2023 IL App (5th) 200068-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 05/26/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0068 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 06-CF-425 ) KRYSTA DONOHO, ) Honorable ) Evan L. Owens, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the defendant, Krysta Donoho’s, petition to file a second successive petition for postconviction relief is affirmed where the defendant failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test.
¶2 The defendant, Krysta Donoho, was convicted in Jefferson County of first degree felony
murder and was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment to be served at 100% and to be followed by
3 years of mandatory supervised release. On direct appeal, this court affirmed her conviction and
sentence. See People v. Donoho, 2011 IL App (5th) 080354-U. Subsequently, the defendant filed
her first pro se postconviction petition, but it was dismissed at the first stage. She appealed the
dismissal but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. She also filed a successive postconviction
petition; the trial court construed this as a motion for leave to file a successive petition and
dismissed the motion. This court affirmed the dismissal. See People v. Donoho, 2018 IL App
1 (5th) 140501-U. On December 6, 2017, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment,
which the trial court dismissed, and this court affirmed. See People v. Donoho, 2021 IL App (5th)
190086-U. Relevant to this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition that is the subject of this appeal. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 As the facts of this case have been iterated several times, we will state only those facts
necessary for this appeal. On December 5, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition under section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018)). In her motion, the defendant argued that she was given a
de facto life sentence in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), where none of the
special mitigating factors of youth were considered at her sentencing hearing. Therefore, she
argued, her sentence violated the eighth amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. Attached to her motion was a successive petition for postconviction relief. The
petition argued that: (1) the sentence imposed on her was a de facto life sentence in violation of
Miller and its progeny, (2) the cause and prejudice test required to file a successive petition for
postconviction relief was satisfied as Miller was not available at the time of her sentencing and
where it applied retroactively, and (3) her sentence violated both the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶5 In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court found the following via docket entry:
“The defendant was 20 years old at the time of the offense and received a 45 year sentence to the Illinois Department of Corrections on 3/18/2008 for the offense of Felony Murder. ***. *** In defendant’s motion for Leave to File Successive Post Conviction Petition (filed in December 2019), the defendant attempts to allege that she has satisfied the ‘cause and
2 effect’ test meaning, in part, that she could not have filed her new claims at the time she filed her original postconviction petition. *** *** Most importantly, the cases cited by the defendant do not constitute changes [in] the law that would likely lead to the defendant’s requested relief or show that she was denied a substantive constitutional right. The decisions in People v. Reyes and People v. Buffer both involved defendants who were 16 years [of] age at the time of the commission of their offenses. The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Miller, 202 Ill[.] 2d 328, involved a [15-year-old] defendant. As such, the Miller, Reyes[,] and Buffer courts’ determination of what constitutes ‘[de facto] natural life sentences’ are inapplicable to this defendant who was 20 years old at the time of the murder of victim Randy Ferrar [sic]. This court has reviewed the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the docket entry of the sentencing court from March 18, 2008. This court has also reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court considered the youth to the defendant and weighed the appropriate sentencing factors in determining the appropriate sentence for the defendant. The sentencing court considered, in part, a letter that was introduced at trial from the defendant in which the defendant compared her relationship with co-defendant Coles as a ‘modern day Bonnie and Clyde.’ The court found that this defendant was dangerous, had a history of violent behavior and was likely to re-offend. The sentencing hearing reflects that this defendant was appropriately sentenced in accordance with the law. In sum, the defendant has failed to show that she has been denied of a substantive constitutional right and would likely prevail on the merits of her claim if Leave to file the proposed successive Post Conviction is granted.”
¶6 The defendant appeals.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to file a
successive postconviction petition where it found that she failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice
test necessary for a successive filing. Specifically, she argues that she was prejudiced in her
sentencing where the trial court failed to substantively consider her youth in crafting her sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the defendant cannot establish prejudice.
¶9 The Act provides a method for criminal defendants to assert that “in the proceedings which
resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West
2018). “A proceeding under the Act is a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction.” People
3 v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 47. Although our supreme court has made clear that the Act
contemplates only one postconviction proceeding, its caselaw establishes two bases upon which
the bar against successive proceedings will be relaxed: (1) a showing of cause and prejudice or
(2) a claim of actual innocence. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23.
¶ 10 When a defendant seeks to file a successive postconviction petition, she must first obtain
leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Leave of court may be granted only if defendant
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2023 IL App (5th) 200068-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 05/26/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0068 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 06-CF-425 ) KRYSTA DONOHO, ) Honorable ) Evan L. Owens, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the defendant, Krysta Donoho’s, petition to file a second successive petition for postconviction relief is affirmed where the defendant failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test.
¶2 The defendant, Krysta Donoho, was convicted in Jefferson County of first degree felony
murder and was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment to be served at 100% and to be followed by
3 years of mandatory supervised release. On direct appeal, this court affirmed her conviction and
sentence. See People v. Donoho, 2011 IL App (5th) 080354-U. Subsequently, the defendant filed
her first pro se postconviction petition, but it was dismissed at the first stage. She appealed the
dismissal but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. She also filed a successive postconviction
petition; the trial court construed this as a motion for leave to file a successive petition and
dismissed the motion. This court affirmed the dismissal. See People v. Donoho, 2018 IL App
1 (5th) 140501-U. On December 6, 2017, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment,
which the trial court dismissed, and this court affirmed. See People v. Donoho, 2021 IL App (5th)
190086-U. Relevant to this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition that is the subject of this appeal. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 As the facts of this case have been iterated several times, we will state only those facts
necessary for this appeal. On December 5, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition under section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018)). In her motion, the defendant argued that she was given a
de facto life sentence in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), where none of the
special mitigating factors of youth were considered at her sentencing hearing. Therefore, she
argued, her sentence violated the eighth amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. Attached to her motion was a successive petition for postconviction relief. The
petition argued that: (1) the sentence imposed on her was a de facto life sentence in violation of
Miller and its progeny, (2) the cause and prejudice test required to file a successive petition for
postconviction relief was satisfied as Miller was not available at the time of her sentencing and
where it applied retroactively, and (3) her sentence violated both the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶5 In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court found the following via docket entry:
“The defendant was 20 years old at the time of the offense and received a 45 year sentence to the Illinois Department of Corrections on 3/18/2008 for the offense of Felony Murder. ***. *** In defendant’s motion for Leave to File Successive Post Conviction Petition (filed in December 2019), the defendant attempts to allege that she has satisfied the ‘cause and
2 effect’ test meaning, in part, that she could not have filed her new claims at the time she filed her original postconviction petition. *** *** Most importantly, the cases cited by the defendant do not constitute changes [in] the law that would likely lead to the defendant’s requested relief or show that she was denied a substantive constitutional right. The decisions in People v. Reyes and People v. Buffer both involved defendants who were 16 years [of] age at the time of the commission of their offenses. The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Miller, 202 Ill[.] 2d 328, involved a [15-year-old] defendant. As such, the Miller, Reyes[,] and Buffer courts’ determination of what constitutes ‘[de facto] natural life sentences’ are inapplicable to this defendant who was 20 years old at the time of the murder of victim Randy Ferrar [sic]. This court has reviewed the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the docket entry of the sentencing court from March 18, 2008. This court has also reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court considered the youth to the defendant and weighed the appropriate sentencing factors in determining the appropriate sentence for the defendant. The sentencing court considered, in part, a letter that was introduced at trial from the defendant in which the defendant compared her relationship with co-defendant Coles as a ‘modern day Bonnie and Clyde.’ The court found that this defendant was dangerous, had a history of violent behavior and was likely to re-offend. The sentencing hearing reflects that this defendant was appropriately sentenced in accordance with the law. In sum, the defendant has failed to show that she has been denied of a substantive constitutional right and would likely prevail on the merits of her claim if Leave to file the proposed successive Post Conviction is granted.”
¶6 The defendant appeals.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to file a
successive postconviction petition where it found that she failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice
test necessary for a successive filing. Specifically, she argues that she was prejudiced in her
sentencing where the trial court failed to substantively consider her youth in crafting her sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the defendant cannot establish prejudice.
¶9 The Act provides a method for criminal defendants to assert that “in the proceedings which
resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West
2018). “A proceeding under the Act is a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction.” People
3 v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 47. Although our supreme court has made clear that the Act
contemplates only one postconviction proceeding, its caselaw establishes two bases upon which
the bar against successive proceedings will be relaxed: (1) a showing of cause and prejudice or
(2) a claim of actual innocence. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23.
¶ 10 When a defendant seeks to file a successive postconviction petition, she must first obtain
leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Leave of court may be granted only if defendant
demonstrates “cause” for her failure to bring the claim in her initial postconviction proceeding and
“prejudice” resulting therefrom. See id. (codifying the cause-and-prejudice test articulated in
People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458-60 (2002)); Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48. A defendant
shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded her ability to raise a specific claim in
her initial postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018); Wrice, 2012 IL 111860,
¶ 48. A defendant shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised in her initial
postconviction petition so infected her trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due
process. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48. It is defendant’s burden to establish a prima facie showing
of cause and prejudice in order to be granted leave before further proceedings on her claims can
follow (People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24; People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30), and both
elements must be satisfied for defendant to prevail (People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15).
We review de novo a court’s denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition.
¶ 11 Here, the defendant committed the crime when she was 20 years old. As this court has
previously found, a 20-year-old offender is an adult. See People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th)
170345, ¶ 20. We agree with the trial court that the defendant’s reliance on Miller and its progeny
is misguided. Our review of the record leads us to the same conclusion as the trial court in that
the sentencing court properly considered the defendant’s youthfulness, potential for rehabilitation,
4 and her propensity to reoffend. Therefore, we find that the court did not err in denying the
defendant’s motion for leave to file a second successive postconviction petition.
¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 13 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Jefferson County denying the
defendant’s petition for leave to file a second successive postconviction petition is hereby
affirmed.
¶ 14 Affirmed.