People v. Duke

Opinion

People v Duke

2026 NY Slip Op 04873

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Horace Duke, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2023-07470, (Ind. No. 389/22)

Lara J. Genovesi, J.P.

Deborah A. Dowling

Lillian Wan

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Sussman & Associates, Goshen, NY (Michael H. Sussman of counsel), for appellant.

David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Goshen, NY (Edward D. Saslaw of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Craig S. Brown, J.), rendered July 25, 2023, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree for stabbing the victim after they both exited their respective vehicles during an apparent road rage incident, resulting in the victim's death.

The defendant contends that the People failed to establish that he intended to cause serious physical injury as required to support his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree (see Penal Law § 125.20[1]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Ramos, 19 NY3d 133, 136; People v Shaw, 230 AD3d 599, 601).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633; People v Shaw, 230 AD3d at 601).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court did not err in admitting evidence that the victim suffered from an alleged disabling medical condition. "[E]vidence is relevant if it has any 'tendency in reason to prove any material fact'" (People v Mateo, 2 NY3d at 424, quoting People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241). Here, the challenged evidence was relevant to the defendant's justification defense, which the People had the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt (see id.; People v Blackwell, 219 AD3d 619, 621; People v Suphal, 7 AD3d 547, 547-548). Moreover, the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice to [*2]the defendant (see People v Cedillo, 242 AD3d 1107, 1107). In any event, any error in the court's decision to admit this evidence was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and no significant probability that the alleged error contributed to his convictions (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242; People v Lewis, 242 AD3d 1116, 1122).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the jurors having witnessed an altercation in the courthouse parking lot during deliberations involving the families of the defendant and the victim. The decision to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial (see People v Hunter, 244 AD3d 1239, 1241). Here, the court conducted a "probing and tactful inquiry" (People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299) of each juror, all of whom assured the court that they could be fair and impartial, and whose credibility the court was in the best position to evaluate. In addition, there was no indication that the occurrence outside of the courthouse prejudiced any of the defendant's substantial rights (see id.; People v Veliz, 222 AD3d 785, 786; People v Santos, 199 AD3d 717). Furthermore, the court gave a curative instruction regarding the occurrence, which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v Hunter, 244 AD3d at 1241; People v Griffen, 244 AD3d 1231, 1233).

The defendant's sentence was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

GENOVESI, J.P., DOWLING, WAN and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court