People v. Dressel

2025 IL App (2d) 250397-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 2-25-0397
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (2d) 250397-U No. 2-25-0397 Order filed December 8, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 25-CF-1607 ) ) Honorable JOHN C. DRESSEL, ) Michael G. Nerheim and ) George D. Strickland, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in ordering defendant’s pretrial detention where the State proved that he posed a real and present risk of danger to the community and no conditions of release could mitigate that risk.

¶2 Defendant, John C. Dressel, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his pretrial release

under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West

2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff.

Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of Public Act 101-652); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL

129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). We affirm. 2025 IL App (2d) 250397-U

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 15, 2025, defendant was charged with two counts of child pornography

(dissemination with children under the age of 13) (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2) (West 2024)) (Class

X felony) and seven counts of possession of child pornography (id. § 11-20.1(a)(6)) (Class 2

felony).

¶5 On July 16, 2025, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). The trial court held a hearing on the petition that same day.

According to the State’s proffer, police officers executed a search warrant on defendant’s residence

in Mundelein following tips that defendant’s Snapchat, Discord, and Instagram accounts were

flagged as having potential child porn activity. Officers searched all three accounts on defendant’s

computer, cell phone, and iPad. The search revealed numerous child pornography videos,

including a video of an apparently disabled child with a tracheotomy tube being vaginally

penetrated by an adult male “at least two times the size of the child,” as well as a video of a large

male anally penetrating a female child under the age of 10 as she cried in pain. The State asserted

that the “vast majority” of the videos found in defendant’s possession contained children under the

age of four. Defendant used Telegram to trade and share the child pornography with other users.

Officers also found a latex material buttocks sex toy in the shape and size of a small child in

defendant’s residence. The State’s petition additionally alleged that defendant refused to open the

door to his residence when officers arrived and that defendant had access to minor children in his

residence.

¶6 The State also proffered that, after receiving his Miranda warning, defendant admitted that

he had watched child pornography “for a couple years now” and downloaded the videos onto his

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phone. He also admitted to chatting with others about child pornography on Telegram, Kik, and

Discord.

¶7 The State argued that defendant posed a real and present threat of dangerousness because

of the inherent dangerousness of child pornography, the content of the pornography defendant

possessed, with the majority containing children under four years old, and his multiple devices and

accounts used to view and disseminate the child pornography for two years. The State argued that

no conditions could mitigate this dangerousness because of defendant’s sophistication based on

the facts, like the defendant in People v. Glass, 2025 IL App (2d) 250103-U.

¶8 In response, defendant’s father testified that he lived with defendant at the same residence

and he answered the door for the police, not defendant. He said that defendant was upstairs

sleeping when the police arrived around 6 a.m. Defendant’s father also testified that no minor

children lived at the residence, just defendant, defendant’s adult sister, defendant’s mother, and

himself. Defendant proffered that he was 22 years old, a high school graduate, and had a full time

job working for an electric company. He said that the company is “standing by him” and will have

employment if he is released.

¶9 Defendant conceded that the proof is evident and the presumption is great that he

committed the charged detainable offenses. Relying on People v. Milam, 2024 IL App (2d)

240027-U and People v. Reamy, 2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U, defendant argued that the State

failed to meet its burden regarding his dangerousness and whether conditions of release could

mitigate his dangerousness. According to defendant, the State presented only generalized harms

of child pornography and no facts specific to his case. Defendant requested conditions of release

including electronic home monitoring (EHM), surrendering his electronic devices, taking away his

internet access, and letting “the sheriff’s office come into his house whenever.”

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¶ 10 After the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s petition. It found that the State provided

clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the charged crimes. The trial court also

found that the State proved defendant’s dangerousness to the community. It noted the disturbing

nature of the videos defendant allegedly possessed and disseminated, including the sexual assault

that such conduct perpetuates, as well as defendant’s sophistication based on his use of multiple

devices and evading detection for two years. Finally, the trial court determined that no conditions

of release could mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. It relied on defendant’s admission of

watching the pornography for 2 years, the sex toy that was found in defendant’s possession, and

the multiple devices and social media platforms that defendant used. The trial court found that,

based on defendant’s sophistication, no conditions of release could adequately ensure that

defendant did not have access to any devices given his actions and that the Lake County sheriff’s

monitoring program only runs from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. Monday through Friday. In its ruling, the

trial court found that defendant did not have access to minor children in his home, but it did not

resolve the factual discrepancy regarding whether defendant refused to answer the door to evade

police.

¶ 11 On August 7, 2025, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on two counts of child

pornography (dissemination with children under the age of 13) (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2) (West

2024)) (Class X felony) and five counts of possession of child pornography (id. § 11-20.1(a)(6))

(Class 2 felony). That same day, defendant filed a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). He argued that the trial court erred in finding him to be a

danger to the community and that no conditions of release could mitigate any dangerousness he

posed.

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¶ 12 On September 8, 2025, the State filed an amended verified petition to detain. The trial

court also conducted the hearing on defendant’s motion for relief that same day. At the hearing,

defendant presented affidavits from both his parents, with whom he would live if released, stating

that they changed their home’s internet password, removed the internet from any devices he might

be able to access (such as a television), and set passwords on their personal devices. Defendant

also argued that the grand jury indicting him on two less charges of possession of child

pornography than initially charged weighed in his favor. Finally, defendant argued that spending

seven weeks in custody shows that he is not of any risk to flout court orders and impressed upon

him that court orders need to be followed.

¶ 13 In response, the State proffered a map from defendant’s neighborhood. On the map, the

State noted several daycares, playgrounds, gun stores, and schools. The State also argued that

defendant could gain access to someone else’s unsecured internet “if he just steps outside the

door.” The State also proffered a photo taken at defendant’s residence showing the sex toy found

in his possession.

¶ 14 After the hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for relief. It noted that the

videos defendant was alleged to have possessed and disseminated were “as disturbing [of] child

pornography as there could be. *** And any person who would find that to be entertaining has

serious dysfunction.” The trial could found that “this level of dysfunction doesn’t go away” and

expressed concern with defendant possibly obtaining a new device. The trial court additionally

noted that EHM is not real time monitoring and didn’t find monitoring by family members—who

already failed to detect his prior actions—as reliable as the court would want. Defendant timely

appealed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 16 The State asserts that our review is de novo because both parties proceeded solely by

proffer. See People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 22; People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709,

¶ 18. However, because defendant presented the live testimony of his father, “the [trial] court’s

ultimate detention decision under section 110-6.1, in addition to any underlying factual findings

supporting the decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence.” Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54; see Glass, 2025 IL App (2d) 250103-U,

¶ 29. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if ‘the opposite conclusion is

clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence

presented.’ ” People v. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322,

332 (2008)).

¶ 17 Upon filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden

to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great

that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)),

(2) the defendant’s pretrial release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person

or persons or the community (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and (3) no condition or combination of

conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)).

“Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact

as to the truth of the proposition in question ***.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services,

2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.

¶ 18 Defendant did not file a memorandum, so his motion for relief serves as his argument on

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Defendant does not contest that the State

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provided sufficient evidence to prove that the proof is evident or the presumption is great that he

committed the charged detainable offenses.

¶ 19 Defendant first argues that the State did not prove that he poses a real and present threat to

the community. Defendant contends that the State presented, and the trial court relied upon, only

the general harms of child pornography, not any specific articulable facts of his case. Of course,

the bare allegations that a defendant committed a violent offense are insufficient to find that a

defendant is dangerous under the Act. See Reamy, 2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U, ¶¶ 22-23.

However, the record rebuts defendant’s assertion that the finding of dangerousness was based

solely on the generalized harms of child pornography.

¶ 20 While it is true that the State’s petition included significant discussion of the general harms

of child pornography, the petition also included numerous facts about defendant’s alleged actions,

on which the trial court relied. For example, the trial court specifically considered the disturbing

nature of the videos and age of the victims found in the videos. It also considered that defendant

used multiple devices to download and disseminate the videos undetected over the course of two

years, which evidenced a level of sophistication. The trial court also considered mitigating factors,

such as the defendant’s age, lack of prior criminal history, and that he did not have access to minor

children inside his home, but still found that defendant was a danger to the community given the

specific facts of the charged offenses. Though the trial court considered some of the inherent

harms of child pornography, the Act dictates that such considerations are proper when considered

with the specific articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g). Defendant’s specific

actions, coupled with the fact that those actions help fuel demand for child pornography,

revictimize the victim each time a video is viewed, and contribute to child abuse and exploitation,

prove defendants dangerousness to the victims and the community. See People v. Schulz, 2024

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IL App (1st) 240422, ¶¶ 25, 26. Because the trial court considered the specific articulable facts of

this case, and such facts reasonably support a finding of dangerousness, we cannot say its finding

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Collins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230577-

U, ¶ 20 (determining that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court

to find a defendant charged with child pornography dangerous after considering the statutory

factors).

¶ 21 Next, defendant argues that the State did not prove that no conditions or combination of

conditions could mitigate his dangerousness. In support, defendant relies on Milam and Reamy.

In Milam, the defendant was charged with three counts of possession of child pornography. 2024

IL App (2d) 240027-U, ¶ 4. The State relied solely on the inherent harms of child pornography

and argued that the defendant thus posed an unmitigated threat to children in general. Id. ¶ 5. The

trial court ordered the defendant’s pretrial detention and this court reversed. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13. We held

that after reviewing the entire record, there was “no evidence to determine that defendant is a

danger to particular individuals or the community at large during pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 12. The

danger the trial court found was “the general threat to children that the act of producing and/or

possessing child pornography generates,” rather than considerations of the specific circumstances

of the defendant’s case. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 22 In Reamy, the defendant was charged with eight counts of possessing child pornography

and two counts of disseminating child pornography on Kik. 2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U, ¶ 4. The

trial court denied the State’s petition for pretrial release, finding that although the defendant posed

a real and present threat to the community, there were conditions that could mitigate the

defendant’s dangerousness. Id. ¶ 9 The trial court ordered that the defendant be placed on EHM,

have no contact with minors, not live in a home with minors, be prohibited from accessing the

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internet and any internet-connected devices, and only leave the house for medical appointments.

Id. This court affirmed. Id. ¶ 23. We determined that, under the circumstances of that case, it was

not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to release defendant with those conditions. Id. ¶ 17.

While the State argued that the conditions would not completely prevent the defendant from

engaging in harmful behavior, “the relevant issue here is whether the conditions would mitigate—

not completely prevent—any real risk and present risk defendant posed to individuals or the

community.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 19. Because the State did not carry its burden of

showing that there were no conditions that could mitigate the defendant’s dangerousness, we were

“left with no choice but to affirm the trial court’s denial of the State’s petition to detain.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 23 Conversely, this court in People v. Currier, 2024 IL App (2d) 240478-U, and Glass

addressed circumstances under which a defendant charged with child pornography may be held in

pretrial detention. In Currier, the defendant was charged with possession and distribution of child

pornography after over 80,000 files of child pornography were found on his computer. Id. ¶¶ 4, 14.

The trial court granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release because the defendant’s

sophisticated knowledge of computers would not allow for any meaningful monitoring of his

activities if released. Id. ¶ 16. This court affirmed because “the size of defendant’s collection of

[child pornography] and the sophistication of his computer setup indicate that defendant had been

engaging in this conduct for some time and could do so again without detection.” Id. ¶ 30. We

determined that the trial court’s findings “were not general findings about the ubiquity of the

internet” but were based on the specific facts of the case, given the defendant’s sophistication. Id.

¶ 24 Similarly, the defendant in Glass was charged with possession and distribution of child

pornography after police found over 7,000 files of child pornography on 10 computers, several

hard drives, and a large server inside the defendant’s home. 2025 IL App (2d) 250103-U, ¶¶ 4, 14.

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The trial court granted the state’s petition to detain, noting the volume of the content on the

defendant’s 10 computers, the defendant’s distribution of the materials, his knowledge of

computers, and his ability to evade detection for a number of years. Id. ¶ 17. We affirmed,

determining that the trial court’s decision was based on the specific circumstances of the

defendant’s case, like in Currier. Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.

¶ 25 Here, the trial court’s finding that no conditions could mitigate defendant’s dangerousness

was based on more than solely the general harms of child pornography and ubiquity of the internet,

unlike Milam and Reamy. Rather, the trial court’s decision was based on defendant’s level of

sophistication with multiple devices and multiple social media platforms that he used to access

and distribute the child pornography undetected for two years. It also noted that the videos

defendant possessed were “as disturbing [of] child pornography as there could be.” Given these

facts, the trial court found that conditions of release, such as EHM, surrendering his devices, and

mandating no use of the internet were insufficient to mitigate his threat.

¶ 26 We therefore believe that this case is more similar to Currier and Glass. As in those cases,

“[d]efendant’s level of sophistication and pattern of conduct during the span of many years,

evinces a strong predilection for child pornography, and the capability of accessing and

distributing such materials without being detected.” Glass, 2025 IL App (2d) 250103-U, ¶ 39.

More specifically, defendant’s use of multiple accounts across multiple devices to view and

disseminate extremely disturbing videos undetected for two years, along with the sex toy found in

his possession, evidence a serious dysfunction that does not simply go away because of court

orders. Given defendant’s specific circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded that there

was no meaningful way to successfully mitigate the threat defendant posed. We cannot say that

such a conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

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¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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