NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 240614-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/18/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0614 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Montgomery County. ) v. ) No. 23-CF-3 ) LANCE M. DAVIDSON, ) Honorable ) Douglas L. Jarman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Sholar concurred in the judgment. ∗
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s sentence where the defendant has forfeited the issue of whether he was forced to proceed pro se during postsentencing proceedings, but remand this matter for an inquiry into the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 On May 23, 2023, the defendant, Lance M. Davidson, was found guilty after a jury trial of
tampering with a security fire or life safety system in violation of section 17-11.5(a) of the Criminal
Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/17-11.5(a) (West 2022)). The defendant proceeded
pro se throughout his jury trial, but requested and was appointed counsel for sentencing. After
sentencing, the defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider sentence which his appointed counsel
∗ Justice Moore also fully participated in this case prior to his retirement. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6 (1992). 1 declined to adopt. The trial court allowed the defendant to proceed pro se on that motion. The
defendant now claims that he was forced to proceed pro se at a critical stage of the proceedings
without a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. The defendant also
claims that the trial court failed to address his posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s sentence but remand this matter for a
Krankel 1 inquiry.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The defendant was charged by information on January 5, 2023, with one count of
tampering with a security fire or life safety system in violation of section 17-11.5(a) of the Criminal
Code (id.), a Class 4 felony. The charge alleged that on January 3, 2023, the defendant knowingly
sabotaged or temporarily malfunctioned a security camera in the Montgomery County jail. The
defendant was appointed counsel, Katherine Drummond, on January 5, 2023. At the time of her
appointment in this case, Drummond was already representing the defendant in another case
pending before the trial court, People v. Davidson, No. 22-CF-310 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County)
(second case). Drummond had also represented the defendant in another pending case, People v.
Davidson, No. 22-CF-262 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County) (third case), until he elected to proceed
pro se in that case.
¶5 We note that many of the documents and pleadings in this case were filed in all three cases
even where the filing applied to only one of the cases. We further note that all three cases were
addressed in the majority of the hearings conducted by the trial court. As such, we will reference
1 Hearings investigating pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel held pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, are commonly referred to as Krankel hearings or Krankel inquiries.
2 the other cases as needed to clarify or give context to a filing, argument, or finding by the trial
court, but make no comments nor offer any opinions regarding the merits of the other cases.
¶6 On January 6, 2023, the defendant, through counsel, filed a speedy trial demand and a
motion for discovery. On January 10, 2023, the defendant filed a pro se speedy trial demand and
a motion for discovery. He also filed a pro se motion to remove appointed counsel. The motion to
remove counsel stated that the defendant did not want court-appointed counsel, that counsel had
previously been removed from the third case, and that the defendant had a right to self-
representation. The trial court conducted a status hearing on January 11, 2023, and addressed the
defendant’s motion to remove counsel. The defendant requested additional time to consider the
issue of representation, and the trial court granted that request.
¶7 Another status conference was held on January 18, 2023, and the trial court again addressed
the defendant’s request to proceed pro se. The defendant stated that he stood on his motion to have
appointed counsel removed and that he wanted to proceed pro se. The trial court admonished the
defendant concerning proceeding pro se and ensured that the defendant had sufficient time to
consult with appointed counsel prior to making his decision on representation. The defendant
acknowledged all of his rights, indicated that he had no questions, and again stated that it was his
desire to represent himself. The trial court stated that they had “been down this road multiple times,
both you representing yourself and requesting counsel.” The trial court cautioned the defendant
that he had “a right to represent yourself to your own peril” and that having a skilled, experienced
attorney would be in the defendant’s best interest. The trial court again confirmed that the
defendant wanted to proceed pro se, found the waiver to be knowingly and voluntarily made, and
then granted the defendant’s motion.
3 ¶8 On February 13, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for counsel which stated, “Please
appoint Erin Mattson to my cases ***.” The trial court addressed the defendant’s motion at a
hearing on February 15, 2023. The trial court informed the defendant that he did not have a right
to the appointment of a specific public defender. The trial court advised the defendant that if he
wanted to proceed with counsel, Drummond would be reappointed since she had previously
represented the defendant through one trial and had not been relieved based on any fault or
allegation of fault. The State also informed the trial court that Mattson, whom the defendant had
requested, would have a conflict and could not be appointed to represent the defendant. The
defendant then stated as follows:
“I would ask for appointed counsel and just ask to note that I’m making the
claim that Miss Drummond would not adopt my post-trial motions [in the third
case] as she did not agree with me. So I would just—I would be requesting to
preserve those.”
¶9 The trial court informed the defendant that he was entitled to counsel, but was “not entitled
to an attorney that agrees with everything you want.” The trial court went on to explain that
attorneys have ethical obligations and limitations, and that the defendant did not have the right to
have the trial court “keep appointing attorneys until you find someone who agrees to do it your
way.” The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and Drummond was reappointed as counsel
in this case and the defendant’s third case.
¶ 10 A jury trial was conducted on April 24, 2023, and the defendant was represented by
Drummond throughout the trial. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision and a mistrial
was declared. The matter was set to be retried on May 23, 2023. On May 22, 2023, the defendant
filed a motion to remove counsel. The trial court held a hearing via Zoom the same day and the
4 defendant confirmed that he wanted to proceed pro se. The trial court reminded the defendant that
the second jury trial was scheduled for the following morning and again admonished the defendant
on the offense, the potential punishment, and his right to counsel. The defendant confirmed his
rights, and stated that he was prepared for trial. The trial court stated that there would be a waiver
for the defendant to sign and that it would be taken care of the next morning prior to trial.
¶ 11 A second jury trial was conducted on May 23, 2023. Prior to the start of the trial, the trial
court again admonished the defendant concerning proceeding pro se, and the defendant again
confirmed his desire to represent himself at trial. The defendant represented himself at the second
jury trial and upon completion of the evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of knowingly
sabotaging or temporarily malfunctioning a security camera in the Montgomery County jail.
¶ 12 On June 1, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for transcripts and an objection to the notice
of arrest being admitted into evidence at trial. He also filed a document titled “Counsel” in all three
cases that stated that “Court appointed counsel, Katherine Drummond, is not communicating with
me about sentencing and trial strategy. She has not made reasonable effort to communicate with
my witnesses in my favor.” Although filed in all three cases, as previously noted, the defendant
was not represented by Drummond at his second jury trial nor at the time of the “Counsel” filing.
¶ 13 A hearing was conducted on June 2, 2023, for status in this matter, pretrial in the second
case, and sentencing in the third case. At the hearing, the trial court addressed the defendant’s
“Counsel” filing. The defendant withdrew that pleading from the third case and the trial court
proceeded with a sentencing hearing with the defendant represented by Drummond.
¶ 14 Upon the completion of sentencing in the third case, the defendant requested counsel, other
than Drummond, be appointed to represent him for sentencing in this case. The trial court again
addressed the defendant’s “Counsel” filing and found that the defendant had not shown a basis for
5 a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court once again informed the defendant that
he did not have a right to request a specific counsel and that if counsel was desired for sentencing
in this matter, Drummond would be reappointed. The defendant then stated that he was requesting
court-appointed counsel for sentencing and the trial court reappointed Drummond. The trial court
set a date for sentencing and noted that it would also address the pretrial on the second case at that
time. The defendant then withdrew his “Counsel” filing as to the second case.
¶ 15 The defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on June 7, 2023. The notice of appeal stated
that the defendant was appealing the jury’s guilty verdict of May 23, 2023. On June 8, 2023, the
defendant filed a “Request for Investigation.” The request for investigation was filed in the trial
court and copied the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission with a note that
stated, “copy to be mailed for review.” The request for investigation stated that “Katherine
Drummond was appointed for defense counsel, but she improperly prosecuted me.” The request
also stated “pro se litigant, requesting conflict counsel to assist me, argue my claims against
Katherine Drummond.” Based on the defendant’s request for investigation, Drummond filed a
motion to withdraw in all of the defendant’s cases on June 9, 2023.
¶ 16 The trial court conducted a hearing on Drummond’s motion to withdraw on July 7, 2023.
At the hearing, the defendant requested that the trial court address any motions filed by Drummond
prior to allowing her to withdraw. The trial court denied that request and granted Drummond’s
request to withdraw. The trial court then went through the status of each case. It noted that this
case was pending sentencing, the second case was pending trial, and that sentencing had been
completed in the third case. The trial court confirmed that the defendant was still requesting
counsel for sentencing in this matter and appointed Mattson to represent the defendant. The
defendant objected, noting the previous stated conflict, and the State agreed that Mattson would
6 have a conflict. As such, the trial court appointed Wesley Poggenpohl. The defendant noted that
Poggenpohl was a former prosecutor, but did not make any objection to his appointment.
¶ 17 At a status hearing on August 7, 2023, the defendant stated he wanted to proceed pro se in
his second case and that he objected “to Mr. Poggenpohl representing me on any of these cases.”
The trial court instructed the defendant to file a written motion setting out his allegations regarding
counsel and denied his oral request to have Poggenpohl removed from all of his cases.
¶ 18 On August 11, 2023, the defendant filed a pro se motion for substitution of judge. The
motion argued that the trial judge appointed Poggenpohl over the defendant’s objection, denied
the defendant’s right to proceed pro se, and violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The
defendant also filed a motion to disqualify Poggenpohl on the same day. That motion alleged that
Poggenpohl had served as a prosecutor and that the “attorney-client relationship is damaged by
irreconcilable difference.” The motion referenced a “Request for Investigation” that was also filed
that day. The request for investigation was a form document from the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois and was completed by the defendant. It
requested an investigation into Poggenpohl alleging that he could not represent the defendant due
to Poggenpohl being a former prosecutor and that “[b]etween 16-CF-25 and 18-CF-78, Wes
Poggenpohl made over 43 court appearances as Prosecutor (Assistant States Attorney of
Montgomery County) against me—those cases were sought for incarceration.”
¶ 19 On September 15, 2023, the trial court, with a different judge presiding, conducted a
hearing on the defendant’s pro se motion for substitution of judge. The defendant’s counsel,
Poggenpohl, declined to adopt the defendant’s pro se motion for substitution of judge. The trial
court noted that generally, the pro se motion would be stricken since the defendant was represented
by counsel; however, given that there was a pending motion to disqualify defense counsel, the
7 defendant was permitted to argue the motion. The defendant stated that the judge was biased and
had entered a sentence that was not permitted by law because it was outside of the sentencing range
for the offense. The trial court noted that even if the sentence was in error, that matter was on
appeal and did not demonstrate bias. The defendant then argued that the judge ignored the
defendant’s objection to Poggenpohl being appointed since Poggenpohl had a conflict of interest
as a former prosecutor. When asked if there was any other factual basis for bias, the defendant
stated, “That’s it.” The trial court found that the defendant had not established any bias and denied
the defendant’s request for substitution of judge. It further held that the initial judge would hear
the defendant’s motion to disqualify defense counsel.
¶ 20 On October 3, 2023, the trial court, with the initial judge presiding, conducted a hearing on
the defendant’s motion to disqualify Poggenpohl as counsel and to proceed pro se. The trial court
went through all the admonishments again, including the offenses charged, the potential
punishments, and the right to counsel in both pending cases. The trial court also confirmed that the
defendant had represented himself at trial in the current matter; his age; that he had no mental or
physical disabilities; that he could read, write, and understand the English language; and that he
understood his rights to have an attorney appointed. The trial court also extensively went through
the disadvantages in self-representation and the advantages to having an experienced, trained
attorney. The defendant acknowledged his rights and understanding, and then stated that he still
desired to proceed pro se. The trial court advised the defendant that “once you decide that you
want to proceed without an attorney, you made that election and you don’t necessarily need to get
another attorney appointed for you. Do you understand that?” The defendant stated, “Yes, Your
Honor.” The trial court then granted the defendant’s motion, vacated Poggenpohl’s appointment,
and set the matter for sentencing on November 14, 2023.
8 ¶ 21 On November 9, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to appoint counsel. The motion stated
that the defendant could “not obtain legal materials efficiently, to prepare a defense through the
prison library.” The matter was called for sentencing on November 14, 2023, and the defendant
indicated that he had not yet received the presentence investigation report (PSI). The trial court
noted that the defendant had filed a motion for counsel and the defendant acknowledged that he
would like counsel to be appointed. The defendant stated that he was unable to get his subpoenas
issued because he had limited access to materials. The defendant informed the trial court that he
was requesting counsel for sentencing in this matter, but wanted to remain pro se in the other
pending case.
¶ 22 The trial court reappointed Poggenpohl for sentencing and the State provided the defendant
with a copy of the PSI, noting that it had been filed on November 2, 2023. The matter was reset
for sentencing on December 14, 2023. On December 8, 2023, the defendant, through counsel, filed
a motion for new trial. The motion for new trial argued that the defendant did not have sufficient
time to consult with his appointed counsel at the May 22, 2023, hearing on his motion to proceed
pro se at the second trial. The motion further alleged that hearing was conducted via Zoom in
violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984), that the defendant did not fully
understand the repercussions of going to trial pro se, and that the defendant did not understand the
30-day requirement for filing a posttrial motion.
¶ 23 On December 13, 2023, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to continue the
sentencing hearing. The next day, the defendant filed a pro se “Objection” which stated that the
defendant objected to Poggenpohl representing him at any proceeding. The “Objection” also
requested that Poggenpohl be removed as counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest because
Poggenpohl, as a prosecutor, had “made over 43 court appearances against the defendant.” As
9 such, the “Objection” requested “appointment of substitute counsel or self-representation would
be better than conflicting interest.” The case was called for sentencing and over the State’s
objection, the trial court granted the continuance.
¶ 24 The matter was called on January 10, 2024, to address the motion to continue, the
“Objection” to Poggenpohl as defense counsel, the motion for new trial, and sentencing. At the
beginning of the hearing, Poggenpohl stated that the defendant was making an oral motion to
continue the sentencing hearing until after the trial was completed in the other pending case. The
State objected. The trial court went through the lengthy procedural history of the defendant
requesting counsel, removing counsel, and then requesting counsel again, causing numerous
delays. The trial court noted that sentencing had been scheduled for seven and a half months and
as such, denied the defendant’s motion to continue sentencing.
¶ 25 The trial court then asked the defendant if he wanted to address his pro se “Objection.” The
defendant argued that Poggenpohl had over 43 court appearances where he had engaged in the
prosecution of the defendant in 2018. The defendant also stated that he did not know whether the
issue “may become moot” depending on what the State asked for at sentencing. The trial court
once again stated that Poggenpohl was an assistant state’s attorney prior to this case being filed
and that Poggenpohl had not been employed in that office during the pendency of this case. As
such, the trial court denied the defendant’s “Objection” to remove Poggenpohl and substitute
counsel. At no point did the defendant request to proceed pro se.
¶ 26 The trial court then went on to address the defendant’s motion for new trial. In support of
that motion, the defendant testified on his own behalf. The defendant stated that he had previously
been represented by Drummond and had moved the trial court to remove her as counsel. The
defendant testified that the hearing on the motion to remove counsel was done remotely with the
10 defendant appearing from the Montgomery County jail. At the hearing, the defendant stated that
the trial court informed him that there would be a form for him to complete regarding the waiver
of counsel, but that the form was not given to him by the State until the day of trial when
Drummond was not present. The defendant testified that he believed Drummond would be present,
so he refused to sign the waiver because he wanted to speak with Drummond. The defendant stated
that if his request for a new trial was granted, he would be represented by an attorney during the
new trial. The defendant also testified that he did not understand that he only had 30 days in which
to file any posttrial motions.
¶ 27 Upon cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he had requested to proceed pro se
more than five times during the pendency of this case and had actually represented himself at major
hearings. The defendant also admitted that the trial court had inquired, before the start of the trial,
whether he was certain that he wanted to proceed pro se and that he had, again, confirmed his
intention to proceed pro se.
¶ 28 The defendant was the only witness and upon the completion of his testimony, the trial
court heard arguments. Defense counsel argued that the trial court did not comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984), since it failed to have the defendant sign a waiver of
counsel, and failed to have the waiver hearing conducted in open court since the defendant
appeared via Zoom. Also, because the defendant was on Zoom, defense counsel argued that the
defendant was not allowed an opportunity to speak privately with his appointed counsel prior to
counsel being dismissed from the case. As such, defense counsel argued that there was no
substantial compliance with Rule 401 and that the defendant should be granted a new trial where
he could be represented by counsel.
11 ¶ 29 The State argued that on the day prior to trial, the defendant was admonished as to the
nature of the charge, the possible penalties, and his right to counsel. The State also argued that, by
his own admission, the defendant was again admonished prior to the start of trial, which occurred
in person in open court. The State also noted that there was no requirement for a written waiver
and as such, argued that the trial court fully complied with Rule 401. Upon completion of
arguments, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
¶ 30 The trial court then proceeded to a sentencing hearing and sentenced the defendant to three
and one-half years’ incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections, to be followed by six
months of mandatory supervised release. The sentence was to be served consecutive to the 50
months of incarceration and 4 years of mandatory supervised release sentence imposed in the third
case. The defendant was then fully advised of his appeal rights. The State moved to dismiss the
defendant’s second case, and the trial court granted the dismissal.
¶ 31 On January 23, 2024, the defendant filed a “Pro Se Appearance” in all three cases. He also
filed an “Objection” and a “Post-Judgement” motion in this case. The objection stated that prior
to sentencing, the defendant had made a verbal objection to Poggenpohl representing him and that
“[t]his was not a Krankel Hearing for ineffective assistance of counsel, it was my objection to his
representing me due to him being a former prosecutor.” The objection further stated that the
defendant should have been allowed to proceed pro se and should be granted a new sentencing
hearing.
¶ 32 The document titled “Post-Judgement” motion stated, in its entirety, as follows:
“I wish to file Motion for New Trial, Motion to Reconsider Sentence. It is
my intent to file a Notice of Appeal but the aforementioned motions may be struck
by the Court.
12 Please preserve my rights to appeal by allowing a Motion to Continue for
appeal rights to a Notice of Appeal until the other post-trial motions are presented.”
(Emphases in original.)
¶ 33 The trial court called all three cases for hearing on February 6, 2024. At the beginning of
the hearing, the State clarified that the defendant had made a pro se filing that stated he would be
filing a motion for new trial and a motion for reconsideration of the sentence but noted that he had
not done so. The State further noted, however, that the defendant was still within his 30 days to do
so. The State also indicated that the defendant had requested to proceed pro se and “that’s what he
wishes to do he has a right to do that now if he wishes to.”
¶ 34 The trial court then inquired whether the defendant intended on filing a motion and the
defendant stated that “[i]t would be my intent to see if Mr. Poggenpohl finds any of them to have
merit, he would raise those, but my desire would be for a new trial and if denied a motion to reduce
sentence.” At this point, both the State and Poggenpohl asked for clarification on whether the
defendant wanted to proceed pro se or have Poggenpohl represent him for postsentencing motions.
The following dialog then occurred:
“THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, [the defendant], you have heard the
confusion here. You have filed a pro se entry of appearance. You plan on
proceeding without counsel or do you want Mr. Poggenpohl to represent you?
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, at this time I don’t even know what Mr.
Poggenpohl’s stance is if he even agrees with any of my allegations.
THE COURT: And if you are going pro se that would not matter. If you
want Mr. Poggenpohl to represent you then, of course, you will want to talk with
him. He will want to talk with you. So do you want him to represent you?
13 THE DEFENDANT: I mean, I—if he is not going to file a motion for new
trial then I would have to do that on myself to preserve that issue. I don’t know if a
notice of appeal has been filed, but I think that would be premature if the motion
for new trial was filed so I guess—and I guess it all depends—
MR. POGGENPOHL: I can answer that. I am not filing a motion for new
trial because we did that prior to the sentencing hearing and it was denied. So if you
are wanting to rehash that issue that’s not a motion I am going to file.”
¶ 35 There were additional discussions between the trial court and the defendant regarding the
defendant’s filings. At one point, the defendant indicated that it was his intention that the filing of
the “Objection” was a motion for a new sentencing hearing. As such, the trial court agreed to
schedule that motion for hearing and asked whether the defendant would be proceeding pro se on
that motion. The defendant then asked whether Poggenpohl was willing to adopt that motion to
which Poggenpohl, understandably, responded with some confusion since the basis of that motion
was the defendant’s argument that Poggenpohl had a conflict and should have been removed.
Poggenpohl also informed the trial court that the defendant had made it clear that he did not want
Poggenpohl to represent him. Poggenpohl further stated that he would not adopt that motion and
the defendant stated that he would argue the motion. The defendant also indicated to the trial court
that he intended to file a motion for a new trial and asked for additional time to file a notice of
appeal. The trial court informed the defendant that it could not grant additional time to file an
appeal, but that the defendant still had time to perfect an appeal.
¶ 36 The defendant filed an affidavit on February 12, 2024. Within the affidavit, the defendant
stated that it was his belief that appointed counsel was required to file the notice of appeal and that
he was asking for assistance to argue the ineffectiveness of Katherine Drummond and Wesley
14 Poggenpohl. The affidavit further stated that it was Poggenpohl’s duty to file any posttrial motions
and that Poggenpohl “refuses not only to assist me but at least to consult with me.” The affidavit
stated that a notary was not available, so the affidavit was not sworn. The same day, the defendant
filed a notice of appeal of the January 10, 2024, “conviction, sentence.” The notice of appeal also
stated that the offense of which the defendant was convicted was “victim of Montgomery County.”
¶ 37 On March 7, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s “Objection”
which the defendant had previously indicated was a motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant
appeared pro se and stated that he had not heard “anything back from Counsel, and I still am
waiting on sentencing hearing transcripts.”
¶ 38 The trial court noted that the defendant had filed a notice of appeal and asked the defendant
if it was his intention to pursue the motion to reconsider or the notice of appeal. The defendant
indicated that he wanted to argue the motion to reconsider, but could not effectively argue the
motion since the transcripts he received covered the trial, but did not contain voir dire or some of
the statements at the beginning of the trial. The trial court then stated that it was striking the notice
of appeal and informed the defendant that he would have 30 days after the ruling on his motion to
reconsider to file a notice of appeal.
¶ 39 The trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence on
May 6, 2024. The transcript states that the defendant appeared pro se, but also indicates that
Poggenpohl appeared at the hearing. The defendant appeared remotely and when asked whether
he was ready to proceed, indicated that there were no witnesses present. The defendant further
indicated that the majority of his argument was based on witnesses. The trial court explained that
there would not be witnesses at the motion hearing, but if a new sentencing hearing was granted,
the defendant could call witnesses at that time. The defendant then stated that there was “some
15 misunderstanding” and asked to speak with Poggenpohl. The defendant consulted with
Poggenpohl and then proceeded pro se with his arguments.
¶ 40 Although the initial “Objection” that was reclassified into the motion to reconsider was
based on Poggenpohl representing the defendant at sentencing, the defendant argued at this hearing
that if he was granted a new sentencing hearing, he could present evidence that may have not been
available before. The defendant stated that he could present a “plethora of witnesses” who could
provide more mitigating factors, such as their assessment of any danger that the defendant posed,
and that these witnesses may be able to persuade the trial court to impose a lower sentence. The
defendant further argued that the transcripts from his classes, not just the fact of the classes
themselves, would have shown the good-time credit he had earned and his 4.0 grade point average.
Finally, the defendant argued that his motion to continue sentencing had been denied or he would
have been able to present the witnesses and transcripts at the initial sentencing hearing.
¶ 41 The trial court heard arguments from the State and upon completion of arguments, stated
that it had considered the defendant’s classes at sentencing and that the defendant had not presented
anything that was not considered at the initial sentencing. As such, the trial court stated that it did
not find any basis for a new sentencing hearing, and denied the defendant’s motion for
reconsideration of sentence. The defendant was informed of his appeal rights and he requested that
his previous notice be reinstated. The trial court granted that request, reinstated the previous notice
of appeal, and reappointed the appellate defender’s office to represent the defendant on appeal.
The defendant’s notice of appeal was received, filed, and docketed in this court on May 7, 2024.
¶ 42 On May 20, 2024, the defendant filed an “Objection” in the trial court that stated that the
May 6, 2024, docket entry indicated that the defendant appeared pro se but the defendant was
under the impression that he was with counsel at the May 6, 2024, hearing. The objection also
16 stated that the defendant had not signed a waiver of counsel or had a hearing in compliance with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984). The objection went on to state that “[e]ven if
that was so, defendant’s request to speak to his attorney of record would nullify that waiver, and
reinstate his right to have the assistance of counsel.”
¶ 43 On June 3, 2024, an amended notice of appeal was filed in this court. The amended notice
of appeal stated that the defendant was appealing the January 10, 2024, and May 6, 2024, orders
of the trial court. On January 7, 2025, the defendant filed a motion in this court to have appointed
appellate counsel removed. The motion contained inappropriate language and was denied on
January 9, 2025. In the order denying the motion, this court noted that the defendant had no
constitutional right to self-representation on appeal and further cautioned the defendant that
directing foul language towards counsel or any other agency or individual involved in this appeal
would not be tolerated. We will now proceed to address the issues the defendant raises on appeal.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 The defendant raises two issues for this court’s consideration. The first issue is whether the
trial court erred in forcing the defendant to represent himself during a critical stage of the
proceedings without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. The
second issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry into the
defendant’s February 12, 2024, complaint that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
from Drummond and Poggenpohl. We will address each issue in the order raised.
¶ 46 A. Waiver of Counsel
¶ 47 The defendant first argues that he never made a clear or unequivocal waiver of his right to
counsel at the February 6, 2024, hearing. The defendant also argues, in the alternative, even if he
did waive counsel, he had requested counsel in his February 12, 2024, filing and the trial court
17 ignored that request, forcing the defendant to proceed pro se at the hearing on his postsentence
motion.
¶ 48 The State argues that the defendant has forfeited any issue concerning his proceeding
pro se at the hearing on his motion to reconsider sentence by failing to file a posttrial motion that
included the arguments now raised on appeal. The State acknowledges that the claim was raised
in the defendant’s filing of May 20, 2024, but argues that the lower court was without jurisdiction
to address the objection since the matter was already on appeal.
¶ 49 Illinois courts have long held that an issue is forfeited on appeal unless a party makes an
objection at the time of the purported error and specifically raises the issue in a written posttrial
motion. People v. Bowens, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1108 (2011). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a)
(eff. Jan. 1, 1967), however, provides that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” The right to counsel
is a fundamental and substantial right. People v. Martin, 2021 IL App (4th) 180267, ¶ 28. Thus, a
claim that the defendant never made a clear or unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel or that
counsel was not appointed when requested is reviewable under the doctrine of plain error
regardless of whether the claims were brought to the attention of the lower court. This does not,
however, end our analysis of whether the defendant has forfeited this issue.
¶ 50 We must also examine the issue of forfeiture under the doctrine of invited error. “[U]nder
the doctrine of invited error, a defendant may not request to proceed in one manner and later
contend on appeal that the course of action was in error.” People v. Harding, 2012 IL App (2d)
101011, ¶ 17. The invitation or agreement by the defendant to a procedure or course of action later
challenged on appeal goes beyond mere waiver and instead, results in the forfeiture of a plain error
review. Id. “To allow a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the trial court as a
18 vehicle for reversal on appeal would offend notions of fair play and encourage defendants to
become duplicitous.” Id.
¶ 51 Here, without considering whether the defendant made a formal waiver of this right to
counsel, the record clearly demonstrates that the defendant did not desire Poggenpohl to continue
representing him since Poggenpohl had refused to adopt the defendant’s pro se motion and
Poggenpohl had also indicated that he would not file another motion for new trial. The defendant
made no objection to proceeding pro se, either at the February 6, 2024, or at the May 6, 2024,
hearings on his pro se motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant also never withdrew his pro se
appearance nor made a formal request for counsel at either hearing. Instead, the defendant elected
to proceed on his pro se motion and then argued that motion pro se without any objection or giving
any indication that he was being denied counsel.
¶ 52 The purpose of requiring a criminal defendant to make an unequivocal request to waive
counsel is to “(1) prevent the defendant from appealing [either] the denial of his right to self-
representation or the denial of his right to counsel, and (2) prevent the defendant from
manipulating or abusing the system by going back and forth between his request for counsel and
his wish to procced pro se.” People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 538 (2002). In this matter, the
defendant had proceeded numerous times with and without counsel throughout these proceedings.
As such, he was familiar with the procedures of a hearing and was especially knowledgeable at
requesting or terminating counsel. The record demonstrates that the defendant clearly indicated
that he wanted to proceed pro se on his motion to reconsider sentence and we find it disingenuous
for the defendant to argue now on appeal that he was forced to proceed pro se. Because the
defendant made the election to proceed pro se, we find that he invited or acquiesced to the course
of action that he now challenges on appeal. Accordingly, we find that under the invited error
19 doctrine, the defendant has forfeited a plain error review and thus, has forfeited this issue on
appeal.
¶ 53 B. Krankel Hearing
¶ 54 The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry
into the defendant’s February 12, 2024, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel by
Drummond and Poggenpohl. In its briefing to this court, the State concedes this issue and agrees
that this matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to conduct the required inquiry into the
defendant’s posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our de novo review,
set out below, we also agree that remand is required.
¶ 55 The Krankel procedure “is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. This procedure
“serves the narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint independent
counsel to argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims.” People v. Patrick,
2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39. The trial court must, at a minimum, conduct some type of inquiry into the
underlying factual basis, if any, of the defendant’s pro se claim. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071,
¶ 11. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial
strategy, then the trial court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the defendant’s pro se
claim. Id.
¶ 56 “The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an
adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003). Whether the trial court properly conducted
a Krankel preliminary inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo. People v.
Thornton, 2024 IL App (4th) 220798, ¶ 74.
20 ¶ 57 On February 12, 2024, the defendant filed an unsworn affidavit in which he asked for
“attorney assistance to argue the ineffectiveness of Katherine Drummond and Wesley
Poggenpohl.” It further stated that the defendant had written two letters to Poggenpohl and that
Poggenpohl “refuses not only to assist me but at least to consult with me.” There are no specific
allegations regarding Drummond in the affidavit; however, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is not required to be supported by facts or specific examples. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 19.
¶ 58 Here, the record on appeal does not demonstrate that the trial court conducted any specific
inquiry into the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel contained in the defendant’s
February 12, 2024, filing. Although the trial court had previously addressed counsels’
performances at the numerous hearings regarding the removal or reappointment of counsel, we
find that it did not specifically address the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
February 12, 2024, filing.
¶ 59 Accordingly, we agree with the parties and find that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of the defendant’s allegations
against his appointed counsels. Therefore, we remand this matter for the limited purpose of
allowing the trial court to conduct the required preliminary investigation. If the trial court
determines that the claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are spurious or pertain only to trial
strategy, the trial court may deny the claims and leave standing the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant has forfeited the issue of whether he
was forced to proceed pro se during postsentencing proceedings, but remand this matter with
directions that the trial court conduct an inquiry into any factual basis of the defendant’s claims of
21 ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 62 Affirmed and remanded with directions.