2025 IL App (1st) 231147-U No. 1-23-1147 Order filed July 14, 2025. First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 02 CR 10455 ) MARGARET DEFRANCISCO, ) The Honorable ) Lawrence Flood, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s 30-year sentence for first degree murder over her contention that the court abused its discretion by “erroneously” focusing on the seriousness of the offense rather than the “extensive” mitigation evidence.
¶2 On December 14, 2004, following a jury trial, defendant Margaret DeFrancisco was
sentenced to a total of 46 years in prison for first degree murder. Defendant was 16 years old at
the time of the offense. On January 9, 2020, the circuit court granted defendant relief pursuant to
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), vacated her No. 1-23-1147
sentence, and set the case for resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
and People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. Following a new sentencing hearing, the court imposed a
30-year sentence for first degree murder. On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its
discretion when it imposed a 30-year sentence for an offense committed when she was a juvenile
by erroneously focusing on the seriousness of the offense and failing to adequately consider
“extensive” mitigation evidence. We affirm.
¶3 We briefly summarize the evidence at trial.
¶4 The evidence at trial established that on June 6, 2000, defendant fatally shot Oscar
Velaquez in the back of the head in the basement of defendant’s family home.
¶5 A female friend testified that defendant asked her to bring her boyfriend’s firearm to
defendant’s home. The friend went to defendant’s home and “handed it over.” When the friend
asked why defendant wanted the firearm, defendant stated that she wanted to scare the victim for
money. The friend understood this to mean that defendant planned to rob the victim. The friend
was present as defendant and her older sister Regina DeFrancisco (Regina) discussed where to rob
the victim, went to the basement for 7 to 10 minutes, and then returned.
¶6 The friend further testified that when the victim arrived, Regina went to the basement and
called him downstairs. Defendant followed with the firearm behind her back. After hearing a
gunshot, the friend began going downstairs, but was met by defendant on the stairs, who handed
her the firearm. After the friend put the firearm in her purse, she went to the basement where she
saw the victim on the floor, bleeding from the ear with his right hand shaking. The sisters went
through the victim’s pockets, and defendant removed a firearm from the victim’s waistband. When
the friend asked “why did they do that,” they did not answer. The friend went back upstairs, but
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later helped the sisters, who had wrapped the victim’s body in sheets, carry the body to the victim’s
vehicle, where they placed it in the trunk. The girls drove to another location where the body was
set on fire.
¶7 Defendant, who admitted that she shot the victim, testified that the victim was angry with
Regina over a debt. The victim and Regina were in the basement when defendant heard the victim
call Regina a “b***” and Regina scream “ ‘Please don’t shoot me.’ ” When defendant began to go
downstairs, a female friend handed her a firearm. Once downstairs, defendant saw the victim
waving a firearm. She believed that the victim would shoot Regina and the firearm she held “went
off.” She did not remember pulling the trigger; she just wanted the victim to “stop.”
¶8 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. She was sentenced to 46 years in
prison, consisting of 21 years for first degree murder and a 25-year firearm enhancement. We
affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. DeFrancisco, No. 1-05-0068 (2006) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant then filed an unsuccessful postconviction petition.
¶9 On December 19, 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. The petition alleged that defendant’s 46-year sentence was a de facto life
sentence imposed on a juvenile in violation of Miller and its progeny and sought a new sentencing
hearing. The circuit court granted leave to file the petition and appointed counsel. On January 9,
2020, the court granted defendant postconviction relief and ordered a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 10 The court then ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report
¶ 11 The PSI indicated that defendant was raised by her physically abusive mother and her
father was “never around.” However, when defendant spent time at her grandmother’s house, her
childhood was “ ‘perfect.’ ” Defendant was physically and sexually abused by her mother’s
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boyfriend. When defendant’s aunt reported the abuse to the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS), defendant’s mother did not cooperate with DCFS. Defendant was raised in a
high crime neighborhood, where she witnessed crime and drugs.
¶ 12 Defendant completed the ninth grade prior to her arrest and obtained a GED in 2002, while
on bond. She received good grades and was never expelled or suspended from school. Defendant
obtained an associate’s degree in prison, and was, at the time of the PSI report, working on a
bachelor’s degree. She also obtained certificates in dog grooming and training. During her
incarceration she worked at Leisure Time Services. Defendant had no prior criminal background.
¶ 13 Defendant related that the offense was “ ‘spur of the moment’ ” and not planned. She had
just turned 16 years old and was “ ‘pretty immature.’ ” She only thought about getting in trouble
with her mother and not about the legal consequences. She additionally asserted that, at trial, she
“ ‘had no idea what was going on.’ ” She was “ ‘very regretful and remorseful’ ” and wished that
the offense had not happened.
¶ 14 Defendant had strong emotional support from her family. She had a “ ‘great’ relationship”
with her 18-year-old daughter and they spoke as much as possible. Defendant had two close
friends, who visited her in prison and spoke with her often. She enjoyed exercise, crochet, and the
“Restorative Justice Team.” Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, she attended church in jail.
¶ 15 Defendant was in good physical health and volunteered monthly with the mental health
counseling group at her correctional institution. She was previously diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), and was recently prescribed antianxiety medication due to the anxiety
caused by the resentencing.
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¶ 16 In mitigation, the defense presented a mitigation report, a psychiatric evaluation,
defendant’s transcripts from Lakeland College and Northwestern University, and four letters in
support.
¶ 17 The mitigation report noted that although defendant believed, based upon her original
sentence, that she would not be released until she was 65 years old, she made “extraordinary
efforts” to rehabilitate herself. Defendant’s mother was the victim of domestic violence, her father
was a drug addict, and defendant’s mother left defendant’s father after he hit her with a vacuum
cleaner. Defendant’s mother obtained an order of protection, but within months, defendant’s father
set the apartment on fire. Defendant last saw her father during first grade and she later learned that
he was high on LSD at that time.
¶ 18 Defendant’s mother, who worked two jobs, was not affectionate, did not like to “joke
around,” and would tell defendant not to touch her and to leave her alone. Additionally, defendant’s
mother used “excessive” corporal punishment and never apologized. Defendant’s mother’s
boyfriend sexually abused defendant and Regina, and threatened to break defendant’s legs if she
revealed the abuse. Due to the abuse, defendant failed second grade and nine-year-old Regina
attempted suicide. Defendant’s mother eventually married the boyfriend despite the abuse and his
arrest for a child sex offense involving defendant’s cousin. Defendant was close to her maternal
grandparents and enjoyed their home, which was clean and had enough food.
¶ 19 Defendant’s family concealed her after the offense. She was then arrested and released on
bond. While on bond, she obtained a GED and an assistant nurse certificate, and became pregnant.
Defendant’s daughter, Aurora Sanchez, was born in 2003, and defendant’s desire to be a good
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mother became her “single and greatest purpose in life.” Although defendant’s mother had legal
guardianship of Sanchez, Sanchez visited defendant often and they spoke on the phone daily.
¶ 20 During her incarceration, defendant worked as a baker and a seamstress and received
favorable performance evaluations. Defendant pursued an education, as well as certificates for
working as a pet care technician and HIV/AIDS peer educator, and became a secondary handler
working to train service dogs. Defendant received 13 disciplinary tickets between 2005 and 2019,
but was also described as a “ ‘model inmate.’ ”
¶ 21 The mitigation report noted that the original sentencing court had no knowledge of
defendant’s abuse, neglect, and traumas, and that there was a “strong relationship” between the
level of traumatic stress suffered in childhood and the risks of poor physical, mental, and
behavioral health as one aged. In other words, a stressful or traumatic childhood can result in
social, emotional, and cognitive impairment. The report concluded that at the time of the offense,
defendant’s prefrontal cortex, which was responsible for processing decisions, consequences,
impulses, and independent thought, was not fully formed.
¶ 22 Attached to the mitigation report were, in pertinent part, numerous additional letters in
support, defendant’s certificates, a psychiatric evaluation report, and an affidavit in which the
affiant averred that the third girl at the offense wished to recant her trial testimony and had only
told police what they wanted to hear.
¶ 23 Dr. Lisa Rone performed the psychiatric evaluation. In her report, Dr. Rone noted that
during childhood, defendant was subjected to her mother’s physical abuse, verbal outbursts, and
“violent” rejection, and was raised in a chaotic home with food insecurity, drug use, and physical
violence. Additionally, defendant’s mother chose not to “alienate” her boyfriend despite her
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knowing that he sexually abused defendant and Regina, and defendant’s mother made the girls
visit him in jail. Dr. Rone opined that at the time of the offense, defendant was experiencing
symptoms from untreated PTSD and acted to protect Regina. Defendant’s severe and repeated
childhood trauma made her “particularity susceptible” to acting impulsively. Defendant showed
no signs of sociopathic behavior; rather, she was empathetic and expressed remorse. Dr. Rone
concluded that defendant would be employable if released and would benefit from therapy for
residual PTSD symptoms and to support community reintegration.
¶ 24 On April 6, 2023, the court held a sentencing hearing. Initially, the judge stated that he
reviewed the transcripts from defendant’s trial and sentencing in 2004, as he did not preside over
trial. The court also reviewed defendant’s direct appeal, the mitigation report and exhibits, the
psychiatric evaluation, the letters of support, and the tickets defendant received in prison.
¶ 25 The State published the victim impact statement of the victim’s mother, who stated that the
victim, her eldest child, was hardworking and a protector, and that his death scarred the family and
led to two of his siblings’ lupus diagnoses.
¶ 26 The defense presented Jennifer Lackey, a philosophy professor at Northwestern University
and the founding director of the Northwestern Prison Education Program, which helps prisoners
obtain bachelor’s degrees. Lackey testified that, nationally, there is 75% recidivism within five
years for those released from prison, but “just over” 5% recidivism for those released from prison
with a bachelor’s degree. Defendant was in the initial class of 20 prisoners admitted to the program
and would graduate in two years with a bachelor’s degree from a “top ten university.” The
application process was “extremely competitive” and only included prisoners who “clear[ed]”
prison policies, including having no disciplinary tickets within a certain time period. Lackey
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described defendant as one of the “absolute top applicants.” If defendant were released prior to the
completion of her degree, the program would support her to ensure completion. Lackey, who knew
defendant “quite well,” described her as engaged, outgoing, and “community-orientated.”
¶ 27 Sanchez, defendant’s then 19-year-old daughter, read a letter into the record. Sanchez had
visited defendant since Sanchez was a baby and did not understand that defendant was in prison
until Sanchez was almost 12 years old. Sanchez had “endless” letters and phone calls from
defendant, who gave “a thousand percent while *** so far away.” After Sanchez told defendant
that other children received daily notes in their lunch boxes, defendant sent envelopes of notes so
that Sanchez also had one each day. Once Sanchez got her own phone, she spoke to defendant at
least three times a week. She described defendant as her parent and friend. Sanchez thought it was
“crazy” that defendant received such a long sentence for an offense committed at age 16, when
Sanchez still felt “like a baby” at age 19. She wanted her mom home to fill an “empty hole.”
Sanchez asserted that defendant grew up and rehabilitated herself.
¶ 28 In allocution, defendant stated that she apologized although she knew that her actions were
unforgivable, and asked to be seen as “something other than the worst thing” she had done. She
rehabilitated herself to make up for her actions, but acknowledged a debt that she could never
repay. She participated in the Restorative Justice Team and stated that “[g]iving back” will be her
life’s work.
¶ 29 In aggravation, the State argued that defendant shot the victim in the back of the head, then
wrapped and burned the body. The State also noted that defendant lied to police about her
involvement in the victim’s death, fled, and was not arrested for two years. The State concluded
that although defendant admitted to shooting the victim, she continued to “minimize” her actions
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rather than admitting that she “executed an unarmed man.” The State acknowledged that defendant
bettered herself in prison, but argued that did not “erase” what she did.
¶ 30 In mitigation, the defense argued that the juvenile brain was immature and had no
understanding of consequences. Counsel argued that defendant accepted responsibility and lived
with guilt and shame. However, defendant grew, changed, and rehabilitated. In more than 20 years
in prison, defendant was an “amazing” mother, hardworking student, and “truly unique from others
in the prison community.” Counsel alleged that an offense committed by a child could not be
evaluated without understanding the life that child was “forced to endure.” Here, defendant was
repeatedly sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend in their home, and only felt protected with
her grandparents.
¶ 31 Counsel noted that when defendant disclosed the abuse, her mother did not believe her and
later married defendant’s abuser. In her childhood, defendant suffered physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse, was neglected, and saw her parents engage in domestic abuse, substance abuse, and
divorce. Although defendant had PTSD, she functioned at a “high level” and followed prison rules.
While defendant’s childhood did not excuse her actions “outright,” it explained her mindset
preceding the offense.
¶ 32 Turning to the facts of the case, counsel noted that the victim called Regina 24 times during
the days preceding the offense, knew he had been “conned,” and purchased a firearm. Additionally,
defendant had just turned 16 years old and there was “no doubt” that her trauma affected her
cognitive function that day. However, the woman before the court was not that 16-year-old; rather,
she was a “poster child” for rehabilitation. All that defendant accomplished was because she
wanted to be someone of whom her daughter was proud despite believing she would not be
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released until age 65. Counsel asked the court to sentence defendant to 21 years in prison, the
sentence originally imposed for first degree murder without the firearm enhancement.
¶ 33 In imposing sentence, the court noted that it additionally considered the PSI, the testimony,
and defendant’s statement in allocution. The court then stated it must also consider the seriousness
of the offense, the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, defendant’s age, and
the other factors in mitigation. The court characterized the mitigation report and psychiatric
evaluation as comprehensive, and acknowledged defendant’s childhood, the “difficult
circumstances,” and the efforts she made while incarcerated although her sentence was 46 years
to be served at 100%. Defendant pursued an education, participated in “groups,” and established
relationships with counselors.
¶ 34 The court commended defendant for participating in the Northwestern University program.
The court also noted that, unlike the original sentencing court, it had Miller and its progeny, which
discussed the development of the juvenile brain, the impulsivity and immaturity of juveniles, and
the “lack of being able to perform—or to make rational decisions at times,” coupled with, in
defendant’s case, PTSD from a traumatic childhood. The court further noted that defendant was
“obviously” rehabilitating herself to be a productive person when released from prison.
¶ 35 The court also noted that this was an “execution-style murder,” followed by an attempt to
conceal the offense and subsequent “desecration of the body.” Although the court did not believe
that the minimum sentence was warranted, a “maximum” 40-year sentence was also inappropriate,
given the evidence in mitigation. The court then stated:
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“And I really have to say that in the cases that I’ve dealt with for re-sentencing,
your case, by far, has shown the greatest effort and the greatest accomplishment towards
rehabilitation that I have heard in these cases.
That being said, I can’t neglect the seriousness of the case, and the seriousness of
the charge, and the seriousness of the act.”
¶ 36 The court sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison, which would give defendant the
opportunity to spend time with her daughter and lead a “productive life.” Defendant filed a motion
to reconsider sentence, which the court denied.
¶ 37 On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion when it imposed a 30-
year sentence for an offense committed when she was 16 years old. She argues that the court
improperly focused on the seriousness of the offense and failed to adequately consider the
“extensive” mitigation evidence.
¶ 38 The Illinois Constitution requires that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. When balancing “the retributive and rehabilitative
purposes of punishment,” the trial court must carefully consider “all factors in aggravation and
mitigation, including, inter alia, the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility,
criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well as the nature
and circumstances of the crime and of defendant’s conduct in the commission of it.” People v.
Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002).
¶ 39 When determining a sentence, “the trial court has broad discretionary powers.” People v.
Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). A sentence within statutory limits will be deemed “excessive”
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and an abuse of discretion when it is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law” or
is “manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Id. at 210. Where a sentence falls
within the statutorily mandated guidelines, it is presumed to be proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL
App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. When reviewing a defendant’s sentence, this court will not reweigh the
aggravating and mitigating factors and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely
because we would have weighed these factors differently. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st)
170478, ¶ 50.
¶ 40 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court therefore instructed sentencing courts to
“take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480.
¶ 41 Accordingly, because defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense, the court was
required to consider the factors in mitigation as outlined in section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code
of Corrections (Code) when imposing sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)
(additional sentencing factors for offenders under 18 years old at the time of the offense). This
section also gave the court discretion to “decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing
enhancement based upon firearm possession *** with personal discharge that proximately causes
*** death to another person.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2020).
¶ 42 Here, defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was subject to a sentence of 20 to 60
years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (West 2000).
Moreover, because she personally discharged the firearm that killed the victim, she was subject to
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a discretionary 25-year sentencing enhancement. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000); 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2020) (a sentencing court may, in its discretion, decline to impose an
otherwise applicable firearm sentencing enhancement on an offender who was under 18 years old
at the time of the offense). The court imposed a 30-year sentence, which was within statutory
guidelines, and is therefore presumptively proper. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 43 Nonetheless, defendant contends that the court failed to adequately consider the
“extensive” mitigation evidence including that she was experiencing PTSD symptoms at the time
of the offense due to childhood trauma, she was accepted into an “elite” Northwestern University
program during her incarceration, and she exhibited a “remarkable” transformation since the
offense.
¶ 44 Absent some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself, a reviewing court
presumes the sentencing court considered all mitigating evidence presented. People v. Sauseda,
2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. That presumption may be overcome by “affirmative evidence”
that the sentencing court failed to consider factors in mitigation. People v. McWilliams, 2015 IL
App (1st) 130913, ¶ 27. In this case, defendant has not identified such evidence.
¶ 45 To the contrary, the court specifically mentioned the mitigation report and psychiatric
evaluation, and acknowledged the “difficult circumstances” of defendant’s childhood. The court
commended defendant for her admission into the Northwestern University program and for
“obviously” rehabilitating herself, despite her original 46-year sentence at 100%. The court also
noted the general impulsivity and immaturity of juvenile brains, which, in this case, was coupled
with defendant’s PTSD. The court concluded that, of all the resentencing cases in which the court
was involved, defendant had “shown the greatest effort” and “greatest accomplishment toward
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rehabilitation.” However, the court was also mindful of the seriousness of the offense, an
“execution-style murder” that defendant and her companions tried to conceal and which resulted
in the “desecration” of the victim’s body. A trial court may properly consider the circumstances of
the offense, including “the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the
defendant” (People v. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 072821, ¶ 55) and “need not give greater weight
to any potential for rehabilitation than to the seriousness of the offense” (People v. Murray, 2020
IL App (3d) 180759, ¶ 33). Here, the court found that the seriousness of the offense did not warrant
a minimum sentence, but that the maximum sentence was likewise inappropriate considering the
mitigation evidence. See People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55 (“the presence of
mitigating factors neither requires a minimum sentence nor precludes a maximum sentence”).
¶ 46 While defendant may believe the mitigation evidence warranted the statutory minimum
sentence, the court was not required to agree. See People v. Wyma, 2020 IL App (1st) 170786,
¶ 99 (rejecting the argument that “the seriousness of the criminal offense had taken a back seat to
rehabilitative potential for the purposes of juvenile sentencing” and noting that the seriousness of
the offense “remains the most important factor when a trial court undertakes to balance the
retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment”). Ultimately “the seriousness of an offense,
and not mitigating evidence, is the most important factor in sentencing.” People v. Wilson, 2016
IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11.
¶ 47 This is not a case, as defendant acknowledges, where the court failed to consider the
mitigation evidence. Rather, she argues the mitigation evidence was so extensive that the court
abused its discretion by failing to impose the statutory minimum sentence. However, in reviewing
a defendant’s sentence, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the lower court merely
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because we may have weighed the factors in aggravation and mitigation differently. See Jones,
2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 50; see also People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999) (“In considering
the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors
differently.”).
¶ 48 Here, the evidence at trial established the defendant asked a friend to bring her a firearm,
shot the victim in the basement of her family home, and burned the body in an attempt to hide the
offense. Based on the record before us, we cannot say the court’s imposition of a 30-year sentence
for first degree murder was an abuse of its discretion. See People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th)
090908, ¶ 24 (“The balance to be struck amongst the aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter
of judicial discretion that should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).
¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 50 Affirmed.
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