2021 IL App (1st) 192016-U No. 1-19-2016 Order filed November 18, 2021 Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 CR 7977 ) DARRYL EDWARDS, ) Honorable ) Carol M. Howard, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Darryl Edwards was found guilty of possessing a
controlled substance, heroin, with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2018)) and No. 1-19-2016
sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Edwards argues that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the heroin. We affirm. 1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Edwards was charged by information with knowingly possessing, with intent to deliver,
between 15 and 100 grams of heroin (count I) and less than 5 grams of methamphetamine (count
II).
¶5 At trial, Chicago police officer Alex Kulisek testified that he participated in a narcotics
investigation on May 2, 2018. That day, in the police station, Kulisek used a computer to remotely
control a “pod” camera and, through the video feed, surveil an apartment building on the 1300
block of North Kildare Avenue.
¶6 Around 3 or 3:30 p.m., Edwards, whom Kulisek identified in court, exited the apartment
building and unlocked a mailbox affixed to the building. He walked around the area, briefly
reentered the building, exited, and walked around again. Then, he entered the driver’s side of a
dark Chevy Impala and drove away. No one else was in the vehicle. The vehicle returned after 6
p.m. and entered the apartment building’s driveway. Edwards exited the passenger side. Kulisek
and other police officers proceeded to the building to execute a search warrant 2, and Edwards was
outside the vehicle when they arrived.
¶7 The State published portions of the footage, which is in the record on appeal. The video’s
playback meter shows the time of day. The camera films from an elevated vantage point down and
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. 2 It is unclear from the record whether the search warrant was related to what Officer Kulisek viewed on the pod camera that day or was based upon some unrelated event or other information.
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across the street from the building and moves to follow Edwards. Just before 3:30 p.m., Edwards
exits the apartment building and unlocks a mailbox affixed to the building. He walks away from
the building for several minutes, then returns and reenters through the same door, which is
unlocked. He again exits the building around 3:42 p.m. and remains in the area. Around 4:20 p.m.,
Edwards enters a black vehicle parked across the street from the building. Its front lights activate,
and Edwards drives away. Around 6:06 p.m., the vehicle returns, parks in the apartment building’s
driveway, and Edwards exits the vehicle’s passenger side.
¶8 On cross-examination, Kulisek testified that Edwards never reentered the building after he
exited around 3:42 p.m.
¶9 Chicago police sergeant John Sandoval testified that, around 6:24 p.m., he helped execute
the search warrant. Sandoval removed keys from the ignition of a black Chevy and used them to
access the building and the second-floor apartment that was the subject of the search warrant.
Following the search, Edwards was arrested, and Sandoval’s custodial search of Edwards
uncovered $924 cash. On cross-examination, Sandoval testified that, when he entered the
two-bedroom apartment, an adult male was in bed in one of the apartment’s bedrooms.
¶ 10 Chicago police officer Christian Perez testified that he entered the apartment to collect
evidence and take photographs. The apartment consisted of a living room, with a bedroom
attached, a kitchen to the right of the living room, a bathroom, and a second bedroom—which the
man in bed was occupying—off the kitchen’s left side.
¶ 11 The living room contained a large television stand which resembled “a china cabinet where
the middle was cut out,” where a flat-screen television stood. Officers discovered a scale in a glass
cabinet on the lower left side of the stand, and pills on top of the stand. A basket on top of the
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stand contained documents bearing Edwards’s name. In a space behind the television, officers
discovered another scale, and a plate with white powder and a credit card.
¶ 12 At trial, Perez identified a Com Ed bill, the credit card, the white powder, and the plate. He
further identified photographs of the bill, the pills, the plate with powder and the credit card, and
the scales. The Com Ed bill, addressed to Edwards at the subject apartment address, was dated
April 9, 2018, and the credit card bore Edwards’s name. The photographs and Com Ed bill are
included in the record on appeal.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Perez testified that other officers entered the apartment before him
and directed him to the items he recovered. Both bedrooms contained personal effects such as
clothes and toiletries. Perez photographed the plate with the credit card and powder after moving
it front of the television. He also moved the scales before photographing them.
¶ 14 The State entered stipulations that Perez would testify he inventoried the pills, another
officer would testify he re-inventoried the plate with suspect narcotics and the credit card, and a
forensic scientist would testify that the pills were positive for 0.6 grams of methamphetamine and
the powder was positive for 19 grams of heroin.
¶ 15 Following closing arguments, the court found Edwards guilty of possessing heroin with
intent to deliver (count I) and not guilty of possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver
(count II). The court noted that the credit card found on top of the heroin would expire in April
2020 and bore Edwards’s name, although the card was unsigned and the court therefore did not
know if it had been activated. The court further noted that the card had “a lot of brown powder on
it,” and appeared to have been used to “separate or cut” the drugs.
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¶ 16 The court denied Edwards’s posttrial motions. Following the sentencing hearing, the court
imposed six years’ imprisonment. The record does not reflect if Edwards filed a motion to
reconsider his sentence.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Edwards appeals, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he possessed the heroin. Edwards argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
controlled the location where the heroin was found, as he was absent for nearly three hours before
its discovery and another adult was alone in the apartment. Edwards further argues that there was
insufficient evidence he knew of the heroin, as it was hidden in a common space, and his credit
card was unsigned and in the apartment while he was gone. Edwards also notes that he was found
not guilty of possessing the methamphetamine which was discovered on top of the television stand
in the living room of the apartment.
¶ 19 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether,
“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42. It is the factfinder’s responsibility to weigh the
evidence and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, and a reviewing court
may not substitute its judgment for the factfinder’s on issues involving the weight of the evidence
or the witnesses’ credibility. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The factfinder need not
disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence, nor search out all possible
explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a reasonable doubt. In re Jonathan C.B.,
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2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. We will reverse a conviction only where the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Belknap,
2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.
¶ 20 Edwards was found guilty of knowingly possessing heroin with intent to deliver. 720 ILCS
570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2018). Edwards challenges the element of possession.
¶ 21 Knowing possession may be actual or constructive. People v. Brown, 327 Ill. App. 3d 816,
824 (2002). To prove constructive possession, as here, the State must establish that the defendant
had knowledge of the contraband’s presence and exercised immediate and exclusive control over
the area where the contraband was found. People v. Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 18.
Constructive possession is often established entirely by circumstantial evidence. Id.
¶ 22 Control is established where the defendant has the intent and capability to maintain control
and dominion over contraband, even without personal present dominion over it. People v. Spencer,
2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Proof that a defendant controlled the premises where contraband
is found creates an inference of knowledge and possession, and habitation in the premises may be
sufficient evidence of control to establish constructive possession. People v. Jackson, 2019 IL App
(1st) 161745, ¶ 27. “Evidence of residency or habitation often takes the form of rent receipts, utility
bills, or mail.” Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 19. Knowledge may be established by the
defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct from which it may be inferred that he knew the
contraband existed where it was found. People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 40.
¶ 23 Knowledge and possession are factual issues on which we will not disturb the factfinder’s
conclusions unless the evidence is “so unbelievable, improbable, or palpably contrary to the verdict
that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817, ¶ 25. The trier of fact may rely on inferences of
knowledge and possession to sustain a conviction. People v. McCarter, 339 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879
(2003). “Constructive possession is not diminished by evidence of others’ access to contraband.”
Jackson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161745, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 338 (2010));
see also People v. Tates, 2016 IL App (1st) 140619, ¶ 25 (possession may be joint, as when
multiple individuals have immediate, exclusive control of contraband or the intention and power
to exercise control).
¶ 24 Here, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Edwards had constructive possession of
the heroin. Through the pod camera, Kulisek observed Edwards enter and exit the apartment
building, and unlock a mailbox attached to the building, on the day the search warrant was
executed. Edwards last exited the building just after 3:42 p.m., he drove away around 4:20 p.m.,
and he returned as a passenger in the same vehicle around 6:06 p.m. The vehicle parked in the
building’s driveway, and Edwards was standing outside the building when officers arrived around
6:24 p.m. to execute the search warrant. Sandoval accessed the building and apartment with the
keys from the vehicle’s ignition. Inside the apartment, officers recovered a Com Ed bill, bearing
Edwards’s name and the apartment’s address, which was dated April 9, 2018. Additionally, Perez
observed other documents bearing Edwards’s name. The apartment had two bedrooms that each
contained clothing and personal effects. The heroin was discovered on a plate behind the
television, along with a credit card in Edwards’s name that would expire in April 2020. As Edwards
(1) was seen exiting and entering the apartment building and accessing the mailbox, (2) the keys
from the vehicle he drove opened the door to the apartment, (3) an electricity bill addressed to him
was found therein, and (4) his credit card was on the plate with heroin, the evidence was sufficient
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for a factfinder to conclude that Edwards controlled the apartment and the area where the heroin
was found, and knew of the heroin’s presence.
¶ 25 Contending that the State did not prove he controlled the apartment, Edwards compares his
case to Maldonado. There, officers searched a home and discovered several boxes of ammunition,
a box with a scale and $1500, and heroin hidden in a statue. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874,
¶ 3. No one was home before, during, or after the search. Id. Officers recovered (1) a mass
marketing mailer addressed to the defendant at the address, (2) an unopened envelope from a bank
which was addressed to the defendant and his wife at the address, and (3) a delivery receipt which
(a) depicted the defendant’s name as the purchaser, (b) listed the house’s address as the purchaser’s
address, and (c) was signed by defendant’s wife’s as receiver. Id. ¶¶ 7, 28.
¶ 26 The defendant appealed his convictions for possessing the contraband. Id. ¶ 17. We found
that the mail and delivery receipt were insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant controlled the home—and, therefore, the contraband—as he was absent during the
search, never admitted his residency, was never seen inside the location, and there were no other
indicia of his residency. Id. ¶¶ 34, 37. Although it was “arguabl[e]” that the defendant controlled
the premises (id. ¶ 41), we stated:
“Numerous reported decisions reference mail as part of the evidence used to support an
inference that the defendant controlled the location where the contraband was recovered
regardless of whether the defendant was present at the time of the seizure. While it is clear
from existing case law that mail addressed to a defendant found where contraband is
recovered may be sufficient to allow an inference of residency, and thereby control, we
will not draw the same inference when a defendant is not present during the execution of a
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search warrant and other indicia of residency or an admission of residency is not shown.”
Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 27 Here, officers recovered a Com Ed bill addressed to Edwards at the residence’s address,
dated one month prior. See Jackson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161745, ¶ 40 (distinguishing utility bills
from the “junk mail” in Maldonado). While Edwards was not inside the apartment when the search
occurred, the pod camera recorded him exiting and entering the building a few hours before the
search, unlocking a mailbox, driving away, and returning as a passenger in the same vehicle. When
officers arrived, Edwards was outside the vehicle, which was parked in the building’s driveway,
and officers accessed the building and apartment with keys from the vehicle’s ignition. Perez
testified that a basket on the television stand contained other documents bearing Edwards’s name,
and an unexpired credit card with Edwards’s name was on the plate with the heroin behind the
television. Thus, other indicia of residency in addition to the Com Ed bill established Edwards’s
control of the apartment. Moreover, although another man was in the apartment, we noted in
Maldonado that it is “settled law” that constructive possession may be established through joint
possession or when others have access to the contraband. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874,
¶ 43.
¶ 28 Similarly distinguishable is People v. Fernandez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141667, where the
defendant had keys to a residence where officers recovered a firearm hidden under a mattress in a
bedroom and more contraband in the garage. Fernandez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141667, ¶¶ 11-12. The
bedroom where the firearm was found also contained the defendant’s photographs and a dresser,
on top of which was the defendant’s insurance card, and which had a drawer holding the
defendant’s passport. Id. ¶¶ 11, 20. More photographs of the defendant hung in the living room.
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Id. ¶ 11. However, no bills or other mail connected the defendant to the residence, the passport and
insurance card had no address, and evidence showed that he received mail elsewhere. Id. ¶¶ 11,
19. An unidentified man was in the residence during the search, and no evidence placed the
defendant in the residence at any time. Id. ¶¶ 10, 21-22.
¶ 29 Here, the Com Ed bill was addressed to Edwards at the apartment, he was in the building
the day of the search and unlocked a mailbox affixed to the building, the keys from a vehicle he
drove accessed the building and apartment, and no evidence showed that he received mail
elsewhere. Thus, we cannot say that no rational factfinder could find that Edwards controlled the
apartment. Edwards’s contentions to the contrary would require us to reweigh the evidence, a
responsibility reserved for the factfinder. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.
¶ 30 The State also presented evidence that Edwards controlled the area where the heroin was
found and knew of its presence. While the heroin was on a plate hidden behind the television and
the trial court found Edwards not guilty of possessing the methamphetamine on the television
stand, Edwards’s credit card was on the plate of heroin. Edwards notes the credit card was unsigned
and remained in the apartment when he left, positing that he did not use the credit card and it is
therefore insufficient to connect him to the heroin. However, that someone else may have placed
Edwards’s credit card on a plate of heroin is a possible explanation of innocence that the trial court
was not required to raise to a reasonable doubt. In re Jonathan C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. Given
the evidence that Edwards controlled the premises, the presence of his credit card on a plate of
heroin creates a reasonable inference that he controlled the area where the heroin was found and
thereby knew of its presence. See Jackson 2019 IL App (1st) 161745, ¶ 27 (proof that a defendant
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controls the premises creates an inference of knowledge of possession); see also Lloyd, 2013 IL
113510, ¶ 42 (reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State).
¶ 31 In so holding, we reject Edwards’s comparisons to Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, and
People v. Zentz, 26 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1975). In Terrell, officers discovered the defendant’s passport,
probation card, prescription bottles, and photograph in the living room of a residence. Terrell, 2017
IL App (1st) 142726, ¶¶ 5, 7. Officers also recovered contraband in a hidden compartment in a
hallway closet. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. We concluded that “the hidden location of the contraband and the State’s
failure to prove that [the defendant] ever entered the home” created a reasonable doubt of his
knowledge of the contraband. Id. ¶ 31. Here, though, the evidence showed Edwards was in the
building on the day of the search, and a credit card in his name was on the plate of heroin, which
supports the inference that he knew of the heroin.
¶ 32 In Zentz, officers recovered a shotgun in the trunk of a vehicle parked near a tavern where
the defendant was arrested, along with credit cards and tax forms bearing the defendant’s name.
Zentz, 26 Ill. App. 3d at 266. A witness further testified that he had chauffeured the defendant in a
similar vehicle months before, and the defendant always possessed a similar shotgun which he
sometimes placed in the trunk. Id. at 266-67. On appeal, we concluded that the State did not prove
the defendant possessed the shotgun because no evidence showed he owned, used, or drove the
vehicle the day the shotgun was discovered, and officers did not recover from the defendant a key
to the vehicle. Id. at 267.
¶ 33 Edwards argues that, likewise, his credit card does not establish his knowledge of the
heroin. However, while no other evidence linked the defendant in Zentz to the vehicle, the State
here presented sufficient evidence linking Edwards to the apartment where the heroin was found
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to establish his control. A rational factfinder could therefore infer from the presence of Edwards’s
credit card that he knew of the heroin. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Edwards constructively
possessed the heroin.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
¶ 37
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