NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250680-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 23, 2026 not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-0680 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Stark County EDWARD E. EATON JR., ) No. 13CF22 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) James A. Mack, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.
¶2 In June 2014, defendant, Edward E. Eaton Jr., pleaded guilty to predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)) and was sentenced to 24 years’
imprisonment. Following proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), the trial court granted defendant postconviction relief and allowed
him to file a motion to reconsider his sentence.
¶3 After multiple remands for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017), postplea counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate and an amended motion to
reconsider defendant’s sentence. See People v. Eaton, No. 3-21-0088 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished
order); People v. Eaton, 2024 IL App (4th) 230859-U. The trial court held a hearing on the amended motion to reconsider on February 14, 2025. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the
court reduced defendant’s sentence to 21 years’ imprisonment. Postplea counsel then filed a
motion to reconsider the 21-year sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion to
reconsider. Defendant appeals, arguing his sentence is excessive because the court failed to give
proper weight to certain mitigating factors. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In September 2013, defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)). Defendant
subsequently entered a plea of guilty to one count, and the other count was dismissed. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
¶6 On June 27, 2016, defendant filed a postconviction petition under the Act pertaining
to plea counsel’s failure to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. The trial court granted
defendant postconviction relief in October 2019 and allowed him to file a motion to reconsider his
sentence. Postplea counsel subsequently filed a motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence but did
not file a certificate of compliance in accordance with Rule 604(d).
¶7 In February 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider his
sentence following a hearing. On appeal, the Appellate Court, Third District, granted defendant’s
unopposed motion to remand for compliance with Rule 604(d) and dismissed the appeal. Eaton,
No. 3-21-0088 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished order).
¶8 On remand, the trial court allowed postplea counsel to file a Rule 604(d) certificate
nunc pro tunc to the date the motion to reconsider counsel sentence was filed. No new hearing was
held on the motion to reconsider.
¶9 In August 2024, this court vacated the denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider
-2- and remanded for new postplea proceedings and strict compliance with Rule 604(d). Eaton, 2024
IL App (4th) 230859-U, ¶ 22.
¶ 10 On remand, postplea counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate and an amended
motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence. The amended motion asserted the original sentencing
court improperly considered the psychological harm it had witnessed in other sexual assault cases
when sentencing defendant in this case. The motion also raised defendant’s history of mental
disability as mitigating evidence omitted by plea counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled
on the amended motion:
“I reviewed the charges, the plea, [the] appellate opinion that brings us here today,
the motion to reconsider, response to the motion to reconsider. So I have reviewed
the original [presentence investigation report (PSI)] prepared in this case, sections
of [the] transcript as well as prior words from the appellate court.
In reviewing all of these—[the] case law that’s cited, I do believe that
[defendant’s] sentence was excessive. I believe that the original sentencing judge
put—although he can consider harm to the victim, his statements went beyond that
and beyond what was presented at the sentencing hearing.
Addressing the other matters brought up in the motion brought up in the
motion, [that] there was mitigating evidence *** not put into evidence by the
original attorney. However, those items were all in the [PSI] in regard to diminished
capacity, the accident, the finding of disability and special education classes, and
the like, prior to this.”
¶ 11 The trial court reduced defendant’s sentence to 21 years’ imprisonment. Postplea
counsel then filed a new motion to reconsider defendant’s 21-year sentence and an accompanying
-3- Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues his 21-year sentence is excessive. Specifically,
defendant contends the trial court failed to give proper weight to several mitigating factors,
including his history of mental illness and substance abuse, his traumatic upbringing, a previous
finding of unfitness, and his guilty plea.
¶ 15 A trial court’s sentence must be based on “the particular circumstances of the case,
including (1) the defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative potential; (2) the seriousness of
the offense; (3) the need to protect society; and (4) the need for punishment and deterrence.”
People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 102. Additionally, the Unified Code of
Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2012)) sets forth the mitigating and
aggravating factors the court must consider when determining an appropriate sentence. See
Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105. However, “[t]he weight to be given to any proper
factor *** is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 104. “A trial court’s sentence is an abuse of
discretion only if it is greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 38.
Moreover, “[a] sentence imposed within the statutory range provided by the legislature is
presumed to be proper.” Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 104. “In considering the propriety
of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.”
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250680-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 23, 2026 not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-0680 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Stark County EDWARD E. EATON JR., ) No. 13CF22 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) James A. Mack, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.
¶2 In June 2014, defendant, Edward E. Eaton Jr., pleaded guilty to predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)) and was sentenced to 24 years’
imprisonment. Following proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), the trial court granted defendant postconviction relief and allowed
him to file a motion to reconsider his sentence.
¶3 After multiple remands for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017), postplea counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate and an amended motion to
reconsider defendant’s sentence. See People v. Eaton, No. 3-21-0088 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished
order); People v. Eaton, 2024 IL App (4th) 230859-U. The trial court held a hearing on the amended motion to reconsider on February 14, 2025. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the
court reduced defendant’s sentence to 21 years’ imprisonment. Postplea counsel then filed a
motion to reconsider the 21-year sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion to
reconsider. Defendant appeals, arguing his sentence is excessive because the court failed to give
proper weight to certain mitigating factors. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In September 2013, defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)). Defendant
subsequently entered a plea of guilty to one count, and the other count was dismissed. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
¶6 On June 27, 2016, defendant filed a postconviction petition under the Act pertaining
to plea counsel’s failure to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. The trial court granted
defendant postconviction relief in October 2019 and allowed him to file a motion to reconsider his
sentence. Postplea counsel subsequently filed a motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence but did
not file a certificate of compliance in accordance with Rule 604(d).
¶7 In February 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider his
sentence following a hearing. On appeal, the Appellate Court, Third District, granted defendant’s
unopposed motion to remand for compliance with Rule 604(d) and dismissed the appeal. Eaton,
No. 3-21-0088 (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished order).
¶8 On remand, the trial court allowed postplea counsel to file a Rule 604(d) certificate
nunc pro tunc to the date the motion to reconsider counsel sentence was filed. No new hearing was
held on the motion to reconsider.
¶9 In August 2024, this court vacated the denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider
-2- and remanded for new postplea proceedings and strict compliance with Rule 604(d). Eaton, 2024
IL App (4th) 230859-U, ¶ 22.
¶ 10 On remand, postplea counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate and an amended
motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence. The amended motion asserted the original sentencing
court improperly considered the psychological harm it had witnessed in other sexual assault cases
when sentencing defendant in this case. The motion also raised defendant’s history of mental
disability as mitigating evidence omitted by plea counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled
on the amended motion:
“I reviewed the charges, the plea, [the] appellate opinion that brings us here today,
the motion to reconsider, response to the motion to reconsider. So I have reviewed
the original [presentence investigation report (PSI)] prepared in this case, sections
of [the] transcript as well as prior words from the appellate court.
In reviewing all of these—[the] case law that’s cited, I do believe that
[defendant’s] sentence was excessive. I believe that the original sentencing judge
put—although he can consider harm to the victim, his statements went beyond that
and beyond what was presented at the sentencing hearing.
Addressing the other matters brought up in the motion brought up in the
motion, [that] there was mitigating evidence *** not put into evidence by the
original attorney. However, those items were all in the [PSI] in regard to diminished
capacity, the accident, the finding of disability and special education classes, and
the like, prior to this.”
¶ 11 The trial court reduced defendant’s sentence to 21 years’ imprisonment. Postplea
counsel then filed a new motion to reconsider defendant’s 21-year sentence and an accompanying
-3- Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues his 21-year sentence is excessive. Specifically,
defendant contends the trial court failed to give proper weight to several mitigating factors,
including his history of mental illness and substance abuse, his traumatic upbringing, a previous
finding of unfitness, and his guilty plea.
¶ 15 A trial court’s sentence must be based on “the particular circumstances of the case,
including (1) the defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative potential; (2) the seriousness of
the offense; (3) the need to protect society; and (4) the need for punishment and deterrence.”
People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 102. Additionally, the Unified Code of
Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2012)) sets forth the mitigating and
aggravating factors the court must consider when determining an appropriate sentence. See
Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105. However, “[t]he weight to be given to any proper
factor *** is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 104. “A trial court’s sentence is an abuse of
discretion only if it is greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 38.
Moreover, “[a] sentence imposed within the statutory range provided by the legislature is
presumed to be proper.” Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 104. “In considering the propriety
of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently.”
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999).
-4- ¶ 16 Based on his guilty plea to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, defendant
was subject to a sentencing range of 6 to 60 years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West
2012). The trial court imposed a sentence of 21 years, well within the statutory range, when it
lowered defendant’s original sentence by 3 years.
¶ 17 Defendant argues the trial court failed to give significant weight to several
mitigating factors that warranted a further reduction of his sentence. First, defendant contends his
history of mental illness and substance abuse was mitigating. Second, defendant points to his
challenging upbringing, including his own history of abuse, neglect, and disability. Third,
defendant explains he was found unfit to stand trial before being restored to fitness prior to his
guilty plea. Lastly, defendant asserts his guilty plea favored “leniency” in sentencing.
¶ 18 “[I]t is presumed a trial court considered all relevant mitigating and aggravating
factors in fashioning a sentence, and that presumption will not be overcome absent explicit
evidence from the record that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors.” People v.
Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 43. The court does not need to recite and assign value
to each factor it considers. People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 19. “A defendant’s
rehabilitative potential and other mitigating factors are not entitled to greater weight than the
seriousness of the offense.” People v. Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652 (2001). Further, the trial
court is not required to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed due to the existence of
mitigating factors. Id.
¶ 19 Here, all the mitigating factors defendant points to were presented to the trial court.
Nothing in the record affirmatively demonstrates the court failed to consider any of the mitigating
factors present. Indeed, the court expressly indicated it had reviewed defendant’s guilty plea, the
earlier sentencing hearing, and the original PSI containing mitigation evidence. The court reduced
-5- defendant’s sentence to 21 years after “reviewing all” of these matters. By arguing the court “failed
to give significant weight” to mitigating factors, defendant is essentially asking this court to
rebalance the mitigating and aggravating factors and substitute our judgment for the judgment of
the trial court, which we cannot and will not do. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214-15
(2010).
¶ 20 Further, not all of defendant’s proposed factors were inherently mitigating. While
“a trial court may properly grant leniency to the defendant who pleads guilty,” such decisions
belong to the trial court’s discretion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. O’Neal, 2021
IL App (4th) 200014, ¶ 71. Further, we note “the trial court [was] not required to view drug
addiction as a mitigating factor.” Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105. “Under the Unified
Code, drug addiction is not an explicit factor in mitigation or aggravation.” Id. “Instead, a history
of substance abuse is a ‘double-edged sword’ that the trial court may view as a mitigating or
aggravating factor.” Id. (quoting People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 83 (2005)).
¶ 21 When sentencing defendant, it was within the trial court’s discretion to weigh the
seriousness of his conduct over the mitigating factors. See Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 652 (“A
defendant’s rehabilitative potential and other mitigating factors are not entitled to greater weight
than the seriousness of the offense.”). Ultimately, the court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
-6-