NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 241151-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is December 12, 2024 not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-1151 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County DYLAN R. DENHAM, ) No. 23CF628 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Debra D. Schafer, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment. Justice Lannerd specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) under People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, the State was permitted to file a petition to deny pretrial release in response to defendant’s motion for reconsideration of his pretrial release conditions and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant, Dylan R. Denham, appeals the trial court’s order entered August 24,
2024, denying him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Act
101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See
Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v.
Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023). For the
following reasons, we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 16, 2023, defendant was charged by criminal complaint with first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2022)) for the fatal shooting of Deontay Turner. According
to the complaint, on or about April 14, 2022, defendant shot Turner without lawful justification,
knowing such an act would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Turner, and
thereby caused Turner’s death. A warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest, and he was arrested
on April 4, 2023. The following day, a $3 million (10%) cash bond was set. Defendant was also
required to surrender all firearms and his firearm owners identification (FOID) card and to have
no contact with gang members. On April 21, 2023, the grand jury returned a five-count indictment
charging defendant with first degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id.
§ 24-1.1(a)).
¶5 On April 19, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the conditions of his
pretrial release pursuant to the Code. Defendant asserted that pursuant to section 110-7.5(b) of the
Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)), having been in pretrial detention on or after January
1, 2023, and after having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, he was entitled to a
hearing as provided for in section 115-5(e) (id. § 110-5(e)) to determine the reason for his
continued detention and to reopen his conditions of pretrial release. Citing People v. Watkins-
Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, defendant furthermore asserted the State by that point was
“beyond the time restraints set forth by [section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1)]” and,
therefore, “a petition for detention would be untimely.” On April 24, 2024, the State filed a petition
to deny pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West
2022)) because defendant was charged with a forcible felony and his pretrial release would pose a
real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. The State identified
-2- “the discovery, the indictment, the pretrial report, [and] the defendant [being] on parole and ***
not following conditions” as “[a]dditional grounds upon which [he] should be denied pretrial
release.”
¶6 On April 24, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider
and the State’s petition to deny pretrial release. Defendant’s counsel asserted the State’s petition
was untimely, “given that this is a petition pursuant to Section 110-6 and my petition is pursuant
to Section 110-7.5, which necessitates a hearing under Section 110-5(e).” Counsel stated he was
relying on Watkins-Romaine in support of this proposition. In response, the State noted
Watkins-Romaine is a decision of the First District, whereas this court had addressed the timeliness
of a petition to deny pretrial release in People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, which would
be binding on the trial court. The court then noted, in Jones, this court “determined that the State
is permitted to file a petition to deny pretrial release” with respect to a defendant who has filed a
motion to reconsider their pretrial release conditions. The court continued, “This is the Fourth
District. I have to follow the Fourth District. There are—unless it’s distinguishable in some way,
and I don’t find that it is distinguishable.” Emphasizing it had “to follow the Fourth District case,”
the court permitted the State to file its petition.
¶7 The State then proffered the following description of Turner’s fatal shooting. On or
about April 14, 2022, ShotSpotter equipment detected multiple gunshots near 11th Street and 6th
Avenue in Rockford. Police responded to the scene and discovered Turner face down on the
sidewalk with bullet wounds in his back. Turner was taken to the hospital, where he died. In their
subsequent investigation, police learned Turner was walking northbound on 11th Street when he
was shot. A “Ring surveillance camera” recorded an individual the State identified as defendant,
wearing a black hooded jacket, approaching Turner from behind on foot. While within a maximum
-3- distance of 10 feet of Turner, defendant shot him approximately 20 times. Thereafter, defendant
ran to a gray Mazda 5 driven by Tyrice Scott. Surveillance footage also showed Desmond
Wilkerson in the vicinity. Wilkerson informed police he and defendant “had just gotten out of the
vehicle” at the time of the shooting. Wilkerson was seen on the video “walking behind, almost as
[a] lookout.” Wilkerson told police that defendant told him to come with him to murder Turner,
but Wilkerson did not want to, whereupon “defendant forced him to get out of the car and
demanded he go with [him].” Wilkerson explained defendant was “hanging out” with members of
the Hunnit Mill street gang, of which Scott was a member. On that day, according to Wilkerson,
“defendant saw Mr. Turner walking and thought he had been part of an opposition gang to Hunnit
Mill so that’s why he decided to murder him.” The State represented that both Wilkerson and Scott
were cooperating with the prosecution; the latter had given a recorded statement admitting to
driving the Mazda 5 that day. The State also proffered that Scott had given his gun to Wilkerson,
who had given it to defendant.
¶8 The State summarized defendant’s criminal history. Defendant was on parole for
armed robbery at the time of Turner’s murder and, according to his parole officer, left Illinois
without permission and was otherwise noncompliant with his parole conditions. The State asserted,
“as shown from his inability to abide by his parole conditions, that there are no conditions or set
of conditions that he would be able to follow to be able to not be a threat to the community.”
¶9 In response, defendant’s counsel began by noting that Wilkerson and Scott were
previously charged with the murder but are now “pointing the finger” at defendant under
cooperation agreements. Additionally, counsel asserted that witnesses reported to police that they
saw two men, a light-skinned Black male and a dark-skinned Black male, on the scene. Counsel
then stated, “And, obviously, [defendant] is white.” Counsel later clarified one of the two people
-4- observed by the witnesses “is believed to be Mr. Wilkerson; the other is the shooter.” Counsel then
proposed various potential conditions of pretrial release for defendant, including living with
relatives at a residence close to the courthouse. Counsel noted defendant’s family ties to Rockford,
employment history, educational background, and willingness to comply with any conditions
required by pretrial services. Counsel acknowledged defendant left Illinois while on parole and
went to Florida, but he explained that was where defendant’s daughter was living. Counsel also
argued:
“You know, there’s an indication this was a gang-related
shooting. There’s no indication whatsoever that [defendant] was
ever in a gang; I think just that Mr. Scott was in a gang. So I think
the notion that somebody would murder someone—empty a gun
into someone, point-blank range in broad daylight—basically,
because they’re an opposition gang member of the guy you’re
hanging out with I think strains credulity here, Judge.”
¶ 10 The trial court inquired, “[W]hat are the consistencies or inconsistencies between
Mr. Wilkerson and Mr. Scott, in terms of their information about what allegedly happened?”
Defendant’s counsel responded that Wilkerson claimed defendant was “essentially the primary
instigator of this incident and forced [him], essentially at gunpoint, to go with him to commit this
crime—again, basically out of nowhere.” By contrast, Scott claimed Wilkerson “was also
complicit in this and was fully cooperating and wanting to go forward with this incident.” The
State asserted that Wilkerson “was a willing participant” but was not the shooter (although he
received the gun from Scott and gave it to defendant, who was found in possession of it after the
shooting).
-5- ¶ 11 The trial court began its ruling by noting, “Clearly, a murder was committed. The
question is more who did it.” Based on the proffers from both sides, the court noted there were two
witnesses to the shooting, both of whom identified defendant as the shooter. The video
corroborated the witnesses’ accounts of the incident. The shooter shot approximately 20 times,
killing the victim. The court found, based on the information provided, there was clear and
convincing evidence to support that defendant committed the offense. The court further found the
random and opportunistic nature of the offense posed a real and present threat to “either those
witnesses or the community generally.”
¶ 12 Finally, the trial court addressed whether there was any condition or combination
of conditions which would ensure defendant’s compliance with pretrial release and mitigate the
threat the court found he posed. The court noted defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen
motor vehicle in 2014; while on probation for that, he was convicted of armed robbery; and while
on parole for that, he was charged with Turner’s murder. Defendant also left Illinois without
permission and was otherwise noncompliant with parole. Further illustrating defendant’s
noncompliance with court orders was his unsuccessful discharge from probation in a juvenile case.
The court also noted the pretrial report reflected defendant had several mental health diagnoses
but was not taking medication or otherwise being treated for them. The court ultimately concluded
there were no conditions that could be put in place to ensure defendant’s compliance with pretrial
release or mitigate the threat he posed, denied his motion to reconsider his pretrial release
conditions, and granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 13 Defendant addressed the trial court after it delivered its decision. Defendant stated:
“Would this hearing that we just had—what type of hearing
was this considered? Because by my understanding of the statute,
-6- with me being incarcerated before the Act went in effect of 110-
7.5(b), I’m entitled and I shall have a hearing under Section 110-
5(e), which is a modification for conditions of pretrial release. And
this seems like this was just a detainment hearing.”
The court explained it entertained the State’s petition “based on the caselaw that we talked about
earlier.” The court accordingly told defendant, “You can think of it as a detainment hearing.”
Defendant continued:
“All right. But the actual plain text of the statute says that
I’m supposed to have a hearing for the modification, and Section
110-5(e) states that it’s for modifications of conditions of release.
And denial is not a condition of release. That’s outright denial.
Detainment is a denial. It’s not a condition of release.”
The court responded, “You know what the statute says. *** [B]ut the caselaw that has interpreted
the statute is interpreting it in a way that you don’t like.” The court explained it is “obligated to
follow the Jones case,” pursuant to which the State was allowed to file its petition to deny pretrial
release. Defendant stated he had read other cases that reached a different conclusion. The court
acknowledged defendant’s disagreement with how the caselaw interpreted the statute and informed
the defendant he could use that as a basis for a motion for relief or on appeal.
¶ 14 On May 3, 2024, defendant filed a “Motion for Relief Under the Act.” Defendant
argued the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the proof is
evident or the presumption great that he committed the murder. Defendant asserted the State failed
to meet its burden in that it only proffered “two self-interested biased witnesses who were able to
extricate themselves from their own charges related to this murder by implicating *** defendant.”
-7- By contrast, “independent disinterested witnesses” would testify to observing two Black males in
the vicinity at the time of the shooting, and defendant is White. Moreover, “[t]here was no proffer
of any forensic evidence tying *** defendant to the scene.” Defendant also argued the State failed
to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence he posed a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community. In particular, he argued, “The State’s
theory of the case strains credulity in that it is alleged that [defendant] committed a murder in
broad daylight pursuant to a gang rivalry he has no part in.” Next, defendant argued the State failed
to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of
conditions could mitigate the threat he posed. Specifically, he contended the trial court “conflated”
the separate statutory considerations of “dangerousness” and “conditions” and “did not separately
consider conditions of release,” such as the ones proposed at the April 2024 hearing. Finally,
defendant argued again that the court improperly allowed the State to file a petition to deny pretrial
release when the court instead should have afforded him a hearing to determine the reason for his
continued detention and to reopen conditions of pretrial release pursuant to section 110-5(e) (725
ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022)). Defendant relied on the First District’s decision in Watkins-
Romaine in support of his contention that the State’s petition was untimely in that the State did not
file it at his first appearance. The State did not respond to defendant’s motion for relief.
¶ 15 On May 8, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for relief.
After arguments, the court denied defendant’s motion. The court explained:
“I can forecast some things you’re going to be doing at trial
concerning challenging the credibility of Mr. Scott and Mr.
Wilkerson, considering the benefits they received, having charges
dismissed, having first degree murder charges dismissed with Mr.
-8- Scott in favor of something lesser. *** I also am aware, as the parties
have made it very clear, that no one on the outside is saying
[defendant] did this. They don’t have an eyewitness who has picked
out [defendant] in a photo lineup. It is relying it appears on the
testimony or anticipated testimony of Mr. Wilkerson and Mr. Scott.
***
And so I still do find that the proof is evident or the
presumption great that the defendant committed the offense. ***
Given the nature of the charge, but not only the nature of the charge,
I do find that he poses a real and present threat. I outlined my reasons
for that. He has a history with probation and being unsuccessfully
discharged. He was on parole at the time of the alleged offense. He
was noncompliant with his parole. And so for those reasons, as well
as all the other reasons that I had articulated in the motion, I did find
that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that would
address that specific threat and mitigate it. So I am going to stand by
the decision.”
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in detaining him pursuant to
the State’s untimely petition to deny pretrial release rather than affording him a hearing to reopen
his conditions of release and (2) the State did not meet its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he committed the murder.
-9- ¶ 19 A. Timeliness of the State’s Petition
¶ 20 Defendant acknowledges the trial court relied on this court’s decision in Jones in
permitting the State to file its petition to deny pretrial release over his argument it was untimely,
but he asserts “Jones was wrongly decided” and “[b]ased on the plain language of the Act, the
State’s petition was untimely and the court lacked authority to detain [him]” pursuant to the
decisions of the First District in Watkins-Romaine and People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890.
Defendant asserts section 110-6.1(c) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West 2022)) required the State to
file its petition on April 5, 2023, the date of his first appearance. Notwithstanding having been
arrested prior to the effective date of the Act, defendant argues, along the lines of these two First
District decisions, he was entitled to a hearing to determine the reason for his continued detention
and to reopen conditions of pretrial release under section 110-5(e). In response, the State asserts
the trial court was obligated to permit it to file its petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to this
court’s decision in Jones.
¶ 21 As indicated in the above discussion, there is, at present, a split in the districts of
the Illinois Appellate Court regarding whether the State is permitted to file a petition to deny
pretrial release for a defendant who was arrested and ordered released on conditions prior to the
effective date of the Act when it did not file the petition in accordance with the time frame set forth
in section 110-6.1(c). For purposes of the instant appeal, this split is manifested between this court
and the First District through the decisions in Jones and Watkins-Romaine, respectively.
¶ 22 In Jones, the defendant was charged with various offenses in July 2023—prior to
the effective date of the Act. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 3. The trial court set a monetary
bond, but the defendant did not pay it and remained in detention. Id. In September 2023, the
defendant filed a motion for pretrial release. Id. ¶ 4. Two days later, the State filed a petition to
- 10 - deny pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1, as amended by the Act. Id. The trial court entered
an order denying pretrial release. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The defendant appealed, arguing the Code did not
permit the State to file a “responsive petition to deny pretrial release” regarding a defendant who
remained in custody after being ordered released upon paying bail. Id. ¶ 9. In particular, the
defendant contended that under section 110-6.1(c), the State was only permitted to file a petition
to deny pretrial release “during the defendant’s first appearance or upon the defendant’s arrest and
release.” Id. ¶ 12. In response, the State relied on section 110-6(g) in support of the proposition
that “the Code allows courts to take the necessary steps to review and revise a defendant’s pretrial
detention.” Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 12.
¶ 23 Five provisions of the Code were central to the resolution of the appeal in Jones.
Under section 110-6.1(c)(1), “A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the
first appearance before a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 110-
6, after arrest and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). Section 6(g) provides, “The court may, at any time, after motion by either
party or on its own motion, remove previously set conditions of pretrial release, subject to the
provisions in this subsection.” Id. § 110-6(g). Under Section 6(i), “Nothing in this Section shall be
construed to limit the State’s ability to file a verified petition seeking denial of pretrial release
under subsection (a) of Section 110-6.1 or subdivision (d)(2) of Section 110-6.1.” Id. § 110-6(i).
Nevertheless, “[o]n or after January 1, 2023, any person who remains in pretrial detention after
having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing
security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” Id. § 110-7.5(b).
Section 5(e) provides, “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered
released with pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for
- 11 - continued detention,” in which, under certain circumstances, “the court shall reopen the conditions
of release hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure
the appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of
compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-5(e).
¶ 24 This court concluded:
“Based on this plain language, the Code does not require the
State to file all its petitions within 21 days of a case’s
commencement. Section 110-6(g) allows for the increase of pretrial
release conditions after a hearing. [Citation.] For defendants arrested
and detained before the Act’s effective date who remained in
detention after being granted pretrial release on the condition that
they pay monetary bail, a motion to deny pretrial release following
the Act’s implementation operates as a motion to increase the
pretrial release conditions to the furthest extent. The Code, as
amended by the Act, allows the State to seek to modify pretrial
release conditions, which includes filing a responding petition
where the defendant moves for pretrial release. *** Accordingly, we
find that section 110-6’s exceptions to the filing time frame
restrictions set forth in section 110-6.1(c)(1) apply here.” Jones,
2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 17.
¶ 25 The First District would take a different approach, expressly disagreeing with this
court’s conclusion in Jones, in its decision in Watkins-Romaine. There, 17 days before the effective
date of the Act, the trial court rejected the State’s request for a “ ‘no bail’ ” order and imposed a
- 12 - monetary bond as a condition of pretrial release. Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479,
¶ 5. In December 2023, the defendant filed a petition for release from detention. Id. ¶ 7. The State
responded with a petition for pretrial detention (even though the defendant remained in custody).
Id. After a hearing, the court granted the State’s petition. Id. ¶ 22. The defendant appealed, arguing
the State’s petition was untimely. Id. ¶ 24. The First District began its analysis by noting:
“The central question before us is whether the Code, outside
of the specific timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c), permits
the State to seek the pretrial detention of an individual who is
already in custody because he was granted bail under the previous
statutory scheme but who nevertheless could not satisfy one of the
conditions of his release.” Id. ¶ 26.
¶ 26 The court referred to its decision in Brown, where it held the State’s petition for
pretrial detention was untimely “because it was not filed for three months after the defendant’s
first appearance before a judge.” Id. ¶ 33. (citing Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, ¶ 13). The
court then held the State’s petition for pretrial detention in Watkins-Romaine was likewise
untimely, as it was not filed at the defendant’s first appearance. Id. ¶ 34. The court disagreed with
this court’s contrary conclusion in Jones, explaining that “[n]owhere does the Code provide that
the State may file a petition on defendant’s first court date after the amended Code went into
effect.” Id. ¶ 37. The court continued:
“The fact that the Code’s timing requirements do not account
for a defendant’s first appearance after the amendment’s effective
date should not and cannot be seen as an oversight. The existence of
section 110-7.5 of the Code demonstrates that the legislature
- 13 - foresaw the need to account for pending cases with preexisting bail
rulings when the amended Code went into effect. Thus, it is telling
that the prescribed procedure for individuals in defendant’s position
is a hearing only to determine the reasons for the continued
detention. [Citation.] If the legislature wanted the hearing triggered
by section 110-7.5(b) to include reconsideration of whether a
defendant is eligible for release or if it wanted to give the State the
ability to file a petition for detention against defendants who had
already been ordered released but remained in custody after the
effective date of the amended Code, it would have said so.” Id. ¶ 39.
The court concluded, “Accordingly, neither *** Jones nor the cases that rely on [it] can be
followed, because they are inconsistent with the plain language of the amended Code.” Id. ¶ 47.
¶ 27 Despite defendant’s arguments regarding the alleged incorrectness of this court’s
decision in Jones and the alleged correctness of the decision of the First District in
Watkins-Romaine, the trial court was obligated to follow Jones in assessing the propriety of the
State’s filing of its petition to deny pretrial release. As the First District has observed:
“It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of the appellate court
are binding precedent on all circuit courts, regardless of locale.
[Citation.] Decisions of the appellate court in one district, though
not binding on the appellate court in other districts, are binding on
circuit courts throughout the state. [Citation.] In the event conflicts
arise amongst the districts, the circuit court is bound by the decision
of the appellate court of the district in which it sits. [Citation.]
- 14 - Generally, a trial court located in one appellate district will adhere
to the decisional law in that district. [Citation.]” Universal Metro
Asian Services Ass’n v. Mahmood, 2021 IL App (1st) 200584, ¶ 30.
In Jones, this court concluded “the Code permits the State to file a responding petition in cases
*** where the defendant was arrested and detained prior to the Act’s effective date and remained
in detention after monetary bail was set.” Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 24. We decline
defendant’s implicit invitation to reconsider our holding in Jones. The trial court properly followed
the sound precedent of Jones by permitting the State to file its petition to deny pretrial release.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument regarding the untimeliness of the State’s petition is unavailing.
¶ 28 B. Denial of Pretrial Release
¶ 29 Defendant argues the State, through its proffer, failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he committed the murder. In
particular, given that Wilkerson’s charges were dropped and Scott was granted a plea deal “by
pointing the finger at [defendant],” the State did not proffer evidence “from any non-biased
witnesses that cast [defendant] as the shooter or even placed him at the scene or in the area.”
Moreover, “[n]o other evidence connected [defendant] to the crime” and neighbors told police they
saw two people, both Black males, in the vicinity. In response, the State contends “the trial court
heard evidence sufficient to support its determination by clear and convincing evidence that
defendant committed the offenses alleged.”
¶ 30 Before a trial court grants a petition seeking to deny pretrial release, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great that the
defendant has committed an offense listed in subsection (a),” (2) “the defendant poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
- 15 - articulable facts of the case,” and (3) “no condition or combination of conditions *** can mitigate
*** the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(e)(1), (2), (3)(i) (West 2022). We review a pretrial release decision for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would
agree with the court’s position. Id. ¶ 10. Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute
its own judgment for that of the trial court simply because it would have analyzed the proper factors
differently. Id. ¶ 11. Likewise, “we will not substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact on
issues regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Vega, 2018
IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 44.
¶ 31 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s
petition to deny pretrial release. According to the State’s proffer, Turner was found face down and
deceased from multiple gunshot wounds near the intersection of 11th Street and 6th Avenue in
Rockford, having walked northbound on 11th Street shortly before being shot. A surveillance
camera recorded an individual identified as defendant approaching Turner from behind and
shooting him approximately 20 times. Defendant then ran to a gray Mazda 5 driven by Tyrice
Scott. Surveillance video also showed Desmond Wilkerson, who was also a passenger in the
Mazda 5, “walking behind, almost as [a] lookout,” and Wilkerson told police defendant forced him
out of the car and demanded he accompany him to the scene where he would murder Turner.
Wilkerson also explained defendant’s acquaintance with members of a gang to which Scott
belonged and defendant’s decision to murder Turner on the belief he was a member of an opposing
gang. The State also proffered that Scott had given his gun to Wilkerson, who had given it to
defendant. Based on this proffer, the court concluded “there is clear and convincing evidence to
- 16 - support that [defendant] committed the offense, allegedly, if believed,” particularly in that
Wilkerson and Scott had identified defendant as the shooter and the video reflecting only one
person shooting “is some element of corroboration to the statements that [Wilkerson and Scott]
have given to the police.” At the hearing on the motion for relief, the court maintained its position
that “the proof is evident or the presumption [is] great that *** defendant committed the offense,”
having noted the “anticipated testimony of Mr. Wilkerson and Mr. Scott,” even though “no one on
the outside is saying [defendant] did this,” such as an independent eyewitness who may have
identified defendant through a “photo lineup.” The trial court’s determination that the State met its
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption
great defendant committed the murder was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or such that no
reasonable person would agree with the court. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11(“We
are not reviewing the State’s evidence anew. Instead, we are reviewing the [trial] court’s evaluation
of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.”).
¶ 32 As defendant did not argue on appeal any error in relation to the trial court’s
findings regarding the threat he was found to pose to any person or persons or the community or
the inadequacy of any conditions of pretrial release to mitigate that threat, those points are
forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall
not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).
¶ 33 In sum, (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the State to file its petition to deny
pretrial release rather than afford defendant a hearing to reopen his previously ordered pretrial
release conditions and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence the proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed the
murder.
- 17 - ¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
¶ 37 JUSTICE LANNERD, specially concurring:
¶ 38 I agree with my esteemed colleagues that we should affirm the circuit court’s
judgment denying defendant pretrial release. However, I write separately because I do not join in
the analysis contained in paragraphs 20 through 27 (supra ¶¶ 20-27) of the majority’s decision.
¶ 39 As Justice Turner explained in his special concurrence in Jones, section 110-6.1 of
the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) only applies to persons charged after the effective
date of the Act. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 38 (Turner, J., specially concurring). However,
section 110-7.5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)) allows the State to respond
to a defendant’s petition for pretrial release in situations where a defendant was charged prior to
the Act’s effective date. See People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 22; People v. Rios,
2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 17. As a result, the circuit court did not make a clear or obvious error
by considering the State’s petition.
¶ 40 I agree with the remainder of the majority’s analysis.
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