People v. Ebel

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250112-U

Order filed July 20, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-25-0112 ) Circuit No. 20-CF-1974 ) ROBERT F. EBEL, ) Honorable ) Judge Margaret O’Connell, Defendant-Appellant. ) Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Peterson and Davenport concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court properly considered all relevant evidence in mitigation and aggravation and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Affirmed.

¶2 Defendant, Robert F. Ebel, pled guilty to one count of aggravated driving under the

influence causing death (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(F) (West 2020)) and crossing a

designated median (id. § 11-708(d)). Defendant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.

Defendant challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing that the court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense during sentencing and that his sentence was excessive given the aggravating

and mitigating factors presented. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 22, 2020, defendant was driving his Tesla southbound on I-55. A semi-truck

was in the right-hand lane, and defendant drove onto the right shoulder of the road in an effort to

maneuver around the semi-truck. John Exner’s vehicle was stopped on the shoulder at that time.

Defendant struck Exner’s vehicle, causing injuries that ultimately resulted in Exner’s death. Due

to the extent of Exner’s injuries, defendant voluntarily submitted to blood and urine testing. No

volatiles were found in defendant’s blood, but cocaine metabolite and cocaine were detected in his

urine.

¶5 The State filed a felony complaint against defendant alleging, inter alia, one count of

aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) causing death (id. § 11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(F)), a Class

2 felony, as well as a citation and complaint for crossing a designated median (id. § 11-708(d)), a

petty offense. Defendant was taken into custody and subsequently released with conditions after

posting bond. As part of these conditions, defendant was ordered to “[n]ot possess or consume any

controlled substances, except as medically prescribed, and submit to drug testing as directed by

the Pretrial Unit.” Defendant’s bond was increased several times following various violations, and

he was eventually taken back into custody.

¶6 Defendant ultimately pled guilty to one count of aggravated DUI causing death and one

count of improperly crossing a dividing space on the roadway. Defendant was informed that the

sentencing range for the aggravated DUI causing death count was 3 to 14 years in the penitentiary.

Id. § 11-501(d)(2)(G). The court found a sufficient factual basis for defendant’s plea, ordered a

presentence report, and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

2 ¶7 The presentence report included, in relevant part, defendant’s statement that he had always

been an aggressive driver and that his philosophy had been “if you buy a fast car then use it.” He

expressed remorse for the accident and Exner’s death. He indicated that he had used one-half of a

gram of cocaine the evening before the accident. He was previously arrested in 2009 for DUI and

was sentenced to court supervision, which was successfully terminated in 2011. In June 2021 and

December 2021, defendant checked himself into rehab and completed the recommended treatment

programs. The report also included an incident report dated August 5, 2024, related to a physical

altercation between defendant and another inmate, resulting in defendant serving 25 days of

disciplinary segregation.

¶8 At the sentencing hearing, the State first called Sean Reeves, a former sergeant with the

Illinois State Police who was assigned to investigate the accident. Reeves spoke with Richard

Santiago, a civilian who approached the scene of the accident prior to first responders arriving.

The State moved to admit a video recording of Santiago’s interview, wherein he recounted

approaching Exner’s vehicle after the accident, observing his injuries, and attempting to render

aid.

¶9 Reeves further explained that he had obtained a series of photographs from the cloud-based

storage system from defendant’s vehicle, which showed defendant’s vantage point moments

before and after the collision. The photographs show defendant’s vehicle driving behind the semi-

truck in the right-hand lane, pulling onto the shoulder of the road where Exner’s vehicle can be

seen, encroaching on Exner’s vehicle, and then surrounded by debris as defendant’s vehicle left

the roadway following the collision.

3 ¶ 10 On cross-examination, Reeves confirmed that defendant had not fled the scene, appeared

cooperative, and had expressed “some” concern for Exner. Reeves also testified that defendant

voluntarily surrendered following the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.

¶ 11 The State next called Nicholas Johnson, who was also traveling southbound on I-55 on the

day of the accident. Johnson testified that he “immediately” noticed an “aggressive Tesla” driven

by defendant. He described defendant’s driving as follows:

“Very aggressive, multiple lane changes, abrupt lane changes where the whole vehicle

jerks. There is the sudden side-shift motion. Multiple vehicles had to hit their brakes to

avoid. I am talking paper thin gaps on the lane changes. Multiple people had to back off

their speed because of his driving.”

Johnson saw defendant drive onto the shoulder of the road, at which point he observed “a massive

acceleration in the vehicle.” Johnson’s view of defendant’s vehicle was obstructed by the semi-

truck, but he noticed the scattering of dust and debris, as well as a change in the traffic pattern.

¶ 12 Johnson pulled over and exited his vehicle, and he noticed Exner’s vehicle “90 degrees to

the direction of traffic. So it was in the grass portion of the shoulder pointing directly at traffic.”

Johnson recounted having to cut the airbags off of Exner’s passenger window to gain access to

him. He described Exner’s injuries and condition. Johnson was then alerted to another vehicle in

the tree line, where he located defendant in his vehicle. He described defendant as follows:

“He was very, very, relaxed for what had just happened. I had asked a question. I was like

hey, are you okay. He didn’t answer me, didn’t acknowledge my presence at all. He was

on the phone. I could hear him asking for the tow truck, doesn’t matter about the car, it’s

total[]ed, just give me a ride home.”

4 When asked whether defendant showed any concern for Exner, Johnson responded, “Absolutely

not.” On cross-examination, Johnson testified that he had not informed defendant of Exner’s

condition and did not know whether defendant had seen Exner or his vehicle.

¶ 13 The State then called Tyler Terrazas, a certified traffic crash reconstruction officer with the

Illinois State Police. Terrazas testified that the posted speed limit at the location of the accident

was 55 miles per hour. Terrazas responded to the scene, located Exner’s vehicle, and observed his

injuries. Terrazas then located defendant and noted that he did not have any serious injuries. The

fire department arrived and had to extricate Exner from his vehicle, which took approximately 15

minutes.

¶ 14 Terrazas further testified that he had reviewed audio and visual recordings of statements

defendant made while seated in a squad car at the scene, and they were admitted into evidence.

One of the videos showed defendant explaining that he was weaving through traffic and did not

initially see Exner’s vehicle on the shoulder. Upon seeing Exner’s vehicle, defendant thought he

could fit between the gap created by the semi-truck in the right-hand lane and Exner’s vehicle on

the shoulder but that he failed to do so. He stated, “It’s a hundred percent my fault. I was driving

recklessly trying to get my daughter. It was ridiculous and stupid, and my kids always yell at me

for doing it. And, um, here I am. Sixty thousand [unintelligible].” It was later clarified that the

unintelligible portion of the video was in reference to the price of defendant’s Tesla.

¶ 15 Terrazas did not observe any overt signs of drug impairment during his interaction with

defendant but noted that drug impairment is more difficult to detect than alcohol impairment.

Defendant can be seen on another squad car video stating that he had not consumed any alcohol

prior to the accident and that he only took prescription medication. While still at the scene and

seated in a squad car, another video showed defendant discussing the speed of his Tesla, as well

5 other vehicles he previously owned, and indicating that he had driven as fast as 120 miles per hour

on a separate occasion. When read the warning to motorists and asked whether he would submit

to blood and urine testing, defendant stated that he had a medical marijuana card and had smoked

the night prior. Defendant ultimately agreed to the testing.

¶ 16 Terrazas explained that both Exner’s and defendant’s vehicles were equipped with event

data recorders (EDRs), which captured each vehicle’s activity for the five seconds immediately

preceding the airbag deployment. Exner’s EDR showed that his vehicle was stopped until the

moment of impact. Defendant’s EDR showed that he was traveling at approximately 73 miles per

hour 5 seconds before the collision, approximately 86 miles per hour 2.5 seconds before the

collision, and 96.9 miles per hour at the time of the collision. During those five seconds,

defendant’s EDR showed no attempt at braking. Also admitted into evidence were photographs

showing the scene of the accident, as well as extensive damage to the vehicles.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Terrazas agreed that defendant’s increasing speed in the five

seconds before the collision “was an effort to get in the hole between the truck, in front of the truck

actually, so he wouldn’t strike the car that was parked on the shoulder ***.” Terrazas further

confirmed that defendant was “cooperative and polite.” He testified that he did not inform

defendant of Exner’s condition, but defendant was aware Exner was transported to the hospital for

injuries. With respect to defendant’s submission to blood and urine testing, the court stated for the

record (based on prior proceedings) that defendant requested catheterization at the hospital in an

effort to comply with the urinalysis and that the catheterization took two attempts. Terrazas agreed

that this was “extraordinary cooperation” that he had never experienced before.

¶ 18 Randolph Reed, a Du Page County pretrial services officer who was assigned to defendant,

testified as the State’s next witness. Reed monitored the conditions of defendant’s release from

6 custody. Reed recounted defendant’s several bond violations, including tampering with a drug

patch, failure to report for testing, and positive drug tests for cocaine. On cross-examination, Reed

confirmed that defendant did not test positive for a controlled substance while he was in treatment

and that relapses are not uncommon for individuals who struggle with substance abuse.

¶ 19 The State also introduced an audio excerpt of a phone call between defendant and his son

while defendant was in jail. During the call, defendant’s son indicated that, when asked by others

how long defendant would remain in custody, his son’s response was that he did not know.

Defendant responded, “Like who?” Defendant’s son responded that he had mentioned to his

friends that his father was in jail. Defendant laughed and asked whether his son told them that

defendant got in an accident and killed someone. Defendant continued, “I mean, you didn’t say

like DUI. I mean, I don’t, I didn’t get a DUI.” When his son questioned this, defendant responded

that it technically was a DUI but that he was not impaired. Defendant stated that, in any other state

he “would have been fine” and that it was “complete bull***.”

¶ 20 The court heard multiple victim impact statements from Exner’s family.

¶ 21 In mitigation, defendant presented letters confirming his completion of the two

rehabilitation programs, character letters, and expert testimony. Defendant called Dr. James

O’Donnell, a pharmacologist, as his expert witness. O’Donnell testified that he reviewed the

accident report, toxicology reports, squad car videos of defendant, hospital and medical records,

police reports, and relevant literature. He also interviewed defendant. From there, O’Donnell

concluded that defendant was not impaired at the time of the accident. He testified that the signs

of cocaine intoxication—hyperactivity, dilated pupils, rapid speech, flight of ideas, and

incoherence of speech—were not present in defendant immediately following the accident.

7 ¶ 22 O’Donnell continued that a substance detected in urine cannot be used to conclude how the

drug is impacting the body, as “the bladder is for all intents and purposes outside the body,” and

substances in the bladder are not absorbed. The cocaine metabolite was merely evidence that the

drug had been used at one time, up to three days prior for the occasional user. O’Donnell explained

that the only way to infer a drug’s impact on the body is if a certain quantity is in the blood in its

active form. “Since we have no cocaine in the blood, there is no possible cocaine effects on the

body.”

¶ 23 The court sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment and ordered restitution to Exner’s

family. The court specifically noted that it did not consider Exner’s death in fashioning its sentence

because it was an element of the offense. The court continued,

“I have looked at the factors in aggravation and mitigation. And as it relates to the factors

in aggravation, I do find, number one, that the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened

serious harm. I find that this was due to a conscious disregard for anyone else on the road

that day which resulted in [Exner’s] death. And I do find that the sentence is necessary to

deter others from committing the same crime.”

Regarding the mitigation factors, the court rejected defendant’s argument that his conduct was a

result of circumstances unlikely to recur, citing his continued drug usage. The court recounted

defendant’s several bond violations and the jail infraction. The court took notice of the evidence

that defendant checked himself into treatment at two different rehabilitation facilities.

¶ 24 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that (1) the court

failed to address his primary argument—that he was unimpaired at the time of the offense; (2) his

sentence created an unwarranted sentencing disparity with similarly situated defendants; and (3)

other factors in mitigation should be reconsidered because defendant’s bond violations did not

8 involve driving, his treatment reduced the risk of recidivism, and he agreed to compensate Exner’s

family for Exner’s funeral expenses.

¶ 25 At the hearing on defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the court stated that it “did accept

*** as a fact” that defendant was unimpaired at the time of the offense and considered this fact as

part of defendant’s sentence. The court also accepted that none of the bond violations involved

defendant driving. As to defendant’s argument that treatment reduced his risk of recidivism, the

court noted that the bond violations occurred before, during, and after treatment. Therefore, the

court rejected this argument and denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration. This appeal

followed.

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues that the court (1) improperly considered Exner’s death, a

factor inherent in the offense, in fashioning its sentence and (2) imposed an excessive sentence

when considering the aggravating and mitigating factors. We address each argument in turn.

¶ 28 A. Exner’s Death as an Aggravating Factor at Sentencing

¶ 29 Initially, the State contends that defendant’s argument that the court improperly considered

Exner’s death during sentencing was forfeited because it was not raised in his motion to reconsider.

However, forfeiture limits the parties, not the court, and we “may look beyond considerations of

forfeiture to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent or where the interests of justice so

require.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 118. Accordingly, regardless of forfeiture, we

address the merits of defendant’s argument.

¶ 30 Defendant acknowledges the court’s initial statement that it did not consider Exner’s death

in rendering its sentence but challenges its subsequent finding that defendant’s conduct caused or

threatened serious harm based upon “his conscious disregard for anyone else on the road that day

9 which resulted in [Exner’s] death.” (Emphasis added.) From this, defendant concludes that the

court did, in fact, expressly and improperly consider Exner’s death as an aggravating factor

notwithstanding its initial statement to the contrary.

¶ 31 “Generally, a circuit court may not use a factor implicit in the offense for which the

defendant was convicted as an aggravating factor at sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] Stated

differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for

imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512, ¶ 51. A trial court may, however,

consider the manner in which the victim’s death occurred, as well as the seriousness, nature, and

circumstances of the offense. People v. Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 88. It is the ultimate

result—here, the victim’s death—that may not be considered in sentencing. Id. We review de novo

whether the court considered an improper factor during sentencing. People v. Minor, 2019 IL App

(3d) 180171, ¶ 28.

¶ 32 There exists a strong presumption that the court utilized proper legal reasoning when

fashioning its sentence, and a reviewing court must consider the entire record rather than isolated

statements made by the court. People v. Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 24. Moreover, “[a]

court is not required to refrain from mentioning factors that constitute elements of the offense.” Id.

¶ 33 Here, the court explicitly stated that it did not consider Exner’s death to be an aggravating

factor. “As the court took the time to make that statement, we must assume that it acted

accordingly.” Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 89. Although the court acknowledged that

defendant’s conduct resulted in Exner’s death, this was noted within the court’s broader statement

that defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm in that he displayed a “conscious

disregard for anyone else on the road that day.” (Emphasis added.) The court’s focus on “anyone

10 else” illustrates that the primary consideration with respect to this aggravating factor was not

Exner’s death. Rather, it was the threat of serious harm to any motorist that was on the road with

defendant that day. “[A] sentencing court may consider the threat to the general public and not just

to the named victim.” Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 30. This consideration speaks to the

severity of the risk, “including the proximity of defendant’s conduct to potential victims other than

[the victim].” (Emphasis in original.) Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 89. Indeed, the court

heard Johnson’s testimony that he observed defendant’s aggressive driving leading up to the

collision, which required other motorists to reduce their own speed to avoid colliding with

defendant. The court’s mere mention of Exner’s death does not alter our conclusion. See Jeffers,

2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 24 (“[a] court is not required to refrain from mentioning factors that

constitute elements of the offense”). We therefore reject defendant’s argument that the court

improperly considered Exner’s death in rendering its sentence.

¶ 34 B. Excessive Sentence

¶ 35 Defendant next challenges his sentence as excessive. In support, defendant first notes that

the DUI statute was intended to keep impaired drivers off the road. People v. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d 267,

269 (1994). Because the court found that defendant was not impaired at the time of the accident,

he concludes that a 12-year sentence “is not in keeping with” the spirit and purpose of the DUI

law. Second, defendant contends that the court assigned insufficient weight to his “extraordinary

cooperation and acceptance of responsibility,” and too much weight to his bond violations. Finally,

he argues that his sentence was manifestly disproportionate to the offense and “grossly disparate

from similarly situated defendants” in other cases.

¶ 36 A defendant’s sentence should reflect both the seriousness of the offense and the goal of

restoring the defendant to useful citizenship. People v. Jones, 2015 IL App (1st) 142597, ¶ 38. The

11 most important factor, however, is the seriousness of the offense. People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App

(1st) 122345, ¶ 123. Where the record contains evidence of mitigating factors, we must presume

that these factors were considered by the court unless there is some indication, other than the

sentence itself, to the contrary. People v. Weiser, 2013 IL App (5th) 120055, ¶ 31. The court has

broad discretion in weighing and balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. “Because the

trial court is in the superior position to evaluate factors such as the defendant’s credibility, habits,

age, demeanor, and general moral character, a reviewing court will not substitute its own judgment

merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.” People v. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st)

170886, ¶ 50. A court need not explain the weight it assigned to each factor. Weiser, 2013 IL App

(5th) 120055, ¶ 35.

¶ 37 A sentence that falls within the statutory range is presumed proper unless it “greatly varies

[from] the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the

offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 33. Here, the statutorily prescribed sentencing

range was 3 to 14 years. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2020). A sentence will not be

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170886, ¶ 50.

¶ 38 We begin with defendant’s assertion that the court’s finding regarding his level of

impairment should have resulted in a lesser sentence. While defendant correctly states that the DUI

statute is “intended to keep drug-impaired drivers off the road,” (Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 269) it also

recognizes that “while it is possible to determine scientifically the amount of alcohol that renders

a driver impaired, it is not possible to do the same for drugs.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Martin,

2011 IL 109102, ¶ 23. The “legal fiction of presumed impairment” is therefore applied to driving

with any amount of controlled substances in the system. Id. As such, notwithstanding the court’s

finding regarding the level of defendant’s impairment, defendant’s sentence was not contrary to

12 the spirit and purpose of the law, which is to keep drivers who have any amount of controlled

substances in their systems off the road.

¶ 39 Moreover, to the extent defendant’s level of impairment may have been relevant to the

court’s consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense at sentencing, the record

demonstrates that the court considered this factor in fashioning its sentence. Essentially, defendant

argues that this was a mitigating factor that should have been assigned more weight resulting in a

shorter sentence. However, as a reviewing court, we cannot substitute our own judgment and

disturb a defendant’s sentence merely because we may have weighed the factors differently. Cruz,

2019 IL App (1st) 170886, ¶ 50.

¶ 40 Defendant further challenges the weight the court placed on his cooperation with law

enforcement following the accident, acceptance of responsibility, and several bond violations.

Again, we cannot reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to conclude that the court abused

its discretion in imposing its sentence simply because they could have been weighed differently.

Id.; People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999) (“A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial

court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and

the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court,

which must rely on the ‘cold’ record.”).

¶ 41 Finally, defendant cites several cases in support of his contention that similarly situated

defendants in other cases have received lesser sentences, thereby demonstrating that his sentence

was manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and grossly disparate relative to other

defendants. However, as correctly noted by the State, our supreme court in Fern rejected cross-

case comparative sentencing, reasoning that it “does not comport with our sentencing scheme’s

goal of individualized sentencing and would unduly interfere with the sentencing discretion vested

13 in our trial courts.” Id. at 55. “The fact that a lesser sentence was imposed in another case has no

bearing on whether the sentence in the case at hand is excessive on the facts of that case.”

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 56. While defendant correctly states that “fundamental fairness

requires that similarly situated defendants not receive grossly disparate sentences,” this notion “has

been applied *** only in the context of codefendants involved in the same crime.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. at 58.

¶ 42 In his reply brief, defendant disagrees with the State’s assertion that he has suggested cross-

comparative sentencing. Defendant, instead, argues that a court may consider sentences “in other

cases for other purposes,” such as to demonstrate that the 12-year sentence imposed here does not

align with the spirit and purpose of the law. Engaging in such comparisons to determine if a

specific sentence aligns with the spirit and purpose of the law, however, similarly runs afoul of the

“sentencing scheme’s goal of individualized sentencing and would unduly interfere with the

sentencing discretion vested in our trial courts.” Id. at 55. Defendant provides no persuasive

support otherwise. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to

12 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page

County.

¶ 45 Affirmed.