NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under August 10, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and 2021 IL App (4th) 200557-U Carla Bender is not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances al- NO. 4-20-0557 Court, IL lowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Woodford County JEFFREY D. DUHAIME, ) No. 16CF31 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles M. Feeney III, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s 19-year sentence for drug-induced homicide because the trial court (1) was not required to obtain a new presentence investigation report and (2) did not err by finding no statutory factors in mitigation.
¶2 In March 2016, the State indicted defendant, Jeffrey D. Duhaime, on three counts
(counts I-III) of drug-induced homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2014)) and two counts (counts
IV-V) of delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(7)(ii), 401(d) (West 2014)). The
State alleged that on December 18, 2015, defendant delivered lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) to
Keionta Williams, which caused her death. Counts I and IV alleged that defendant delivered more
than 10 objects containing LSD in violation of section 401(c) of the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act (Act) (id. § 401(c)). Under the drug-induced homicide statute, a person who commits a
drug-induced homicide in violation of section 401(c) of the Act is subject to a prison sentence of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years. 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(c) (West 2014).
¶3 In December 2016, a jury convicted defendant on all counts. In February 2017, the
trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison under subsection (c) of the drug-induced
homicide statute. See id.
¶4 On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions for drug-induced homicide
and delivery of a controlled substance but vacated defendant’s convictions for delivering more
than 10 objects containing LSD, concluding the evidence was insufficient. People v. Duhaime,
2019 IL App (4th) 170223-U, ¶¶ 91, 101. We remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. Id.
¶ 101.
¶5 In February 2020, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on defendant’s
remaining convictions and sentenced him to 19 years in prison.
¶6 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court (1) erred by failing to obtain and consider
an updated presentence investigation report (PSI) and (2) abused its discretion when it failed to
consider a statutory factor in mitigation. We disagree and affirm.
¶7 I. BACKGROUND
¶8 A. The Charges
¶9 In March 2016, the State indicted defendant on three counts of drug-induced
homicide and two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Count I alleged defendant
(1) committed drug-induced homicide by delivering more than 10 objects containing LSD in
violation of subsection (c) of section 401 of the Act (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(7)(ii) (West 2014)) to
individuals attending a party in Kappa, Illinois, on December 18, 2015, and (2) Keionta Williams
died as a result of ingesting that LSD. Because count I alleged delivery of more than 10 objects,
defendant upon conviction was subject to a sentence of between 15 and 30 years in prison. See
-2- 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(c) (West 2014). Counts II and III alleged (1) defendant delivered LSD in
violation of subsection 401(d) of the Act and (2) Williams died as a result of ingestion of that LSD.
If convicted of either count II or III, defendant was subject to a sentence as in any other Class X
felony—namely, a prison sentence between 6 to 30 years. See id. § 9-3.3(b).
¶ 10 Count IV alleged defendant delivered more than 10 objects containing LSD to
individuals at the party on December 18, 2015, a Class 1 felony. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(7)(ii)
(West 2014). Count V alleged defendant delivered LSD to Williams at that same party, a Class 2
felony. See id. § 401(d).
¶ 11 B. The Trial
¶ 12 In December 2016, the trial court conducted defendant’s jury trial. A more detailed
description of the evidence presented at trial can be found in our prior decision. See Duhaime,
2019 IL App (4th) 170223-U, ¶¶ 13-49.
¶ 13 In summary, the evidence showed that on December 18, 2015, Williams and a
friend attended a party organized in part by defendant in Kappa. At the party, Williams and her
friend obtained LSD from defendant. A few hours after taking the LSD, Williams “freak[ed] out,”
“looked terrified,” and “took off running” into a field adjacent to the party. Partygoers looked for
Williams in the surrounding area but could not locate her. At around 2 a.m., a bus traveling north
on Interstate 39 struck and killed Williams, whom a crash reconstruction expert determined was
walking in a lane of traffic. Several partygoers identified defendant as the person who sold
Williams and others LSD.
¶ 14 The jury convicted defendant on all five counts, including delivery of more than 10
objects of LSD.
¶ 15 C. The Sentencing Hearing
-3- ¶ 16 In February 2017, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. The
court noted that counts II through V were lesser included offenses of drug-induced homicide and
therefore sentenced defendant only on count I, which had a sentencing range of 15 to 30 years in
prison. The presentence investigation report indicated defendant had (1) prior convictions
involving drugs and (2) completed drug treatment. The court believed defendant’s prior
involvement with drugs, as well as his continued involvement after treatment, demonstrated that
(1) he should have known the dangers of drug dealing and (2) a lengthy sentence was necessary to
deter others. The court also noted that defendant blamed others for his problems rather than taking
responsibility and his attitude—demonstrated by his actions and demeanor both before his arrest
and during the criminal proceedings—showed “arrogance” and lack of rehabilitative potential. The
court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison to be served at 75%.
¶ 17 D. The Direct Appeal
¶ 18 On direct appeal, defendant challenged his convictions on the grounds that (1) the
trial court gave an improper jury instruction for causation and (2) the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. This court concluded that
(1) the jury was properly instructed, (2) the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant’s
delivery of LSD to Williams was a cause of her death, and (3) the evidence that defendant delivered
more than 10 objects containing LSD was so unsatisfactory that it created a reasonable doubt as to
defendant’s guilt. Duhaime, 2019 IL App (4th) 170223-U.
¶ 19 This court vacated defendant’s convictions on counts I and IV. Because the trial
court sentenced defendant only on count I, we remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. Id.
¶ 103.
¶ 20 E. The Proceedings on Remand
-4- ¶ 21 In February 2020, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The court noted
that it had a copy of the original PSI from defendant’s 2017 sentencing but did not have a
supplement to the PSI or an updated PSI. Regarding the PSI, the State noted that it had declined
to prosecute one of the criminal charges listed as pending in the original PSI. The State did not
know the status of a second pending criminal case and assumed it was still pending. Defense
counsel agreed with those changes and stated she had no further objections or changes.
¶ 22 The State offered a victim impact statement from the victim’s father. The statement
was the same statement admitted by the trial court at defendant’s original sentencing.
¶ 23 Defendant’s mother, Helen McIntosh, testified that she talked to defendant on the
phone daily and wrote to him frequently while he has been in prison. McIntosh had “seen a lot of
changes” in defendant and opined that he had matured, “grow[n] up,” and “got his head clear.”
Defendant had accepted full responsibility for the death of Williams and “felt really bad about
everything that’s going on.” McIntosh stated that defendant now realized that he never should have
brought drugs to the party and he was suffering from his own “problems.”
¶ 24 McIntosh testified she was thankful defendant had been sent to prison and believed
defendant felt the same way. Defendant had plans for the future including (1) getting his General
Educational Development certificate (GED), (2) learning trade skills from family members in
Tennessee upon his release, and (3) speaking in classrooms about the dangers of drugs. On
cross-examination, McIntosh acknowledged that she knew defendant was using marijuana starting
around age 16 but stated defendant was living with his father at the time and she did not know he
had any substance abuse problems.
¶ 25 Defendant testified that when he was originally sentenced at age 21, he was
“young” and “stupid.” Defendant stated he was arrogant and thought “I had everything figured
-5- out” and “no harm would ever come from just hanging out and partying and doing all these things.”
Defendant now understood “all it takes is one time” and “the path that [he] chose cost somebody
their life.”
¶ 26 Defendant admitted he had a problem with marijuana and alcohol before he was
sent to prison. Defendant explained that he started using marijuana at age 14 or 15 when he first
moved to Illinois with his father. Defendant then started using alcohol, synthetic drugs, and “it just
really led to a downward spiral.” Defendant stated he “beat the habit” when he was put on
probation at age 16 and explained that although he “didn’t follow the terms and meet the
conditions, [he] kept getting chances after chances with De[ ]Witt County probation.” Defendant’s
probation was transferred to Bloomington when his father moved there, and at age 18, defendant
completed a month-long inpatient drug treatment. Defendant stated he stayed sober for about six
months after treatment.
¶ 27 Defendant testified that he relapsed after breaking up with his girlfriend. Defendant
began using cocaine and “party drugs,” “anything to mask the pain.” Defendant stated he now
realized that his repeated failure to follow through with probation demonstrated arrogance.
Defendant stated he used LSD only once, the day Williams died. “I was young and arrogant and
just wanted to do anything to try and have a good time and fit in with others.” The following
exchange occurred:
“Q. Did you think that giving someone LSD could end in not such a great
way?
A. At the time, no. But today at this point in my life, absolutely.
Q. Did you ever think that someone would die as a result?
A. At the time, no.
-6- Q. Can you see it now?
A. Absolutely.”
Defendant explained that he did not realize the danger at the time because “I was wrapped up in
my own problems, my own addiction, just this disease that I was fighting.”
¶ 28 Defendant testified that he was glad he went to prison. During his four years of
incarceration, defendant had to “look back and reflect on the decisions that [he] made then.” Being
in prison allowed him to “really work on myself and really find me, it’s changed me for the better.”
Defendant stated he was ready to become a productive member of society, which was not the case
when he committed the crime. Defendant said, “I can’t thank the courts here in Woodford County
for saving my life—I can’t thank them enough for that.” Defendant informed the court that he
came to this realization on his own and believed he was “cured of this disease now.”
¶ 29 Defendant stated he planned on obtaining a GED and pursuing higher education
upon release. Although not required, defendant worked many different jobs while in prison.
Defendant also attended a school program but was unable to finish because he was put in
segregation for 90 days when he had a fight with his cellmate. Defendant explained that he caught
his cellmate stealing from his commissary box and confronted him. The cellmate responded by
punching defendant, and defendant fought back. Defendant stated he should have asked for
assistance instead of fighting back because he was a big guy and probably could have taken it.
Defendant had not been able to finish or reenter the school program because there was a long
waiting list. Defendant stated he was also applying to be placed in drug and alcohol treatment and
counseling.
¶ 30 Regarding his plan after release, defendant explained that he wanted to move to
Tennessee and live with his mother and grandfather. Defendant had found a technical school that
-7- had a “diesel repair program” that he wanted to attend. He further wanted to get involved in his
mother’s church and help his grandfather maintain the 200 acres of land he owned. Defendant
acknowledged that he might not be allowed to move to Tennessee upon release. If required to stay
in Illinois, defendant’s father had already agreed to give him a place to live during the duration of
his mandatory supervised release.
¶ 31 On cross-examination, defendant admitted (1) he sold LSD at the party, (2) he sold
LSD to Williams, and (3) Williams died because of defendant’s giving her LSD. The State
cross-examined defendant extensively about the PSI and his statements therein. Defendant stated
that he did not remember telling the probation officer preparing the PSI that he used two-thirds of
a gram of cocaine a day and drank 12 to 14 beers a day. Defendant maintained he gave an
“estimate” about how much cocaine he used and that the figures sounded like an exaggeration.
Defendant stated he drank 12 to 14 beers when he attended parties, which was usually on Thursday,
Friday, and Saturday nights. Defendant agreed that when he was 21, he lived in a college town that
had parties on a daily basis. Defendant agreed that he used up to an eighth of an ounce of marijuana
a day and self-medicated with marijuana and alcohol. The State further cross-examined defendant
about the criminal history in the PSI, which defendant did not dispute, and his disciplinary history
while in prison, which defendant also did not dispute.
¶ 32 The State argued that a 20-year sentence was appropriate based largely on the
statements of drug and alcohol use in the PSI and defendant’s prior failure to comply with
probation despite multiple attempts. Defendant argued that a six-year sentence was appropriate
because he had accepted responsibility, demonstrated his rehabilitative potential while in prison,
and was now mature enough to become a productive member of society.
¶ 33 The trial court first determined that counts II and V were lesser included offenses
-8- of drug-induced homicide and sentenced defendant only as to count III. The court then reiterated
that it had considered the PSI, the statements attached thereto, the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, and the testimony presented at the sentencing hearing. The court found no statutory
factors in mitigation applied. Regarding statutory factors in aggravation, the court believed
defendant’s criminal history and deterrence were relevant factors. The court also considered as
aggravating factors defendant’s involvement in organizing the party, inviting “[p]eople of a young
age,” and the age of the victim.
¶ 34 The trial court stated as follows:
“But in looking at the Presentence Investigation—and I will agree with the
arguments that have been made, especially by the defense, that, you know, that the
defendant then versus the defendant now. But I am going to focus on both. But
looking at the defendant then, you know, his statements as far as drug use, which
have never been really changed until today, very different. His assertions are very
different in regard to his cocaine usage. But his reported hobbies and activities he
liked to do back then, get high, drink, and cruise. He—that tells me that he—his
very existence, his focus of his life, was about existing with a reckless disregard for
others. And the fact that the defendant has battled his substance abuse issues—
although I don’t think he was battling very hard at the time—I think he was hip
deep in the throw of pursuing them with great vigor. And he inflicted the
introduction of mind-altering substances onto other people. I think that’s
aggravating. He didn’t do it out of aggravation—or out of ignorance. He did it out
of a desire for money, really.
But there are very strong differences in how this court—and I would
-9- imagine almost all courts—treat drug users, for instance, and drug dealers. And
[defendant] falls in the latter category. And worse yet are those people that for profit
distribute substances that impact the recipients of their poison by killing them. And
that’s where [defendant] finds himself as well.
The court did not give a great deal of weight to the number of units, or
whatever, of parts of the LSD. There were minimum sentences involved, but I did
not give overwhelming weight to that. And I really looked more at the defendant
and his conduct and the victim and the tremendous harm that the defendant caused
in trying to achieve a just sentence that is a balance between protecting society from
someone so dedicated to throwing poison upon the youth of our society. And—but
recognizing what—quite honestly, I did not see much rehabilitative potential in the
defendant. And I see more of that now. I will say that. I see more rehabilitative
potential because I did not see much of any.”
¶ 35 The trial court stated that it appreciated defendant’s admission of delivery of LSD
to Williams and recognition of the harm he caused. The court also noted that defendant “appears
to be less full of himself today than back then.” Nonetheless, the court believed that “the minimum
sentence would be an absolute travesty of justice.” The court sentenced defendant to 19 years.
¶ 36 In October 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to
reconsider sentence, in which defendant argued that the court did not adequately consider
defendant’s rehabilitative potential (“19 years is excessive in light of the progress that Defendant
has accomplished in prison.”). The court stated as follows:
“And to the extent that in this case I don’t—it’s an interesting analysis. I
don’t—I don’t analyze a case as to what is the minimum, what is the maximum
- 10 - and, you know, I was X number of years over the minimum, and then it comes back,
and now I am—now I am, you know—I need to be the same X number of years
over the minimum. That’s not really how I analyze it. I weigh the factors, I weigh
the evidence that was presented at trial, I weigh the—you know, listen to the
arguments. I mean, in this case, as [the State]—or has alluded to, the defendant
introduced a very powerful substance to a bunch of young people at this underage
drinking party, and a very young woman, who had a bright future ahead of her, was
killed as a direct result of the defendant.
So, I—I think that the sentence the court gave of 19 years, et cetera, is
appropriate and fair and just, and I’m not going to reconsider it. Or—well, I’m not
going to change it, is a better way to put it. So, motion to reconsider is denied.”
¶ 37 This appeal followed.
¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 39 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court (1) erred by failing to obtain and consider
an updated PSI and (2) abused its discretion when it failed to consider a statutory factor in
mitigation. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 40 A. A New PSI Was Not Required
¶ 41 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it considered the original PSI
and did not obtain a supplemental PSI or new PSI. Defendant contends that the original PSI was
inadequate because it did not include information about the defendant from the three years after
he was sentenced and was incarcerated. We disagree.
¶ 42 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 43 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both
- 11 - according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “A defendant shall not be sentenced for a felony before
a written presentence report of investigation is presented to and considered by the court.” 730 ILCS
5/5-3-1 (West 2018). This statutory requirement is mandatory and cannot be waived by a defendant
except in the cases designated by statute. People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 561 (1980). In any
case in which the original sentence is vacated, “[t]he trial court shall hold a hearing under Section
5-4-1 of this Code which may include evidence of the defendant’s life, moral character and
occupation during the time since the original sentence was passed. The trial court shall then impose
sentence upon the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(d) (West 2018).
¶ 44 “[T]he requirements of section 5-3-1 are met when the trial court considers a
recently-prepared presentence investigation report which contains the information necessary for a
sentencing decision. Accordingly, a new presentence investigation report is not required when a
defendant is resentenced after his original sentence is vacated on appeal.” People v. Tucker, 263
Ill. App. 3d 895, 898, 636 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1994); see also People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147,
157, 529 N.E.2d 497, 502 (1988) (declining to read section 5-5-3(d) as requiring a supplemental
PSI prior to resentencing); People v. Moore, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1075, 513 N.E.2d 87, 91 (1987)
(“[W]e are aware of no case that mandates the trial court to order a new report upon resentencing
when the original one is considered and there is no claim that the information in the report is old
or incomplete.”).
¶ 45 2. This Case
¶ 46 In this case, the trial court considered the original PSI, which complied with all
statutory requirements at the time of the original sentencing. Unlike in People v. Harris, 105 Ill.
2d 290, 296, 473 N.E.2d 1291 (1995), the PSI included information about defendant’s history and
- 12 - character from his entire life up until his arrest. The PSI was not based on a small segment of
defendant’s life.
¶ 47 Defendant argues that the cases that hold a new PSI is not required on resentencing
are distinguishable because those cases involved resentencing for a conviction that was affirmed
on appeal whereas here defendant was sentenced on a completely different count. Defendant
provides no support for his contention, nor does he explain why such a distinction makes a
difference. Defendant was originally sentenced for drug-induced homicide and on remand he was
again sentenced for drug-induced homicide. The only difference between the counts on which
defendant was sentenced was the aggravating circumstance of delivering more than 10 objects of
LSD. Defendant provides no explanation whatsoever for why the lack of that element of the
offense renders the PSI deficient.
¶ 48 In addition, the trial judge that sentenced defendant on remand was the same judge
who (1) presided over defendant’s jury trial and (2) originally sentenced defendant. When
resentencing defendant, the trial court remarked that defendant had shown some rehabilitative
potential since his incarceration, which the court did not see in defendant previously. The court
also noted that defendant seemed “less full of himself.” Clearly, the court was familiar with
defendant and the prior proceedings.
¶ 49 Moreover, defendant presented extensive testimony focused almost exclusively on
how he had changed since his conviction. The trial court explicitly considered that testimony and
directly contrasted it with the statements in the PSI. Indeed, defendant’s strategy at sentencing
appears to have been for him to (1) acknowledge his prior bad habits, conduct, and attitude and
(2) use his actions while in prison to demonstrate his changed attitude, acceptance of
responsibility, and rehabilitative potential. In short, defendant had the opportunity to and did
- 13 - present all of the information he complains was missing from the PSI.
¶ 50 The appellate court has routinely held that a new PSI is not required on resentencing
when (1) the trial judge was the same and familiar with the prior proceedings and (2) the defendant
had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence from his time in prison. See People v. Acevedo,
216 Ill. App. 3d 195, 202-03, 576 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1991) (holding that the trial court did not
commit error by failing to order a new PSI, especially because the trial court was familiar with the
defendant’s case from prior proceedings and gave the defendant an opportunity to present
mitigating evidence); People v. Brown, 198 Ill. App. 3d 156, 159, 555 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)
(concluding that the original PSI was sufficient because the same trial judge presided over
resentencing and the second sentencing hearing took place 13 months after the original); People
v. Morton, 102 Ill. App. 3d 280, 281, 430 N.E.2d 383, 384 (1981) (holding that a new PSI was
discretionary, the same judge heard both proceedings, the second hearing occurred 11 months after
the first, and both sides presented new evidence at the resentencing hearing). We agree with these
decisions and conclude that the three-year gap between the date of the PSI and the resentencing is
not a basis to distinguish them under these circumstances. See Acevedo, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 202-
03.
¶ 51 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by considering the original
PSI (and not an updated one) at resentencing.
¶ 52 B. The Trial Court Properly Found No Applicable Statutory Factors in Mitigation
¶ 53 Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion where it
“failed to consider a statutory factor in mitigation and sentenced [defendant] to a lengthy sentence
despite evidence warranting a much lesser sentence.” Defendant acknowledges that he failed to
preserve the error by objecting in the trial court but asks this court to review for plain error. We
- 14 - conclude no error occurred.
¶ 54 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 55 The Illinois Supreme Court recently explained the plain-error doctrine in People v.
Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 81, 162 N.E.3d 223, in which it wrote the following:
“A reviewing court will consider unpreserved error when a clear or obvious error
occurs and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to
tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the
error, or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s
trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness
of the evidence. [Citations.] When a defendant fails to establish plain error, the
result is that his procedural default must be honored.”
¶ 56 The first step in the plain-error analysis is generally to determine whether an error
occurred. People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18, 67 N.E.3d 213. If no error has occurred, a
defendant’s plain-error claim cannot succeed. Id.
¶ 57 2. This Case
¶ 58 Defendant contends that the trial court should have found that he did not
“contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to another”
as a statutory factor in mitigation. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(2) (West 2018). Defendant notes that he
testified explicitly that he did not realize at the time that his selling LSD could result in someone’s
death.
¶ 59 At sentencing, the trial court noted, “And the fact that the defendant has battled his
substance abuse issues—although I don’t think he was battling very hard at the time ***. And he
inflicted the introduction of mind-altering substances onto other people. I think that’s
- 15 - aggravating.” The court also noted that defendant did not do so “out of ignorance.” As we discuss
next, the trial court’s inference that defendant must have been aware of the threat of harm by selling
drugs was supported by the evidence at trial and sentencing.
¶ 60 Although defendant testified that he did not see the potential for harm at the time,
defendant also stated that he now “absolutely” understood the dangers. The trial court was free to
assess the credibility of defendant and disbelieve his statement that he only realized the danger in
hindsight. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence, the court stated, “the defendant
introduced a very powerful substance to a bunch of young people at this underage drinking party.”
It strains credulity to suggest that defendant was unaware that LSD was a hallucinogenic drug at
the time he was selling it, particularly because he had taken LSD at the very party at which he was
selling it. The danger of giving such a drug to young persons at a party, with alcohol, located on
the edge of a rural community is immediately apparent to adults, even those who have recently
reached age 21.
¶ 61 We conclude that nothing in the record shows that the manner in which the trial
court reached that sentence was in error.
¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 63 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 64 Affirmed.
- 16 -