People v. Davidson

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Davidson

178 N.W.2d 85, 23 Mich. App. 4, 1970 Mich. App. LEXIS 1778

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 27, 1970

DocketDocket 5,221

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 178 N.W.2d 85 (People v. Davidson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Davidson, 178 N.W.2d 85, 23 Mich. App. 4, 1970 Mich. App. LEXIS 1778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).

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Opinion

*5 Per Curiam.

Defendant, Michael Davidson, appeals his nonjury conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. *

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in considering his juvenile record in imposing sentence. This precise issue has been considered by this Court in People v. Coleman (1969), 19 Mich App 250, where we ruled that the post-conviction examination of juvenile records in imposing sentence is not a use of such records as “evidence” in violation of MCLA § 712A.23 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [598.23]). This holding has been reiterated in People v. Charles Williams (1969), 19 Mich App 544.

Defendant’s second allegation of error objects to the quantum of proof, saying the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial was hazy and inconclusive as to the breaking and entering. We have thoroughly considered the evidence introduced at trial and find that, although it is predominantly circumstantial, it ■ was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Affirmed.

*

MOLA § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 28.305).

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*5 Per Curiam.

Defendant, Michael Davidson, appeals his nonjury conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. *

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in considering his juvenile record in imposing sentence. This precise issue has been considered by this Court in People v. Coleman (1969), 19 Mich App 250, where we ruled that the post-conviction examination of juvenile records in imposing sentence is not a use of such records as “evidence” in violation of MCLA § 712A.23 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [598.23]). This holding has been reiterated in People v. Charles Williams (1969), 19 Mich App 544.

Defendant’s second allegation of error objects to the quantum of proof, saying the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial was hazy and inconclusive as to the breaking and entering. We have thoroughly considered the evidence introduced at trial and find that, although it is predominantly circumstantial, it ■ was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Affirmed.

*

MOLA § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 28.305).

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Bluebook (online)

178 N.W.2d 85, 23 Mich. App. 4, 1970 Mich. App. LEXIS 1778, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-davidson-michctapp-1970.

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