People v. Desir

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Desir

124 A.D.2d 742, 508 N.Y.S.2d 478, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62042

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 17, 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 124 A.D.2d 742 (People v. Desir) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Desir, 124 A.D.2d 742, 508 N.Y.S.2d 478, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62042 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

[743]*743The People proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as found by a jury, that the defendant burglarized the apartment of Louisianna Millen and stole certain items of jewelry. The only evidence regarding the value of that jewelry was Ms. Millen’s testimony that she purchased two items for approximately $330. As conceded by the People, this did not establish that the value of the jewelry exceeded $250 and accordingly the convictions have been modified (see, People v Jackson, 111 AD2d 253; People v Womble, 111 AD2d 283). As the defendant has already served the maximum time to which he could be sentenced for petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, there is no need to remit for resentencing (see, People v Giles, 121 AD2d 738; People v Womble, supra).

The sentence imposed for the conviction for burglary in the second degree was not excessive (People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Hooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.

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[743]*743The People proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as found by a jury, that the defendant burglarized the apartment of Louisianna Millen and stole certain items of jewelry. The only evidence regarding the value of that jewelry was Ms. Millen’s testimony that she purchased two items for approximately $330. As conceded by the People, this did not establish that the value of the jewelry exceeded $250 and accordingly the convictions have been modified (see, People v Jackson, 111 AD2d 253; People v Womble, 111 AD2d 283). As the defendant has already served the maximum time to which he could be sentenced for petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, there is no need to remit for resentencing (see, People v Giles, 121 AD2d 738; People v Womble, supra).

The sentence imposed for the conviction for burglary in the second degree was not excessive (People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Hooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

124 A.D.2d 742, 508 N.Y.S.2d 478, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-desir-nyappdiv-1986.

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