People v. Damuth

84 A.D.2d 917
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 13, 1981
DocketAppeal No. 1
StatusPublished

This text of 84 A.D.2d 917 (People v. Damuth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Damuth, 84 A.D.2d 917 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

Judgment reversed, on the law, plea vacated, motion to suppress granted and matter remitted to Oneida County Court for further proceedings on the indictment. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment of the County Court, Oneida County, convicting him upon his plea of guilty of arson in the third degree (Penal Law, § 150.10, subd 1). The sole issue deals with the admissibility of a statement defendant made to a member of the Rome Police Department after the police officer was aware that defendant had telephoned an attorney. Relying on People v Hobson (39 NY2d 479) and People v Marrero (51 NY2d 56), defendant claims that his statement should have been suppressed since it was obtained in the absence of counsel after the police were aware that defendant had made a telephone call to an attorney while the police officer was in his residence investigating the crime. It is undisputed that the defendant had sought the assistance of counsel in connection with the charge that the police were investigating. He had thereby manifested “his own view that he [was] not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice” (Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 110 [White, J., concurring]; see People v Marrero, supra, p 59; People v Johnson, 79 AD2d 201, 203, application for lv to app granted 53 NY2d 843). The People urge that these principles are not applicable in this case because when the police officer asked further questions of the defendant to clarify the question of representation, he was led to believe that the defendant was not “presently” represented by counsel in connection with the matter under investigation. If the officer was uncertain, however, as to the scope of the attorney’s representation, the defendant should not have been questioned (see People v Marrero, supra). The court thus erred in not granting defendant’s application to suppress. All concur, except Schnepp, J., who dissents and votes to affirm in the following memorandum.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Michigan v. Mosley
423 U.S. 96 (Supreme Court, 1975)
People v. Hobson
348 N.E.2d 894 (New York Court of Appeals, 1976)
People v. Rogers
397 N.E.2d 709 (New York Court of Appeals, 1979)
People v. Cunningham
400 N.E.2d 360 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Marrero
409 N.E.2d 980 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Skinner
417 N.E.2d 501 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Bartolomeo
423 N.E.2d 371 (New York Court of Appeals, 1981)
People v. Johnson
79 A.D.2d 201 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
84 A.D.2d 917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-damuth-nyappdiv-1981.