NO. 4-07-0150 Filed 4/21/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County EARL G. EHLEY, ) No. 06DT707 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Richard P. Klaus, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In October 2006, defendant, Earl G. Ehley, was involved
in a motor-vehicle accident and transported to the emergency room
at Carle Hospital. Once there, medical personnel performed
chemical testing on defendant's blood, which revealed a blood-
alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.204. Thereafter, Deputy Jeff
Verckler of the Champaign County sheriff's department arrested
defendant for driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-
501 (West 2006)) of alcohol, read him the warning-to-motorists
notice, and requested defendant submit to chemical testing but
did not tell defendant of the test performed by medical
personnel. Defendant refused to submit to chemical testing.
After the Secretary of State suspended defendant's license for
the refusal, defendant filed a petition to rescind his statutory
summary suspension. Following a hearing, the trial court found defendant failed to make a prima facie case for rescission and
granted the State's motion for a directed finding.
On appeal, defendant argues that once blood is drawn
and tested pursuant to emergency medical treatment, implied
consent is satisfied and no further request for chemical testing
by law enforcement is necessary or appropriate. This argument
requires an examination of two sections of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1, 11-501.4(a) (West
2006)). Section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-
501.1 (West 2006)) (the law-enforcement-directed testing
provision) provides as follows: (1) an arresting officer may
request that a motorist submit to chemical testing; (2) a
motorist's refusal to submit to testing will result in statutory
summary suspension; and (3) the test results are admissible in
any civil or criminal action arising out of the DUI arrest. 625
ILCS 5/11-501.1(a),(c) (West 2006). Section 11-501.4(a) of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West 2006)) (the medical-
personnel-directed testing provision) provides that the results
of chemical testing performed by medical personnel--but not at
the request of the arresting officer--while a person is receiving
medical treatment in a hospital emergency room for injuries
resulting from a motor-vehicle accident are admissible in
criminal prosecutions for DUI. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
- 2 - I. BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2006, defendant was arrested for DUI (625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006)). The arresting officer, Deputy
Verckler, prepared a sworn report indicating defendant refused to
submit to chemical testing. The sworn report identified the
following as reasonable grounds for believing defendant violated
section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code: (1) defendant was at fault in
a two-vehicle accident when he ran a red light; (2) defendant had
an odor of alcohol on his breath and a bar stamp on his hand; and
(3) blood taken at the hospital for emergency treatment disclosed
a BAC of 0.204. The citation issued to defendant indicated
personal injury ("driver injury only" was not marked on the
citation) had occurred as a result of the accident. Thereafter,
the office of the Secretary of State notified defendant that his
driver's license was suspended for three years, effective
November 22, 2006.
On December 4, 2006, defendant filed a petition to
rescind the statutory summary suspension. Defendant asserted
that he did not refuse to submit to or fail to complete chemical
testing upon the request of the arresting officer.
On January 26, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on
defendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension.
Defendant testified that on October 7, 2006, he was involved in a
motor-vehicle accident that rendered him unconscious. Defendant
- 3 - was taken by ambulance to the hospital and admitted to the
intensive-care unit (ICU). Defendant had no recollection of
having a conversation with a police officer. Defendant did not
recall being asked to give a breath or blood test or consenting
or refusing to consent to such testing. Before defendant left
the hospital, a nurse told him that his blood had been tested to
determine his BAC.
On cross-examination, defendant recalled that on
Saturday, October 6, 2006, from approximately 9 p.m. to 11:45
p.m., he was at a bar. He drank eight beers. Defendant recalled
driving toward the railroad tracks on Airport Road and trying to
stop. The next thing he remembered was waking up in the ICU.
After defendant's testimony, the State moved for a
directed finding. Because defendant recalled nothing, the State
argued he had failed to make a prima facie case that he did not
refuse chemical testing. The State pointed out that the
arresting officer's sworn report indicated defendant's blood had
been drawn and testing disclosed a BAC of 0.204. The State
argued, however, that this did not demonstrate defendant
consented because it was not chemical testing performed at the
request of the arresting officer.
Defendant argued he made a prima facie case that he did
not refuse chemical testing. Defendant argued that Deputy
Verckler knew defendant's BAC when he completed his report.
- 4 - Defendant claimed that Deputy Verckler's report, indicating
defendant refused testing, was "disingenuous at best."
The trial court noted that defendant had presented no
evidence indicating that the chemical test disclosing the 0.204
BAC was administered at the direction of the arresting officer as
provided in section 11-501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-501.1(a) (West 2006) (providing that any person who drives a
motor vehicle is deemed to have given consent to testing to
determine whether he is intoxicated and that such test "shall be
administered at the direction of the arresting officer")). The
court asked defendant what evidence he presented would enable the
court to make that finding.
Given the evidence that the citations were issued and
defendant's BAC had been obtained before he left the hospital,
defendant argued he could reasonably assume that he had
consented. Defendant stated that if testimony from the officer
was necessary, he wanted to reopen the evidence. Over the
State's objection, the trial court allowed defendant to reopen
the evidence.
Deputy Verckler testified that on October 7, 2006, he
investigated an accident that occurred on Airport Road in
Champaign County. Deputy Verckler briefly talked to witnesses at
the scene, had the vehicles towed, and took a few measurements.
Thereafter, Deputy Verckler went to Carle Hospital to make
- 5 - contact with defendant.
Upon his arrival at the hospital, Deputy Verckler spoke
to hospital staff about defendant's condition and asked the staff
whether blood had been taken. Hospital staff told him
defendant's BAC was 0.204.
Deputy Verckler went to the ICU to see defendant.
Defendant had four or five nurses working around him. Defendant
had a breathing tube down his throat, and his arms were
restrained because he was struggling with the nurses. Defendant
appeared to be going in and out of consciousness. Deputy
Verckler did not interfere and just waited.
Deputy Verckler believed he had probable cause to
charge defendant with DUI based on (1) statements of a witness at
the scene and the nurses that they could smell alcohol on
defendant; (2) the bar stamp on defendant's hand; and (3) the BAC
results from the hospital. Therefore, Deputy Verckler wrote
defendant a citation.
Deputy Verckler intended to "read this to him
unconscious, because he's not deemed to withdraw consent."
However, by the time Deputy Verckler completed the citation and
started talking to defendant, defendant appeared more coherent.
Defendant could see and respond to Deputy Verckler. Deputy
Verckler asked defendant if he knew where he was. Deputy
Verckler did not recall whether defendant shook his head "yes" or
- 6 - "no." Deputy Verckler told defendant he was in an accident, had
obviously been drinking, and was technically being placed under
arrest for DUI but would stay at the hospital. Deputy Verckler
then told defendant he was going to read the warning to motorist
to him and ask if he wanted to consent to a blood and urine draw.
Because defendant was now responding to him and shaking his head,
Deputy Verckler changed his original plan to simply read the
warning to defendant and take the blood and urine.
Deputy Verckler read the warning to motorist and asked
defendant if he wanted to give blood and urine to be tested.
Defendant shook his head no. Deputy Verckler then testified that
he wanted to be sure, so he said, "just so I understand, you are
refusing, then?" Defendant shook his head "yes." According to
Deputy Verckler, defendant "didn't talk; but he confirmed it
twice." Deputy Verckler did not recall whether he told defendant
he already had his BAC results, but he usually did not tell that
to motorists.
On cross-examination, Deputy Verckler testified that he
did not direct hospital personnel to draw blood from defendant.
It had already been done, and the results had come back when
Deputy Verckler arrived at the hospital.
After Deputy Verckler testified, the State renewed its
motion for a directed finding. The trial court noted that
defendant did not recall what happened and did not rebut the
- 7 - deputy's testimony. The court also noted that the evidence
clearly established that defendant's BAC was obtained through a
blood draw at the hospital before Deputy Verckler arrived at the
hospital. As such, the court found it would be impossible to
conclude that the test was performed at the direction of the
officer. Consequently, the court granted the State's motion for
a directed finding and denied the petition to rescind the
statutory summary suspension.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant Did Raise a Statutory Ground To Challenge his Summary Suspension
The State argues that defendant has not raised a ground
permitted by section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/2-118.1(b) (West 2006)), which limits the issues that can be
raised in a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension.
We disagree.
A petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension
must state the grounds upon which the summary suspension should
be rescinded. People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 843
N.E.2d 308, 311 (2006). By statute, the grounds upon which the
petition may be based are limited to whether (1) the motorist was
lawfully arrested for DUI; (2) the arresting officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, or both; (3) the motorist refused to
- 8 - submit to chemical testing after being advised that such refusal
would result in a statutory summary suspension of driving
privileges; and (4) the motorist submitted to chemical testing
and failed the test. See 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2006). The
supreme court has also held that the trial court is implicitly
authorized to consider defects in the officer's sworn report (see
People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50, 54, 521 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1988))
and challenges to the validity of the chemical test (see People
v. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d 153, 160, 514 N.E.2d 965, 969 (1987)).
In his petition, defendant alleged he did not refuse to
submit to and/or complete the required chemical test upon request
of the arresting officer. On appeal, defendant essentially
argues that he did not refuse to submit to the chemical testing
because the relevant statutory provisions can be interpreted to
provide that once chemical testing is performed by medical
personnel pursuant to section 11-501.4 of the Vehicle Code, the
arresting officer cannot ask a motorist to perform further
chemical tests. That is, according to defendant, if the
arresting officer cannot ask for further testing, the motorist
cannot be charged with having refused. Because this argument
challenges whether defendant refused to submit to chemical
testing, defendant has raised a proper ground for a petition to
rescind a statutory summary suspension. See 625 ILCS 5/2-
118.1(b)(3) (West 2006) (whether the motorist refused to submit
- 9 - to chemical testing after being advised that such refusal would
result in a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges is
a proper ground to raise in a petition to rescind the statutory
summary suspension).
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted the State's Motion for a Directed Finding
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it granted
the State's motion for a directed finding. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review.
Defendant argues this court reviews de novo whether a defendant
has made a prima facie case to rescind statutory summary
suspension. Defendant also argues this case essentially involves
statutory interpretation, which is also reviewed de novo.
The State argues that where, as here, the trial court's
decision on whether a defendant made a prima facie case involves
a credibility determination, that decision will not be disturbed
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
State rejects defendant's characterization of the issue as one of
statutory interpretation because (1) the statute permitted what
occurred here, and (2) defendant seeks judicial intervention in a
legislative scheme that he does not claim is unconstitutional.
In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the
defendant motorist bears the burden of proof to establish a prima
facie case for rescission. People v. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d
- 10 - 860, 862, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (2002). The defendant must
satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 773 N.E.2d at 1274. After the
defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the State to come forward with evidence justifying the
suspension. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 295, 665 N.E.2d
1215, 1217-18 (1996). A trial court's factual findings on a
petition to rescind will be reversed only where such findings are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Rush, 319
Ill. App. 3d 34, 38, 745 N.E.2d 157, 161 (2001).
However, when the trial court's determination is based
solely on the review of written documents, the appellate court
reviews de novo the determination that the defendant failed to
make a prima facie case. People v. Rozela, 345 Ill. App. 3d 217,
222, 802 N.E.2d 372, 376 (2003). Moreover, where the ultimate
issue involves statutory construction, review is also de novo.
People v. Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695, 840 N.E.2d 807,
811 (2005) (review is de novo in statutory summary suspension
case where the ultimate issue was whether the Vehicle Code
imposed a duty on the arresting officer to make sure defendant
was not confused about whether he was being offered a preliminary
breath test or a breath test admissible in a DUI prosecution).
In this case, the issue is one of statutory
construction, i.e., whether testing performed pursuant to section
- 11 - 11-501.4(a) precludes an arresting officer from seeking further
chemical testing under section 11-501.1(a), thereby rendering a
refusal of further chemical testing a nullity. The trial court
concluded in the negative and therefore found defendant had
failed to make a prima facie case for rescission. This court
reviews that finding de novo.
2. Defendant Failed To Make a Prima Facie Case That He Did Not Refuse Chemical Testing
Defendant argues the legislature has created a loophole
by which the State can derive the benefit of having the BAC
admitted into evidence pursuant to section 11-501.4(a) of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West 2006)) and still
derive the benefit of arguing that a motorist refused to submit
to chemical testing requested by the arresting officer pursuant
to section 11-501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-
501.1(a) (West 2006)). In doing so, according to defendant, the
State can punish a motorist for being in excess of the legal
limit and further punish a motorist by imposing harsher penalties
for his refusal to consent to further chemical testing.
a. Examination of Statutory Summary Suspension and Implied Consent
Pursuant to the implied-consent statute, section 11-
501.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2006)), any
motorist driving on an Illinois public highway who is arrested
for DUI is deemed to have consented to chemical testing of the
- 12 - blood, breath, or urine to determine his BAC. People v. Fisher,
184 Ill. 2d 441, 444, 705 N.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1998). A "person who
is dead, unconscious, or who is otherwise in a condition
rendering the person incapable of refusal, shall be deemed not to
have withdrawn the consent" provided in section 11-501.1(a) of
the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(b) (West 2006)).
Otherwise, if the motorist is not dead, unconscious, or in a
condition rendering him incapable of refusal, the arrested
motorist may withdraw the implied consent and refuse testing.
Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at 444, 705 N.E.2d at 70.
A person asked to submit to law-enforcement-directed
testing pursuant to section 11-501.1(a) must be warned by the
officer that (1) refusing to submit to a test will result in a
statutory summary suspension and (2) submitting to a test that
shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater will result in
statutory summary suspension. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West
2006). The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
warnings are not meant to enable an "'informed choice'" but are
an evidence-gathering tool for the State. People v. Johnson, 197
Ill. 2d 478, 486-87, 758 N.E.2d 805, 810-11 (2001). That is, the
suspension provisions are meant to motivate drivers to submit to
testing. Johnson, 197 Ill. 2d at 487, 758 N.E.2d at 811.
The length of the administrative suspension for a
refusal depends on the motorist's past record. See 625 ILCS 5/6-
- 13 - 208.1(a) (West 2006). In this case, defendant was not a first-
time offender. Therefore, the Secretary of State administra-
tively suspended defendant's license for three years rather than
one year. See 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(3) (West 2006). The
statutory-summary-suspension procedure is civil in nature and not
part of the criminal prosecution for DUI. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at
445, 705 N.E.2d at 70.
b. The Vehicle Code's Statutory Provisions Relating to Law-Enforcement-Directed Testing (Section 11-501.1) and Medical-Personnel-Directed Testing (Section 11-501.4(a)) Operate Independently
Section 11-501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-
501.1(a) (West 2006)) addresses chemical testing performed at the
direction of the arresting officer. When a police officer asks a
motorist to submit to a chemical test, the officer shall warn the
motorist of the consequences of both refusing to submit to the
test and of submitting to the test if the motorist's drug and/or
alcohol concentration exceed legal limits. See 625 ILCS 5/11-
501.1(c) (West 2006). If the motorist refuses testing, or the
test discloses a drug and/or alcohol concentration above the
legal limit, the officer must submit a sworn report to the proper
circuit court and the Secretary of State. See 625 ILCS 5/11-
501.1(d) (West 2006). The Secretary of State must, upon receipt
of the sworn report, enter the appropriate statutory summary
suspension. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(e) (West 2006).
The results of tests performed pursuant to section 11-
- 14 - 501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2006))
are admissible in any civil or criminal action arising out of a
defendant's arrest for a DUI offense, a similar local ordinance,
or a statutory-summary-suspension proceeding, so long as certain
requirements, such as the blood being taken by a qualified
person, are met. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(a) (West 2006).
In contrast, section 11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West 2006)) which pertains to medical-
personnel-directed testing, provides that the results of blood
tests performed by medical personnel while a person is receiving
medical treatment in a hospital emergency room are only admissi-
ble in evidence in prosecutions for DUI, similar provisions of a
local ordinance, or reckless homicide prosecutions, so long as
certain criteria are met. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West
2006). Specifically, section 11-501.4(a)(1) provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the results of blood tests performed for
the purpose of determining the content of
alcohol *** of an individual's blood con-
ducted upon persons receiving medical treat-
ment in a hospital emergency room are admis-
sible in evidence as a business[-]record
exception to the hearsay rule only in prose-
cutions for any violation of [s]ection 11-501
- 15 - of [the Vehicle] Code or a similar provision
of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for
reckless homicide brought under the Criminal
Code of 1961, when each of the following
criteria are met:
(1) the chemical tests performed upon an
individual's blood were ordered in the regu-
lar course of providing emergency medical
treatment and not at the request of
law[-]enforcement authorities." 625 ILCS
5/11-501.4(a)(1) (West 2006).
Section 11-501.4 contains additional criteria, but the parties do
not dispute the criteria contained in section 11-501.4 were met.
Defendant asks this court to close the alleged loophole
by interpreting the statutes "as they were surely intended."
Defendant asserts that section 11-501.4 of the Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/11-501.4 (West 2006)) can be interpreted to provide that
once blood is taken and tested pursuant to emergency medical
treatment, implied consent is satisfied, and no further inquiry
by law enforcement is necessary or appropriate as to the issue of
chemical testing.
When construing a statute, the primary consideration is
to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. People
v. Skillom, 361 Ill. App. 3d 901, 906, 838 N.E.2d 117, 122
- 16 - (2005). A court must consider the statute in its entirety.
People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135, 766 N.E.2d 641, 644
(2002). "The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is
the language of the statute, which, if plain and unambiguous,
must be read without exception, limitation, or other condition."
Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 135, 766 N.E.2d at 644. Statutory inter-
pretation is not a means by which this court may rewrite statutes
in "ways that contravene their clear and unambiguous language."
People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477, 485, 861 N.E.2d 989, 994
(2006).
The purpose of the statutory-summary-suspension proce-
dure is to quickly remove impaired drivers from the highway.
Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 840 N.E.2d at 811. Section
11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2006))
should be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose.
Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 840 N.E.2d at 811. In fact,
the legislature enacted the statutory-summary-suspension proce-
dure as a system separate from criminal prosecutions "[i]n
recognition of the fact that it often takes a very long time for
the State to prosecute impaired drivers and remove their drivers'
licenses." People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166, 561 N.E.2d
648, 650 (1990).
In this case, the plain language of sections 11-501.1
and 11-501.4(a) indicate that each applies to a distinct situa-
- 17 - tion. That is, the results of medical-personnel-directed testing
are admissible only in DUI prosecutions, similar provisions of
local ordinances, or in reckless-homicide prosecutions and are
not admissible in statutory-summary-suspension proceedings. See
People v. Massie, 305 Ill. App. 3d 550, 559, 713 N.E.2d 110, 116
(1999) (finding that the legislature has chosen to limit the
admissibility of results obtained pursuant to section 11-501.4(a)
to criminal prosecutions and not statutory-summary-suspension
proceedings). In contrast, results of law-enforcement-directed
testing are admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
arising out of the DUI arrest and statutory-summary-suspension
proceedings. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(a) (West 2006) (providing
for the admissibility of chemical testing in any civil or crimi-
nal proceeding arising out of a DUI and proceedings pursuant to
section 2-118.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West
2006)) so long as certain requirements are met, such as the tests
being performed according to certain standards).
The legislature limited the use of medical-personnel-
directed testing by making the results of such testing inadmissi-
ble in a statutory-summary-suspension proceeding. As a result,
even when medical-personnel-directed testing has been performed
pursuant to section 11-501.4(a) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West
2006)), the arresting officer must seek chemical testing pursuant
- 18 - 501.1(a) (West 2006)) to preserve the State's ability to sum-
marily suspend the motorist's license. See, e.g., People v.
Coffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598-600, 712 N.E.2d 909, 911-12
(1999) (holding that the State is not estopped from using the
result of a blood-alcohol test performed on a blood sample
obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant
for DUI even though the State previously used the defendant's
refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary
suspension of his driver's license as the positions taken by the
State were not factually inconsistent). Consequently, the
arresting officer did not act improperly by asking defendant to
submit to a chemical test even though he knew hospital staff had
already drawn blood and determined defendant's BAC. The Secre-
tary of State properly suspended defendant's driver's license
when defendant revoked his implied consent.
This court is not persuaded by the recent Second
District Appellate Court decision in People v. Severson, No. 2-
07-0134 (March 7, 2008), Ill. App. 3d , N.E.2d .
In Severson, the defendant initially refused to submit to testing
but later permitted his blood to be drawn after being told he
could not refuse and his blood could be taken regardless of his
refusal. The Severson court held that the record supported the
trial court's conclusion that the defendant had not refused to
consent and affirmed the rescission of the defendant's statutory
- 19 - summary suspension.
While this court does not agree with the Severson
decision, this case is nonetheless distinguishable. In this
case, defendant does not challenge whether he refused to consent.
He argues the State had no basis on which to ask defendant to
consent when the State already had the results of the medical-
personnel-directed testing. Moreover, Severson did not involve
medical-personnel-directed testing, which is not admissible in
statutory-summary-suspension proceedings. See 625 ILCS 5/11-
501.4(a) (West 2006) (results of blood tests performed by medical
personnel while a person is receiving medical treatment in a
hospital emergency room are only admissible in evidence in DUI
prosecutions, similar provisions of a local ordinance, or
reckless-homicide prosecutions); Massie, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 559,
713 N.E.2d at 116 (finding that the legislature has chosen to
limit the admissibility of results obtained pursuant to section
11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code to criminal prosecutions and not
statutory-summary-suspension proceedings). If defendant herein
had consented, his blood would have been drawn and those test
results would have been used to statutorily suspend defendant's
driver's license. Under defendant's theory, once medical-
personnel-directed testing occurs, the State would not be permit-
ted to request defendant's consent, and would be unable to use
the medical-personnel-directed test results in a statutory-
- 20 - summary-suspension proceeding, and his licence could not be
summarily suspended. Nothing in the plain language of the
statute compels such a result.
To summarize, reading the statutes as defendant re-
quests would contravene the statutes' plain language and purpose
to protect highway travelers, quickly remove impaired drivers
from the highways, and motivate drivers to submit to testing. If
an arresting officer cannot request further chemical testing once
medical-personnel-directed testing has been performed, the
Secretary of State would have no basis on which to suspend a
motorist's license because the results of the medical-personnel-
directed testing would not be admissible in a statutory-summary-
suspension proceeding. The statutes clearly provide that even
where medical-personnel-directed testing has been performed, the
arresting officer may request further chemical testing pursuant
501.1(a) (West 2006)) for use in civil, criminal, and statutory-
summary-suspension proceedings. A motorist's refusal to submit
to law-enforcement-directed testing pursuant to section 11-
501.1(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West
2006)), even when medical-personnel-directed testing has been
performed pursuant to section 11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West 2006)), will result in a statutory
summary suspension of his driver's license.
- 21 - III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON, P.J., concurs.
COOK, J., specially concurs.
- 22 - JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
results of medical-personnel-directed testing under section 11-
501.4 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4 (West 2006)) are
not admissible in statutory-summary-suspension proceedings. Slip
op. at 16. As the majority points out, such results are admissi-
ble in DUI prosecutions. Slip op. at 16. DUI convictions are
admissible in mandatory revocation proceedings by the Secretary
of State. 625 ILCS 5/6-205(a)2 (West 2006). If the Secretary of
State is entitled to consider the DUI conviction, he is also
entitled to consider the evidence on which that conviction is
based.
I recognize that a summary suspension will usually take
place quickly, before there has been a DUI conviction. That is
the whole purpose of the summary-suspension procedure. That is
no reason, however, to bar the Secretary's consideration of
evidence admissible in DUI proceedings. The fact that section
11-501.4(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a) (West
2006)) does not explicitly state that the Secretary must be
notified of medical-personnel-directed testing results is not
significant. The statute makes no provision that the Secretary
may not be notified of such testing. Explicit provisions for
disclosure in some cases do not rule out the possibility of
disclosure in other cases.
- 23 - Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that the fact
that medical-personnel-directed testing has been performed does
not prevent (1) an arresting officer from requesting that a
driver submit to chemical testing under section 11-501.1(a) of
the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2006)) or (2) the
State from punishing the driver for refusing to submit to that
testing under section 6-208.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-
208.1 (West 2006)). Because the chemical testing is more likely
to produce quick results that may be acted on by the Secretary of
State, medical-personnel-directed testing is not an alternative
which may be used in place of chemical testing.
- 24 -