People v. Dorsey

2025 IL App (1st) 230035-U

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 230035-U No. 1-23-0035 First Division November 17, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Circuit Court of ILLINOIS, ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 17 CR 11231 v. ) ) JAYTON DORSEY, ) Honorable ) Timothy J. Joyce Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction and sentence for first-degree murder is affirmed. The trial court did not err by acting impartially, admitting firearm identification evidence without a Frye hearing, or denying defendant’s request for a continuance. Additionally, the State did not make improper comments during cross-examination or closing argument, and defendant’s sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

¶2 Following separate but simultaneous jury trials, defendant Jayton Dorsey and his cousin,

codefendant Timothy Gordon, were each convicted on three counts of first-degree murder and No. 1-23-0035

sentenced to mandatory terms of life in prison. 1 Defendant now appeals, arguing that (1) the trial

court erred in denying his motion for a Frye hearing on firearm identification evidence, (2) the

trial court acted as an impartial advocate for the State, (3) the State made several improper remarks

during cross-examination and closing argument, (4) the trial court erred in denying his posttrial

request for a continuance, and (5) his life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of

the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The charges in this case arose from the June 30, 2017, shooting deaths of Javon Jackson,

Sedrick Ringer, and John Hunter. The evidence showed that the victims were killed by a barrage

of gunfire while standing outside a building in the 5700 block of South Wells Street in Chicago.

¶5 A. Motion to Exclude Firearm Identification Evidence

¶6 Prior to trial, defendant filed an extensive, 75-page motion in limine seeking to exclude the

testimony of forensic firearms examiner Jennifer Sher. The motion cited reports from various

scientific bodies casting doubt on the efficacy of firearm identification, the practice of

microscopically examining fired ammunition to determine whether it was fired from a particular

gun. Defendant also asserted that firearm examiners were prone to false positives for a variety of

reasons such as cognitive bias. For these reasons, defendant argued that firearm identification

“cannot be said to enjoy wide-spread scientific acceptance, nor to possess reliability sufficient to

overcome the prejudicial and overblown statements of its practitioners.” Although defendant

acknowledged that Illinois courts have long admitted firearm identification evidence, he contended

that the field could no longer withstand scrutiny in light of the recent evidence cited in his motion.

1 This court affirmed Gordon’s convictions and sentence in a separate appeal. People v. Gordon, 2025 IL App (1st) 230037-U. He is not a party to this appeal.

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Defendant therefore requested that the trial court either exclude any testimony regarding firearm

identification or conduct a pretrial hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

Cir. 1923), to assess the general acceptance and reliability of the firearms evidence.

¶7 In response, the State argued that a Frye hearing was unnecessary because the

methodologies in question were not new or novel and have been routinely admitted by Illinois

courts. The State also cited People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (1st) 102476, ¶ 91, where this court

considered many of the criticisms raised in defendant’s motion and concluded that the trial court

in that case did not err in admitting expert testimony on firearm identification without first holding

a Frye hearing.

¶8 After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. The

court stated the firearms evidence would be admitted without a Frye hearing because the

examinations were “of a type that is generally accepted in the field to which it belongs.”

¶9 B. Jury Trial

¶ 10 At trial, Michael Graves testified that he heard the gunshots from his home on South Wells

just before 9 p.m. on June 30, 2017. As he approached the window to check on the noise, Graves

noticed “a couple of muzzle flashes” and “maybe two people” shooting firearms. However, the

shooters quickly fled and Graves did not see their faces. Graves was able to describe the shooters

only as “African-American males.”

¶ 11 Detective Mark Campbell testified that he and his partner, Officer Krista Hinton, were on

patrol near South Wells at the time of the shooting. When they heard the gunshots, the officers

immediately activated their emergency equipment and drove toward the source of the noise. As

they approached South Wells, Detective Campbell saw “two or three males” firing guns at a

residence from the sidewalk.

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¶ 12 The shooters then ran south toward 58th Street, which was the next block over. As the

officers pursued in their vehicle, they noticed a white Pontiac parked on 58th Street. Detective

Campbell testified that two men inside the Pontiac “looked like” the people he had just seen

shooting firearms.

¶ 13 The Pontiac then drove off and entered the Dan Ryan Expressway “at a high rate of speed.”

The officers followed the Pontiac down the expressway as it “weav[ed] in different lanes” to avoid

slower traffic. Eventually, the Pontiac spun out of control and crashed onto a grassy hill on the

side of the expressway. As Detective Campbell exited his vehicle and approached the crash site,

he saw two people from the Pontiac run up the hill and climb a barbed wire fence surrounding an

IDOT parking lot.

¶ 14 Detective Campbell and Officer Hinton secured the area around the crashed Pontiac and

waited for backup to arrive. During that time, Detective Campbell observed a handgun in plain

view in the backseat of the Pontiac. The State introduced into evidence video footage from the

officers’ squad car, which substantially corroborates Detective Campbell’s testimony. 2 With the

help of a police helicopter, defendant and Gordon were subsequently found and arrested while

attempting to hide on the back deck of a residence on 66th Street. Footage from the helicopter and

the arresting officers’ body-worn cameras were also introduced into evidence.

¶ 15 Shortly after the arrests, at approximately 9:44 p.m., Detective Joseph Murtaugh

administered gunshot residue (GSR) collection kits for defendant and Gordon. These kits were

2 The video footage was not included in the record on appeal in this case, but was made part of the record on appeal in codefendant Gordon’s case. We take judicial notice of the video exhibits. In re Marcus S., 2022 IL App (3d) 170014, ¶ 46 n.4 (appellate court may sua sponte take judicial notice of public documents contained in the record of any other judicial proceeding if doing so would be helpful in deciding the case before us).

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later analyzed by forensic scientist Scott Rochowicz, who testified for the State as an expert in

GSR testing. Rochowicz determined that defendant’s right hand showed “a minimum of three of

the tricomponent particles and additional consistent particles,” leading Rochowicz to conclude that

defendant had likely discharged a firearm or been in close proximity to the discharge of a firearm.

However, Rochowicz testified that defendant’s left hand and both of Gordon’s hands tested

negative for GSR. Rochowicz acknowledged that GSR could be removed from a person’s hands

by a variety of activities, including running, climbing a fence, and touching other objects.

¶ 16 The firearms evidence collected in this case consisted of a .45-caliber handgun recovered

from the backseat of the crashed Pontiac and a .40-caliber handgun recovered from the IDOT

parking lot through which defendant and Gordon fled after the crash. Police also recovered

numerous .40-caliber, .45-caliber, and 9-millimeter fired cartridge cases from the murder scene.

¶ 17 Per the trial court’s pretrial ruling, Sher testified that she investigated this evidence for the

Illinois State Police as an expert in the field of firearm identification. After comparing the fired

cartridge cases to test shots from the recovered firearms, Sher determined that all .40-caliber

cartridge cases found at the scene were fired from the gun recovered in the IDOT parking lot, and

that all .45-caliber cartridge cases found at the scene were fired from the gun recovered from the

Pontiac. Sher also determined that all of the 9-millimeter cartridge cases from the scene were fired

by the same weapon; however no 9-millimeter firearm was ever recovered in this case. Defendant’s

counsel chose not to question Sher on cross-examination.

¶ 18 Forensic scientist Cynthia Prus testified that she examined various latent fingerprint

samples collected in this case, including those on the firearm recovered from the IDOT parking

lot. After comparing a print from the firearm to a known sample from defendant, Prus concluded

that the firearm print was made by defendant’s right ring finger.

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¶ 19 Forensic scientist Dr. Yongfei Wu testified that he created DNA profiles from samples

provided by defendant and Gordon. He then compared these profiles to various unknown DNA

samples from evidence collected in this case. In particular, Dr. Wu analyzed DNA swabs from the

recovered firearms, which he combined because each had a “very low amount of DNA” on its

own. Dr. Wu explained that the swabs showed a “mixture” of DNA from at least four people. Even

with the help of sophisticated computer programs, this mixture was too complex to identify any

individuals who may have contributed their DNA. Dr. Wu further testified that Gordon’s DNA

was found on a T-shirt hanging from the barbed wire fence surrounding the IDOT parking lot.

¶ 20 On cross-examination, Dr. Wu confirmed that he did not determine that defendant’s DNA

was present on any of the evidence he tested. Nevertheless, defense counsel proceeded to question

Dr. Wu about whether defendant could be definitively excluded as contributing to the mixture

from the gun swabs. In response to this questioning, Dr. Wu acknowledged that he identified alleles

at 19 of the possible 23 chromosomal locations in the mixture, but reiterated that he was unable to

include or exclude anyone based on his results. The following exchange then occurred:

“Q. It’s true also, Dr. Wu, that for those 19 locations, specifically for [the gun swabs] there

are often alleles present that cannot have come from Mr. Dorsey present [sic] that are not

in his DNA?

THE COURT: Well, that’s necessarily true in a mixture?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge, that is true.

THE COURT: Let’s take a recess. Take the jury out, bring them in the hallway if you

would.”

¶ 21 Once the jury was excused, the court asked defense counsel what he was looking to

establish with these questions. Defense counsel objected, arguing that it would be inappropriate to

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discuss the matter in the presence of Dr. Wu. The court disagreed, stating “No, let’s go. Come on.”

Defense counsel then explained that he sought to establish that “at a multitude of these genetic

locations [Dr. Wu] tested, even though DNA results were obtained Mr. Dorsey’s alleles are not

present at those locations in these mixtures.” After a lengthy discussion, the court allowed defense

counsel to continue his line of questioning, but cautioned that the defense would not be allowed to

mislead the jury by contending that defendant was excluded from the mixture at closing arguments.

¶ 22 When cross-examination resumed, Dr. Wu explained that the absence of defendant’s alleles

at a particular location does not necessarily exclude him as a contributor for several reasons. For

example, Dr. Wu explained that a person’s DNA can be “dropped out and not detected” at a

location if it is at a “low level.” However, Dr. Wu agreed that another explanation for the absence

of defendant’s alleles at a particular location is that he was not a contributor.

¶ 23 On re-direct examination, Dr. Wu testified that it would not be generally accepted in the

field of DNA analysis to exclude an individual as a contributor to a mixture based on the absence

of his alleles at some location. Dr. Wu reiterated that the mixture from the gun swabs was too

complex to include or exclude any person as a contributor.

¶ 24 The defense’s case-in-chief consisted solely of defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified

that he was in Chicago in June 2017 because he was staying at his aunt’s house while on summer

break from college. On the night of the shooting, defendant attended a family gathering at the

aunt’s house in honor of his late cousin, who had been shot and killed approximately three weeks

prior. At the gathering, defendant’s cousin Marquise Banks pulled him aside and showed him a

gun. Because defendant did not have any experience with firearms, Banks showed him how to

work the safety and remove the clip. Defendant briefly touched the gun to practice what Banks

had shown him. Defendant then handed the gun back to Banks and they rejoined the party.

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¶ 25 Several hours later, Gordon, Banks, and Cameron Slater (a friend of Banks’ who defendant

knew only as “Cam”) told defendant that they wanted to go buy marijuana. Defendant drove them

in the Pontiac because he was the only one with a valid drivers’ license. He did not know who

owned the vehicle.

¶ 26 Defendant drove to 58th Street and parked on the side of the street. Gordon, Banks, and

Slater exited the vehicle while defendant stayed behind in the driver’s seat. As defendant waited

for them to return, he heard a “few loud bangs.” The noises then became more rapid and “sounded

extremely close.” Defendant was afraid and crouched down in his seat for cover.

¶ 27 Moments later, Gordon, Banks, and Slater returned to the car in a panic and yelled for him

to drive away. Defendant did not know what was going on but sped off onto the expressway as

instructed. Defendant knew the police were pursuing them, but he was “too afraid to stop.”

Defendant soon lost control of the car and crashed on the side of the expressway.

¶ 28 Defendant, Gordon, Banks, and Slater all exited the car and ran. Banks and Slater ran in

one direction while defendant and Gordon ran in the other. Defendant and Gordon hopped the

embankment on the expressway and climbed a fence into an IDOT parking lot. They then ran

through the parking lot and into a neighborhood, where they were arrested while attempting to

hide on the porch of a residence.

¶ 29 Defendant testified that he never saw Gordon, Banks, or Slater with a gun after they left

the family gathering. Defendant denied firing a gun on the day of the murders. He did not know

that the others were planning on committing a shooting.

¶ 30 C. Motion Regarding Defendant’s Motive

¶ 31 Upon the close of evidence, defendant filed a motion to prevent the State from suggesting

during its closing argument that the shooting was motivated by revenge for his recently-murdered

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cousin. Defendant contended that such an argument would require the State to rely on assumptions

not based on the evidence because “[n]ot a scintilla of evidence” connected the victims with the

murder of defendant’s cousin. Defendant further maintained that the argument would also

“impermissibly inject the specter of gang violence” into the trial because “most people associate

retaliatory shootings with gang activity.”

¶ 32 After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. In so

ruling, the court stated that defendant’s testimony “suggests the possible motive by his own

cousins” Banks and Gordon because they had been at a gathering to commemorate the death of

their mutual cousin immediately prior to the shooting.

¶ 33 D. Closing Arguments

¶ 34 At closing arguments, the State argued that defendant, Gordon, and an unknown third

gunman planned to commit the shooting and positioned their Pontiac to make a quick escape onto

the expressway. Unfortunately for them, they were “caught essentially red-handed” because

officers happened to be nearby. The State emphasized that the fingerprint, GSR, and firearms

evidence showed that defendant handled one of the murder weapons and fired at the victims more

than a dozen times. The State also contended that defendant’s innocent explanations for this

forensic evidence were “fanciful” and “ridiculous.”

¶ 35 The defense’s theory at closing argument was that Gordon, Banks, and Slater were the

shooters while defendant was “tricked *** into being a getaway driver” under the pretense of

buying marijuana. Defense counsel contended that the GSR could have been transferred to

defendant from one of the shooters or arresting officers. Similarly, the presence of defendant’s

fingerprint on the .40-caliber firearm was explained by his testimony that he touched it when Banks

showed it to him at the family gathering. The defense also emphasized that defendant’s DNA was

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not found on either recovered firearm despite allegedly shooting one of them many times. Finally,

defense counsel argued that defendant would not derail his life for a “motiveless shooting,” noting

that “there hasn’t even been an allegation of how he has any connection to any of [the victims] or

why there would be a retaliatory strike” for his cousin’s recent murder.

¶ 36 In rebuttal, the State contended that defendant and Gordon committed the murders in a

“targeted hit” as revenge for the recent murder of their mutual cousin. The State maintained that

the forensic and circumstantial evidence established that defendant was one of the shooters beyond

a reasonable doubt. The State further asserted that defendant was a “horrible liar” whose testimony

“complete defies logic” in various ways.

¶ 37 D. Posttrial Motions

¶ 38 On July 18, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder with respect to all

three victims. The matter was then continued to September 9, 2022, for argument on posttrial

motions. On that date, defendant was not present in court because, according to the sheriff, he

“refused to come to court.”

¶ 39 On November 10, 2022, the matter was continued again because the parties had not yet

filed their posttrial motions. The case was then set for arguments on posttrial motions on December

14, 2022. On that date, defense counsel informed the court that he was ready to proceed with

posttrial motions, but that defendant wished to address the court. The following exchange then

occurred:

“DEFENDANT DORSEY: I wanted to ask you if I was to ask my attorney to withdraw

from the case, would I have to proceed with my retrial motion today?

THE COURT: You want your attorney to withdraw from the case?

DEFENDANT DORSEY: Yes.

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THE COURT: When I say your attorney, I mean Mr. Schleyer and Mr. Gutierrez—

DEFENDANT DORSEY: Yes.”

Defendant then explained that he and his mother had “been in contact with several lawyers” and

were in the process of deciding which one to hire. Defendant continued that it had taken him “a

while” to find new counsel because he “had trouble getting in contact” with many of the candidates

and working out a financial arrangement. The court ultimately denied defendant’s request for a

continuance, noting that it had been nearly four and a half years since the shooting and over five

months since the verdicts were read. The court opined that defendant therefore had “ample time to

have secured counsel” but had not so. The court noted that it had asked defendant “several very

open-ended questions” regarding his request for a continuance and that he had not offered “any

particular reason” why he wanted to obtain replacement counsel.

¶ 40 The court then heard arguments on the motion written by defendant’s trial counsel. That

motion raised numerous claims, including that (1) the State failed to prove the charges beyond a

reasonable doubt; (2) the court erred in denying several of defendant’s pretrial motions, including

those to limit or exclude testimony regarding firearm and fingerprint identification; (3) the court

erred in allowing hearsay statements; (4) the court erred by interjecting its own opinion during Dr.

Wu’s cross-examination; (5) the court erred in allowing the State to ask defendant improper

questions on cross-examination; and (6) the court erred in allowing the State to argue that the

shooting was motivated by revenge for defendant’s recently-murdered cousin. Defendant’s motion

was denied.

¶ 41 E. Sentencing Hearing

¶ 42 After the denial of defendant’s posttrial motion, the matter proceeded to a sentencing

hearing. The State argued that the only sentence allowed under the law was a natural life sentence,

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which the State maintained was appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the “utter

disregard for human life” exhibited by defendant. The court also reviewed a “fairly lengthy” packet

of mitigating evidence submitted by the defense, as well as defendant’s Presentence Investigation

Report (PSI). The mitigation packet and PSI revealed that defendant was primarily raised without

a father in “less fortunate” economic circumstances.. Despite these challenges, defendant became

a star football player who set numerous high school records for Dunbar Vocational Career

Academy. After graduating from Dunbar, defendant played at Dodge City Community College in

Kansas, where he also received an academic scholarship and worked as a resident assistant. The

mitigation packet contains several letters from defendant’s teammates attesting to his high moral

character.

¶ 43 In argument, defense counsel acknowledged that a life sentence was required by statute,

but contended that such a sentence was “cruel and unusual” because it did not consider defendant’s

age, education, background, and potential for rehabilitation. Invoking the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), counsel further asserted that the court

should consider that “youthful offenders have different brain activity” that impacts their ability to

regulate their behavior and appreciate the consequences of their actions. Defendant did not make

a statement in allocution.

¶ 44 The court sentenced defendant to life in prison, which the court found was statutorily

required because defendant was over the age of 18 and convicted of multiple murders. The court

noted the defense’s invocation of Miller, but opined that concerns about youthful offenders did not

apply to this case because defendant was “obviously well educated” and did not have “minimal

involvement” in the shooting. The court further stated that the sentence “pass[es] Constitutional

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muster” as applied to defendant given the “brazen” and “horrific” nature of the offense.

Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied.

¶ 45 This appeal followed.

¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 47 A. Motion for Frye Hearing

¶ 48 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to either

exclude the State’s firearm identification evidence and or hold a Frye hearing to determine the

admissibility of that evidence. As he did below, defendant contends that firearm identification

evidence is inadmissible because it is not generally accepted in the scientific community. For

support, defendant relies primarily on a 2009 report from the National Academy of Sciences that

concluded the field of firearms lacks objective standards and has not been subjected to rigorous

scientific scrutiny or research.

¶ 49 In Illinois, the admission of expert testimony is governed by the standard first articulated

in Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In re Detention of New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 25. Under Frye,

scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if it is based on a methodology or principle that is

generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523,

529-30 (2004). To qualify as “generally accepted,” the methodology or principle in question need

not have gained universal acceptance or even be accepted by a majority of experts in the relevant

field. Id. Instead, it is sufficient that the methodology underlying the expert witness’s opinion is

reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Id. at 530. Additionally, the Frye standard applies

only to scientific methodologies that are “new” or “novel.” Id. A scientific methodology is

considered “new” or “novel” in this context if it is original or does not resemble something

formerly known or used. Id. A trial court may decide that a scientific methodology or principle is

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generally accepted by either (1) holding an evidentiary hearing or (2) taking judicial notice of

unequivocal and undisputed prior judicial decisions or technical writings on the subject. People v.

McKown, 226 Ill. 2d 245, 254 (2007). Whether a scientific methodology is “generally accepted”

within the meaning of the Frye standard is reviewed de novo. People v. Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d 386,

430-31 (2009).

¶ 50 Initially, we note that the State contends that the firearm identification evidence relevant

to this case is neither “new” nor “novel” within the meaning of Frye because Illinois courts have

allowed such evidence since at least our supreme court’s 1930 decision in People v. Fisher, 340

Ill. 216, 240-41 (1930). Defendant acknowledges that Illinois courts have routinely allowed

firearm identification evidence for many years, but insists that the methodology is still novel

because, as Frye hearings are rarely held on firearm identification evidence, newer research “has

not been adequately litigated” in Illinois.

¶ 51 We find People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 54, instructive. There, as

here, the defendant relied primarily on the 2009 report from the National Academy of Sciences

and our supreme court’s decision in People v. McKown, 226 Ill. 2d 245 (2007), in arguing that the

trial court erred by admitting firearm identification evidence without holding a Frye hearing. Id.

We disagreed, stating that “[t]oolmark and firearm identification evidence is not new or novel,

either pursuant to the plain meaning of those words or in accordance with the analysis employed

by our supreme court in McKown.” Id. ¶ 61We continued that, “[f]ar from being unsettled, the law

in Illinois is consistent in its admission of such evidence.” Id.

¶ 52 We distinguished firearm identification evidence from the horizontal gaze nystagmus test

relevant in McKown, noting that the admissibly of the former was well-settled whereas the latter

had never been accepted after a Frye hearing in an Illinois court. Id. ¶ 58. We also rejected the

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defendant’s reliance on the National Academy of Sciences report, holding that “the report’s

concerns go to the weight and not to the admissibility of such evidence.” Id. ¶ 62. Accordingly,

we affirmed the admission of firearm identification evidence without the need for a Frye hearing.

Id. ¶ 62; see also Robinson, 2013 IL App (1st) 102476, ¶ 91 (same).

¶ 53 In this case, defendant does not address Rodriguez other than summarily asserting it was

erroneously decided based on “unsubstantiated science from a different time.” However,

Rodriguez remains good law and we see no reason to depart from it. We also note that much of the

research cited by defendant, particularly the 2009 National Academy of Sciences report predates

Rodriguez and was considered by that court.

¶ 54 In any event, even if we were to find that the firearm identification evidence should not

have been admitted, the error would have been harmless. Even where evidence is erroneously

admitted, this court may affirm a conviction if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 31. Evidentiary error is harmless where there is

no reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted but for the error. People

v. Sheppard, 2021 IL App (1st) 181613, ¶ 23.

¶ 55 Here, any evidentiary error would have been harmless because the evidence against

defendant was overwhelming. Even without the challenged firearm identification evidence, the

trial evidence still established that defendant was present at the crime scene with the shooters and

led the police on a high-speed chase in an attempt to escape. Defendant continued to flee on foot

after crashing his vehicle, bloodying his hands by climbing a barbed wire fence in the process.

Defendant’s hand also tested positive for GSR shortly after his arrest, and it is undisputed that his

fingerprint was found on the .40-caliber firearm recovered from the path of his flight from police.

The caliber of that firearm matched many of the spent cartridge cases found at the crime scene.

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Considering this substantial evidence, further evidence connecting the .40-caliber firearm to the

cartridge cases left at the scene was little more than cumulative.

¶ 56 To be sure, defendant contends that the error was not harmless because “the State presented

no evidence refuting his testimony,” which he maintains explains the forensic evidence against

him. However, defendant’s testimony does not render any evidentiary error prejudicial. We agree

with the trial court that defendant’s self-serving testimony was somewhat “fantastical,” and thus

have no reason to believe the jury would have accepted it but for the claimed evidentiary error.

See also Gordon, 2025 IL App (1st) 230037-U, ¶ 35 (opining that similar testimony from Gordon

“strains credulity”). Consequently, any error in the admission of the firearm identification evidence

would have been harmless.

¶ 57 B. Dr. Wu’s Cross-Examination

¶ 58 Defendant next argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial when the trial court

“abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter and showed bias toward the defense” during the cross-

examination of Dr. Wu. In particular, defendant challenges the following instance where the court

interjected while defense counsel was cross-examining Dr. Wu about whether defendant could be

excluded as a contributor to the DNA mixture from the recovered firearms:

“Q. It’s true also, Dr. Wu, that for those 19 locations, specifically for both [firearm swabs]

there are often alleles present that cannot have come from Mr. Dorsey present [sic] that are

not in his DNA?

THE COURT: Let’s take a recess. Take the jury out, bring them in the hallway if you

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The court then held a sidebar during which, over defense counsel’s objection, Dr. Wu remained

present on the witness stand outside the presence of the jury.

¶ 59 Of course, every criminal defendant has a right to a fair trial before a neutral judge.

However, a trial court has wide discretion to control the course of the trial, including the right to

raise its own objections and question witnesses. People v. Moore, 2023 IL App (1st) 211421, ¶

115. A court must exercise extreme caution to avoid influencing the jury by stating or implying its

opinion on the credibility of a witness or the argument of one of the parties. People v. Tatum, 389

Ill. App. 3d 656, 662 (2009). That said, a trial judge does not become an advocate for the State

merely because his questions solicit evidence beneficial to the prosecution. People v. Harris, 384

Ill. App. 3d 551, 561 (2008). Even where a trial judge acted improperly, a new trial is warranted

only if the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s conduct. Moore, 2023 IL App (1st) 211421, ¶

115.

¶ 60 Here, defendant contends that the trial judge interjected his own opinion on the evidence

by stating that it was “necessarily true in a [DNA] mixture” that not every allele was contributed

by the same person. Defendant also maintains that the court continued “acting as an advocate for

the State” by forcing defense counsel to discuss his theory of the case in the presence of Dr. Wu

during the side bar.

¶ 61 We find no reversible error here. First, we fail to see how the “necessarily true” comment

prejudiced defendant, as the court agreed with the premise of defense counsel’s question. That is

why defense counsel answered the court’s question by stating, “Yes, Judge, that is true.”

Additionally, the sidebar occurred outside the presence of the jury, so any comments from the

court could not have influenced it. Although defendant maintains that Dr. Wu should not have

been allowed to hear the reason for defense counsel’s line of questioning, the defense’s theory was

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rather obvious. And, even after the sidebar, Dr. Wu essentially reiterated what he said on direct

examination: the guns swabs were too complex to identify who may have contributed to them.

There is little chance that Dr. Wu would have testified that defendant was excluded as a contributor

had he not been present for the sidebar. Instead, it is highly likely that the State would have elicited

that defendant could not be excluded during redirect examination anyway.

¶ 62 Regardless, this line of questioning was of minor importance to the overall trial. At best,

defense counsel’s questioning could have established that defendant’s DNA was not found on the

recovered firearms. However, the jury would still have heard that defendant’s fingerprint was

found on the gun recovered in the IDOT parking lot. Indeed, defendant himself admitted to

handling the gun at his aunt’s house just before the shooting. Thus, there is no reasonable

possibility that the trial court’s conduct prejudiced defendant, and therefore no reversible error.

¶ 63 C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 64 Defendant next contends that the State committed “prosecutorial misconduct” through

various statements made in cross-examination and closing argument. Generally, the State is

afforded wide latitude in opening statements, closing arguments, and cross-examinations. People

v. Jones, 2016 IL App (1st) 141008, ¶ 21. However, it remains improper for a prosecutor to make

statements that have no purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury. Id. It is also improper

for the prosecution to misstate the evidence or argue facts that were not in the evidence. People v.

Daniel, 2022 IL App (1st) 182604, ¶ 84. On the other hand, the State may assume the truth of its

evidence and comment on any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. In evaluating allegedly

improper remarks for the State, the comments must be viewed in their entirety and in context of

the closing argument as a whole. Id. Statements are generally not improper where they were

provoked or invited by the defense. Id. Additionally, even improper comments do not warrant

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reversal unless they “engendered such substantial prejudice against the defendant that it is

impossible to tell whether the verdict of guilt resulted from them.” McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st)

180015, ¶ 43.

¶ 65 This court has previously noted the “confusion” surrounding the appropriate standard of

review when a defendant alleges that the State made improper remarks during closing argument.

People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 123249, ¶ 39. This confusion stems from two supreme court

cases: (1) People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007), where our supreme court held that whether

a prosecutor’s comments were egregious enough to require a new trial is a question of law

reviewed de novo, and (2) People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 244 (2000), where our supreme court

reviewed the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments under the abuse of

discretion standard. Here, the parties agree that the proper standard is whether the trial court abused

its discretion in allowing the State to make the challenged remarks. Regardless, we observe that

we would reach the same conclusion under either standard. See People v. Stewart, 2013 IL App

(1st) 210912, ¶ 77 (appellate court need not resolve dispute over standard of review where it

determines that the challenged comments were proper under any standard).

¶ 66 A review of the record shows that the challenged remarks are rather isolated and involve

only minor trial issues. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that these comments affected the

outcome of defendant’s trial.

¶ 67 1. “Facts Not in Evidence”

¶ 68 For example, defendant contends that the State improperly argued facts not in evidence

when, on four occasions during its cross-examination of defendant, it implied that he was driving

either 100 or 110 miles per hour before crashing the Pontiac. Defendant observes that he testified

only that he drove faster than 55 miles per hour. Similarly, Detective Campbell testified only that

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defendant was traveling “at a high rate or speed” and “faster than the flow of traffic” on the

expressway. Thus, defendant concludes that it was improper to suggest that he drove 100 miles

per hour where there was no evidence of his precise speed.

¶ 69 However, we have no doubt that the verdict did not hinge on the jury’s belief that defendant

drove 100 miles per hour rather than some lesser speed. In any event, the jury observed the video

from Detective Campbell’s dashboard camera which confirms that defendant drove extremely

quickly and recklessly for about 30 seconds before losing control and crashing his vehicle. We

also note that the State’s closing argument did not mention a specific speed, but rather told the

jurors that they “saw that video” and “can make a determination of how fast [defendant]’s going”

for themselves.

¶ 70 2. “Misstatement” of Testimony

¶ 71 Similarly, defendant argues that the prosecution “misstated” his testimony by implying that

he was present at the crime scene during the following exchange:

“Q. Mr. Dorsey, just before I ask you about what happened, I just want to clarify a couple

things. So, according to you, you were just present when this shooting occurred; right?

A. Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.”

Defendant maintains that this was error because his testimony was that he was sitting in the Pontiac

half a block away rather than at the scene of the shooting.

¶ 72 First, we fail to see how defendant can claim that the prosecutor misstated his testimony

when he answered the question in the affirmative, meaning he agreed that he was “just present”

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when the shooting occurred. Additionally, it was reasonable for the State to describe defendant as

“present” when, by his own account, he was no more than half a block from the shooting and

reunited with the shooters just moments later. Indeed, defendant testified that the gunfire was so

close to him that he crouched down in his seat for fear of getting shot. Thus, his argument is

meritless.

¶ 73 3. Questions Outside Defendant’s Knowledge

¶ 74 Defendant further argues that, elsewhere during cross-examination, the State improperly

asked two questions that were outside the scope of his knowledge. First, defendant takes issue with

the State asking him whether the IDOT parking lot was “where that gun that has your fingerprints

on [it] was recovered.” Second, defendant challenges the State asking him whether, as the only

licensed driver in the group, he was asked to drive the others to the shooting because it was

“important for [Banks] to follow the rules of the road.”

¶ 75 As with the question about his presence at the crime scene, we note that defendant

answered, “Yes” to the question of whether the gun with his fingerprint was the one recovered in

the IDOT parking lot. Thus, defendant cannot seriously claim that the question was outside of his

personal knowledge.

¶ 76 As for the question regarding Banks’ desire to “follow the rules of the road,” defendant

simply answered that he “had no idea what [Banks’] thought process was,” and the State moved

on to a different line of questioning. Clearly, this single question on an unimportant issue did not

affect the verdict. Reversal is therefore not required.

¶ 77 4. “Taunting” and “Sarcastic” Remarks

¶ 78 Next, defendant alleges that the prosecutors made generally “taunting” and “sarcastic”

remarks that were unrelated to the evidence and designed solely to “harass and demean” him in

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order to undermine his credibility. In particular, defendant likens his case to People v. Schaffer,

2014 IL App (1st) 113493, ¶ 51, where this court reversed a defendant’s conviction based on

improper questions that “were designed to ridicule and demean [the] defendant.” However, that

case is readily distinguishable.

¶ 79 In Schaffer, the defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault. Id. ¶ 1.

There was no dispute that the defendant and the victim engaged in sexual activity; the only issue

was whether it was consensual. Id. ¶ 2. On cross-examination, the State repeatedly asked the

defendant whether the victim and investigating detectives fabricated their testimony against him.

Id. ¶ 51. We first found that this questioning was error, as it is improper for the State to ask a

defendant his opinion on the veracity of other witnesses. Id. ¶ 49. Second, we found that this error

warranted reversal because the evidence was closely balanced in a classic “ ‘he said/she said’

scenario” where both the defendant and the victim had “some problems with credibility.” Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 80 In contrast to Shaffer, the State in the present case did not ask defendant to opine on the

veracity of other witnesses. Nor did the State ask questions solely designed to demean defendant.

For instance, defendant objects to the State asking him whether Banks “magically appear[ed]” at

his aunt’s house before the shooting. Although defendant asserts that this question “had no real

purpose” other than to harass him, the record shows that the State’s strategy was to establish that

Banks drove himself a significant distance to attend the family gathering. And defendant did admit

that Banks drove the Pontiac to the gathering, thus undermining his testimony that his cousins

needed him to drive to the shooting because he was the only one with a valid driver’s license.

While the wording of this and other questions was perhaps mildly sarcastic, we agree with the

State’s characterization that its cross-examination was “vigorous” without crossing the line into

embarrassing or demeaning defendant.

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¶ 81 Furthermore, this case also differs from Shaffer in that the evidence was not closely

balanced. Rather than a case of “he said/ she said,” defendant’s involvement in the shooting was

proved by ample physical and forensic evidence as detailed above. Reversal is not warranted in

the face of this overwhelming evidence.

¶ 82 5. Motive

¶ 83 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to argue that the

shootings were motivated by revenge for the recent murder of defendant and Gordon’s mutual

cousin. Defendant contends that this argument was improper where there was no evidence

connecting the victims to the cousin’s murder or suggesting that defendant believed the victims to

be responsible.

¶ 84 Initially, we note that we affirmed Gordon’s convictions over a similar argument on direct

appeal. Gordon, 2025 IL App (1st) 230037-U ¶¶ 58-59. There, Gordon contended that the State

argued facts not in evidence during closing argument by stating that he and defendant were at a

“party commemorating the death of [their] deceased cousin” before the shooting. Id. ¶ 58. We

disagreed, finding that it was a “fair inference and within the wide latitude afforded in closing

argument” based on Gordon’s “ambiguous” testimony on whether the party was connected to the

cousin’s death. Id. Regardless, we stated that this “relatively minor” aspect of the State’s overall

closing argument did not create substantial prejudice, especially where the trial court properly

instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. Id. ¶ 59.

¶ 85 Defendant’s argument in this case is even weaker than the one we rejected in Gordon. Here,

defendant testified that “it was a family gathering for the –[his] cousin” and that “the family was

there because [his] cousin was previously deceased.” Thus, as in Gordon, it was a fair inference

from the evidence to connect the shooting with the cousin’s murder. We also note that the State

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only mentioned the possible motive in rebuttal after defense counsel first argued that it was “a

motiveless shooting” and that “there hasn’t even been any allegation of how he has any connection

to any of [the victims] or why there would be a retaliatory strike three weeks after a murder.”

Generally, it is proper for the State to respond to arguments from defense counsel that clearly invite

a response. People v. Cosmano, 2021 IL App (1st) 10116, ¶ 57.

¶ 86 Regardless, the evidence against defendant is even stronger than the evidence against

Gordon. In addition to the evidence cited in Gordon, defendant personally drove the vehicle that

fled from police, tested positive for GSR, and was connected via fingerprint to one of the recovered

murder weapons. Finally, as in Gordon, the trial court instructed defendant’s jury that “closing

arguments are not evidence and any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not

based on the evidence is to be disregarded.” We therefore find no reversible error in the State’s

comments.

¶ 87 In sum, defendant challenges only isolated comments on tangential trial matters. We find

the challenged remarks to be generally proper, reasonably based on the evidence, and within the

wide latitude afforded to the State during closing argument. Regardless, even a handful of

improper remarks on minor issues would not require reversal in light of the overwhelming against

defendant. Thus, defendant’s arguments are meritless.

¶ 88 D. Request for a Continuance

¶ 89 Defendant next argues that he was deprived of his right to the counsel of his choice when

the trial court denied his posttrial request for a continuance to find substitute counsel. Defendant

therefore asks us to remand the matter “to allow [him] to obtain new counsel and for a new

sentencing hearing.”

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¶ 90 Both the Illinois and United States Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to

retain counsel of their choosing. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970 art. I, § 8. However, that

right is not absolute and cannot be used to “ ‘thwart the administration of justice, or to otherwise

embarrass the effective prosecution of crime.’ ” People v. Bingham, 364 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645

(2006) (quoting People v. Solomon, 24 Ill. 2d 586, 590 (1962)). Thus, when faced with a

defendant’s request for a continuance to procure substitute counsel, a court must balance the

defendant’s right to counsel with the need for efficient administration of justice. Id. Whether a

continuance is proper necessarily depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (2009). Factors for the court to consider include (1) whether

the defendant articulates an acceptable reason for seeking new counsel, (2) whether the defendant

has been in continuous custody, (3) the defendant’s efforts in obtaining new counsel, (4) the

defendant’s cooperation with current counsel, and (5) the length of time current counsel has

represented the defendant. People v. Adams, 2016 IL App (1st) 141135, ¶ 13. Whether to grant or

deny a continuance for the substitution of counsel is left to the discretion of the trial court, and the

court’s decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. People v.

Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 245 (2000).

¶ 91 Initially, we note that defendant concedes that this issue was “not fully preserved,”

presumably because it was not included in his posttrial motion. See People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL

App (1st) 221227, ¶ 43 (“In order to preserve an alleged error for appellate review, a defendant

must raise the alleged error both at trial and in a posttrial motion, or else the alleged error is

forfeited.”). He nevertheless maintains that we should review the matter under the second prong

of the plain error doctrine, which allows us to review a forfeited issue where “a clear or obvious

error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

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challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People

v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

¶ 92 In this case, the record shows that defendant’s posttrial motion was filed by his trial counsel

before defendant raised his pro se request for a continuance to his counsel or the trial court. Thus,

it would seem unfair to penalize defendant for the failure to include the matter in an already-filed

motion. Additionally, we have stated that a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice is so

fundamental to the judicial process that “its erroneous denial requires automatic reversal” without

regard to the strength of the evidence. Adams, 2016 IL App (1st) 141135, ¶ 15. Thus, we will

review the matter for plain error. However, before applying the plain-error doctrine, we must first

determine whether the trial court committed a clear or obvious error. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill.

2d 598, 611 (2010).

¶ 93 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Defendant primarily

contends that it would have been reasonable and minimally disruptive to the administration of

justice to grant him a “short continuance” in which to obtain substitute counsel. However, that the

continuance would have been a short one is speculative. The record shows that defendant had not

yet hired substitute counsel and admitted that he had been having trouble doing so. “[I]t is well

established that a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion in denying a motion for

substitution of counsel in the absence of ready and willing substitute counsel.” Segoviano, 189 Ill.

2d 228, 245 (2000). A continuance would have required substitute counsel to have been identified,

hired, and sufficiently familiarized with the issues to argue posttrial motions and sentencing in a

triple murder case. In contrast, defendant’s trial counsel was uniquely familiar with the case, as he

had continuously represented defendant for more than four years at the time defendant requested

continuance. The record does not reveal any notable disagreement between defendant and counsel

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during this time. Indeed, and perhaps more importantly, defendant never articulated any reason

why he sought to change counsels or why he waited until five months after the end of trial to

request a continuance.

¶ 94 Defendant counters by arguing that he never specified the length or reason for the sought

continuance because the trial court’s inquiry into his request was insufficient. Defendant supports

this argument by citing to Adams, where this court reversed a conviction based on “the trial court’s

utter failure to make any kind of inquiry into [the defendant’s] request” for a continuance to

substitute counsel. Adams, 2016 IL App (1st) 141135, ¶ 16. However, this case is not like Adams

because the trial court here asked defendant several direct questions and gave him multiple

opportunities to explain why he sought to substitute his counsel. Although we agree with defendant

that the court could have asked slightly more specific questions, we cannot say that this rose to the

level of abuse of discretion. See People v. Roberts, 2021 IL App (3d) 190445, ¶ 36 (trial court’s

inquiry was sufficient where the court “provided [the] defendant with multiple open-ended

opportunities to express the reasons for her dissatisfaction” with counsel). We also disagree that

the court was required to ask additional questions because defendant “lacked the legal expertise”

to respond to the court’s inquiries. When requesting a continuance to obtain substitute counsel, it

does not take a trained legal mind to explain the basic reason for the request or the approximate

length of the continuance sought. We note in this regard that defendant was 26 years old at the

time of his request, had attended college on an academic scholarship, and, according to the trial

court, was “obviously well educated.” Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying defendant’s posttrial request for a continuance.

¶ 95 E. Proportionate Penalties Clause

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¶ 96 Finally, defendant argues that his mandatory life sentence violates the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him because of his age, background, and

potential for rehabilitation. Defendant also contends, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to support this claim with scientific evidence that his developing brain was

comparable to that of a juvenile offender.

¶ 97 The proportionate penalties clause provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both

according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. This clause is similar to the eighth amendment to the

United States Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., amend.

VIII; People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st) 191145, ¶ 42.

¶ 98 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentencing scheme that requires a

juvenile offender to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole violates the eighth

amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). The Court reasoned in part that a sentencing court

should be able to consider the role that the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant

characteristics played in the offense, as well as the nature of the offense itself and the juvenile’s

potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 477. Illinois courts have since adopted the reasoning of Miller

with respect to eighth amendment claims, but have made clear that “for sentencing purposes, the

age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932,

¶ 61.

¶ 99 Defendant acknowledges that he was too old at the time of the offense to raise an eighth

amendment Miller claim. However, defendant maintains that he may still raise a similar claim

under the proportionate penalties clause because emerging neuroscience suggests that the

development of a 21-year-old’s brain is similar to that of a juvenile or young adult offender.

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¶ 100 Illinois courts have held that the proportionate penalties clause provides greater protection

against oppressive sentences than the eighth amendment. People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st)

171628, ¶ 55. Moreover, as defendant points out, our supreme court has not necessarily foreclosed

the possibility that offenders over the age of 18 but under the age of 21 could raise a proportionate

penalties clause claim based on Miller principles in a postconviction petition. People v. Harris,

2018 IL App (1st) 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 (18-year-old defendant); People v. Thompson, 2015 IL App

(1st) 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant).

¶ 101 Critically, however, “[n]one of the defendants in those cases were over the age of 21.”

People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88. Indeed, this court has repeatedly rejected proportionate

penalties clause claims for defendants age 21 and over. See, e.g., People v. Everett, 2022 IL App

(1st) 201169, ¶ 40; People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42; People v. Montanez, 2022

IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 56; People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 35.

¶ 102 Moreover, this case does not present the rare sort of facts that might allow a defendant over

the age of 18 to raise a successful proportionate penalties clause claim based on Miller principles.

Not only was defendant 21 years old at the time of the offense, the record does not suggest that he

was particularly immature or impetuous for his age. At the time of the shooting, defendant was a

high school graduate who was attending college on an academic scholarship while also playing on

the football team and working as a resident assistant in the dormitories. Additionally, this is not a

case where defendant played only a minor role in the offense. Cf. People v. Leon Miller, 2002 Ill.

2d 328, 341-343 (15-year-old defendant convicted under a theory of accountability for serving as

a “lookout” during a shooting). Instead, the evidence showed that defendant personally drove the

gunmen to the shooting, fired at the victims more than a dozen times, and lead the police on a high-

speed chase while attempting to escape. Thus, defendant’s life sentence is not disproportionate as

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applied to him. Furthermore, trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to present additional

evidence to support this argument.

¶ 103 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 104 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 105 Affirmed.

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