People v. Curry

2025 IL App (4th) 250287-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0287
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE This Order was filed under 2025 IL App (4th) 250287-U FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is December 12, 2025 NO. 4-25-0287 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County LATAYUSS CURRY, ) No. 23CF266 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer Hartmann Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s sentence.

¶2 In July 2023, defendant, Latayuss Curry, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional

Center, was indicted on two counts of aggravated battery, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(d)(4)(i), (h) (West 2020)). In September 2024, a jury found defendant guilty of both counts.

¶3 In November 2024, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced

defendant to two concurrent 15-year sentences, to be served consecutively to the prison

sentences he was already serving.

¶4 In March 2025, the trial court conducted a posttrial motions hearing and modified

defendant’s sentences to two concurrent 14-year prison sentences, which again were to be served

consecutively to the sentences he was already serving.

¶5 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court’s hostility toward him denied him a fair and impartial sentencing hearing. We affirm.

¶6 I. BACKGROUND

¶7 A. The Charges

¶8 In July 2023, the grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of aggravated

battery, a Class 2 felony (id.). The State alleged that defendant, who was serving a prison

sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), threw his urine on two correctional

institution officers.

¶9 B. The Jury Trial

¶ 10 In December 2023, the trial court conducted defendant’s jury trial. The State

presented testimony from (1) Michael George, an internal affairs investigator at Pontiac

Correctional Center; (2) Correctional Officer Sean Brown; and (3) Correctional Officer Derrick

Caudle. The State also presented surveillance video from the correctional center. The evidence

showed the following.

¶ 11 On October 6, 2021, Correctional Officers Brown and Caudle were delivering

food to inmates at Pontiac Correctional Center. When they arrived at defendant’s cell, Brown

ordered him to sit on his bed. Defendant complied, and Brown unlocked and opened the feeding

hatch to pass the meal tray into the cell. Defendant then performed a “fast motion,” jumping up

and jamming his arm through the hatch to push a tray filled with feces and urine—which was

already sitting inside the hatch—outward toward the officers. Brown attempted to deflect the

urine and feces with his hand, but they struck his face and torso. The substances also struck

Caudle on his left side.

¶ 12 Defendant did not present any evidence.

¶ 13 Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of aggravated battery.

-2- ¶ 14 C. The Sentencing Hearing

¶ 15 In November 2024, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. At

the beginning of the hearing, the court noted that it had received a presentence investigation

report (PSI), detailing defendant’s criminal history and noting his placement “in mental health

treatment-oriented units due to an acknowledged mental illness.” The PSI showed that defendant

was 31 years old at the time of the trial and was serving multiple prison sentences, with a

projected parole date of January 2065.

¶ 16 Defendant’s criminal history included (1) a January 2018 conviction for

aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony; (2) two January 2018 convictions for

aggravated battery, a Class 2 felony; (3) two July 2018 convictions for aggravated battery, a

Class 2 felony; (4) a February 2012 conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2

felony; (5) a February 2012 conviction for unlawful restraint, a Class 4 felony; and (6) a March

2011 conviction for retail theft, a Class A misdemeanor.

¶ 17 The State offered no other evidence in aggravation beyond the information

contained within the PSI. Defense counsel offered no evidence in mitigation but noted to the trial

court that defendant’s projected parole date was actually in December 2064.

¶ 18 The State recommended that defendant receive 12 years in prison, consecutive to

the sentences he was already serving, based on the evidence presented at trial and his violent

criminal history, which mandated he receive a Class X sentence.

¶ 19 Defense counsel noted that defendant was in prison for 40 more years and was

currently housed at Joliet Treatment Center for the treatment of his mental illness. Counsel

requested six years in prison, which was the minimum possible sentence. Defendant did not give

a statement in allocution.

-3- ¶ 20 The trial court began its oral ruling by noting that defendant was being sentenced

on two convictions for aggravated battery, a Class 2 felony. The court noted that defendant was

subject to mandatory Class X sentencing based upon his prior record and the statutory factors it

was required to consider.

¶ 21 The hearing then proceeded as follows. (We have italicized the statements of the

trial court that defendant contends denied him a fair sentencing hearing.)

“[THE COURT:] Here, there are a number of very strong aggravating

factors. In addition, the seriousness of the offense I think, and nature and

circumstances of the offense are noteworthy. For the life of me, I can’t understand

why people, specifically defendants and inmates in [DOC] think that it’s

appropriate to throw urine and feces at the guards, especially in this situation

where it was unprovoked. And really it’s a crime that requires time and thought.

You have to save a container, you have to fill that container, then you have to

hang onto that container until the guard comes to your door. So, it is not a spur of

the moment, oh, shoot, I’m just going to throw this; I mean, it takes some

planning on your part to do this. And in this particular case, the guards are just

bringing you your dinner and you’re upset about something and you take it out on

these guards. I can’t imagine anything more disgusting than having somebody

throw their urine and feces at you for no reason whatsoever. It’s childish, it’s

immature, it’s completely disrespectful; and the State made a very good point

when they said, look, if you can’t follow the rules when you’re in [DOC], when

can you follow the rules[?] And I understand the guards, they sign up for stuff,

right, they sign up to deal with unruly inmates, they sign up for the transport; they

-4- don’t sign up for somebody to throw their urine and feces in their face. No matter

what happened, it is unacceptable, period, and I am so tired of seeing it, especially

in a situation like this where it’s completely out of the blue, no reason for it

whatsoever.

So, to me, deterrence is a very strong factor in aggravation. So, we have

the evidence that came out at trial, which I think is severe in terms of under the

circumstances under which this happened when the guards are just delivering

food and out of the blue this happens so, we have that. And then we have

deterrence, very strong factor in this case. It is absolutely unacceptable for this to

happen, and I’ve been saying that for a long time this is not the first time I’ve

been saying that. And, you know, spitting is bad enough, that’s bad; urine and

feces is another level. And, you know, it’s one thing to sit here and say, well, they

signed up for it. Well, they don’t sign up for it. Okay? Nobody wants that, nobody

agrees, there is no amount of money that you could pay anybody to put up with

that at work. Period.

I’m pretty sure, [defendant], that you would not want somebody throwing

feces and urine at you. I’m half tempted to start ordering the guards to save their

urine and feces and throw it at an inmate who does it to them. I think that is—

[DEFENDANT]: Just fucking shoot me dumb-ass bitch.

THE COURT: Well, that’s fine, [defendant], if you want to say that to me,

that’s just fine. If you want to leave the courtroom we’ll let you leave the

courtroom; but you did it, and now you’re going to have to pay the price for doing

it. And I have to outline—

-5- [DEFENDANT]:—that’s fucking, you’re are [sic] allowed to shoot me

too, I don’t know.

THE COURT: I have to state for the record the reasons.

So, go ahead and take [defendant] out of the courtroom—

Do you want to be out of the courtroom? Do you want to do that or are

you going to keep your mouth shut and listen or do you want to be out of the

courtroom?

[DEFENDANT]: (No response.)

THE COURT: All right. Take him out of the courtroom.

[DEFENDANT]: Not going, I—My sentence.

THE COURT: Well then, you be quiet and don’t interrupt me and

especially don’t throw those kinds of words at me; that’s another sign of

disrespect on your part. Okay? I don’t know why it is that you seem to think it’s

okay to treat people like that, it’s simply not.

So, deterrence is very strong factor in aggravation. And, honestly, I kind

of like that idea of letting the guards throw their urine and feces at the inmates.

So, I’m thinking about whether or not I can order that. Maybe I’ll just collect my

own and throw it the next time we’re in court.

Also, your prior record is strong factor in aggravation. Not only the record

that’s listed in the [PSI], which is lengthy and severe, I do agree with the State,

not the longest record I’ve ever seen, but certainly a severe record of violence; I

don’t necessarily agree with [defense counsel] that you’ve done nothing since

2017. *** [T]here have been some issues within [DOC] that have required you to

-6- be disciplined; and that tells me that, you know, again, you’re not willing to

follow the rules and procedures in the prison. I don’t think it’s likely to happen

while you’re in the public; and I don’t think, based upon your record and your

history, that there’s any rehabilitative potential.

You know, I don’t know what’s possessing you to do these things. It’s

inappropriate, and we have to have people that comply with the rules of—

What’s he doing over there, just shaking?

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER: Just shaking.

THE COURT: All right. I don’t want him to explode, take him out of here.

Yeah, you’re over there shaking your leg, you look like you’re about ready to

blow your head off.

[DEFENDANT]: If I was going to blow my head, I would have did it

already.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you’re going to just sit still, you’re making

everybody nervous in here that you’re going—

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.

THE COURT: I don’t want you to, like, up and hurt somebody or try to

jump on one of the guards or something. That’s what you’re making me think

when you’re sitting there, you’re shaking your legs so fast that your arm’s

shaking.

Okay. So, deterrence, prior record, seriousness of the offense. I think that,

given the strong aggravating factors, no mitigating factors because the defendant

did not provide any evidence to probation, so, I am going to sentence the

-7- defendant to a term of 15 years on Count 1 and 15 years on Count 2.” (Emphases

added.)

¶ 22 The trial court ordered that defendant serve those 15-year sentences concurrently

to one another and consecutively to the sentences he was already serving in DOC

¶ 23 D. The Hearing on Defendant’s Motion To Reconsider the Sentence

¶ 24 In March 2025, the trial court considered and denied defendant’s posttrial

motions, which included his (1) motion to reconsider the sentence, (2) supplement to that

motion, and (3) motion for a new trial.

¶ 25 When ruling, the trial court stated as follows:

“In regards to the sentencing, the State accurately points out that the time

that the Court, when the Court was explaining its ruling to this defendant with

regards to his sentence, it is the defendant who became disrespectful, not the

Court. The defendant was not only impatient with the Court but also extremely

disrespectful and using vulgar language. It was following that language that the

Court was a little bit more clear in regards to the basis for its ruling. So, I do not

think that the Court made disparaging comments directed towards this defendant

or that anything was said during the sentencing hearing that would indicate this

Court was—Let me pull up the actual language that was used. There was nothing

to suggest that this defendant did not receive a fair and impartial sentencing

hearing. I believe I was more than patient with the defendant. He interrupted me

and swore at me with very vulgar language several times; yet, I allowed him to

stay in the courtroom. So, I am not exactly sure why the Court explaining its

ruling would rise to the level of this defendant not receiving a fair and impartial

-8- sentencing hearing. So, the motion for reconsideration of sentence—well, strike

that.

In addition, I would simply point out that the sentence appears to be

beyond the range as required by the new case law; so, I am going to modify the

sentence to 14 years since that appears to be the greatest sentence that he can

receive for this sentence. So, that sentence of 14 years then is within the range

prescribed by law. The Court considered all relevant statutory factors, the

arguments of the attorneys; and I believe that the Court’s ruling is appropriate

under all of the circumstances of the case. And so, the defendant is, the motion for

resentencing is denied, except that I will reduce it to 14 years in accordance with

the case law that just came out.” (Emphases added.)

¶ 26 This appeal followed.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court’s hostility towards him denied him a

fair and impartial sentencing hearing. We affirm.

¶ 29 As an initial matter, defendant concedes that he forfeited this issue for review

both by failing to raise a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing hearing and by failing to

raise it in a posttrial motion. See People v. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 40 (requiring a defendant

to object and raise the alleged error in a posttrial motion to avoid forfeiture). Nonetheless, he

contends that we may consider his sentencing claim under either prong of the plain-error

doctrine. Id. ¶ 43. For the reasons that follow, we conclude defendant has not shown plain error

under either prong; accordingly, we affirm his sentence.

¶ 30 A. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

-9- ¶ 31 1. Plain Error Generally

¶ 32 The plain-error doctrine allows reviewing courts to review a forfeited error if the

error falls under one of the following two prongs:

“(1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or

obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of

the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless

of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20.

¶ 33 The usual first step in a plain-error analysis is to determine whether a clear and

obvious error occurred. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 44. “That is true because if there is no error,

then there can be no plain error.” People v. Maury, 2025 IL App (4th) 220887, ¶ 93. “ ‘However,

similar to the analytical framework we use to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

[citation], the first step of plain-error analysis is merely a matter of convention,’ and we may

begin the analysis in any order.” Id. (quoting People v. Bowens, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1108

(2011)).

¶ 34 2. Judicial Impartiality

¶ 35 A trial court must conduct itself in a fair and impartial manner, and the court may

not show bias or prejudice against either party. People v. Moore, 2023 IL App (1st) 211421,

¶ 115. Judicial restraint in the court’s conduct and remarks is not limited to the presence of the

jury but is required throughout all the court’s dealings with the litigants who come before

it. People v. Johnson, 2012 IL App (1st) 091730, ¶ 80. “A sentencing hearing is fundamentally

unfair—and due process is denied—when the proceeding is affected by judicial bias.” People v.

- 10 - Rademacher, 2016 IL App (3d) 130881, ¶ 47. This is so regardless of whether the ultimate

sentence imposed was within the statutory limits. Id.

¶ 36 A trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and it is the burden of the party

challenging the court’s impartiality to overcome that presumption. People v. Romero, 2018 IL

App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96. We view allegations of judicial bias or prejudice in context and evaluate

the allegations in terms of the trial judge’s specific reaction to the events taking place. Id. To

show bias, a defendant must “demonstrate that the judge displayed ‘active personal animosity,

hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Shelton, 401 Ill. App.

3d 564, 583 (2010)). Judges must be fair and dispassionate arbitrators above all else. People v.

Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 994 (1997). Thus, any showing of bias against a party constitutes

reversible error. Id.

¶ 37 Whether the trial judge’s conduct requires reversal is reviewed de novo. Romero,

2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96.

¶ 38 B. This Case

¶ 39 Whether under either the first or second prong of the plain-error doctrine, there

can be no plain error without any clear or obvious error. Maury, 2025 IL App (4th) 220887, ¶ 93.

Because we conclude the trial court did not err, defendant’s plain-error argument fails, and we

honor his procedural forfeiture.

¶ 40 Defendant argues that the trial court judge’s remarks during the sentencing

hearing demonstrate she was not a fair, unbiased, and impartial jurist. He contends that this

argument is bolstered by the 14-year sentence he received—the maximum allowable by law—

which he characterizes as improper given the nature of the offense.

¶ 41 Although the trial judge’s comments could have been more restrained, they do not

- 11 - demonstrate bias against defendant. Her comments are a far cry from the sort of comments that

demonstrated a trial judge’s prejudice against defendants in the cases cited by defendant, such as

Phuong, People v. Montgomery, 2023 IL App (3d) 200389, and People v. Fisher, 2023 IL App

(4th) 220717, which defendant cites in support of his argument.

¶ 42 In Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 992-93, the trial court showed personal bias against

the defendant based on her language and ethnicity, making sarcastic comments about her need

for a Chinese interpreter and shaking her head “ ‘in Chinese.’ ” The court ultimately found the

defendant guilty of retail theft, stating, “ ‘There’s no question in my mind as to the guilt of the

defendant with or without English.’ ” Id. at 993. The appellate court reversed, holding the

judge’s “numerous insulting remarks” established prejudice and deprived the defendant of a fair

trial. Id. at 993-95.

¶ 43 Similarly, in Montgomery, 2023 IL App (3d) 200389, ¶ 32, the appellate court

reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court “failed to hide its animosity

toward [the] defendant.” The appellate court provided the following explanation:

“The court’s animosity was laid bare in the sentencing hearing when it

(1) mimicked [the] defendant’s demands to the arresting officer, (2) referred

dismissively to [the] defendant’s wife, (3) envisaged a hypothetical prison

scenario where it would personally discredit [the] defendant’s claims of

mistreatment, (4) criticized the arresting officer’s patience in dealing with [the]

defendant, (5) suggested the officer should have tased [the] defendant upon

noncompliance, and (6) most disconcerting of all, stated it would have killed [the]

defendant if it were in the store clerk’s shoes.” Id.

¶ 44 Likewise, in Fisher, 2023 IL App (4th) 220717, ¶ 40, this court remanded for

- 12 - resentencing, noting the trial court judge’s “remarks toward [the] defendant, [when] taken

together, constitute a tour de force of sarcasm and scorn establishing the trial court’s prejudice

against [the] defendant.” We noted the trial judge’s numerous improper derogatory and sarcastic

remarks regarding (1) the defendant’s behavior in jail, (2) his decision to have a jury trial, (3) the

sex offender evaluation, (4) the defendant’s mother’s death, (5) the fact that the defendant

fathered many children, and (6) the defendant’s limited intellectual ability. Id. ¶¶ 36-39.

¶ 45 Unlike the trial judges in Fisher, Phuong, and Montgomery, the judge’s comments

in the present case focused on the nature of the offense instead of any immutable characteristic of

defendant, his exercise of rights, or the judge’s personal disdain for defendant. Although her

expression of disgust at defendant’s act of saving excrement to throw at correctional officers

tended toward the hyperbolic, her unfortunate comments reflected an understandable reaction to

the specific nature of the offense—namely, the premeditated collection and weaponization of

bodily waste against correctional officers. See People v. Rennie, 2014 IL App (3d) 130014, ¶ 29

(“[A] judge may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and

extent of each element of the offense committed by the defendant.”).

¶ 46 Furthermore, the trial judge in the present case did not indicate a categorical

refusal to consider certain sentences for this offense. See People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583, 587

(1975) (“[T]he trial judge heard defendant’s argument for granting probation and then expressed

his opinion that perpetrators of such a crime should not receive probation.”); People v. Miller,

2014 IL App (2d) 120873, ¶ 38 (“[T]he court wrongly believed either that first-offender

probation was unavailable because defendant did not plead guilty or that defendant should be

denied first-offender probation because of the court’s personal belief that only those who enter

plea agreements should have that option.”). Instead, the judge’s statements in this case that she

- 13 - was tired of seeing this specific type of offense merely emphasized the need for deterrence, given

the frequency of these attacks within DOC generally and Pontiac Correctional Center

specifically—a statutory factor in aggravation she was required to consider (730 ILCS

5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2024)).

¶ 47 Regarding defendant’s assertion that the trial court improperly emphasized

deterrence to the exclusion of his mental health mitigation, we note—as did the trial court—that

the only “evidence” regarding his mental health was a brief statement in the PSI indicating that

defendant was placed “in mental health treatment-oriented units due to an acknowledged mental

illness.” However, the specific nature of his condition was entirely unknown to the trial court due

to defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the presentence investigation, which resulted in a PSI

showing only defendant’s lengthy criminal history. Defendant cannot decline to provide

potentially mitigating evidence and then complain on appeal that the trial court failed to consider

the very information he withheld.

¶ 48 Regardless, as we have emphasized on many occasions, the “existence of

mitigating factors does not require the trial court to reduce a sentence from the maximum

allowed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388,

¶ 42 (quoting People v. Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652 (2001)). Moreover, we are not

convinced that this factor is entitled to the mitigating weight defendant claims. See People v.

Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 104 (“The weight to be given to any proper factor *** is

left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse

of discretion.” (Emphasis omitted.)). Indeed, this court has regarded mental health issues as a

“ ‘double-edged sword,’ ” which the trial court is free to consider either in mitigation or

aggravation. People v. Brunner, 2012 IL App (4th) 100708, ¶ 61 (citing People v. Coleman, 183

- 14 - Ill. 2d 366, 406 (1998) (“[T]his court has repeatedly held that information about a defendant’s

mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)).

¶ 49 The trial court’s statement that there was no evidence in mitigation at the start of

its discussion of defendant’s sentence is entirely consistent with the view that the vague

statement in the PSI regarding his mental health was of no mitigating or evidentiary value to

determining defendant’s sentence. We presume that the “trial court based its sentencing

determination on proper legal reasoning, and *** consider the record as a whole, rather than

focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court” (People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL

App (4th) 110720, ¶ 22), and defendant has failed to overcome that presumption on appeal. See

People v. Williams, 2019 IL App (1st) 173131, ¶ 21 (“The defendant bears the burden of making

an affirmative showing that the sentencing court did not consider the relevant factors.”).

¶ 50 Finally, although we agree with defendant that a judge “should be patient,

dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors and witnesses, lawyers and others with whom he

deals in his official capacity” (People v. Eckert, 194 Ill. App. 3d 667, 674 (1990)), the trial

court’s comments in this case pale in comparison to the personal vitriol displayed in Fisher,

Montgomery, and Phuong. We note that “[s]entencing hearings do not occur in a vacuum, and

the duty to impose a fair sentence entails an explanation of the court’s reasoning in the context of

the offenses of which a defendant has been convicted.” People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st)

140134, ¶ 15. “Indeed, a sentencing hearing is likely the only opportunity a court has to

communicate its views regarding the defendant’s conduct.” Id. Although we do not endorse the

trial court’s specific comments in this case, we continue to encourage such explanations for the

benefit of defendants and to aid in our review on appeal.

- 15 - ¶ 51 Ultimately, defendant received a fair hearing and a sentence within the statutory

range for a Class X felony. Because the trial court committed no error, defendant’s plain-error

argument fails, and we honor his procedural forfeiture.

¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 53 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 54 Affirmed.

- 16 -