People v. Duncan

2024 IL App (5th) 240588

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (5th) 240588 Decision filed 07/30/24. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0588 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for IN THE Rehearing or the disposition of the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Vermilion County. ) v. ) No. 24-CF-253 ) STETTSON DUNCAN, ) Honorable ) Robert E. McIntire, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Moore and Boie concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION ¶1 The State appeals the Vermilion County circuit court’s order granting defendant, Stettson

Duncan, pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)

(725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)). 1 The State argues that the circuit court erred by finding that

defendant was not charged with a detainable offense as provided in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the

Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit

court’s order and remand the matter for a new hearing consistent with this opinion.

1 As amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); see also Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023).

1 ¶2 I. Background

¶3 On April 18, 2024, the State charged defendant by information with the following: one

count of aggravated battery by strangulation (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(5) (West 2022)), a Class 3

felony; one count of possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2022)), a

Class 4 felony; and two counts of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1), (2) (West 2022)), Class A

misdemeanors. The State alleged that the offenses took place on April 17, 2024. In support of the

aggravated battery and battery counts, the State alleged that defendant strangled and grabbed the

neck of the victim, Amber Drullinger.

¶4 Also, on April 18, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release.

The State alleged in the petition that defendant was “charged with an offense under Section 110-

6.1(a)(1), (1.5) or (3) through (7),” that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community, and that no condition or combination of conditions could

mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based

on the specific articulable facts of the case. The State specifically noted that defendant committed

a felony involving the threat of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.

¶5 On April 19, 2024, the circuit court held a pretrial detention hearing. The State first

contended that defendant committed a detainable offense, where he committed an offense that

involved the threat of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The State

proffered that defendant, who was intoxicated, began choking the victim, Amber, as she drove

defendant to the liquor store. Amber stopped the vehicle when it became difficult for her to breathe.

Defendant exited the vehicle, and Amber drove to her parents’ house, where she called police.

Police responded and observed red markings on Amber’s neck. Police subsequently located

2 defendant, who denied choking Amber. Defendant claimed that Amber fabricated the incident.

Police found cocaine in defendant’s possession.

¶6 The State proffered that there were three separate orders of protection against defendant.

The State noted that some victims “in those orders of protection describe the same exact behavior

of this defendant, choking, in front of their children; and in prior cases in those orders of protection,

judges here in this county have granted those orders of protection.” The State noted that defendant

had three pending cases that were all violent, domestic violence-related offenses involving

different victims. The State further noted that defendant had prior criminal convictions for

aggravated battery, possession of a controlled substance, and battery, as well as a juvenile

conviction for aggravated battery.

¶7 The State argued that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed

“this offense” and that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the victim and the

community at large. The State highlighted the fact that defendant strangled the victim while she

was driving a car, which could have caused the victim to lose consciousness and cross into another

lane of traffic or strike a pedestrian. The State argued that the offense was detainable because

defendant’s act of strangling or choking the victim threatened great bodily harm.

¶8 Defense counsel argued that the offense of aggravated battery, as charged by the State, was

not one of the 18 forcible felonies listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5)

(West 2022)). Defense counsel also argued that the offense of aggravated battery by strangulation

did not fall under the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). The residual clause of section 110-

6.1(a)(1.5) makes “any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm

or permanent disability or disfigurement” detainable. Id.. Defense counsel relied on People v.

Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, in which the Third District held that the offenses of

3 aggravated battery of a peace officer and aggravated battery of a nurse were not detainable offenses

under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

¶9 The circuit court found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant

committed the charged offense of aggravated battery by strangulation and that defendant posed a

real and present threat to the safety of the victim and the community at large. In so finding, the

court relied on defendant’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offense. The

court also found that there was no condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate the

threat defendant posed. The court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

“So essentially what I have done and hope that the record is very clear that I have

checked all the boxes that would be [sic] need to be checked if this were a detainable

offense. I find [defense counsel’s] argument well thought out. I find it compelling. I find it

absurd that were [the victim] a family member, under the Domestic Violence Act, that

[defendant] unquestionably could be detained. *** According to Grandberry, and which I

think and I don’t see any contrary Fifth District authority yet, but under Grandberry, ***

what they have said is since aggravated battery causing great bodily harm or permanent

disfigurement is a named felony, they suggest—well, they don’t suggest. They rule that all

other forms of aggravated battery don’t fit under the residuary clause. And so frankly, I

find it an absurdity that apparently strangling a domestic partner is a detainable offense and

strangling someone who is a stranger isn’t. At least according to what I understand the case

law to be.

And so reluctantly, I am going to deny the State’s petition based on my

understanding of the cases that the People have not charged a detainable offense.”

4 ¶ 10 Also, on April 19, 2024, the circuit court entered a written “opinion” and a conditions of

pretrial release order. In the opinion, the court reiterated the findings it made at the detention

hearing. The court also found that “while the offense as alleged does not require proof of great

bodily harm as an element, the facts presented support a finding, and the court so finds, that in this

particular case Defendant’s conduct threatened great bodily harm or permanent disability or

disfigurement.” In the conditions of pretrial release order, the court found that defendant was not

charged with a detention-eligible offense. The court ordered defendant’s release under the

conditions that he appear in court to answer the charge as ordered by the court, submit to the orders

and process of the court, not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction, and file written notice

with the clerk within 24 hours after a change of address. In addition, the court ordered defendant

to report to pretrial services, not leave Illinois, refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous

weapon, and have no contact with the victim and/or the victim’s residence. The court further

ordered that defendant be subject to electronic global positioning system (GPS) monitoring.

¶ 11 On April 23, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to request relief pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The State generally asserted in the petition that

defendant was charged with an offense listed under, inter alia, section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), where the

charged offense was a felony involving a threat of great bodily harm. Thus, the State requested

that the circuit court reconsider defendant’s detention.

¶ 12 On April 26, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition for relief. The

State stood on its petition. Defense counsel stated, “No error was alleged in the petition, Your

Honor.” The court responded, “Well it is actually alleged, it’s just—but I understand your position

to be that the—you know, that the—essentially, the petition should be denied based on the law.”

The court reiterated its prior determination that it would have ordered defendant detained if he had

5 been charged with a detainable offense. The court explained that, based on its understanding of the

case law, aggravated battery by strangulation was excluded as a detainable offense. Thus, the court

denied the State’s petition for relief.

¶ 13 Also, on April 26, 2024, the State filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The Office of the State Appellate Defender was

appointed to represent defendant on appeal.

¶ 14 II. Analysis

¶ 15 On appeal, the State argues that this court should reverse the circuit court’s order granting

defendant pretrial release because defendant was charged with a detainable offense. Specifically,

the State argues that defendant was charged with a “forcible felony” under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

In response, defendant argues that this court should affirm the court’s order granting him pretrial

release because “no error was preserved in the State’s motion for relief and [he] was not charged

with a detainable offense.”

¶ 16 We first address defendant’s argument that no error was preserved in the State’s petition

for relief. Rule 604(h)(2) provides as follows:

“As a prerequisite to appeal, the party taking the appeal shall first present to the trial court

a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on appeal and the grounds for such

relief. The trial court shall promptly hear and decide the motion for relief. Upon appeal,

any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other than errors occurring for the first time at

the hearing on the motion for relief, shall be deemed waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (Apr.

15, 2024).

¶ 17 Here, the State’s petition for relief alleged that defendant was charged with an offense listed

under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) and that the charged offense was a felony involving a threat of great

6 bodily harm. At the hearing on the petition for relief, defense counsel stated that no error was

alleged in the petition, and the circuit court responded, “Well it is actually alleged, it’s just—but I

understand your position to be that the—you know, that the—essentially, the petition should be

denied based on the law.” We acknowledge that the State’s petition did not specifically allege that

the court erred in its application of the law. While the State’s petition could have been more artfully

worded, we conclude that the State’s petition was sufficient to notify the court of the alleged error,

as evidenced by the court’s statement to defense counsel and the court’s ruling on the State’s

petition. Thus, we reject defendant’s argument that the State waived review of the alleged error on

appeal.

¶ 18 We next consider whether the circuit court erred by determining that aggravated battery by

strangulation was not a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). We note that our

resolution of this issue requires us to interpret various statutes. “Statutory interpretation presents a

question of law that is subject to de novo review.” People v. Challans, 2024 IL App (5th) 240353,

¶ 11 (citing People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 15). “The primary object of statutory construction

is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, and all other rules are subordinate

to this principle.” Id. (citing People v. Jamison, 229 Ill. 2d 184, 188 (2008)). “The most reliable

indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.”

People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. “A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words

and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation.” Id. “Each word,

clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not

be rendered superfluous.” Id.

¶ 19 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)),

as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). Under the Code, a defendant’s pretrial

7 release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-

6.1 (West 2022). The circuit court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is

charged with a qualifying offense and the court concludes the defendant poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high

likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).

¶ 20 “The language of the Code requires that the defendant ‘is charged with’ a detainable offense

or an attempt of a detainable offense.” Challans, 2024 IL App (5th) 240353, ¶ 12 (quoting 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)). The State, here, alleged that defendant was charged with a

forcible felony made detainable under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“[T]he defendant is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this Section, means

treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a

child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery,

aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there is use of force against another person,

residential burglary, home invasion, vehicular invasion, aggravated arson, arson,

aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or

permanent disability or disfigurement or any other felony which involves the threat of or

infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement[.]” 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (2022).

¶ 21 Here, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery in violation of section 12-

3.05(a)(5) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(5) (West 2022)).

Section 12-3.05(a)(5) provides that a person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a

8 battery, he or she knowingly strangles another individual. Id. At issue is whether an aggravated

battery by strangulation is a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

¶ 22 The State first argues that an aggravated battery by strangulation is an “aggravated battery

resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement”—one of the 18 forcible

felonies listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). We disagree.

¶ 23 Section 12-3.05(a) of the Criminal Code provides:

“(a) Offense based on injury. A person commits aggravated battery when, in

committing a battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm, he or she knowingly does

any of the following:

(1) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.

(2) Causes severe and permanent disability, great bodily harm, or

disfigurement by means of a caustic or flammable substance, a poisonous gas, a

deadly biological or chemical contaminant or agent, a radioactive substance, or a

bomb or explosive compound.

(3) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to an

individual whom the person knows to be a peace officer, community policing

volunteer, fireman, private security officer, correctional institution employee, or

Department of Human Services employee supervising or controlling sexually

dangerous persons or sexually violent persons:

***

(4) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to an

individual 60 years of age or older.

(5) Strangles another individual.” Id. § 12-3.05(a).

9 ¶ 24 The State observes that “[t]he aggravated battery statute includes offenses based on the

nature of the injury, offenses based on injury to a child or person with an intellectual disability,

offenses based on location of the conduct, and offenses based on the status of the victim.” See id.

§ 12-3.05(a)-(d). The State asserts that aggravated battery by strangulation falls under the category

of offenses based on injury, evidencing the legislature’s intent to include aggravated battery by

strangulation in the same category as other offenses that involve great bodily harm or permanent

disability or disfigurement. According to the State, “[i]t would be redundant to show strangulation

as an offense which involves ‘the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability

or disfigurement.’ ” The State acknowledges that the other offenses listed in subsection (a) contain

the phrases “bodily harm or permanent disability” as descriptive language but claims the same

descriptive language “is not necessary for the act of strangulation” because the harm is “self-

evident.” The State notes that the legislature defined the word “strangle” as “intentionally

impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of an individual by applying pressure to

the throat or neck of that individual or by blocking the nose or mouth of that individual.” Id. § 12-

3.05(i).

¶ 25 However, the State fails to acknowledge that the legislature also included a provision that

elevates an aggravated battery based on strangulation from a Class 3 felony to a Class 1 felony

when, inter alia, “the person caused great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to

the other person while committing the offense.” Id. § 12-3.05(h)(B). The legislature’s inclusion of

this provision indicates that the legislature contemplated situations where strangulation would not

cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The State, here, charged

defendant with a Class 3 felony aggravated battery by strangulation and did not allege that

defendant caused great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. Accordingly, we

10 reject the State’s argument that aggravated battery by strangulation, as charged here, is an

“aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement”—one

of the 18 forcible felonies listed in section 110-6.1(a)(5)(1.5).

¶ 26 The State next argues that an aggravated battery by strangulation falls under the residual

clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), which provides that “any other felony which involves the threat

of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement” is detainable. We

agree.

¶ 27 As defendant correctly notes, several appellate courts have rejected similar arguments. See

Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546; People v. Brooks, 2024 IL App (4th) 240503. In

Grandberry, the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery of a peace officer

(based on the defendant’s act of spitting) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2022)) and six counts

of aggravated battery of a nurse (based on the defendant’s act of biting) (id. § 12-3.05(d)(11)).

Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, ¶ 3. The circuit court found that the defendant was charged

with a detainable offense. Id. ¶ 6. On appeal, the Third District concluded that aggravated battery

of a peace officer and aggravated battery of a nurse were not listed as forcible felonies in section

110-6.1(a)(1.5). Id. ¶ 11. The Third District also rejected the State’s argument that the “defendant’s

charges fell under the ‘any other felony’ portion of the statute.” Id. ¶ 12. In doing so, the Third

District reasoned as follows:

“The statute specifically lists 18 felonies that are considered forcible felonies and then

states ‘or any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm

or permanent disability or disfigurement.’ [Citation.] This language means any felonies

other than those listed. As the statute specifically enumerated a subset of aggravated battery

as a forcible felony (aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent

11 disability or disfigurement), ‘other felony’ must refer to felonies other than aggravated

battery, not different subsets of aggravated battery like we have here. Moreover, we note

that the list of forcible felonies includes some felonies without qualification, like robbery

and aggravated robbery, and others with qualification, like aggravated battery resulting in

great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and burglary where there is use

of force against another person. Had the legislature intended to include all aggravated

batteries, it would have done so.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 12.

Thus, the Third District found that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting the State’s

petition for detention because the defendant was not charged with a detainable offense and

remanded the matter back to the circuit court for the court to determine appropriate conditions for

pretrial release. Id. ¶ 13.

¶ 28 The Fourth District has followed the reasoning of Grandberry. See Brooks, 2024 IL App

(4th) 240503, ¶¶ 20, 21 (following the reasoning of Grandberry and concluding that aggravated

battery charge based on the location of the conduct at issue did not fall under the residual clause

of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). We note that, while similar, Grandberry and Brooks did not address

the specific issue before this court—whether aggravated battery by strangulation is a forcible

felony under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). After careful consideration, we decline to follow the

reasoning of Grandberry to the extent it applies here. See O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid

Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (“[T]he opinion of one district, division, or panel of

the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels.”).

¶ 29 In our view, the Third District improperly focused on the single word “other” in interpreting

section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). In viewing the statute as a whole, including the legislature’s use of the

words “any other felony” that “involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent

12 disability or disfigurement,” it is our view that the legislature included a residual clause to serve

as a “catch-all” mechanism, which allows the circuit courts to examine the specific facts and

circumstances of the charged offense and determine whether the defendant’s conduct implicates

the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). It is our interpretation that the legislature’s inclusion

of the residual clause was intended to focus on whether the conduct threatened or caused great

bodily harm—not on the specific felony offense committed. It is clear that the circuit court is in

the best position to evaluate the specific facts and circumstances of each case and determine if

pretrial release is appropriate or if detention is necessary to protect the public. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

2 (West 2022) (one purpose of the Code is to protect the safety of any other person or the

community); see also People v. Jones, 226 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1056 (1992) (“In seeking the intent

of the legislature the courts will not only consider the language used but also the evil to be remedied

and the object to be obtained.”). Thus, our interpretation of the residual clause allows the circuit

court to carefully examine the facts and circumstances of each case, consider whether the conduct

at issue is a felony that involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent

disability or disfigurement, and determine if detention is appropriate. See Jones, 226 Ill. App. 3d

at 1056 (“Although we believe our interpretation is what the legislature intended, we would

welcome further clarification by the legislature.”).

¶ 30 We note that, here, the circuit court expressly stated that, but for Grandberry, it would

order defendant detained based on its finding that defendant’s conduct threatened great bodily

harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The State’s proffer demonstrated that defendant

strangled the victim while the victim was operating a vehicle on a roadway. In our view, the

conduct at issue in the present case is precisely the conduct the legislature contemplated when

including the residual clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).

13 ¶ 31 Therefore, we decline to follow the reasoning of Grandberry to the extent it applies here

and conclude that the circuit court, in following that case, erred by determining that aggravated

battery by strangulation was not a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). We hold that

the offense of aggravated battery by strangulation may fall under the “any other felony” portion of

section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) if the circuit court determines that the offense involves the threat of or

infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.

¶ 32 III. Conclusion

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Vermilion County

and remand the matter back to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 34 Reversed and remanded.

14 People v. Duncan, 2024 IL App (5th) 240588

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, No. 24-CF- 253; the Hon. Robert E. McIntire, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys for Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People. Appellant:

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Samuel B. Steinberg, for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellee. Appellee: