2025 IL App (1st) 190422-UB
FIFTH DIVISION June 13, 2025
No. 1-19-0422
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 CR 11401 ) EARL DAWSON, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Oden Johnson and Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to his prior qualifying felony convictions as predicates for the armed habitual criminal offense; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting police course-of- investigation testimony; and (3) defendant was not subject to improper double enhancement and his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. ¶2 Following a jury trial, Earl Dawson was convicted of the offense of being an armed habitual
criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a), (b) (West 2016). On direct appeal, Mr. Dawson
successfully argued, with one justice dissenting, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had the prior qualifying criminal convictions necessary to sustain his AHC No. 1-19-0422
conviction. As a result, we reduced his conviction to the lesser-included offense of aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2016)) and remanded for
resentencing. People v. Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 67.
¶3 On May 29, 2024, in the exercise of its supervisory authority, our supreme court directed
this court to (1) vacate our September 30, 2022, judgment in this case, (2) consider the effect of
the supreme court’s subsequently decided opinion in People v. Gray, 2024 IL 127815, “on the
issue of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dawson had the requisite
predicate adult convictions necessary to sustain his [AHC] conviction,” and (3) “determine if a
different result [wa]s warranted.” People v. Dawson, No. 129136 (Ill. May 29, 2024).
¶4 After vacating our prior judgment in this appeal, we granted the parties leave to each file a
supplemental brief on the issues presented by the supreme court’s supervisory order. In response,
Mr. Dawson filed a brief in which he concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that at trial the State
had “presented sufficient evidence to sustain [Mr. Dawson’s] [AHC] conviction” based on his
counsel’s stipulation. However, Mr. Dawson argues that “a different outcome [i]s [not] warranted”
because counsel was ineffective for stipulating to “qualifying” prior felony convictions. In
response, the State argues that consideration of ineffective assistance exceeds the supreme court’s
mandate and, if we decide to reach this argument, Mr. Dawson’s claim that the stipulation was
ineffective assistance is without merit.
¶5 For the following reasons, we reject Mr. Dawson’s argument that his lawyer’s stipulation
that he had qualifying prior convictions was ineffective assistance of counsel. We also incorporate
our determination from our initial decision that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing evidence about the police course-of-investigation. Finally, we reject Mr. Dawson’s
argument that the court’s 12-year sentence rested on improper sentencing factors or was an abuse
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of discretion. Because of our resolution of the merits of this appeal, we deny Mr. Dawson’s motion
for immediate release, which we took with the case.
¶6 I. BACKGROUND
¶7 Prior to trial, Mr. Dawson moved to exclude the officers’ course-of-investigation testimony
about why they were in the area and why they chased him. Defense counsel argued:
[“DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So I’m just asking for a limiting testimony. I know that
officers have to testify why they were in the area in order for it to make sense.
THE COURT: They have to show why they went to a location and why they did
certain things and why they chased somebody and why they chased him all the way in the
house and looking for certain things. That’s all fair game.
*** I will tell the jury that he’s not accused of any shooting, that he’s not charged
with any shooting, that the only reasons they are hearing that is not for the truth of the
matter asserted, but just to indicate why the police were—say that they were at a location
and say that they acted in a certain way. So, I will give a limiting instruction as to that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And part of my motion is that none of it should come out.
It should just be that the officers were told to go in the area and saw him running. I don’t
believe any shooting is admissible.
THE COURT: Well, to say that—to have a complete vacuum as to why the police
are chasing somebody from the street into a house wouldn’t make any sense.”
¶8 The trial court found that, “[o]therwise,” without this information, “it just seems like [the
police] are out there randomly barging into people’s homes for no reason whatsoever.” Instead,
the trial court stated that it would provide a limiting instruction.
¶9 The trial occurred on November 8, 2018. The evidence at trial showed that police officers
3 No. 1-19-0422
responded to a radio dispatch on July 20, 2017, about a shooting in the area. The dispatch described
the subject as a “male black with a red shirt running in an alley.” After driving to the area, one of
the officers observed Mr. Dawson running from an alley and observed that he fit the description
provided in the dispatch. Chasing Mr. Dawson on foot, the officer followed him into a residence
where the officer observed Mr. Dawson pull a dark object from his waistband and place it on top
of a laundry basket behind a door. After Mr. Dawson was detained and handcuffed, the police
recovered two firearms from the top of the laundry basket: a Smith & Wesson 9-mm handgun and
a Jennings 9-mm handgun.
¶ 10 Over Mr. Dawson’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s request to certify two
police officers as experts in fingerprint analysis. One of the officers testified that an inked
fingerprint card from Mr. Dawson shared 20 characteristics with the ridge impressions recovered
from the grip of the Jennings handgun. The expert testified that eight characteristics in the same
relative positions generally indicates that the prints came from the same individual.
¶ 11 The parties stipulated that Mr. Dawson had previously been convicted of two qualifying
felony offenses. Defense counsel agreed to several other stipulations, including to the proposed
testimony of the officer who recovered the firearms from “a laundry bag,” to a “proper chain of
custody” for the firearms, and to the fingerprints taken from Mr. Dawson. Mr. Dawson did not
testify or present any evidence.
¶ 12 During the trial, the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction stating that Mr.
Dawson was not accused of a shooting and that there was “no evidence” that Mr. Dawson “was
involved in” a shooting:
“THE COURT: Let me make it clear, Ladies and Gentlemen. This is about—
receiving a call about shots, that’s not for the truth of the matter asserted. That’s to indicate
4 No. 1-19-0422
what the officer is saying that he heard and why he acted and did certain things accordingly.
Mr. Dawson is not accused of shooting anybody. That’s not what this case is about.
And I want you to only understand that the only reason you’re hearing about that is not to
say that somebody was actually shot. There’s certainly not—there’s no evidence that Mr.
Dawson was involved in that, but just [to] indicate why the officer was where he was and
did what he did.”
¶ 13 Immediately prior to the jury deliberations, the trial court again reminded the jurors: “Any
evidence that was received for a limited purpose should not be considered by you for any other
purpose.”
¶ 14 During jury instructions, the court told the jury that, to find Mr. Dawson guilty, it had to
find that the State had proven two propositions: (1) “that the defendant possessed any firearm”;
and (2) “that the defendant had previously been convicted of two qualifying felony offenses.” The
court further instructed the jury that, in this case, “the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
the proposition that the defendant has previously been convicted of two qualifying felony
offenses.”
¶ 15 The jury acquitted Mr. Dawson of the AHC count predicated on the Smith & Wesson
handgun but found him guilty of the AHC count predicated on the Jennings handgun.
¶ 16 In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Dawson asserted a number of errors, including that the
trial court erred in permitting information about the alleged shooting to be introduced at trial. On
February 7, 2019, the trial court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing.
¶ 17 In aggravation, the State described Mr. Dawson’s criminal history, which consisted of the
two armed robberies that the State used as predicate offenses. Both robberies occurred in 2013,
when Mr. Dawson was 17 years old. The court then asked if the State “kn[e]w anything about
5 No. 1-19-0422
those robberies.” The State explained that, in one, Mr. Dawson demanded property from the victim
while displaying a semi-automatic pistol, and took her headphones, iPad or iPod, and purse. The
State also said that Mr. Dawson “pointed the pistol into the victim’s head pushing her head back
somewhat” before fleeing. In the other, Mr. Dawson approached the victim, demanded her phone,
wallet, and other property, and displayed a black semi-automatic pistol “with his right hand
cocking the gun.” Another offender displayed a handgun. The victim gave Mr. Dawson her phone,
Mr. Dawson pushed her, and while she was on the ground, he kicked her “in the left rib area three
times” before fleeing. Both victims identified Mr. Dawson—one from a photo array, the other
from a lineup. Mr. Dawson was sentenced to concurrent eight years terms for the two robberies
and a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR).
¶ 18 In mitigation, defense counsel noted that Mr. Dawson was 23 years old and that his mother
was usually in court but was sometimes unable to make it due to work. Mr. Dawson had graduated
from elementary school, attended high school until he was incarcerated for the 2013 armed
robberies, and obtained his GED on June 11, 2018, while he was still incarcerated. Counsel
explained that Mr. Dawson wanted to attend college, had been accepted at a university, and
intended to study computer graphics. Before he was arrested, Mr. Dawson was employed as a cook
at a local restaurant. Defense counsel requested the minimum sentence, arguing that Mr. Dawson
was young and had made an effort while incarcerated to better his education so that he could be a
productive citizen.”
¶ 19 According to the presentence investigation report, Mr. Dawson did not have any juvenile
adjudications of delinquency and had no gang affiliation. Mr. Dawson also informed the
investigator that “he had been seeing a mental health professional (while incarcerated), once a
month since 2017” and “[wa]s taking psychotropic medication (Zoloft and Remeron) due to being
6 No. 1-19-0422
diagnosed with PTSD and failure to adjust.”
¶ 20 The trial court observed that Mr. Dawson had been on MSR for two armed robberies, then
said, “And while still on [MSR], you’re out running around with a gun that you never should have
had. You are young. This was a possessory offense, but this is serious stuff. And you are one of
the last people in the world who needs to be running around with a gun on the streets.” After
saying, “I will try to be as modest as I can,” the judge sentenced Mr. Dawson to 12 years in prison.
Defense counsel immediately tendered a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court
denied. This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 22 Mr. Dawson’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied on February 7, 2019, and he
timely filed a notice of appeal that same day. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under article
VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021), governing appeals from final
judgments in criminal cases. The sequence of events following our initial appeal is outlined above,
supra ¶ 3, and the case is before us again on remand from our supreme court’s supervisory order.
Dawson, No. 129136.
¶ 23 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 A. Counsel’s Stipulation Was Not Ineffective Assistance
¶ 25 Mr. Dawson was convicted under a statute that provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he or
she *** possesses *** any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more times
of any combination of the following offenses:
(1) a forcible felony as defined in Section 2-8 of this Code[.]” 720 ILCS
7 No. 1-19-0422
5/24- 1.7(a)(1) (West 2016).
The parties agree that a juvenile adjudication is not a prior criminal conviction for the purpose
of criminal statutes requiring a prior conviction as an element of the offense. People v. Taylor,
221 Ill. 2d 157, 171 (2006).
¶ 26 In 2013, when Mr. Dawson, then 17 years old, committed the underlying armed robberies,
section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) provided that, “[e]xcept as provided in
Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was under 17 years of age
at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” 705
ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2012).
¶ 27 However, in 2014, the law changed. Effective January 1, 2014, section 5-120 of the Act
provides that “[e]xcept as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no
minor who was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under
the criminal laws of this State.” 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2016).
¶ 28 Mr. Dawson’s argument on appeal initially was that the State failed to meet its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he had two qualifying convictions. He contended that
because he was 17 and not 18 when he committed his prior felony offenses, if they had been
committed at the time he was charged for AHC, he likely would not have received adult
convictions for those crimes.
¶ 29 Two justices of this court agreed and reduced his AHC conviction to the lesser-included
offense of AUUW. Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 67. The majority relied in part on this
court’s reasoning in People v. Gray, 2021 IL App (1st) 191086, ¶¶ 15-16, reversed, 2024 IL
127815, where we found that the AHC statute had a present tense component which meant that—
to meet its burden of showing the defendant had two qualifying adult convictions under the law in
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effect at the time of his AHC offense—the State needed to prove either that the defendant was at
least 18 years old at the time of each qualifying predicate offense or that the defendant would have
been transferred to adult court as a 17-year-old. Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 44. Because
one of the two stipulated-to offenses in Gray was committed when the defendant in that case was
17 years old, we concluded there that the State “did not show that the conviction was for conduct
that ‘is punishable’ as a felony as of the date of the firearm possession in 2016” and thus failed to
meet its burden. Gray, 2021 IL App (1st) 191086, ¶ 16.
¶ 30 Justice Mitchell dissented from our earlier decision in this case. He pointed out that when
the legislature amended the Act in 2014 to raise the minimum age for prosecution in adult court
from 17 to 18, it made the amendment prospective only, and the armed robbery convictions that
Mr. Dawson received were adult convictions at the time he received them. Dawson, 2022 IL App
(1st) 190422, ¶¶ 69-72 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
¶ 31 On November 30, 2022, our supreme court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal
in Gray. In Gray, as in this case, the defendant’s lawyer had stipulated at trial that he had “ ‘two
prior qualifying felony convictions for purposes of sustaining the charge of [AHC].’ ” Gray, 2024
IL 127815, ¶ 9. The supreme court found it unnecessary to address the question of whether the
defendant’s age at the time of the predicate offenses was relevant. Id. ¶ 28. Rather, “[s]ince defense
counsel stipulated that [the] defendant had the two requisite convictions, thereby removing the
State’s obligation to provide evidence of the two convictions, [the] defendant [could not] directly
attack the evidence.” Id. The stipulation was “determinative.” Id.
¶ 32 The supreme court in Gray went on to address whether the stipulation was ineffective
assistance of counsel in that case. Id. ¶¶ 29-32. The court cited the standard in Strickland v.
Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), requiring a defendant to show both that “(1) the attorney’s
9 No. 1-19-0422
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the attorney’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant in that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 29. The supreme court found that because the defendant was 17
years old for only one of the two stipulated-to offenses, and he had an additional prior qualifying
conviction after he was 17, he could not show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.
Id. ¶¶ 14, 32.
¶ 33 Our supreme court has ordered us to reconsider our decision in this case in light of its
decision in Gray. Mr. Dawson now argues his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating that he
had two qualifying prior convictions because, since he had no other qualifying convictions,
entering into that stipulation prejudiced the outcome of his case and fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
¶ 34 In response, the State argues both that Mr. Dawson has forfeited this claim and that it is
beyond the scope of our mandate. We reject both of these preliminary arguments. The supreme
court’s order asks us to consider “the effect” of Gray on the issue of whether the stipulation
satisfied the State’s burden to prove the requisite predicate adult convictions and to “determine if
a different result is warranted.” (Emphasis added.) Dawson, No. 129136. In his supplemental brief,
Mr. Dawson considered “the effect” of Gray and decided to concede, for purposes of appellate
argument, that the stipulation did, indeed, satisfy the State’s burden of proof. However, Mr.
Dawson then argued, per the supreme court’s order, that a different result was nevertheless not
warranted. Mr. Dawson’s chosen line of argument is well within the supreme court’s mandate.
¶ 35 Nor is the argument forfeited. In Mr. Dawson’s initial brief in this appeal, he argued, “[i]n
the alternative, should this Court not vacate Mr. Dawson’s conviction, it should find that counsel
10 No. 1-19-0422
was ineffective for stipulating that Mr. Dawson had ‘previously been convicted of two qualifying
offenses.’ ” This introductory sentence was followed by several well-reasoned paragraphs full of
citations to relevant case law, as well as to the underlying factual record. Thus, we will consider
the merits of Mr. Dawson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for entering into this stipulation.
¶ 36 Mr. Dawson argues that, at the time of his trial in November 2018, it was unreasonable for
his counsel to stipulate that his two armed robbery convictions for offenses committed when he
was 17 years old qualified as predicate convictions for the AHC offense.
¶ 37 Just recently, our supreme court unanimously rejected the contention underlying that
argument—that the State must prove that a defendant would have, at the time of the AHC charge,
been prosecuted as an adult for any predicate offense to that charge. People v. Wallace, 2025 IL
130173. The court concluded that this was “simply not a reasonable reading of the statutory
language.” Id. ¶ 19. Thus, the development in the law that Mr. Dawson contends his counsel
unreasonably failed to foresee has now been overturned by our supreme court. A lawyer certainly
does not render deficient performance by failing to argue for a reading of a statute that our supreme
court has since found to be unreasonable. Moreover, any claim that counsel was ineffective for not
raising this argument would also fail at this point since Mr. Dawson could not show he was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to make this argument. See Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (ineffective assistance claim requires showing that lawyer’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defendant.)
¶ 38 In short, counsel’s stipulation was not ineffective assistance.
¶ 39 B. Course-of-Investigation Testimony
¶ 40 Mr. Dawson argues that the trial court erred by admitting, over his objection, the State’s
course-of-investigation testimony about receiving a radio dispatch regarding a shooting. The State
11 No. 1-19-0422
responds that the testimony was properly admitted to explain why officers were chasing him.
¶ 41 Generally, “[e]videntiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be reversed unless the trial court has abused that discretion.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52,
89 (2001). “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary,
fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court.” Id. “The decision whether to admit evidence cannot be made in isolation,” and the “trial
court must consider a number of circumstances that bear on that issue, including questions of
reliability and prejudice.” Id. And, as our supreme court has made clear, “[r]easonable minds [can]
differ about whether such evidence is admissible without requiring reversal under the abuse of
discretion standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 186
(2003).
¶ 42 Mr. Dawson argues that the officers’ testimony about the radio dispatch, which led them
to be in the area and to chase him, was admitted in error. Normally, a radio dispatch by an out-of-
court declarant would be considered inadmissible hearsay, which is “an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1085
(2004). However, when statements are admitted for the limited purpose of showing the course of
a police investigation, they are not considered hearsay, because they are admitted to explain why
the investigating officer who heard the statements took the steps they did, rather than for the truth
of the matter asserted. Id. A statement that is not hearsay may still be excluded if it is unduly
prejudicial (Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)), i.e., if it tends to lead the factfinder to decide facts
on an improper basis (People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (1995)).
¶ 43 Here, in finding that the radio dispatch testimony was admissible, the trial judge said, “[T]o
have a complete vacuum as to why the police are chasing somebody from the street into a house
12 No. 1-19-0422
wouldn’t make any sense. And I think the Government should have an opportunity to explain and
put in context why the officers are doing the things that they are doing.” In addition, to the extent
that the dispatch about shots fired was prejudicial, that prejudice was minimized by the trial court’s
admonishment that there was “no evidence” that Mr. Dawson was “involved” in a shooting. We
find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the course-of-investigation testimony.
¶ 44 In support of his claim that the testimony was erroneously admitted, Mr. Dawson cites
Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, and People v. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d 615 (2000), but both cases
are distinguishable. In Jura, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
Id. at 1082. The evidence at trial established that, after receiving a radio dispatch about a man with
a gun, the police arrived at the specified location, only to find five men present, including the
defendant. Id. The State introduced testimony that the radio dispatch had further described the one
with the gun as a white male, six feet tall, with a teardrop tattoo on his face, under his right eye.
Id. 1082-84. The officers testified that, except for the defendant, none of the other men had teardrop
tattoos on their faces. Id. After the officers arrived, the defendant threw a gun into a garbage can
and fled down an alley but was quickly apprehended. Id. The appellate court said that it “could
accept the State’s argument that it used the hearsay merely to explain the investigation undertaken
by the police” if the State had not repeatedly elicited the hearsay through multiple witnesses, relied
on the hearsay in opening statement and closing argument, and “repeated the ‘fact’ the hearsay
description matched the defendant although the trial judge had sustained objection to this question
and that ‘fact’ was not in evidence.” Id. at 1088-89. The appellate court found, in light of the
credibility dispute between the defendant and the police at trial about who possessed the gun, that
this error was not harmless. Id. at 1091.
¶ 45 Jura is readily distinguishable from this case. In Jura, the radio description was used to
13 No. 1-19-0422
distinguish the defendant from among a group of possible other suspects also present at the scene,
and no limiting instruction was provided. Here, by contrast, the trial court gave a particularly clear
limiting instruction, reiterating to the jurors that Mr. Dawson was “not accused of shooting
anybody,” that that was “not what this case [wa]s about,” and that they were hearing about shots
fired “not to say that somebody was actually shot,” because there was “no evidence that [Mr.
Dawson] was involved in that,” but only to “indicate why the officer was where he was and did
what he did.” Unlike in Jura, the dispatch here was also not used to distinguish Mr. Dawson from
other suspects present at the scene. In addition, in Jura, the defendant started running upon seeing
the police and was apprehended outside. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-25 (2000)
(“[h]eadlong” flight immediately upon seeing the police enter an area, combined with presence in
a high-crime area, supports a finding of reasonable suspicion). As a result, the State in Jura needed
less explanation for the police chase than here, where Mr. Dawson was already running when the
police arrived and the police chased him into a home.
¶ 46 Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d 615, is also distinguishable from this case. There, the
defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Id. at 617. The evidence at trial established that, after
the robbery, the victim reported that three men had robbed him and drove off, and he provided a
description of the three men and their car. Id. One of the responding officers testified at trial that,
while at the scene, he received a radio call from another officer, who stated that the police had
stopped a car matching the description provided by the victim, that the car contained three men,
and that the three men fled but one was apprehended. Id. Minutes later, the victim identified the
apprehended man as one of the three robbers, identified the car as the one they had fled in, and
later identified the defendant as one of the other robbers from both a photo array and an in-person
lineup. Id.
14 No. 1-19-0422
¶ 47 The appellate court in Edgecombe reversed and remanded for a new trial based on certain
remarks by the State that highlighted the defendant’s “failure to testify” and that improperly shifted
the burden of proof. Id. at 624. Although not reversing based on the defendant’s other claims, the
appellate court still addressed them “because they might arise on retrial,” and concluded that the
radio call’s contents were erroneously admitted. Id. at 624, 627.
¶ 48 Unlike in this case, the hearsay put before the jury in Edgecombe, without any limiting
instruction, was essentially another officer’s assertion that the defendant ran upon seeing the
police. The fact that the defendant ran at that moment was completely unnecessary to explain what
the police did next. Id. Here, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding
that the jurors needed some explanation of why the police suddenly started chasing Mr. Dawson
through the street and into a home. As the trial court explained, “[o]therwise it just seems like they
are out there randomly barging into people’s homes for no reason whatsoever.” We find no abuse
of discretion.
¶ 49 C. Sentencing
¶ 50 Mr. Dawson also argues that his 12-year sentence was improper. We did not address this
issue in our original opinion because we remanded for resentencing on the reduced charge of
AUUW. However, because we are now affirming Mr. Dawson’s AHC conviction, we will address
his sentencing arguments.
¶ 51 According to Mr. Dawson, we should reduce his sentence or remand for resentencing
because (1) the trial court improperly considered factors inherent in the AHC offense in
aggravation and (2) his sentence of 12 years was excessive. We consider each argument in turn.
¶ 52 1. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Rely on a Factor Inherent to the Offense
¶ 53 Initially, the State argues, and Mr. Dawson concedes, that he has forfeited consideration of
15 No. 1-19-0422
whether the court considered an improper factor in sentencing because his trial counsel did not
object or raise it in the motion to reconsider his sentence. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544
(2010); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2016) (“A defendant’s challenge to the correctness
of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed
with the circuit court clerk within 30 days following the imposition of sentence.”).
¶ 54 Mr. Dawson nonetheless asks that we review this issue under the plain-error doctrine,
which allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved errors when a clear or obvious error
occurred and “either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the
error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at
545. Mr. Dawson also argues, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this issue at sentencing. To show ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that
“counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “deficient
performance resulted in prejudice.” People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 44. Because “the failure
of a defendant to show that error occurred at all defeats both an ineffective assistance claim and a
claim of error under either prong of the plain error doctrine” (People v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st)
120802, ¶ 47), we first consider whether error occurred at all.
¶ 55 “There is a general prohibition against the use of a single factor both as an element of a
defendant’s crime and as an aggravating factor justifying the imposition of a harsher sentence than
might otherwise have been imposed.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79,
83-84 (1992). “Such dual use of a single factor is sometimes referred to as ‘double enhancement.’ ”
Id. at 84. As our supreme court explained, a double enhancement is generally prohibited because
“it is assumed that the legislature, in determining the appropriate range of punishment for a
criminal offense, necessarily took into account the factors inherent in the offense.” Id. Our supreme
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court has also cautioned, however, that the rule should “not be rigidly applied,” where it would
“restrict[ ] the function of a sentencing judge by forcing him to ignore factors relevant to the
imposition of sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207,
226-27 (1996). When determining whether a trial court considered an improper factor in imposing
sentence, the reviewing court considers the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words
or statements. People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009). The defendant must
affirmatively show that the sentence was based on an improper consideration. Id.
¶ 56 Mr. Dawson argues that the trial court subjected him to an improper double enhancement
when it considered his possession of a firearm and his prior convictions—both factors inherent in
the offense of AHC—as aggravating factors at sentencing.
¶ 57 We considered a similar argument in People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924. On
appeal from his 13-year sentence for AHC, the defendant in Brown argued the court improperly
considered his prior conviction for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon as a factor
in aggravation when it served as a predicate offense for his conviction. Id. ¶¶ 7, 19. In rejecting
this argument, we relied on our supreme court’s decision in Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207:
“In Thomas [citation], our supreme court explained, ‘the discretionary act of a sentencing
court in fashioning a particular sentence tailored to the needs of society and the defendant,
within the available parameters, is a requisite part of every individualized sentencing
determination.’ Thus, ‘[t]he judicial exercise of this discretion, in fashioning an appropriate
sentence within the framework provided by the legislature, is not properly understood as
an ‘enhancement.’ [Citation.] As part of that framework, the trial court must consider a
number of aggravating and mitigating factors in imposing its sentence, including the
defendant’s criminal history. [Citation.] Thomas, therefore, found the trial court’s use of
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prior convictions to impose a Class X sentence did not preclude it from ‘reconsidering’ the
same prior convictions and using them a second time as an aggravating factor in
sentencing.” Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924, ¶ 20 (quoting Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 224-
25, 227-29).
¶ 58 We acknowledged in Brown that Thomas “concerned the mandatory Class X sentencing
statute rather than the Class X AHC offense,” but nonetheless found the reasoning in Thomas
applicable. Id. ¶ 21. Ultimately, we found that the trial court could properly consider the
defendant’s prior UUWF conviction as part of his criminal history because “while the fact of [the
defendant’s] prior UUWF conviction determined his eligibility for an AHC charge, it [wa]s the
nature and circumstances of that conviction which, along with other factors in aggravation and
mitigation, determined the exact length of his sentence.” (Emphases in original.) Id. (citing
Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 227-28).
¶ 59 Here, as in Brown, there was no improper double enhancement. In sentencing Mr. Dawson
to 12 years in prison, the trial court did not focus on the fact that Mr. Dawson had two prior felony
convictions but instead focused on the circumstances of those convictions, an entirely proper
consideration for a sentencing court. See also People v. Sherman, 2020 IL App (1st) 172162, ¶ 54
(finding no reversible error based on a double enhancement where the trial court referred to the
defendant’s prior convictions, also used as predicate convictions for his AHC conviction, “in
finding that he should not receive the minimum six-year sentence”).
¶ 60 Mr. Dawson urges us to disagree with Brown, arguing that it was wrongly decided because
although it relied on the holding in Thomas, it “failed to acknowledge that the Illinois Supreme
Court had held the exact opposite” in People v. Hobbs, 86 Ill. 2d 242 (1981). This is simply
incorrect. The supreme court in Thomas explained that “[i]n Hobbs, the defendant’s misdemeanor
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theft conviction was enhanced to a Class 4 felony on the basis of a prior felony theft conviction,
and the same prior felony theft conviction was again used to impose an extended term sentence.”
Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 225. The Hobbs court found “that because the prior felony theft conviction
was an element of the later felony theft, serving to enhance the offense from a misdemeanor to a
felony, use of the same prior theft conviction to impose an extended term” was an improper double
enhancement. Id. at 225-26. However, the court in Thomas also noted that the Hobbs holding “was
limited to situations where the same prior conviction is used both to enhance the class of an offense
and to enhance the punishment for that offense.” Id. at 226. Contrary to Mr. Dawson’s argument,
that is not what happened here. People v. Chaney, 379 Ill. App. 3d 524 (2008), which Mr. Dawson
also relies on, is inapplicable to this case for the same reason. See id. at 532 (finding an
impermissible double enhancement where at least one of the defendant’s two prior Class 2 felony
convictions “was used both to establish the offense as a Class 2 felony and then also used to impose
Class X sentencing”).
¶ 61 Mr. Dawson also relies on People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (5th) 180192. There, the appellate
court “briefly acknowledge[d]” the defendant’s claim of sentencing error and found that he was
subject to an improper double enhancement because the trial court considered a prior felony as an
aggravating factor at sentencing after it had also been used as a predicate for his armed habitual
criminal conviction. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. In Taylor, however, there is no indication that the trial court did
anything other than consider the fact of the defendant’s prior conviction. Id. ¶ 21. Here, in contrast,
the trial court specifically asked for the facts of the prior convictions, making clear its intent to
consider the nature and circumstances of those convictions in aggravation rather than simply the
fact that they existed. We are not persuaded by Taylor.
¶ 62 Mr. Dawson argues that the trial court also improperly relied on the fact that he was in
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possession of a firearm in aggravation. At sentencing, the trial court did note that while Mr.
Dawson was on MSR, he was “running around with a gun that [he] never should’ve had,” and that
it “was a possessory offense, but this is serious stuff.” It is clear to us that the court was, once
again, not referencing or relying on the fact that Mr. Dawson was in possession of the gun, but
rather that he was in possession of the gun when he was on MSR for his prior offenses, which also
involved the use of a gun. The trial court’s consideration of the nature and circumstances of the
offense for which it was sentencing Mr. Dawson was appropriate.
¶ 63 2. Mr. Dawson’s Sentence Is Not Excessive
¶ 64 Finally, Mr. Dawson argues that his 12-year sentence was excessive based on the nature of
the offense, his background, the mitigation evidence, and subsequent changes in juvenile law.
¶ 65 Sentencing involves a careful evaluation of various mitigating and aggravating factors
(People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 150795, ¶ 44) and balancing the seriousness of the offense
with the defendant’s rehabilitative potential (People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46). A
trial court also has wide discretion in sentencing, and “its sentencing decisions are entitled to great
deference.” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). “A reviewing court gives great
deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the trial judge, having
observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors
than the reviewing court, which must rely on the ‘cold’ record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 212-13.
¶ 66 Mr. Dawson was found guilty of AHC, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a), (b) (West
2016)), with a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016)).
Because Mr. Dawson’s sentence of 12 years was well within the sentencing range, it is presumed
proper and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 50.
20 No. 1-19-0422
An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentence “is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose
of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. “This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court merely because we would have weighed the sentencing factors differently.” Jones, 2019
IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 50.
¶ 67 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Before the sentencing hearing began,
the court ensured that the presentence investigation report—which included information about Mr.
Dawson’s social history, education and employment, family, health history, and substance use—
had been distributed. When the State presented only the fact of Mr. Dawson’s prior criminal
convictions in aggravation, the court asked the State for more information about those convictions.
The court listened to defense counsel’s argument in mitigation and Mr. Dawson’s statement in
allocution. When sentencing Mr. Dawson, the court acknowledged that he was young, and
although it did not mention Mr. Dawson’s other mitigating evidence, “it was not required to recite
or assign a value to each factor in mitigation or aggravation that form[ed] part of the record.”
Id. ¶ 55.
¶ 68 Mr. Dawson argues that his sentence was extreme “[c]onsidering that [AHC] is a
possession offense.” He also points out that if he had “not been eligible to be convicted of [AHC],”
he would have faced a less serious felony offense with a lower sentencing range. All of that may
be true, but it is not relevant. The court was constrained by the sentencing range for AHC and,
within that range of 6 to 30 years, his 12-year sentence was on the low end.
¶ 69 Mr. Dawson also argues that the court did not consider the mitigating factors—specifically
his youth, changes in the law with respect to young offenders, his educational and employment
pursuits, his strong support system, and his mental illness. However, the trial court “is not required
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to recite or assign a value to each factor in mitigation or aggravation that forms part of the record,”
and when mitigation evidence has been presented to the trial court, “it is presumed the court
considered those factors, absent some indication to the contrary.” Jones, 2019 IL App (1st)
170478, ¶¶ 54-55. In this case, there were also aggravating circumstances, including the fact that
Mr. Dawson was found by a jury to be in possession of a firearm, and he possessed that firearm
while, as the judge noted, he was still on MSR for two offenses in which he had used a gun to rob
women on the street. Mr. Dawson is essentially asking us to reweigh these factors, which we have
no authority to do. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214-15.
¶ 70 Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.
¶ 71 D. Motion for Immediate Release
¶ 72 Mr. Dawson has a pending motion for immediate release. In light of our resolution of the
issues in this case, that motion is denied.
¶ 73 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 74 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Dawson’s conviction.
¶ 75 Affirmed.