People v. Davidson

2025 IL App (5th) 230503-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: 5-23-0503
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 230503-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/24/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0503 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Montgomery County. ) v. ) No. 22-CF-262 ) LANCE M. DAVIDSON, ) Honorable ) Douglas L. Jarman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for domestic battery.

¶2 Following a jury trial in Montgomery County, defendant was convicted of domestic

battery. The trial court sentenced him to four years and two months in prison with four years of

mandatory supervised release. Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The State charged defendant by two count information. Count One of the information

alleged that, on or about July 27, 2022, defendant committed aggravated battery by striking Gary

Samela’s head with a deadly weapon, a baseball bat. Count Two alleged that defendant committed

1 domestic battery that same day by striking Jessica Holliday, a family or household member, and

by pulling her hair.

¶5 On November 28, 2022, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Following jury selection, the

State presented Officer Larry Davis from the Litchfield Police Department as its first witness.

Officer Davis was on duty on July 27, 2022, and he was dispatched to a residence on East Kirkham

Street in Litchfield, Illinois, at approximately 1:30 in the morning. Officer Davis and Officer

Reader responded to the scene. Dispatch advised that “a male and female were arguing” and that

“a male” was “struck in the head with a bat.” Officer Davis first responded to Apartment C and

contacted the resident of the apartment, Gary Samela.

¶6 Officer Davis then knocked on the door of Apartment D. He knocked “several times” but

there was “no answer.” Officer Davis could hear “a male and female arguing” but when he

knocked, “[t]hey got quiet.” Officer Davis went to Apartment A, who originally called 911. He

then returned to Apartment D. He knocked again, and no one answered. Officer Davis and Officer

Reader called their Sergeant to confirm whether “there was enough exigent circumstances to force

entry to make sure the female was okay.” Officer Davis knocked again and “announced that we

were going to force entry if no one came to the door.” Jessica Holliday answered the door. Officer

Davis testified that he knew Holliday and defendant from “previous interactions.” Holliday

advised Officer Davis that defendant was “in the back” of the apartment. Officer Davis handcuffed

defendant, read him his Miranda rights, and asked defendant “what happened with his neighbor.”

Officer Davis secured defendant in his squad car.

¶7 Officer Davis spoke with Holliday. Officer Davis described Holliday as “super timid, had

tears in her eyes.” Holliday appeared “very scared” and “didn’t want to give much information

2 because she thought she was going to get punished worse for it.” Holliday ultimately made a

statement to law enforcement.

¶8 Jessica Holliday testified. Holliday testified that she lived on East Kirkham Street in

Apartment D. Holliday identified defendant as her “boyfriend” of two years. Holliday testified that

on July 27, 2022, at 1:30 in the morning, law enforcement arrived at the apartment in response to

an argument between Holliday and defendant. Holliday testified that defendant “had gotten hit in

the face earlier in the day” and “he got blood” on Holliday’s arm. The two were fighting because

Holliday “wanted to take a shower, and he wanted to go to bed.” The two argued outside of the

apartment in the “breezeway.” Holliday testified that defendant “pushed me out the door.” The

State clarified, “Shoved you?” Holliday responded, “Yes.” The following exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. At some point was Lance pulling on your hair?

A. To the—when he pushed me out the door, yeah, to keep me out the door. Yeah.

Q. Did he strike you at all?

A. A little bit.

Q. What do you mean by a little bit?

A. It wasn’t a full on hit.

Q. Okay. Well, just tell me what happened.

A. The door got slammed on my arm.

Q. Okay.

A. Like that was basically the hit.

Q. Okay. So in shoving you outside, the door got slammed and that hit your arm?

A. Yeah.

3 ¶9 The neighbor, Gary Samela, came outside and asked defendant to stop. Holliday went back

inside the apartment. On cross-examination, Holliday clarified that: “[w]e had gotten into the

argument. He had pushed me out the door. The neighbor came out, tried to stop him. He said mind

his own business. I went inside. That’s when [defendant] came back inside, and that’s when we

heard the pounding at the door.” Holliday testified that she “had just gotten pushed out the door.”

The door struck Holliday, and she attempted to re-enter the apartment. She testified “That’s when

my hair was pulled.” Defense counsel asked:

Q. So your testimony now is, is that when you tried to get back in the apartment your

hair was pulled?

A. It was then in that same…

Q. So was your hair pulled when you were being pushed out of the apartment or was

your hair being pulled when you were trying to get back into the apartment?

A. When I was trying to get back in the apartment, he had grabbed me by the hair.

Q. Okay. And did you—were you able to gain access back into the apartment?

A. After the neighbor came out.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, defense counsel adduced that Holliday wrote an email to the State’s

Attorney’s Office on July 28, 2022, after the incident. In the e-mail, Holliday indicated that there

was no physical altercation, and the fight was merely verbal. On redirect, Holliday testified that

she wrote the e-mail to “help” defendant, because she “loved him.” The State asked:

Q. And why did you want to help Lance?

A. Because I loved him.

4 Q. Okay. So when then are you telling us—obviously telling us that he struck you

and pulled your hair and shoved you out the door if that doesn’t help him currently, is that

fair?

A. I really don’t like to lie.

Q. Okay. So I guess I have to ask you which one is the truth, the e-mail or what you

told us today?

A. In fairness, I feel that it’s all relatively true.

Q. How so?

A. I didn’t see what happened with the neighbor.

Q. Okay. What about the part about the altercation being only verbal?

A. It’s easier to write it than it is to speak it.

¶ 11 The State next called Gary Samela. On July 27, 2022, Samela resided at East Kirkham in

Litchfield, Illinois, in Apartment C. At the time of trial, Samela was in the Montgomery County

Jail. Samela testified that he was charged with one count of child pornography and two counts of

failure to register as a sex offender charges. Samela was a registered sex offender.

¶ 12 On the date of the incident, Samela heard “a woman’s voice screaming.” The screaming

woke Samela from sleep, and he went to the front door of his apartment. Upon opening the door,

Samela observed “Jessica Holliday sitting out in the door stoop, and [defendant] pulling her hair,

and Jessica was screaming.” Samela yelled at defendant. Defendant yelled back at Samela, and

defendant brought “out an aluminum bat” and started “swinging.” Defendant hit Samela in the

head with the baseball bat.

¶ 13 The State rested. Defendant recalled Officer Davis, who testified that Samela advised

Officer Davis that he was struck in the back of the head with a baseball bat. Defendant rested.

5 Following closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury found defendant not guilty of

aggravated battery, or the lesser included battery, against Samela. The jury found defendant guilty

of domestic battery against Holliday.

¶ 14 On June 2, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to four years and two months in prison

with four years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on June

7, 2023.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. Specifically, defendant contends that Holliday’s testimony was inconsistent. In response,

the State argues that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State and affirm.

¶ 17 The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224

(2009). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a court of review must

determine “whether, [after] viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘ ”any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting People v.

Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). It is not the role of the

reviewing court to retry the defendant. In re Q.P., 2015 IL 118569, ¶ 24. Rather, it is the

responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences from the facts. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. Therefore, a court

of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the

weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

6 ¶ 18 A criminal conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless the evidence is

so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. Although a fact-finder’s determination of

witness credibility is entitled to great deference, it is not conclusive and does not bind the

reviewing court. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).

¶ 19 The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive and

credible, even where it is contradicted by the defendant. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228. Where

the finding of the defendant’s guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, a reviewing court must

decide whether a fact-finder could reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a reasonable

doubt. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 279. Under this standard, the eyewitness testimony may be

found insufficient “only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable

person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 280. A conviction will not be reversed

simply because the evidence is contradictory or because the defendant claims that a witness was

not credible. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228.

¶ 20 The jury was instructed that: “A person commits the offense of domestic battery when he

knowingly and by any means makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any

family or household member.” Moreover, to “sustain the charge of domestic battery, the State must

prove the following propositions: First, that the defendant knowingly made physical contact of an

insulting or provoking nature with Jessica Holliday; and [s]econd, that Jessica Holliday was then

a family or household member to the defendant.” Holliday testified that the two were in a dating

relationship. Thus, defendant concedes that the State proved that Holliday was a family or

household member. Defendant disputes, however, that defendant knowingly struck Holliday.

7 Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that defendant knowingly made

physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. We disagree.

¶ 21 First, the State presented evidence that defendant struck Holliday. Holliday testified: “We

had gotten into the argument. He had pushed me out the door.” Holliday testified that she “had just

gotten pushed out the door.” The door struck Holliday, and she attempted to re-enter the apartment.

She testified “That’s when my hair was pulled.” Holliday also testified that the defendant “pushed

me out the door.” The State clarified, “Shoved you?” Holliday responded, “Yes.”

¶ 22 Second, the State presented evidence that defendant pulled Holliday’s hair. Holliday

testified that defendant pulled her hair to “keep [her] out the door.” Holliday testified that she “had

just gotten pushed out the door.” The door struck Holliday, and she attempted to re-enter the

apartment. She testified “That’s when my hair was pulled.” Samela corroborated Holliday’s

testimony. Samela testified that he observed “Jessica Holliday sitting out in the door stoop, and

[defendant] pulling her hair, and Jessica was screaming.” Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient

to prove defendant guilty of domestic battery beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 23 Defendant asserts that Holliday was inconsistent during her trial testimony regarding when

the contact occurred. Specifically, defendant contends that Holliday testified that defendant pulled

her hair when pushing her out of the apartment but later stated that he pulled her hair when entering

the apartment. Defendant also argues that Holliday gave inconsistent statements, wherein she told

the State before trial that she and defendant “only argued and that no physical altercation occurred

at all[.]” Defendant argues that Holliday indicated that the encounter was merely verbal. Finally,

defendant argues that Holliday’s testimony “suggested that any physical contact was unintentional

and accidental” as a result of defendant shutting the apartment door. For these reasons, defendant

8 contends that no rational fact-finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We disagree.

¶ 24 Even contradictory testimony does not necessarily destroy the credibility of a witness, and

it is the task of the trier of fact to determine when, if at all, she testified truthfully. Cunningham,

212 Ill. 2d at 283 (citing Sparling v. Peabody Coal Co., 59 Ill. 2d 491, 498-99 (1974)). Thus, the

fact-finder is charged with deciding “how flaws in part of the testimony affect the credibility of

the whole.” Id. Minor discrepancies in testimony affect only its weight and will not render it

unworthy of belief. People v. Burgos, 243 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1001 (1993). Here, there is nothing in

the record indicating that the alleged inconsistencies cited by defendant render the whole of the

victim’s testimony unworthy of belief. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 284. The record reflects

that defense counsel strenuously cross examined Holliday about the same inconsistencies

defendant now raises on appeal, and nonetheless, the jury convicted defendant of domestic battery.

The arguments that defendant makes before this court “were also made to the jury below and we,

therefore, will not usurp its role in determining whether they raised a reasonable doubt.” People v.

Rojas, 359 Ill. App. 3d 392, 398 (2005).

¶ 25 Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, coupled with the

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could

have found defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that

the State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty of domestic battery beyond a

reasonable doubt.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Montgomery County conviction for domestic

battery is affirmed.

9 ¶ 28 Affirmed.