Filed 5/26/21 P. v. Derouen CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E072796
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1604075)
CHAD EARL DEROUEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Bernard Schwartz, Judge.
Affirmed.
Eric E. Reynolds, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Teresa
Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 After hearing evidence the police found over 280 marijuana plants and an electric
meter bypass in Chad DeRouen’s home, the jury convicted him of unlawfully cultivating
marijuana and stealing utility services (a misdemeanor and a felony, respectively). On
appeal, DeRouen challenges his marijuana conviction on the ground the trial court
erroneously denied him an opportunity to present a collective cultivation defense under
the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA). (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.7 et seq.)
He also raises two challenges to his sentence, arguing the trial court (1) incorrectly
determined he owed the electric company $46,148.96 in restitution and (2) violated his
due process rights as articulated in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas) by imposing various fees and a restitution fine without first determining his
ability to pay. We conclude each of these arguments lacks merit and affirm.
I
FACTS
A. Prosecution’s Case
On August 16, 2016, two Riverside County deputy sheriffs executed a search
warrant at DeRouen’s Perris home based on information he might be running an indoor
marijuana grow operation. Inside his garage, the deputies found 220 marijuana plants,
several fans, a large appliance that was either an air conditioner or CO2 generator, and 16
grow lights with 1000-watt bulbs. The plants were between five and six feet tall and in
the final budding stage. Inside one of the bedrooms, they found 64 smaller marijuana
plants (three to five feet tall), fans, and grow lights. They didn’t find any evidence of
2 marijuana consumption (smoking devices or spent marijuana) but they did find a
surveillance system, digital scale, and several trash bags containing harvesting byproduct
(marijuana leaves and stems).
One of the deputies testified at trial. He said a single indoor plant typically yields
about a quarter to a half a pound of marijuana. He also said the trash bags full of leaves
and stems suggested DeRouen had been growing for a while, at least long enough to have
harvested a previous crop.
The same day the deputies executed the warrant, a revenue protection investigator
from Southern California Edison inspected DeRouen’s home. Inside the drywall in the
garage the investigator found an electric meter bypass, an illegal device that diverts
electricity around the meter so the customer receives electricity without the utility’s
knowledge. Using amp clamps to measure the electricity being fed to the home, the
investigator estimated DeRouen was receiving 323,712 undetected kilowatts of electricity
per day, which resulted in a loss of revenue to Edison of $3,010.50 a month. Based on his
review of the billing records for DeRouen’s home, the investigator concluded the bypass
had been running since August 2014, resulting in a total loss of $72,252.52.
The investigator testified that this wasn’t the first time he’d found an electrical
bypass at DeRouen’s home. He said about two years earlier, in August 2012, he
suspected something was amiss when Edison had received signals from DeRouen’s meter
on three separate occasions, despite the fact his electricity had been shut off the previous
3 month. Sure enough, when he inspected DeRouen’s home on August 24, 2012, he found
a bypass and removed it.
B. Defense Case
DeRouen testified that he suffered from narcolepsy, cataplexy, and migraines, and
a doctor had given him a medical marijuana recommendation to treat these conditions. He
said the doctor had also given him two grow recommendations—one for 15 plants and
another for 99 plants. At the time of his arrest, he was smoking about seven grams a day.
DeRouen said he had been growing 90 plants, not 284 as the deputies had claimed.
He said this was his first grow and he was doing it for his own personal use. He expected
his plants to yield only about six to eight pounds and had no intention of selling any of it.
He denied knowing there had been a bypass at his home in 2016. When he started
his operation in July 2016, he hired a man named Jeremy to set up the electrical wiring
for his grow rooms. He had noticed the bypass panel after Jeremy left but didn’t know
what it was. As for the 2012 bypass, he said his friend Kenny had installed it without his
permission when he wasn’t home. When he returned home, he saw what Kenny had done
and knew it was illegal, but didn’t know how to remove it, and the Edison inspector had
shown up the next day and taken it anyway.
A man named Giovanni who was employed by a heating and air conditioning
company testified that he’d performed work at DeRouen’s house in March 2015 and
didn’t recall seeing any marijuana plants.
4 William Britt, a patient advocate and expert on medical marijuana and indoor
grow operations, testified that he believed DeRouen was an amateur grower. He said that
after reviewing photographs of DeRouen’s operation, he had concluded there were less
than 284 marijuana plants. He explained that while an expert operation usually yields
about a pound of marijuana for every 1,000-watt grow light, amateurs produce much less
because they are inexperienced with preventing pests, mold, and other issues that
decrease yield. He said it takes an average of four months to grow a crop of plants, and
amateurs often grow more plants than they need for personal use because of the high loss
rate. Finally, he said a patient like DeRouen who smokes seven grams of marijuana a day
would consume about 5.6 pounds in a year.
C. Rebuttal
A Riverside County sheriff’s investigator testified as an indoor grow expert for the
prosecution. He disagreed with Britt’s opinion that DeRouen was an amateur grower. He
said that in 80 to 90 percent of the unlawful cultivation cases he’s seen, the grower had
been using an electrical bypass. In this case, DeRouen had a bypass in addition custom
electrical wiring and a significant amount of plants and lighting. He concluded
DeRouen’s confiscated crop would have yielded 142 to 284 pounds of marijuana and that
DeRouen had grown at least one previous crop. Finally, he said heavy marijuana users
consume about three to five grams a day.
5 D. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury convicted DeRouen of felony theft of utility services valued at more than
$950 (Pen. Code, § 498, subd. (d)) and misdemeanor cultivation of marijuana (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11358, unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code). The trial court denied
DeRouen’s motion to reduce the felony theft conviction to a misdemeanor (Pen. Code,
§ 17, subd. (b)) and placed him on three years felony probation, on the conditions he
serve 180 days in the work release program, pay various fines and fees, and refrain from
cultivating marijuana (though he could still possess and consume it for medical
purposes). The fines and fees the court imposed were $46,148.96 in victim restitution to
Southern California Edison, a $60 conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373), an $80 court
operations fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), and a $514.58 booking fee (Gov. Code, § 29550).1
II
ANALYSIS
A. The Collective Cultivation Defense
Before trial, the court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine
whether DeRouen had sufficient evidence to present a compassionate use defense and a
collective cultivation defense to the jury. The court concluded DeRouen’s offer of proof
was sufficient to present the first defense but not the second. DeRouen argues this was
error and that he carried the minimal evidentiary burden required to present a collective
cultivation defense. We disagree.
1 The court also imposed a $600 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4) but ordered it stayed pending successful completion of probation. 6 1. Applicable legal principles
The MMPA recognizes a qualified right to collectively cultivate medical
marijuana for medical purposes and on a nonprofit basis. The defense, commonly called
“collective cultivation,” applies when the defendant can “show that members of the
collective or cooperative: (1) are qualified patients who have been prescribed marijuana
for medicinal purposes, (2) collectively associate to cultivate marijuana, and (3) are not
engaged in a profit-making enterprise.” (People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525,
529 (Jackson).)
CALCRIM No. 3413, the jury instruction for the defense, requires the defendant
to show: (1) they and all members of the collective or cooperative are either qualified
patients or primary caregivers of qualified patients; (2) all members must collectively or
cooperatively associate to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes only; and (3) the
marijuana cultivated must be in only that amount which is reasonably related to the
members’ own personal medical needs and may not be cultivated for profit.
CALCRIM No. 3413 also provides the following factors the jury may consider
when deciding whether a collective meets the requirements of the MMPA: the size of the
collective’s membership, volume of purchases, level of members’ participation, whether
the collective was formally established as a nonprofit, presence of financial records,
accountability of the collective to its members, and evidence of profit or loss.
In short, the collective cultivation defense protects medical marijuana cooperatives
and collectives that operate in a closed loop, where grower members cultivate marijuana
7 to sell to consumer members, “so long as all members are patients or primary caregivers,
all the buying and selling is done on a nonprofit basis within the collective or
cooperative, there are no transactions with nonmembers, and the amount cultivated is
reasonably necessary for the membership’s medical needs.” (People v. Anderson (2015)
232 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1277-1278.) As the Attorney General’s “Guidelines for the
Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical Use” advise, “[n]othing
allows marijuana to be purchased from outside the collective or cooperative for
distribution to its members. Instead, the cycle should be a closed-circuit of marijuana
cultivation and consumption with no purchases or sales to or from non-members. To help
prevent diversion of medical marijuana to non-medical markets, collectives and
cooperatives should document each member’s contribution of labor, resources, or money
to the enterprise. They should also track and record the source of their marijuana.”
(Guidelines, § IV.B.4., p. 10, italics added; see also People v. London (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 544, 554 (London) [noting the Attorney General’s guidelines are not binding
on courts but “are entitled to ‘considerable weight’”].)
DeRouen is correct that the burden a defendant must carry to present an
affirmative defense to the jury is relatively minimal. They must present enough evidence
to simply “raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the elements of the defenses have been
proven,” and “‘the trial court must leave issues of witness credibility to the jury.’”
(Jackson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 533.) “The standard for evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidentiary foundation is whether a reasonable jury, accepting all the evidence as
8 true, could find the defendant’s actions justified by” the collective cultivation defense.
(People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539 (Trippet).) Because this inquiry is a
legal one, not a factual one, we independently review the record to determine whether
DeRouen satisfied the evidentiary threshold. (Ibid.) Independent review is also
appropriate because DeRouen’s challenge has a constitutional dimension. He argues the
trial court’s evidentiary ruling violated his right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485; People v. Seijas
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 [de novo review applies to “determinations affecting
constitutional rights”].)
2. Additional facts
Before trial, DeRouen’s counsel subpoenaed documents from Mr. Stewart, who
purportedly worked at Mo Val Wellness Center. Counsel believed the documents would
confirm this entity was a marijuana collective and would shed light on the collectives
policies, procedures, and membership. He also hoped they would demonstrate DeRouen’s
status as a grower member.
The documents Mr. Stewart produced consisted of articles of incorporation for Mo
Val Wellness Center plus about 100 membership applications, which contained copies of
the applicants’ driver’s licenses, medical marijuana cards, and other confidential
information. The court reviewed the applications in camera and concluded there was no
good cause to release the applications to the defense. It suggested defense counsel re-
9 subpoena the documents in a redacted form or try to interview members of Mo Val
Wellness Center directly.
Defense counsel subpoenaed Mr. Stewart a second time, this time requesting
redacted versions of “one dozen application documents, including any medical marijuana
cards, as well as any primary caregiver registration forms, for individuals who are
members of the [Mo Val] Wellness Center on or about August 2016.” In response, Mr.
Stewart produced 12 member registration forms—10 of which were on letterhead labeled
“215 Shop (Free Choice Healing Center, Inc.)” and two of which didn’t identify any
particular collective. All but one of the forms were completed after DeRouen’s arrest on
August 16, 2016. Because the forms contained no private medical or identifying
information, the court released them to the defense.
At the evidentiary hearing, DeRouen’s counsel called Mr. Stewart to testify as the
owner of Mo Val Wellness Center and its custodian of records. Counsel represented that
Mr. Stewart would be able to explain that Mo Val Wellness Center had changed its name
to Free Choice Living. However, Mr. Stewart asserted his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and refused to testify about anything except the documents he had
produced. (RT 233-234, 308-310.) However, even about the documents, all he could say
was that he had put them in a file after receiving them. He didn’t know when or how they
had been prepared. Following Mr. Stewart’s testimony, the court ruled the redacted
applications were hearsay and inadmissible because Mr. Stewart hadn’t provided enough
information to apply the business records exception.
10 DeRouen then testified in an attempt to supply the requisite evidence for a
collective cultivation defense. He said he had a medical marijuana recommendation from
his physician to treat various medical conditions and that, in May 2015, he had become a
member the marijuana collective Mo Val Wellness Center. He said the collective had
hundreds of members. He also said that around the same time he’d become a member, he
reached an oral agreement with Mr. Stewart to grow marijuana for the collective. He said
they agreed that the only compensation he’d receive was to keep some of the marijuana
for his own use.
The rest of DeRouen’s testimony was, at best, confusing. He said he had initially
thought Mr. Stewart ran Mo Val Wellness Center, but it turned out he actually ran an
entity called Free Choice Healing Center, which was not a marijuana collective, but
rather a company that provided therapeutic and wellness services like massages and
wellness evaluations to its patients. DeRouen said Free Choice Healing Center then
became a collective after Mo Val Wellness Center switched management sometime in
2015 or mid-2016. But he also said Mo Val Wellness Center had been renamed Free
Choice Healing Center after it was shut down. He didn’t know how Free Choice Healing
Center operated or when it became a collective or nonprofit.
Next, defense counsel called a physician who said he had given Mr. Stewart a
medical marijuana recommendation to treat chronic cancer-related pain.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that DeRouen had not met
the threshold requirement to present a collective cultivation defense but had produced
11 enough evidence to present a compassionate use defense. The court reasoned that
although it was possible to have a collective with only two members (DeRouen and Mr.
Stewart), DeRouen hadn’t produced any evidence to satisfy the second or third elements
of the defense: that the members of the collective were working together to cultivate
marijuana for their medical purposes only and that the amount grown was reasonably
related to their medical needs.
3. Discussion
DeRouen argues this ruling was error. He claims he satisfied the evidentiary
threshold for presenting the defense by testifying that he was a qualified patient and
member of the Mo Val Wellness Center collective (which had hundreds of members) and
that he had an agreement with Mr. Stewart to grow marijuana for the collective for no
payment except the marijuana he kept for himself. But even accepting this evidence as
true as the standard requires, it falls short of establishing a prima facie case that the
defense applies. (Jackson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 533; Trippet, supra, 56
Cal.App.4th at p. 1539.)
As the trial court correctly observed, DeRouen provided no evidence regarding the
second and third elements of the defense. Nothing in his testimony would allow a jury to
find the amount of marijuana he was growing for the collective was for members only
and was reasonably related to their personal medical needs. Similarly, nothing in his
testimony would allow a jury to find the price the collective charged customer members
for the marijuana was used to cover growing and distribution costs only, and did not
12 create profits. Crucially, DeRouen presented no evidence about how much marijuana Mr.
Stewart or any of the other members required to treat their medical needs. And, because
Mr. Stewart invoked his Fifth Amendment right, DeRouen was not able to present any
evidence about Mo Val Wellness Center’s or Free Choice Healing Center’s cultivation
policies. (London, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 555.)
The cases DeRouen relies on do not convince us otherwise. Jackson and People v.
Colvin (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1029 are inapplicable because the error in those cases was
a legal one—the trial courts in those cases applied an incorrect definition of the collective
cultivation defense. (Jackson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529-530 [trial court
mistakenly believed the defense applied only if every collective member actively
participates in the cultivation process]; Colvin, at p. 1037 [trial court incorrectly
concluded the defense applied only to the act of cultivation and not to the necessary and
related acts of transportation and distribution].) The trial court made no legal error here.
And finally, People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747 is distinguishable
because there the defendant had presented precisely the kind of details about the
collective’s cultivation policies and operations that DeRouen failed to produce. (See id. at
p. 786 [noting the defendant had “presented evidence of the policies and procedures
FloraCare used in providing marijuana for the people who came to him, including the
verification of their prescriptions and identities, the fact that these people paid
membership fees and reimbursed the defendant for costs incurred in the cultivation
through donations . . . [as well as] evidence that members volunteered at the
13 cooperative”].) Because DeRouen presented insufficient evidence that the collective
cultivation defense applied to him, we conclude the trial court did not violate his
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense.
B. Victim Restitution
DeRouen argues the court lacked a rational basis for concluding he stole 45,157.50
in electricity from Edison and ordering him to pay that amount in restitution.2 Again, we
disagree.
1. Additional facts
At the restitution hearing, Edison claimed a loss of $72,252.52 as a result of
DeRouen’s theft. They based this amount on their conclusion that he stole $3,010.50
worth of electricity each month the bypass was operational, and it had been operational
for two years—from August 2014 to August 2016. The prosecution argued Edison’s
claim was based on reliable evidence; namely, the amp clamp measurement and the
investigator’s review of DeRouen’s billing records.
Defense counsel argued the evidence showed DeRouen stole, at most, $6,000
worth of electricity. DeRouen’s ex-girlfriend testified at the hearing that the grow the
police found at his home had been his first, and DeRouen’s counsel submitted receipts
showing DeRouen had bought items for the grow in April 2016.3 Counsel also reminded
2 The restitution order also included $991.46 for Edison’s investigative costs, for a total of $46,148.96, but DeRouen doesn’t challenge this aspect of the order.
3DeRouen’s ex-girlfriend was tried on the same charges as DeRouen (under an aiding and abetting theory), but the jury acquitted her of both counts. 14 the court of Giovanni’s trial testimony that he hadn’t recalled seeing any marijuana plants
at DeRouen’s home when he performed work there in March 2015. He argued this
evidence showed the grow had been in effect for only two or three months, not two years.
The court and the parties then discussed DeRouen’s billing records at length in an
attempt to determine when the bypass had started. The prosecution argued DeRouen’s
average daily kilowatt use indicated he had been using a bypass as far back as 2012. The
court ultimately concluded that while it was impossible to know precisely when the theft
had begun, there was substantial evidence to support a finding that DeRouen had started
using a bypass sometime between May and June 2015 at the latest, which meant he had
been stealing electricity for 15 months. Because DeRouen had not contested Edison’s
claim of monthly loss ($3,010.50), the court determined he had stolen approximately
$45,157.50 of electricity.
2. Discussion
The California Constitution contains a “broad . . . mandate . . . that restitution must
be imposed ‘in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ ” (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 655, citing Cal. Const. art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) To
implement this constitutional directive, our criminal restitution statute, Penal Code
section 1204.4, “allows for recovery of a broad variety of economic losses that are
incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046.) A victim’s right to restitution under this statute must be
“broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.)
15 Where, as here, the restitution is for theft, the victim’s statements about the value
of the stolen property constitute prima facie evidence of the property’s worth for
purposes of restitution. (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 690 (Prosser).)
Once the victim has made a prima facie showing of the value of the loss, “the burden
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that
claimed by the victim.” (Id. at p. 691; see also ibid. [placing the burden of proof on the
defendant is fair because “the situation is one of the thief’s own making, and as between
the victim and the thief, the equities favor the victim”].)
We review a trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion and will uphold it
so long as there is “‘a factual and rational basis for the amount.’” (People v. Baker (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) ‘“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the ‘“power of
the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the trial court’s
findings.” [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We do not
reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.”’ (Prosser, supra, 157
Cal.App.4th at pp. 686-687.)
DeRouen argues there is insufficient evidence to support the restitution amount
because the court’s conclusion that bypass began mid-May 2015 was the product of
speculation. He points to the evidence he produced at the restitution hearing to argue the
16 only rational conclusion to be drawn from this record is that bypass began just a few
months before the police discovered the grow operation. This argument contradicts the
applicable standard of review and overlooks the evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion.
The trial court was not required to accept DeRouen’s or Edison’s statements about
when the bypass began. Instead, it conducted its own analysis of the evidence and arrived
at something of a middle ground, concluding the bypass had been running for 15 months
instead of two years or two months. That conclusion was grounded in the record.
According to the prosecution’s witnesses, the plants at DeRouen’s home were in the final
budding stages of the (four-month) grow cycle, and the trash bags containing harvest
byproduct indicated DeRouen had grown at least one previous harvest. And, according to
DeRouen’s own testimony, he reached a verbal agreement with Mr. Stewart to grow
marijuana for Mo Val Wellness Center right about the same time he’d joined the
collective, in May 2015. In addition, DeRouen’s electricity bill for May 2015 was
extremely low and, in the months that followed, his usage patterns were erratic. The court
interpreted the drastic swings in DeRouen’s electricity usage as further support the
bypass had been operating during that time. This evidence (indeed, DeRouen’s testimony
on its own) provided a rational and factual basis to conclude he began using a bypass in
May 2015 when he joined Mo Val Wellness Center.
17 C. Dueñas and Ability to Pay
DeRouen argues we must reverse the $600 restitution fine and the three fees
(conviction, court operations, and booking) and remand for an ability-to-pay hearing in
accordance with the holding in Dueñas. The problem with this challenge is DeRouen
failed to raise any objection to the fines and fees during his sentencing hearing, despite
the fact Dueñas had been issued months earlier. While we traditionally excuse the failure
to object where an objection “would have been futile or wholly unsupported by
substantive law then in existence” (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237), DeRouen
cannot argue his failure to object would have been futile because he had the benefit of the
Dueñas opinion when his sentence was imposed. We therefore conclude the argument is
forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [the failure to
object in the trial court forfeits a claim on appeal, even claims based on constitutional
rights]; People v. Keene (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 861, 864 (“The concept of forfeiture for
failure to raise ability to pay fines, fees or assessments is well established in our case
law”].)
Plus, even before Dueñas, defendants had a statutory right to object to a restitution
fine above the $300 minimum, and so, Dueñas aside, it would not have been futile for
DeRouen to object to the $600 restitution fine (which the court stayed anyway). (Pen.
Code, § 1202.4, subd. (d) [in considering a defendant’s inability to pay as a factor in
setting the amount of the fine in excess of the minimum fine, “[c]onsideration of a
defendant’s inability to pay may include his or her future earning capacity”]; see also
18 People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154 [even pre-Dueñas, a defendant
forfeits their challenge to a restitution fine over the statutory minimum by failing to
object].) That leaves $654.58 in fees that DeRouen could have objected to, but didn’t.
Considering defense counsel’s assurance during the hearing that his client would be
seeking employment as soon as possible, and given that the fee amount is relatively
minimal and DeRouen is relatively young (in his early 40s), we would nevertheless
conclude that any due process violation was harmless because the record demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt he will be able to pay the fees with future earnings. (People v.
Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035.)
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.