant

enter the door of her home from her vantage point, but she saw him approach the house and then

saw him holding items from her house. He also testified that the defendant maintained his

innocence during the interview. On redirect examination, Officer Wilson stated that Ramsey heard

someone in her house, which is what prompted her to look outside and see the man.

¶ 10 The State called no further witnesses and then proceeded by proffer. The State asked the

trial court to note that at the time of this offense, the defendant was placed on pretrial release

3 conditions in case 24-CF-182. The trial court heard probable cause for another case for the

defendant during this hearing, Jefferson County case No. 25-MT-317, when he was cited with a

reckless driving ticket the day before the burglary. The State proffered the defendant’s criminal

history, including juvenile cases for armed violence, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and

possession of a stolen firearm.

¶ 11 The State then argued that the defendant should be denied pretrial release due to the distress

his release would place upon the victim. The defendant was already on pretrial release with

conditions when he committed the burglary, showing a “blatant disregard for court orders.” The

defendant’s prior juvenile history showed multiple weapons charges. The State argued that the

defendant is a threat to the community as well, due to the crime of burglary involving the invasion

of the sanctity of one’s home, instead of it being just a property crime. The State additionally

argued that no condition or combination of conditions would address the threat the defendant

poses, as he has already demonstrated by committing the present offense that he will not abide by

the court’s conditions.

¶ 12 The defendant proffered that he is 19 years old, has significant family ties to the area, and

is self-employed at a retail store. He is not on probation, parole, or work release. The defendant

argued that he is not a danger to the community because no one was hurt during the commission

of the offense, and that no weapons were used. The defendant requested release on home

confinement with electronic monitoring, allowing him to continue working.

¶ 13 The trial court considered the evidence presented and stated that the defendant does have

significant ties to the area, he is young, and he is a business owner. However, at a young age, he

already has a “considerable record as a juvenile” which includes weapon charges. The offense

itself is a Class 1 felony, with a mandatory prison sentence of 4 to 15 years, which contributes to

4 a risk of flight even with home confinement. The trial court said that despite the previous

conditions given to the defendant, he ignored the court’s order and incurred two new offenses. The

trial court found that no condition or combination of conditions would cause the defendant to abide

by the court’s orders to mitigate his threat against the public safety and granted the State’s petition

to detain.

¶ 14 The defendant filed a motion for relief and immediate pretrial release on July 23, 2025.

The motion alleged that the trial court failed to consider the defendant’s ties to the community, his

employment opportunities, his willingness to abide by any terms of pretrial release, and that no

weapon was used in the commission of the offense. The matter proceeded to a hearing on July 30,

2025.

¶ 15 During the hearing on the motion for relief, the defendant argued that the trial court failed

to consider the elements listed in the motion. Specifically, he has significant family ties to the

county, owns a local retail store, was not on probation, parole, or work release, and does not have

a record of failure to appear. The defendant would submit to any conditions of release, including

home confinement.

¶ 16 The State proffered that the defendant has two pending felony cases and was on pretrial

release with conditions during the present offense. The defendant previously failed to appear in

his other felony case. The State proceeded by proffer with the information presented at the original

pretrial detention hearing. In addition to Officer Wilson’s testimony, the State’s proffer included

additional witnesses who saw the defendant in the area and identified him to law enforcement.

¶ 17 The State argued that the defendant has a very recent juvenile criminal history and that he

was on pretrial release at the time of the offense. The State maintained that there are no less

restrictive conditions available that would mitigate the defendant’s risk. The defendant specifically

5 poses a risk to Ramsey and those in the neighborhood. The State also proffered the facts from the

defendant’s other pending case, 24-CF-182, in which, during a shooting investigation, law

enforcement discovered a controlled substance on the defendant.

¶ 18 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for relief, stating the same reasons as the

original hearing. 1 The defendant timely appealed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 OSAD did not file a memorandum but filed a notice in lieu of a Rule 604(h)(7)

memorandum. “Issues raised in the motion for relief are before the appellate court regardless of

whether the optional memorandum is filed.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Therefore,

our review is limited to the issues raised by the defendant in his motion for relief.

¶ 21 In his motion for relief, the defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or a presumption great that

the defendant committed a qualifying offense. The defendant first argued that the State failed to

meet its burden of proof that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community. Lastly, the defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of

proof that less restrictive conditions would not avoid the real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community.

¶ 22 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by Public Act 101-

652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending

various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting

effective date as September 18, 2023). A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain

1 During this hearing, the State asked the trial court to enter an order on its petition to revoke pretrial release in case 24-CF-182 because no formal order was entered. The trial court granted the petition to revoke at the same time. 6 statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely, verified

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the

defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of proffer based upon reliable

information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the

defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the trial court concludes the defendant poses a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or

there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).

¶ 23 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. Where the parties to a

pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence, this

court stands in the same position as the trial court and may conduct its own independent review of

the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626,

¶ 54. However, where the trial court is asked to consider the testimony of live witnesses, and make

factual findings, such as the State’s burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that

conditions of pretrial release would not protect any person or the community, the defendant has a

high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or the defendant failed to comply with

previously ordered conditions of pretrial release, our standard of review is the manifest weight of

the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

7 conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).

¶ 24 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial

detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing. The trial court heard testimonial evidence from

the State that included the information from Ramsey, eyewitness accounts, and security footage of

the defendant during the commission of the offense and immediately afterwards. Ramsey heard a

noise from inside her house, saw the defendant approach her home, and then leave with tools that

were previously inside her home. Security footage corroborated her account, as well as the other

witnesses. The record indicates that the defendant’s criminal history includes multiple weapon-

related charges. While all his offenses were juvenile cases, the defendant is only 19 years old and

has two other pending cases. As the trial court correctly noted, the defendant was on pretrial release

during the commission of this offense, which included the condition of not violating any laws. The

trial court did consider the elements listed in the defendant’s motion for relief to his favor during

the hearings, but ultimately decided they did not outweigh the risk factors. The trial court stated to

the defendant:

“Even though you are 19, you’ve racked up a considerable record as a juvenile, and

you are starting to work on it as an adult, as well.

Several things I must consider, in addition to your criminal history, which is

extensive and does involve some weapons charges which is concerning, is the seriousness

of the offense alleged here that we’re here on today, which is residential burglary. ***

***

Additionally, and in my opinion more importantly, there is the fact that you were

on pretrial release conditions on 24-CF-182 on a possession of controlled substance charge.

8 *** But you were on pretrial conditions, and that is a court order and that means what it

says, and one of the things it says is that you do not violate the law.”

¶ 25 Based on these facts, the trial court found that no condition or combination of conditions,

including home confinement and electronic monitoring, could reasonably mitigate the danger the

defendant posed to the victim and the community. An opposite conclusion is not clearly evident

or the finding itself is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.

Therefore, we find that the trial court’s decision to detain the defendant was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 38, 43.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court of Jefferson County.

¶ 28 Affirmed.