People v. Damon

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Damon

70 A.D.2d 885, 417 N.Y.S.2d 209, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12464

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 4, 1979

StatusPublished

This text of 70 A.D.2d 885 (People v. Damon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Damon, 70 A.D.2d 885, 417 N.Y.S.2d 209, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12464 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

— Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings-County, rendered May 26, 1978, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Upon the record before the court defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the right to a speedy trial. The People appear to have been ready for trial one month following the commencement of the criminal action against him and at least 65 days of the eight-month period which elapsed before he pleaded guilty are statutorily excludable from computation of the six-month period within which he should have been brought to trial (see CPL 30.30, subd 4). Defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender and, in light of the brutal nature of the crime, the sentence imposed was not excessive. Lazer, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and Margett, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

— Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings-County, rendered May 26, 1978, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Upon the record before the court defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the right to a speedy trial. The People appear to have been ready for trial one month following the commencement of the criminal action against him and at least 65 days of the eight-month period which elapsed before he pleaded guilty are statutorily excludable from computation of the six-month period within which he should have been brought to trial (see CPL 30.30, subd 4). Defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender and, in light of the brutal nature of the crime, the sentence imposed was not excessive. Lazer, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and Margett, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

70 A.D.2d 885, 417 N.Y.S.2d 209, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12464, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-damon-nyappdiv-1979.