No. 2--03--0424
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Boone County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
v. ) No. 01--CF--81
BILLY J. EFFLER, ) Honorable
) Gerald F. Grubb,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BYRNE delivered
the
opinion of
the
court:
Following a jury trial, defendant, Billy J. Effler, was convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery and sentenced to five years' imprisonment pursuant to
the
first clause of section 8--2(c) of
the
Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/8--2(c) (West 2000)), which provides that a person convicted of conspiracy may be imprisoned for a term not to exceed
the
maximum provided for
the
offense that is
the
object of
the
conspiracy.
The underlying offense of forgery is a Class 3 felony.
720 ILCS 5/17--3(d) (West 2000).
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that
the
trial court should have construed
the
statute in its entirety and sentenced him under
the
last clause,
because it applies to offenses, such as forgery, that
are not enumerated in
section 8--2(c) and limits
the
punishment for conspiracy to commit such an offense to that allowed for a Class 4 felony
,
which
carries a maximum of three years (see
730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(a)(7) (West 2000)).
We agree.
Because this case involves only a question of statutory interpretation, which we must review
de
novo
(see
People v. Robinson
, 172
Ill. 2d
452, 457 (1996)), we dispense with
the
facts of
the
case. All that is relevant here is that
defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with
the
statute. It provides:
"
A person convicted of conspiracy may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed
the
maximum provided for
the
offense which is
the
object of
the
conspiracy
, except that if
the
object is an offense prohibited by Sections 11--15, 11--16, 11--17, 11--19, 24--1(a)(1), 24--1(a)(7), 28--1, 28--3 and 28--4 of
the
'Criminal Code of 1961', approved July 28, 1961, as amended, or prohibited by Sections 404 or 406(b) of
the
'Illinois Controlled Substances Act', enacted by
the
77th General Assembly, or an inchoate offense related to any of
the
aforesaid principal offenses,
the
person convicted may be sentenced for a Class 3 felony however, conspiracy to commit treason, first degree murder, or aggravated kidnapping shall not be sentenced in excess of a Class 2 felony,
and conspiracy to commit any offense other than those specified in this subsection, and other than those set forth in Sections 401, 402, or 407 of
the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, shall not be sentenced in excess of a Class 4 felony
." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/8--2(c) (West 2000).
Defendant does not dispute that he was convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery and that forgery is a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/17--3(d) (West 2000). The trial court sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment,
the
maximum allowed for a Class 3 felony, based upon
the
language in
the
first clause of section 8--2(c), which permits "[a] person convicted of conspiracy to be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed
the
maximum provided for
the
offense which is
the
object of
the
conspiracy." 720 ILCS 5/8--2(c) (West 2000). Under defendant's reading of
the
statute, however, he maintains that the first clause applies to conspiracies to commit misdemeanors and that
the
last clause applies to his conviction, because conspiracy to commit forgery is not specifically listed in
the
statute. Accordingly,
defendant
argues that
the
trial court should have sentenced him as a Class 4 offender under
the
last clause. The State maintains that
a person who is convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery
should be sentenced under the
first clause and that interpreting
the
first clause as
applying solely to misdemeanors as defendant
urges amounts to reading into
the
statute a limitation that
the
legislature did not express.
Our primary objective when construing
the
meaning of a disputed statute is to ascertain and give effect
to
the
intent of
the
legislature.
People v. Zaremba
, 158
Ill. 2d
36, 40 (1994).
Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it.
Gill v. Miller
, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 56 (1983). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which, if plain and unambiguous, must be read without exception, limitation, or other condition.
People v. Lavallier
, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 468 (1999);
People v. Robinson
, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996).
A court should not construe a statute in a manner that would lead to consequences that are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust. A court should avoid an interpretation of a statute that would render any portion of it meaningless or void.
Paciga v. Property Tax Appeal Board
, 322
Ill. App. 3d
157, 161 (2001). Moreover, a criminal or penal statute is to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute.
People v. Laubscher
, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (1998).
Any ambiguity in a penal statute must be resolved in favor of
the
defense.
People v. Whitney
,
188 Ill. 2d
91, 98 (1999).
When interpreting a statute,
the
court may consider
the
reason and necessity for
the
law,
the
evils sought to be remedied, and
the
purposes to be achieved.
People v. Storms
, 254
Ill. App. 3d
139, 142 (1993). Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a specific crime and an overt act in furtherance of
the
agreement.
People v. Moorhead
, 128
Ill. App. 3d
137, 141 (1984). A conspiracy to commit a crime generally is not considered to be as serious an offense as
the
underlying offense itself, unless
the
legislature intends otherwise. Therefore,
the
legislature's classifications of conspiracies should ensure that
the
sentencing structure is proportionate to
the
seriousness of
the
underlying offenses, with realistic maximums.
Applying these principles to
the
present case, we have carefully examined
the
statute to determine whether
the
last clause applies to conspiracy to commit forgery. We find that it does.
It is clear that
the
first clause is a general provision that "sets
the
ceiling" for persons convicted of conspiracies. It directs
the
court that "[a] person convicted of conspiracy may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed
the
maximum provided for
the
offense which is
the
object of
the
conspiracy." 720 ILCS 5/8--2(c) (West 2000). In other words,
the
legislature intends that
the
conspiracy offender cannot be punished more severely for
the
conspiracy offense than
he or she would be punished for the
underlying offense. T
he
first clause appears to apply to both felony
and
misdemeanor offenses, as
the
only limitation it sets is that
the
person convicted of
the
conspiracy offense may be "fined" or "imprisoned" or "both."
The second clause of section 8--2(c) applies to certain enumerated misdemeanors and other offenses, such as those prohibited by section 404 or 406(b) of
the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/404, 406(b) (West 2000)), and it is relevant to this case only in
that conspiracy to commit forgery is not listed there. Similarly, the third clause of section 8--2(c) applies to conspiracies to commit
the
capital offenses of treason, first-degree murder, and aggravated kidnapping. Clearly, conspiracy to commit forgery is not enumerated in
the
third clause either.
The final clause, however, provides that conspiracy to commit any offense not specified in
the
statute
"shall not be sentenced in excess of a Class 4 felony." 720 ILCS 5/8--2(c) (West 2000). Therefore, unlike
the
first clause of section 8--2(c),
the
final clause distinguishes between conspiracies to commit felonies and misdemeanors. Clearly,
the
legislature has reduced
the
maximum punishment for those felony conspiracy offenses that are not specifically enumerated in
the
statute
. An isolated reading of
the
first clause would indicate that conspiracy to commit any felony may be punished as severely as
the
underlying offense. However, for conspiracy to commit an unspecified felony,
the
final clause reduces
the
punishment to no greater than
the
maximum for a Class 4 felony
.
Construing
the
statute in its entirety, we hold that, for offenses that are not enumerated in section 8--2(c),
the
final clause limits
the
maximum punishment for conspiracy to commit a felony to that allowed for a Class 4 felony,
and
the
first clause limits
the
maximum punishment for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor to
the
maximum provided for
the
underlying misdemeanor. Logically
, conspiracy to commit any misdemeanor other than those mentioned in the statute would be within only
the
first clause of
section 8--2(c)
.
We emphasize that
the
first clause of section 8--2(c) would also apply to sections 401, 402, and 407 of
the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401, 402, 407 (West 2000))
. Conspiracy to commit an offense under sections 401, 402, and 407 may not be punished more severely than the
underlying offense. Furthermore,
the
last clause cannot apply to a misdemeanor because a court cannot punish someone for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor
to
the
extent of a Class 4 felony. To read this any other way would lead to an absurd result clearly not intended by
the
legislature.
Certainly, if we were to a
pply
the
first clause of
the
statute in
the
manner
the
State asserts, it would lead to
consequences
the
legislature sought to avoid. For example, if punishment were to be handed out according to
the
first clause, then a person who conspired
to commit armed robbery could be sentenced in line with a Class X felony (see 720 ILCS 5/18--2(b) (West 2000)). However,
the
specific limitations of
the
third clause of section 8--2(c) provide that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder can be punished only to
the
extent of a Class 2 felony. The legislature could not have intended to punish a person who conspired to commit armed robbery more severely than a person who conspired to commit first-degree murder.
Furthermore, if we were to apply the first clause to a person convicted of conspiracy to commit an unspecified felony
, then
the
last clause would be rendered meaningless. Additionally, such an interpretation would not favor
the
accused. As we have interpreted the statute, the legislature's classifications of conspiracies ensure that the
sentencing structure is proportionate to the
seriousness of the underlying offense.
The State also argues that, in
People v. Gonzales
, 314
Ill. App. 3d
993 (2000), we held that
the
defendant
's conviction of criminal drug conspiracy made him ineligible for custodial sentence credit pursuant to sections 5--8--7(d) and 5--5--3(c)(2)(C) of
the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--8--7(d), 5--5--3(c)(2)(C) (West 1998)). Noting that
the
sentencing scheme created by section 405.1(c) of
the
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/405.1(c) (West 1998)) permits a
defendant
convicted of criminal drug conspiracy to be sentenced as if he were convicted of
the
offense that was
the
object of
the
conspiracy, which in
Gonzales
was a Class X unlawful delivery of cocaine, we found that
the
legislature clearly intended that such a
defendant
receive a Class X sentence and carry
the
label of a Class X offender.
Gonzales
, 314
Ill. App. 3d
at 997. The State recognizes that
the
sentencing statute at issue in
Gonzales
differs from that in
the
present case, but nevertheless believes that we should follow our reasoning in
Gonzales
; that, with few exceptions,
the
legislature intends to punish group criminal activity based upon
the
seriousness of
the
offense that is
the
object of
the
conspiracy.
Our interpretation of section 8--2(c) does not deviate from the principle that
the
legislature intends to structure punishment in proportion to
the
seriousness of
the
offense. However, in the
Gonzales
case, we applied a provision that
the
legislature specifically added to
the
calculated drug conspiracy statute, mandating that
the
sentence may not be less than
the
minimum nor more than
the
maximum provided for
the
offense that is
the
object of
the
conspiracy. 720 ILCS 570/405.1(c) (West 1998). Section 8--2(c) otherwise has no application to a calculated drug conspiracy case.
Finally, we direct
the
State to
People v. King
, 140
Ill. App. 3d
937 (1985),
wherein we
held that
the
trial court erred in determining that conspiracy to commit robbery is a Class 2 felony,
and we found
that
the
sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery cannot be in excess of that for a Class 4 felony under
section 8--2(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 8--2(c))
.
King
, 140
Ill. App. 3d
at 945.
At
that time,
the
statute was virtually
the
same as it is today.
While we did not analyze
whether conspiracy to commit robbery, which was not enumerated in
the
statute, properly fell within the
last clause of
the
statute, it is evident that we applied
the
last clause because
the
underlying offense of robbery at
the
time was a Class 2 felony (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 18--1(b)) and, under
the
last clause of section 8--2(c), the defendant's conspiracy offense fell within
the
lower classification of a Class 4 felony.
For the reasons stated, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134
Ill. 2d
R. 615(b)(4)), we vacate
the
five-year sentence and, because
defendant
does not request a new sentencing hearing but requests that
the
maximum sentence for a Class 4 felony be imposed
, we modify
defendant
's sentence to
the
maximum term for a Class 4 felony, which is three years. See 730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(a)(7) (West 2000).
Affirmed as modified.
KAPALA and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.