NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 180259-U September 22, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-18-0259 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County JAYLAND DONALDSON, ) No. 17CF261 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to an aggregate 12-year term of imprisonment.
(2) Defendant forfeited his posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to bring them to the trial court’s attention.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Jayland Donaldson, guilty
of three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), (d)(i)
(West 2016); id. § 407(b)(1), (2)) and two counts of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance (id. § 401(c)(2), id. § 407(b)(1); 720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 2016)) and
sentenced him to an aggregate term of 12 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing the court
erred by (1) considering improper aggravating factors at sentencing and imposing an excessive
sentence and (2) failing to inquire into his posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 2017, the State charged defendant with multiple drug-related offenses,
including three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2),
(d)(i) (West 2016); id. § 407(b)(1), (2)) (counts I, II, and III); two counts of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver ((id. § 401(c)(2), id. § 407(b)(1); 720 ILCS 550/5(c)
(West 2016)) (counts IV and VI); and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016)) (count V). The charges were based on allegations that, on
three occasions in August 2017, defendant sold cocaine to a confidential source during controlled
drug buys that occurred within 1000 feet of public housing; possessed with the intent to deliver
more than a gram of cocaine within 1000 feet of public housing; possessed with the intent to deliver
more than 10 grams but less than 30 grams of a substance containing cannabis; and unlawfully
possessed a substance containing hydrocodone.
¶5 In December 2017 and January 2018, defendant’s bench trial was conducted. The
State’s evidence showed that in August 2017, William Spandet agreed to work as a confidential
source for the police, specifically Sergeant Jeff Hamilton with the Livingston County Proactive
Unit. On August 8, 19, and 22, 2017, Spandet purchased cocaine from defendant during three
controlled drug buys. An unspecified amount of cocaine was sold during the first buy and 2.1
grams and 1.9 grams of cocaine were sold during the second and third buys, respectively. Each
buy occurred in Spandet’s vehicle while it was parked within an approximate 50-foot range of
Meadowview Court, a public housing complex where defendant resided. Regarding how the
location of the controlled buys was chosen, Hamilton testified as follows:
“The first buy the confidential source was directed to meet out there in front
-2- of the parking lot. The second and third buy I believe [defendant] himself directed
the confidential source to park in the same general area. I think on the third time
specifically [defendant] told the confidential source to park a little bit further down
the street out of the way of the cameras of the housing complex.”
¶6 Spandet testified he was told to call Hamilton when he learned of the potential to
buy drugs in Livingston County. He identified defendant as the person who sold him drugs on
three occasions in August 2017. At the time of the first transaction, Spandet knew he had the
potential to buy drugs from either an individual named Chad Callahan or defendant.
¶7 The record shows the State presented audio recordings of the first two drug buys,
which were obtained using a recording device given to Spandet. It also presented surveillance
videos captured by the police of the second and third controlled buys. The audio recording of the
first buy indicates Spandet spoke with an individual other than defendant before ultimately meeting
with defendant and purchasing cocaine. At the conclusion of the controlled buy, Spandet asked if
he could do business with defendant again and defendant replied “anytime.” Upon request,
defendant provided his phone number to Spandet and identified himself as “Jay.” Defendant also
stated as follows: “If you keep f*** with me, a g[ram] is gonna be 80 bucks for you, bro.” After
defendant exited the vehicle, Spandet used a racial slur to describe defendant’s appearance.
¶8 Spandet testified that prior to the second controlled buy, defendant stated he would
sell Spandet an “eight-ball” but then later expressed that he did not have enough cocaine for an
“eight-ball.” As a result, Spandet brought a scale to his meeting with defendant, which was used
during the drug transaction. An audio recording of the second buy reflects defendant expressed
that he wanted a similar scale for himself.
¶9 The same date as the third and final controlled buy, the police executed a search
-3- warrant on defendant’s apartment at the Meadowview Court complex. During the search, the
police located 12.4 grams of cannabis in a cabinet under the kitchen sink; 3.1 grams of “bagged
up” cocaine in a backpack in the living room; 1.2 grams of cocaine inside a “fake tomato paste
container”; a digital scale; empty “baggies”; and currency used during the August 22 controlled
buy.
¶ 10 The State’s evidence further showed that Hamilton interviewed defendant after the
execution of the search warrant. A recording of the interview was admitted into evidence and
played for the trial court. During the interview, defendant acknowledged that the police would find
cannabis, cocaine, a scale, and sandwich bags in his residence. He also admitted that the cocaine
found in the fake tomato paste container belonged to him and that the phone number contacted
during the controlled buys was his number. However, defendant asserted the backpack found in
his residence belonged to an individual named Heather Osmolski, who was at the residence when
it was searched. Hamilton testified that in addition to cocaine, the backpack also contained a digital
scale.
¶ 11 During the recorded interview with Hamilton, defendant further asserted that he
“just started” selling cocaine and was not selling “that much.” When Hamilton asked if defendant
was selling “a couple of grams a day,” defendant agreed, stating he sold cocaine “to make a little
money.” Defendant stated he charged $80 for a gram of cocaine and estimated that he had been
selling cocaine for around “two weeks.” He acknowledged selling cannabis “on and off” since he
was “younger.”
¶ 12 Defendant testified on his own behalf, stating he was 19 years old. He asserted that
the backpack found in his apartment belonged to Osmolski and that nothing in the backpack was
his. Defendant acknowledged selling drugs to Spandet during the controlled drug buys. He also
-4- admitted that the cocaine found in the fake tomato paste container was his but maintained that it
was for his own “personal use” and not for sale. Defendant testified that he was addicted to cocaine.
He stated he would purchase “an eight ball,” which weighed 3.5 grams and try to “make it last
through the week.” According to defendant he “never had really” sold cocaine “until [he] was
brought upon [sic] somebody that said they wanted some; and that was Spandet.” He asserted
Spandet was the only person he sold drugs to and that Spandet always called him.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, defendant testified he obtained the cocaine he sold from a
man in Joliet named “Tank.” He asserted he “just started messing around with cocaine in August.”
When asked whether he was selling cannabis before that, defendant respondent “[n]ot really” and
that he “was smoking it.” However, he also agreed that he was “dealing *** weed *** off and on
since [he] was a kid.” Defendant stated he was not employed and obtained money to buy drugs
from his girlfriend.
¶ 14 Ultimately, the trial court found defendant guilty of each charged offense except
count V, which charged him with unlawful possession of hydrocodone. The court found the
evidence was overwhelming regarding defendant’s participation in the three controlled drug buys
involving Spandet. It also determined it was “highly unlikely” that those were the only times
defendant had ever sold drugs and further stated as follows: “The evidence is pretty compelling
that you were engaging in a drug operation. Now maybe it was early on in the drug operation. I
don’t know. But I do think it’s unlikely particularly since you admitted selling the marijuana for
years.”
¶ 15 Defendant did not file a posttrial motion and in February 2018, the trial court
conducted his sentencing hearing. Defendant’s presentence investigation (PSI) report showed he
was born in June 1998. He had a history of delinquency that involved adjudications for disorderly
-5- conduct while armed in 2012, for which he was sentenced to a term of probation that was
successfully terminated in May 2013; criminal damage to property in 2013, for which he was
sentenced to a term of probation that was successfully terminated in June 2014; battery and
possession of cannabis in March 2015, for which he was sentenced to a term of probation until his
21st birthday; home invasion and aggravated battery in February 2015, for which he was sentenced
to a term of probation until his twenty-first birthday; and aggravated battery in October 2016, for
which he was sentenced to 30 months’ probation beginning in December 2016.
¶ 16 The PSI report also showed defendant grew up in a home with his mother and his
mother’s boyfriend. He described his childhood as “a little rough” but reported having a good
relationship with both his mother and her boyfriend. Defendant had no relationship with his
biological father, who was incarcerated when defendant was three months old.
¶ 17 At the time of the underlying offenses, defendant resided with his girlfriend, Kira
Smith, and their two children, ages three years and six months. Defendant was also the father of
two other children: a three-year-old daughter who resided with her mother in Wisconsin and an
infant son who resided with his mother in Pontiac, Illinois.
¶ 18 In May 2016, defendant graduated from high school. He reported being currently
unemployed and that Smith supported him financially. In the past, defendant worked for
McDonald’s, Exact Packaging, and Wal-Mart. His longest period of employment was with
Wal-Mart for six months. Defendant stated he was fired from that job for failing a drug test.
¶ 19 Regarding his history of drug use, defendant reported that he began smoking
cannabis at age 10 and, by age 12, was using cannabis daily. According to defendant, he last used
cannabis in August 2017. At that time “he was smoking daily and would smoke throughout the
day,” costing him approximately $100 per day. Defendant stated he began using cocaine in June
-6- 2017, at the age of 19, after his grandmother died. He asserted “he needed something to help him
relax from the anger he was experiencing.” Defendant reported daily use of one to two grams of
cocaine, which cost him approximately $150 per day. Finally, defendant admitted that he had a
history of abusing prescription drugs. Although the report states his last use of prescription drugs
was in June 2016, defendant also claimed that “[h]e would use Xanax to come down off of his
cocaine use,” which he asserted did not begin until 2017.
¶ 20 Defendant acknowledged having a problem with drugs. He asserted he had “trouble
dealing with anxiety and anger” and self-medicated with drugs to calm himself down. He believed
he had “an addictive personality” and that substance-abuse treatment would help him. According
to the PSI report, defendant asserted the underlying offenses were the result of him “supporting
his drug addiction” and that he felt “depressed and remorseful about what he [had done].” He also
provided a written statement in which he expressed remorse and reiterated that he had only been
“thinking about supporting [his drug] habits.” Defendant expressed that he wanted help, “to change
for the better,” to further his education and become a welder, and to be a part of his children’s
lives.
¶ 21 Finally, the PSI report shows defendant’s juvenile probation officer reported the
following regarding defendant’s conduct while on probation:
“[Defendant] has never stopped using drugs while on [p]robation. He also did not
cooperate with substance abuse counseling and mental health counseling. He has
had a few jobs during the term of [p]robation, but he was not able to keep a job for
very long. In addition, he constantly lies about work, counseling, and drug use.”
¶ 22 The record reflects that although defendant was not eligible for probation, he
underwent a “Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities” (TASC) assessment to determine the
-7- “appropriateness for TASC services” and his “likelihood of rehabilitation.” According to a “TASC
Finding Letter,” defendant was determined to have “severe” cocaine and cannabis withdrawal and
recommended for “outpatient services.” The letter stated that if treatment services were made
available to defendant, his likelihood of rehabilitation would be “strong.”
¶ 23 The only additional evidence presented to the trial court were two letters submitted
by defendant in mitigation from Smith and his mother (the letters do not appear in the appellate
record). The State then recommended a sentence of 18 years in prison, i.e., concurrent sentences
of 15 years in prison for count I; 18 years in prison for counts II, III, and IV; and 3 years in prison
for count VI. It argued that aggravating factors in the case included the need for deterrence and
defendant’s prior history of delinquency, which it argued showed “a consistent level of
criminality.” It also asked the court to consider that defendant was convicted of delivering cocaine,
one of the “most highly toxic substances” as identified by the legislature, as well as the fact that
the offenses involved “a non-possessory use by someone with no other visible means of support.”
See 720 ILCS 570/411(1), (4) (West 2016). Further, the State noted the underlying offenses
involved three separate deliveries of cocaine rather than “just one simple delivery” that might be
considered “a blip on the radar.” Finally, it argued that defendant failed to take advantage of
resources available to him while on probation for his juvenile offenses.
¶ 24 Defendant’s counsel asked the court to impose a minimum sentence of six years in
prison. He characterized the State’s emphasis on the seriousness of the offense as “proper” but
argued that defendant was an “addict” whose drug addiction “led him into these things.” Counsel
also pointed out that defendant had completed his education and was employed before becoming
addicted to cocaine. He asserted defendant had potential and could benefit from drug treatment
programs while in prison.
-8- ¶ 25 Defendant spoke on his own behalf, asserting that his history of juvenile
delinquency was the result of “a lot of family problems going on.” He maintained that he wanted
to change his life and acknowledged that he needed help. Defendant also stated he knew he
“messed up” but that he had “learned from [his] mistakes.” He asked the court not to impose the
18-year sentence recommended by the State, noting “[t]his [was his] first adult record” and stating
he did not believe he deserved 18 years.
¶ 26 As stated, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 12 years in prison—
imposing concurrent sentences of 12 years for counts I, II, III, and IV, and 3 years for count VI.
In setting forth its ruling, the court noted the seriousness of the offenses and found “strong
aggravating factors” in the case, including that the offenses at issue involved “the unlawful
delivery of the most highly toxic controlled substance by a person who would have no other visible
means of support,” that defendant’s actions caused or threatened serious harm to the community,
defendant’s prior record, and deterrence. As to defendant’s history of delinquency, the court stated
as follows:
“Now I understand it’s a juvenile record. And I believe that the law or the medical
research is pretty clear in regard[ ] to the development of juveniles which is one
reason why that is treated differently. But I still think that in this particular case it’s
an issue, primarily because it shows everything that was done to try to help you
become a productive member of society; and you just chose not to in this particular
situation.”
The court also determined that there was a lack of strong mitigating factors in the case. It noted
defendant’s argument regarding addiction but found he had been given previous opportunities to
address substance abuse issues through probation.
-9- ¶ 27 The record shows that as the trial court set forth its ruling, defendant interjected
comments and questions directed to the court, resulting in a back-and-forth exchange between the
court and defendant. Specifically, defendant expressed that his crimes were the result of his
addiction, commenting that he had been on probation with no police contact until he “started using
cocaine” and became involved “with the wrong people”; did not consider himself a drug dealer;
was remorseful; and that he “didn’t sell that much.”
¶ 28 The trial court responded, recalling its involvement with defendant’s previous
juvenile delinquency proceedings. It recounted defendant’s history of delinquency and stated, “the
thing that’s *** frustrating and a little disheartening is that in juvenile court we went to great
lengths.” The court noted attempts to address defendant’s “ongoing drug use” while he was on
probation and also stated as follows:
“I specifically recall when you got put on probation for that home invasion because
you could have just as easily gone to the Department of Juvenile Justice. And as we
sit here right now I’m wondering what the difference would be honestly because
we worked hard. You worked hard. And then you can’t not know that you cannot
sell this amount of a controlled substance.”
In response to defendant’s comments, the court further emphasized that he sold drugs on more
than one occasion and was being sentenced on multiple charges, including several Class X
felonies.
¶ 29 After sentencing, in March 2018, a pro se letter from defendant was filed. In the
letter, defendant asserted he was writing “to ask for an appeal on [his] case.” He stated he
understood what he did was wrong but believed his sentence was too “harsh” for his “first adult
record.” Defendant stated he wanted to “put motions in for [his] appeal” and then listed three
- 10 - motions: (1) a “motion of an effective counsel,” (2) a “motion to reconsider sentencing,” and (3) a
“motion of the p[ur]ity and strength of substances.” Regarding the basis for his first motion,
defendant stated as follows:
“My public defende[r] wasn’t representing me to the best of his knowledge. [H]e
was hard to contact, and he never came [to] see me until the day of court, we hadn’t
[sic] have time to really talk about anything or come to any agreements and when I
ask to put in motions he brush[ed] them away. And [defense counsel] didn’t object
to any unnecessary arguments.”
¶ 30 The same day defendant’s pro se letter was filed, the Livingston County circuit
clerk’s office sent him a response. The response characterized defendant’s pro se filing as one
“requesting motions and an appeal.” It also informed defendant that the clerk’s office did “not
have the paperwork to provide [him]” and directed defendant to the law library of the facility where
he was incarcerated.
¶ 31 Also in March 2018, defendant’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence on
defendant’s behalf, arguing the trial court should have imposed a lesser sentence based on
defendant’s history, potential for rehabilitation, and the impact on defendant’s family. In April
2018, the court conducted a hearing and denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. The record
reflects defendant appeared at the hearing in person. During the hearing, no reference was made
by the court or the parties to defendant’s pro se letter.
¶ 32 This appeal followed.
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 A. Sentencing Errors
¶ 35 On appeal, defendant challenges his aggregate 12-year sentence as excessive and
- 11 - an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. He argues both that such a sentence was manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offenses at issue and that the court considered improper factors
in aggravation, specifically “its own personal feelings” toward defendant and his crimes.
¶ 36 Initially, defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited the sentencing issues he
raises on appeal by failing to first bring them to the trial court’s attention. See People v. Hillier,
237 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010) (“[T]o preserve a claim of sentencing error,
both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are
required.”). However, he argues that this court should overlook his forfeiture because (1) the
forfeiture doctrine may be relaxed where a trial judge’s conduct is at issue, (2) plain error occurred,
or (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his alleged errors.
¶ 37 First, in People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 401, 189 N.E.2d 295, 297 (1963), the
supreme court held that there should be a “less rigid” application of the forfeiture rule when the
conduct of the trial judge is at issue. In particular, the forfeiture rule may be relaxed under Sprinkle
“when a trial judge oversteps his or her authority in the presence of the jury or when counsel has
been effectively prevented from objecting because it would have fallen on deaf ears.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 612, 939 N.E.2d 403, 412 (2010).
Ultimately, however, a defendant’s forfeiture should only be excused under the Sprinkle doctrine
“in extraordinary circumstances *** such as when a judge makes inappropriate remarks to a jury
or relies on social commentary instead of evidence in imposing a *** sentence.” Id.
¶ 38 Here, defendant has alleged nothing more than that his forfeiture should be relaxed
because an issue he raises on appeal involves the sentencing judge’s “conduct.” He has not shown
the existence of any extraordinary circumstances or anything to suggest that his objections would
necessarily have fallen on “deaf ears.” Under the circumstances presented, we find this case is not
- 12 - an appropriate one in which to relax the forfeiture rule under Sprinkle.
¶ 39 Second, as stated, defendant also argues that his forfeiture should be excused under
the plain-error doctrine and because his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his
sentencing issues. To obtain relief under the plain-error doctrine, “a defendant must first show that
a clear or obvious error occurred.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. He then must “show either that (1) the
evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to
deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id.
¶ 40 Additionally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed under the
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Peterson, 2017 IL
120331, ¶ 79, 106 N.E.3d 944. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A failure by the defendant to satisfy either prong of
the Strickland standard precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.
¶ 41 Here, relaxation of the forfeiture rule based on either plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel requires a finding that the trial court committed error when imposing
defendant’s sentences. For the reasons that follow, we find defendant has failed to establish the
occurrence of any error and, thus, cannot establish either plain error or that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to preserve his alleged sentencing errors.
¶ 42 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both
according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “In determining an appropriate sentence, a defendant’s
history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with the seriousness of the offense, the need
- 13 - to protect society, and the need for deterrence and punishment, must be equally weighed.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170105, ¶ 33, 102 N.E.3d 761.
¶ 43 “The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its
sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212,
940 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (2010). “On review, the sentence imposed by the trial court will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20, 143
N.E.3d 794. “In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with
great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would
have weighed the factors differently.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53, 723 N.E.2d 207, 209
(1999). “A sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense.” Id. at 54.
¶ 44 Defendant asserts that we may review de novo whether the trial court relied on an
improper factor when imposing his sentence. See People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759,
¶ 18, 99 N.E.3d 590 (stating “[t]he question of whether the trial court relied on an improper factor
in imposing the defendant’s sentence presents a question of law, which we review de novo”).
Ultimately, we note a strong presumption exists “that the trial court based its sentencing
determination on proper legal reasoning, and a court of review should consider the record as a
whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. On review, “[t]he defendant must affirmatively establish that the sentence was
based on improper considerations.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99, 145
N.E.3d 544.
¶ 45 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment for
- 14 - five drug-related felony offenses, including four 12-year sentences for one Class 1 felony offense
and three Class X felony offenses. Conviction for a Class 1 felony subjects a defendant to a
sentencing range of 4 to 15 years in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2016)), while a
conviction for a Class X felony subjects a defendant to a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years in prison
(id. § 5-4.5-25(a)). Additionally, when determining an appropriate sentence for a defendant
convicted of an offense under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, a trial court may consider
certain factors “as indicative of the type of offenses which the legislature deems most damaging
to the peace and welfare of the citizens of Illinois and which warrants the most severe penalties.”
720 ILCS 570/411 (West 2016). Those factors include that the defendant delivered cocaine, a
“highly toxic controlled substance” as identified by the legislature, and that the case involved
“non-possessory offenses by persons who have no other visible means of support.” Id. § 411(1),
(4).
¶ 46 When sentencing defendant to a total of 12 years in prison in this case, the trial
court found the existence of “strong aggravating factors,” including defendant’s delivery of a
highly toxic substance, that the case involved non-possessory offenses by someone with no visible
means of support, that defendant’s actions caused or threatened serious harm to the community,
defendant’s prior record, and the need for deterrence. Each of these factors was a proper
consideration for the court and supported by the record. In fact, the presence of the first two factors
are explicitly deemed by the legislature as circumstances warranting more severe penalties. Id.
Additionally, while the present case represents defendant’s first and only adult conviction, the
record reflects that, at age 19, he had a lengthy and recent history of juvenile delinquency
adjudications. His more recent juvenile offenses were for home invasion and aggravated battery.
Additionally, defendant was on probation when he committed the offenses in this case.
- 15 - ¶ 47 As stated, defendant argues his aggregate 12-year sentence was manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the underlying offenses. Specifically, he asserts the trial court
“mistakenly understood [his] involvement in a ‘drug operation’ to be much more extensive than
what it actually was.” He maintains that, “at most, [he was] an [in]experienced, low-level
operative” and “more pawn than kingpin,” warranting no more than the imposition of the
mandatory minimum sentence of six years in prison. Relative to this argument, defendant contends
the evidence showed (1) his drug-related conduct was being “managed” by an unidentified third
party; (2) the police colluded with a “racist informant to establish a sales location that was within
1,000 feet of public housing,” causing the elevation of charges against him; (3) he did not know
the precise weight of the amount of cocaine sold during the first controlled buy; (4) he “foolishly
provided his name” during the first controlled buy; (5) he had less cocaine to sell Spandet than
promised at the time of the second controlled buy and commented on Spandet’s scale, stating he
needed to buy one for himself; (6) he did not solicit drug sales and the underlying deliveries were
instigated by Spandet; (7) the amounts of cocaine he was convicted of selling were “quite modest”;
and (8) he sold drugs to support his own addiction.
¶ 48 Contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, the record does not reflect any
mistaken finding by the trial court that he acted as a drug “kingpin” or was involved in a
large-scale, drug-selling operation. Instead, it shows the court was familiar with defendant and
well aware of the actions that led to the underlying charges in the case, the amounts of drugs
defendant sold and which were found in his apartment, and defendant’s claims that he sold drugs
to support his own addiction.
¶ 49 Further, we disagree with any suggestion by defendant that the evidence against
him showed he was a “pawn” or being “managed” by another person, or that he had a level of
- 16 - involvement in the underlying offenses that warranted only a mandatory minimum sentence of six
years in prison. Certainly, the evidence presented at trial indicated that the initial meeting between
Spandet and defendant was facilitated by a third person. However, there was no evidence to
support a finding that defendant’s actions were being directed by that other person or that his
culpability was anything less than what he clearly admitted to, i.e., purchasing drugs, not only for
his own personal use, but also to sell to others to make money. As the trial court found, the
underlying circumstances involved a course of conduct by defendant and indicated that he was
engaging in some type of drug selling “operation” from his residence. Such finding was supported
by the record and not made in error.
¶ 50 We note defendant acknowledged to Hamilton that he sold cannabis “on and off”
since he was “younger.” Although he claimed that he had not been selling cocaine for very long,
he did agree that he sold a couple of grams of cocaine a day. The audio recording of the first
controlled buy reflects defendant anticipated and encouraged further dealings between himself and
Spandet and promised to sell Spandet a gram of cocaine for $80 if Spandet continued to buy from
him in the future. Additionally, while defendant may not have chosen the location of the initial
controlled buy, the location was near his residence, which contained both drugs and items related
to the sale of drugs, and evidence was presented that he gave Spandet directions regarding where
to park his car for the second and third drug transactions.
¶ 51 Given the circumstances presented, we find no sentencing error by the trial court.
The 12-year sentences it imposed were not manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the charged
offenses.
¶ 52 On appeal, defendant also asserts that the trial court considered an improper factor
in aggravation—its own personal and subjective feelings. We disagree.
- 17 - ¶ 53 Here, the record indicates the trial court was familiar with defendant and involved
in sentencing him in connection with his previous juvenile offenses. As defendant points out,
during his sentencing, he and the court engaged in a colloquy regarding defendant’s criminal
history and the current offenses. Although the court made comments indicating it found
defendant’s current circumstances “frustrating” and “a little disheartening” given his previous
opportunities while on probation, when viewed as a whole, its comments do not reflect that it relied
on any improper considerations when sentencing defendant. As discussed, the court clearly
identified the aggravating factors it found persuasive and upon which it relied. Additionally, its
comments to defendant directly reflect its assessment of matters related to the seriousness of the
underlying offenses and defendant’s rehabilitative potential, not matters outside of the record or
its own personal opinions of defendant or his crimes.
¶ 54 In particular, the record shows a determination by the trial court that defendant’s
continued involvement in the criminal justice system, after previous opportunities for
community-based sentences and treatment, reflected negatively on his potential for rehabilitation.
Such a finding is supported by the record and not an abuse of the court’s discretion. Specifically,
we note the PSI report contains a statement from defendant’s juvenile probation officer that
defendant “never stopped using drugs while on [p]robation,” failed to cooperate with substance
abuse and mental health counseling, was unable to maintain employment, and “constantly lie[d]
about work, counseling, and drug use.”
¶ 55 Defendant additionally argues that the trial court erred by considering his
“background” as aggravating rather than mitigating. He notes the TASC letter that stated he had a
strong likelihood of rehabilitation; his own expressions of remorse and future goals; his strong
family ties; his completion of high school; and his strong work ethic, which was only thwarted by
- 18 - his substance abuse issues. Further, defendant maintains that the court should have considered his
substance abuse problems as mitigation, given his youth and his strong likelihood for
rehabilitation.
¶ 56 First, as stated, the trial court’s comments clearly reflect doubts as to defendant’s
rehabilitative potential given his continued criminality and failure to take advantage of past
opportunities while on probation. That finding was supported by the record and not an abuse of
discretion.
¶ 57 Second, as acknowledged by defendant, “the trial court is not required to view drug
addiction as a mitigating factor,” and “a history of substance abuse is a ‘double-edged sword’ that
the trial court may view as a mitigating or aggravating factor.” People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App
(4th) 170035, ¶ 105, 126 N.E.3d 703 (quoting People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 83, 842 N.E.2d 618,
663 (2005)). In this instance, the court acknowledged defendant’s arguments regarding addiction
but noted he had been given previous opportunities to address substance abuse issues through
probation. Given that the record also shows defendant’s consistent and continued involvement in
criminal activity, along with his failure to cooperate with substance-abuse counseling while on
probation, we can find no abuse of discretion by the court in refusing to view his alleged addiction
issues as mitigating.
¶ 58 Third, to the extent defendant has identified mitigating factors in the case, we note
that such evidence was not necessarily entitled to greater weight than aggravating factors or the
seriousness of the offense. See People v. Shaw, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1093-94, 815 N.E.2d 469,
474 (2004) (“[A] defendant’s rehabilitative potential and other mitigating factors are not entitled
to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense.”). As stated, the trial court clearly identified
the aggravating factors it considered, which it characterized as “strong.” The court’s consideration
- 19 - of those factors was not error and we will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the evidence
presented.
¶ 59 Finally, we note that in challenging his sentence, defendant additionally argues his
counsel was ineffective, not only for failing to preserve his sentencing issues, but also by
“conceding that the State’s argument regarding the seriousness of the offenses was correct” when
his “conduct was not nearly as serious as the State made it out to be.” The record shows that at
sentencing, defendant’s counsel began his argument to the court by stating as follows: “[The State]
emphasizes I believe two points—the seriousness of the offense which is proper, and the history
of the minor which again it was juvenile history.” After these comments, defense counsel went on
to argue that the underlying offenses were perpetuated by defendant’s drug addiction and pointed
out that defendant had completed his education and was employed before becoming addicted to
cocaine. He also argued that defendant could benefit from treatment for his addiction.
¶ 60 Here, we find no deficient performance by defendant’s counsel. Defendant was
being sentenced for multiple drug-related offenses, including three Class X felonies and one Class
1 felony. Additionally, there is no dispute that the underlying offenses involved factors “indicative
of the type of offenses which the legislature deems most damaging to the peace and welfare of the
citizens of Illinois and which warrants the most severe penalties.” 720 ILCS 570/411 (West 2016).
Under these facts, defendant’s offenses were serious and it was not error for his counsel to
acknowledge that such an argument by the State was “proper” but then assert that a less severe
sentence was, nevertheless, warranted based on mitigating circumstances, including defendant’s
substance-abuse issues. Accordingly, we find no error as alleged by defendant.
¶ 61 B. Pro Se Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims
¶ 62 On appeal, defendant also argues the trial court erred by failing to inquire into his
- 20 - posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He notes that he sent a letter to the court
in March 2018, alleging his counsel’s ineffectiveness but that his claims were never addressed
below.
¶ 63 Under the supreme court’s decision in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464
N.E.2d 1045 (1984), and its progeny, a trial court is required to conduct an inquiry into a
defendant’s posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the
appointment of new counsel is warranted to assist the defendant. People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App
(4th) 180214, ¶ 18, 137 N.E.3d 868. “[T]he goal of any Krankel proceeding is to facilitate the trial
court’s full consideration of a defendant’s pro se claim and thereby potentially limit issues on
appeal.” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13, 88 N.E.3d 732. To trigger a Krankel inquiry, “a
pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s
attention[.]” People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638 (2003).
¶ 64 However, this court has stated that “a defendant who fails to bring [a pro se
ineffective-assistance] claim to the trial court’s attention forfeits it notwithstanding having
presented it in a letter to the court.” People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1076-77, 950 N.E.2d
1164, 1182 (2011). In Allen, we held that the defendant forfeited his pro se claims of ineffective
assistance, which were contained in a letter to the trial court, where he failed to raise those claims
in subsequent appearances before the court. Id. at 1077. Similarly, in People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. App.
3d 97, 108-09, 518 N.E.2d 741, 748-49 (1988), the Second District found the defendant “waived”
a claim, contained within a letter to the trial court, that he was not “ ‘properly defended’ ” by his
counsel on the basis that it appeared “from the record, that the trial judge, defendant’s counsel, and
the State were all unaware of [the] defendant’s letter as no mention was made of it, and [the]
defendant did not himself refer to it in the post[ ]trial proceedings.”
- 21 - ¶ 65 This case is similar to both Allen and Lewis. Following his sentencing, defendant
raised ineffective-assistance claims in a pro se letter directed to the trial court. The letter was filed
and, the same day, responded to by the circuit clerk’s office. However, nothing in the record
indicates the trial judge, the State, or defense counsel knew about the letter or defendant’s
allegations. Additionally, defendant subsequently appeared before the court at a hearing on his
motion to reconsider his sentence, filed with the aid of counsel, and made no reference to his pro se
letter or his ineffective-assistance claims. Therefore, defendant has forfeited his
ineffective-assistance claims and remand for an inquiry under Krankel is not required.
¶ 66 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 68 Affirmed.
- 22 -