People v. Draper

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Draper

468 N.W.2d 902, 188 Mich. App. 77

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 19, 1991

DocketDocket 135973

StatusPublished

This text of 468 N.W.2d 902 (People v. Draper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Draper, 468 N.W.2d 902, 188 Mich. App. 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(a), and was sentenced to a term of twenty to fifty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, we affirmed. People v Draper, 150 Mich App 481; 389 NW2d 89 (1986). However, by order of the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, this case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 456 NW2d 391 (1990), and its companion case of People v Badour. 437 Mich 872 (1990). Upon reconsideration, we reverse.

In Beckley, a plurality decision, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that an expert witness may testify that the behavior of the child victim is consistent with that of child sexual abuse victims generally. However, the expert may not testify about whether the victim’s allegations are truthful, or whether sexual abuse in fact occurred.

In this case, the experts, Rosemary Jalovaara and Linda Butterfield, both psychologists, testified about characteristics normally found in sexually abused children. Under Beckley, that testimony was proper because it assists the trier of fact without rendering an opinion regarding whether abuse had in fact occurred.

However, both experts went on to conclude that, in their opinion, the victim in this case had been sexually abused. We feel that this is the kind of testimony prohibited under Beckley. These opinions go beyond merely relating whether the victim’s behavior is consistent with that found in *79 other child sexual abuse victims. They are opinions on an ultimate issue of fact, which is for the jury’s determination alone.

Consequently, defendant’s conviction is reversed, and we remand this case for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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Per Curiam.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(a), and was sentenced to a term of twenty to fifty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, we affirmed. People v Draper, 150 Mich App 481; 389 NW2d 89 (1986). However, by order of the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, this case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 456 NW2d 391 (1990), and its companion case of People v Badour. 437 Mich 872 (1990). Upon reconsideration, we reverse.

In Beckley, a plurality decision, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that an expert witness may testify that the behavior of the child victim is consistent with that of child sexual abuse victims generally. However, the expert may not testify about whether the victim’s allegations are truthful, or whether sexual abuse in fact occurred.

In this case, the experts, Rosemary Jalovaara and Linda Butterfield, both psychologists, testified about characteristics normally found in sexually abused children. Under Beckley, that testimony was proper because it assists the trier of fact without rendering an opinion regarding whether abuse had in fact occurred.

However, both experts went on to conclude that, in their opinion, the victim in this case had been sexually abused. We feel that this is the kind of testimony prohibited under Beckley. These opinions go beyond merely relating whether the victim’s behavior is consistent with that found in *79 other child sexual abuse victims. They are opinions on an ultimate issue of fact, which is for the jury’s determination alone.

Consequently, defendant’s conviction is reversed, and we remand this case for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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468 N.W.2d 902, 188 Mich. App. 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-draper-michctapp-1991.

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