People v. Douglas

Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California

People v. Douglas

31 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 26, 106 Cal. Rptr. 611, 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 1131

CourtAppellate Division of the Superior Court of California

DecidedFebruary 23, 1973

DocketCrim. A. No. 11740

StatusPublished

This text of 31 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 26 (People v. Douglas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Douglas, 31 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 26, 106 Cal. Rptr. 611, 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 1131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).

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Opinion

ZACK, J.

Appellant was convicted in a nonjury trial of a violation of section 21453, subdivision (a), of the Vehicle Code. The question we consider is whether a court, in such a proceeding, may refuse to hear any final argument from a defendant. We treat the recitation in the engrossed statement on appeal that the judge “ignored, talked-over and otherwise refused to acknowledge the defendant” when he attempted to make a closing summation, and that, “No closing statements were made by either party,” as a refusal to hear such argument. (Compare People v. Don Carlos (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863, 866 [117 P.2d 748].)

It is established that a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to make some closing argument, whether the case be jury or nonjury. (People v. Green (1893) 99 Cal. 564, 567 [34 P. 231]; People v. Don Carlos, supra. See People v. Travis (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 29, 37 [276 P.2d 193]; Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (5). Note, for civil nonjury cases, Larson v. Blue and White Cab Co. (1938) 24 Cal.App.2d 576, 578 [75 P.2d 612]. See also People v. Sieber (1927) 201 Cal. 341, 355-356 [257 P. 64]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 443, p. 445.) It is also settled that the court may, in its sound discretion, limit such argument. (People v. Don Carlos, supra, and cases cited at p. 866.)

We do not reach the question whether a limitation of argument may, as to the time allowed or subject matter permitted, become, in a particular case, a denial of argument. Here, contrary to Green, Don Carlos, and People v. Marcias (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 860, 864 [279 P.2d 987], the record shows no closing argument was allowed at all.

Was the denial prejudicial? It is true that Don Carlos alternatively held that denial was not. However, the opinion (p. 866) shows that some (but not how much) argument was actually allowed, and it is not, therefore, controlling. Further, it would appear fictional for us to attempt to assess the prejudice in a given case on the basis of an argument that was never made. If the denial of any argument is error of constitutional dim'en[Supp. 28]*Supp. 28sions, as Don Carlos indicates, we cannot hold that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].)

The judgment is reversed.

Whyte, P. J., and Katz, J., concurred.

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Opinion

ZACK, J.

Appellant was convicted in a nonjury trial of a violation of section 21453, subdivision (a), of the Vehicle Code. The question we consider is whether a court, in such a proceeding, may refuse to hear any final argument from a defendant. We treat the recitation in the engrossed statement on appeal that the judge “ignored, talked-over and otherwise refused to acknowledge the defendant” when he attempted to make a closing summation, and that, “No closing statements were made by either party,” as a refusal to hear such argument. (Compare People v. Don Carlos (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863, 866 [117 P.2d 748].)

It is established that a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to make some closing argument, whether the case be jury or nonjury. (People v. Green (1893) 99 Cal. 564, 567 [34 P. 231]; People v. Don Carlos, supra. See People v. Travis (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 29, 37 [276 P.2d 193]; Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (5). Note, for civil nonjury cases, Larson v. Blue and White Cab Co. (1938) 24 Cal.App.2d 576, 578 [75 P.2d 612]. See also People v. Sieber (1927) 201 Cal. 341, 355-356 [257 P. 64]; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, § 443, p. 445.) It is also settled that the court may, in its sound discretion, limit such argument. (People v. Don Carlos, supra, and cases cited at p. 866.)

We do not reach the question whether a limitation of argument may, as to the time allowed or subject matter permitted, become, in a particular case, a denial of argument. Here, contrary to Green, Don Carlos, and People v. Marcias (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 860, 864 [279 P.2d 987], the record shows no closing argument was allowed at all.

Was the denial prejudicial? It is true that Don Carlos alternatively held that denial was not. However, the opinion (p. 866) shows that some (but not how much) argument was actually allowed, and it is not, therefore, controlling. Further, it would appear fictional for us to attempt to assess the prejudice in a given case on the basis of an argument that was never made. If the denial of any argument is error of constitutional dim'en[Supp. 28]*Supp. 28sions, as Don Carlos indicates, we cannot hold that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].)

The judgment is reversed.

Whyte, P. J., and Katz, J., concurred.

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31 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 26, 106 Cal. Rptr. 611, 1973 Cal. App. LEXIS 1131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-douglas-calappdeptsuper-1973.

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