People v. Dairsaw

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Dairsaw

53 A.D.2d 698, 385 N.Y.S.2d 117, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13453

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 28, 1976

StatusPublished

This text of 53 A.D.2d 698 (People v. Dairsaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Dairsaw, 53 A.D.2d 698, 385 N.Y.S.2d 117, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13453 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, rendered September 5, 1974, convicting him of murder, rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant was entitled to the charge which he requested that his arraignment was unnecessarily delayed as a matter of law. However, in our opinion the delay had no bearing on the voluntariness of his statements, and consequently the court’s submission of that issue to the jury as a question of fact did not constitute reversible error (see People v Vargas, 7 NY2d 555). The evidence supports the conclusion that he confessed because the mounting evidence against him compelled him to abandon all hope of extricating himself from the crimes (see People v Carbonaro, 21 NY2d 271). Based upon all of the evidence, we find that appellant’s guilt was overwhelmingly established. We have examined his other contentions and find them to be without substance. Martuscello, Acting P. J., Rabin, Shapiro, Titone and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, rendered September 5, 1974, convicting him of murder, rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant was entitled to the charge which he requested that his arraignment was unnecessarily delayed as a matter of law. However, in our opinion the delay had no bearing on the voluntariness of his statements, and consequently the court’s submission of that issue to the jury as a question of fact did not constitute reversible error (see People v Vargas, 7 NY2d 555). The evidence supports the conclusion that he confessed because the mounting evidence against him compelled him to abandon all hope of extricating himself from the crimes (see People v Carbonaro, 21 NY2d 271). Based upon all of the evidence, we find that appellant’s guilt was overwhelmingly established. We have examined his other contentions and find them to be without substance. Martuscello, Acting P. J., Rabin, Shapiro, Titone and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

53 A.D.2d 698, 385 N.Y.S.2d 117, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-dairsaw-nyappdiv-1976.

Opinion

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